Hearing Of The House Oversight And Government Reform Committee - The Future Of The V-22 Osprey: Costs, Capabilities, And Challenges

Statement

Chaired By: Rep. Edolphus Towns (D-NY)

Witnesses: Mike Sullivan, Director Of Acquisition And Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office (Gao); Dakota Wood, Senior Fellow, Center For Strategic And Budgetary Assessments; Lieutenant General George Trautman, Deputy Commandant For Aviation, United States Marine Corps; Lieutenant Colonel Karsten S. Heckl, Commander, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 162 (Vmm-162); A.R. Rivolo, Retired United States Air Force Pilot

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REP. TOWNS: The committee will come to order. Today's hearing is on the V-22 Osprey, an aircraft that has been in development for about 25 years and has a very controversial past. This hearing, however, looks beyond the checkered past and focuses on the current issues raised in a new report by the Government Accountability Office.

According to the GAO, the V-22 has operational problems that raise serious questions as to whether the aircraft can accomplish the full range of its missions of the helicopter it was intended to replace or the range of the missions provided by other modern helicopters. GAO found that the V-22 has problems with parts, maintenance, reliability, and availability, and I understand the reliability issue is one in which the Department of Defense concurs.

In addition, GAO found that the V-22 may not be operationally effective in combat and questions the ability of the aircraft to operate in both extreme heat and extreme cold. In short, GAO found that the Osprey has severe operational and suitability problems, and these problems have not come cheap. Since 1983, more than $27 billion has been appropriated for the V-22 program. The cost per aircraft has almost tripled since the Osprey's inception to some 120 million (dollars) each, and the cost of the program may rise even higher given expected increases in operation and support costs.

Let me be clear -- the value of just one American service member is priceless, and if a $120 million aircraft like the V-22 does the best job of protecting our troops and helping them to accomplish their missions, then it should be supported. But at a $120 million per aircraft the Osprey better work as advertised.

When we first convened this hearing a month ago, I decided, with the support of Ranking Member Congressman Issa, to postpone the hearing because the Department of Defense had failed to produce certain key records pertaining to the Osprey. It took them a few weeks to do it, but finally we obtained copies of the after-action reports and other data that we had requested.

The additional documents raised even more serious questions about the V-22. The Marine Corps' own reports on the performance of the Osprey in Iraq reveal that the Osprey was restricted to a very limited role due to its vulnerability to hostile fire, its lack of maneuverability, and its unreliability in the heat and sand in Iraq.

In the course of our investigation, we asked the Defense Department for an inventory of all of their Ospreys and how many of those were ready for combat. The answer was both surprising and appalling. Since 1988, the Marine Corps has bought 105 Ospreys. Of this number, only 47 are considered combat deployable. Worse, we asked the Marine Corps how many of these are ready for combat on any given day.

On the day the Marine Corps picked, June the 3rd of this year, only 22 of these 47 Ospreys were ready for combat. In other words, fewer than half could be used for combat on a good day. At this point, I have strong reservations about the future of this aircraft, and let me say I'm anxious to hear from our witnesses on this particular issue. At this point, I yield five minutes to the ranking member of the committee, Congressman Darrell Issa.

REP. DARRELL ISSA (R-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing today and thank you again for postponing the original hearing to give a better opportunity for the Department of Defense to provide us with information necessary to conduct our oversight. As Chairman Towns said, the Osprey has certainly had a checkered past. Additionally, with the high cost of the Osprey and the plane's unique mission, it is important that this committee be an honest broker.

The V-22 clearly is a unique aircraft. Hybrid helicopter and airplane, it does enjoy an ability to fly faster and further than any helicopter in the fleet. Having said that, Chairman, I'm a child of the 60s. I'm a soldier of the 70s. I had an opportunity in the 1977- 78 time frame to be part of a research project called -- (inaudible) -- Dove Taswell (ph). Taswell was a fly-off between a great many aircraft designed to (kill tanks ?).

Fortunately, I was not a tank platoon leader at the time, and as we went through that I became acutely aware the Department of Defense and the U.S. Congress can in fact buy aircraft for unique missions that let us down. In this case, the HN was unable to perform as well as either attack helicopters (Kotoh ?) -- (inaudible) -- Cobra or even an F-4 in killing tanks, Soviet equivalent tanks, and surviving.

That has left me skeptical anytime someone tells me that an aircraft uniquely does a job. Like Ike Skelton from Missouri, I believe we have to make you prove it. Today, we're going to hear testimony that certainly surprised us. It showed us that, in fact, although this aircraft is unique and does meet certain specifications that may in the future be essential to a vertical lift (long ?) self- deployment and, in fact, a mission that could happen again but happened during my military career.

In the 1970s, when our soldiers were -- (inaudible) -- our embassy was taken hostage in Iran, the absence of an aircraft like the Osprey caused us to have to refuel and refit in the desert. That mid- desert night led to the loss of both materiel and men that left us embarrassed and unable to rescue our embassy personnel in Tehran, ultimately having to wait until they were released at the whim of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Notwithstanding that great need and these many years later, we certainly have to ask where are we today, and as the chairman said, we're at 22 combat-ready aircraft on a given day. And if we accept that the Osprey is worth further investment -- and as a Congressman with 44,000 Marines at Camp Pendleton, I hope, in fact, we will make that decision -- then how do we go from a low readiness of an aircraft with great promise to one that, in fact, has higher readiness, better survivability, and, in fact, is more prepared for that day in the desert or night in the desert that may never come again but if it comes we may need this aircraft?

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward to the testimony. Yield back.

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much. At this time I yield five minutes to the chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tierney -- (inaudible).

REP. JOHN TIERNEY (D-MA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As you're well aware, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs continues to focus extensively on wasteful defense programs. I can't underscore enough the importance of oversight of programs that just don't seem to measure up to our expectations even though we continue to throw money at them.

Annually, Congress gets a report on the health of the Department of Defense's major weapons acquisitions portfolio from the general -- Government Accountability Office, and frankly, with $300 billion in cost growth that portfolio is anything but healthy. Swine flu is not the only epidemic around here.

Defense cost overruns have waylaid budgetary flexibility at a time when we face economic hardship at home and significant challenges abroad. It is time to take a hard look at programs that have a history of procurement challenges and see where improvements, if any, have been made to those programs to ensure a better return on taxpayer investments.

If problems continue, then it may be time to reconsider more drastic action on the part of Congress. Today, we have the case of the V-22, a program with quite a (storied ?) procurement history involving almost every type of challenge imaginable, resulting in cost overruns compounded over nearly a quarter century. The aircraft was intended as a more capable replacement for existing helicopters.

However, in its report, the GAO expressed concerns about the ability of the V-22 to perform a full range of missions that these previous helicopters could including operating in harsh climates. Now the Department of Defense is going to procure fewer than half of the originally planned 1,000 V-22s. How is that an original plan calling for a thousand of them now going to be fulfilled by fewer than half of that number with -- (inaudible) -- less capable aircraft?

What's equally concerning is that amongst this error-laden procurement process for the V-22 the program has been allowed to survive without proper scrutiny for such a long time because political decisions have trumped technical and budgetary realities. The elimination of such a program or even reducing orders for it can have (difficult ?) consequences on employment in some members' districts. It is not a new strategy -- (inaudible) -- contractors to devise and follow a strategy of spreading the work out over several facilities and subcontractors encompassing as many states and districts as possible in order to assure protection of their profits.

This is a legitimate and serious matter for all those rightly concerned about our economy and our workforce. Still, it would seem that a better course would be to develop a policy of keeping those people at work in burgeoning innovative industries than in developing systems that help us achieve our national security priorities that don't become antiquated before completion and that do so within planned budgets and planned schedules.

The alternative of continuing failed programs as jobs programs that are rife with waste or abuse of the procurement system and in many instances fail to produce the needed weapons systems to protect those who protect us is not the wisest course. In most instances, such a program probably would not be the most efficient and cost effective -- (inaudible) -- jobs program at any rate.

As we look at this out-of-control issue with defense contracts, we ought also to look at our policies for protecting the financial security and employment prospect of those to be affected by cuts to wasteful programs. We owe good workers that, given Congress and the administration's complicity in allowing such a problematic condition to develop. Thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much. Any other members seeking recognition? Gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.

REP. ELIJAH CUMMINGS (D-MD): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate myself as well to the comments that have been made here this afternoon. I want to thank you and the ranking member for holding this hearing.

One of the things that as I sit here, Mr. Chairman, I think about is a matter that we are dealing with at my -- in my role as chairman of the Committee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Matters (sic) in the transportation committee and that's our Deepwater Project. This reminds me so much of that. It's incredible. And we have been straightening that out.

When we started it, Mr. Chairman, were three things that I said to my committee, and I want to say this to these wonderful gentlemen here this afternoon. First, we must get what we bargained for, period. We must get what we bargained for. You don't buy a lawnmower that doesn't cut grass. It makes no sense.

Number two, I said to my subcommittee whatever we buy for the military it must do no harm to them. We're out there -- our young people are -- I also serve on the board of the Naval Academy and I see a lot of our young people go into the Marines and do wonderful things. But the idea that we might be buying equipment with the American people's money that could actually do harm to those folks makes no sense whatsoever.

And three, I said we must make sure that whatever equipment we buy that it give them -- that it is the equipment that they need to carry out their mission. End of game. That's it. If we can do those three things then we have done a lot. Sadly, sadly, this Osprey appears to fail all three of them -- to fail all three of them. Then the question becomes, Mr. Chairman, which I'm interested to hear today, is how did we get to this point. I think Mr. Tierney was very clear and I think he made a good statement when he said that a lot of times this is based on politics, and I believe that that's quite true.

And also -- (inaudible) -- is politics to what extent. To the extent of a plane costing this kind of money unable to do what it's supposed to do? Harming our people? We're not getting what we bargained for? And then you have to ask the question, the people who are in charge -- our acquisition people, the people who are responsible -- is there a -- is there incompetence? Are we stuck in a culture of mediocrity? Is there no empathy for our military?

These are the questions that have to be raised and I hope that they're answered, and Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing our witnesses and I thank you. And with that I yield back.

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much. And I yield to the gentleman from Missouri -- (inaudible).

REP. WILLIAM LACY CLAY (D-MO): I thank the chairman and I want to thank you, Chairman Towns, for convening this important hearing. This committee has devoted substantial resources to investigating contract -- (inaudible) -- and appropriately so. With the dramatic rise in volume and value of contracts, we must enhance our management and oversight capacity so we're maximizing returns for taxpayers.

In previous hearings, this committee has discussed the shortage of acquisition personnel specifically in the Department of Defense. During the Bush administration, the value of contracts doubled with virtually no significant increase in procurement personnel. At a smart contracting caucus meeting just this past week, members of this committee discussed how we need to increase the capacity as well as the number of acquisition personnel.

As this committee's work has demonstrated, our acquisition challenges are real. With these systemic challenges, it's not surprising that we have not resolved problems exemplified by the V-22 Osprey. By most indications, this would seem to be a very expensive piece of equipment that has not performed as promised. In spite of its failure to perform, Congress has spent even more money on it even as it becomes apparent it will never perform as promised.

The Government Accountability Office has noted that the V-22 suffers from an unreliable supply chain and a frequent shortage of parts. We should not need the GAO to identify this problem. If the Department of Defense does not have the capacity to identify this problem themselves, then we need to determine how to assure that it can in the future.

Similarly, we should not need the GAO to identify -- (inaudible) -- continual and unforeseen increases in cost. Our acquisition personnel need to be equipped and need to be there to be able to preempt this kind of problem in the first place. Chairman, we've chosen a very powerful example to demonstrate the need to reform our acquisition process in the federal government. I hope that we can use the lessons from the V-22 to identify steps that we can take to avoid repeating these mistakes in the future to enhancing the capacity of our acquisition systems and personnel. And I thank the chair.

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much.

At this time we would like to -- (inaudible) -- all our witnesses to please stand -- (inaudible).

Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth -- (inaudible)?

ALL: (Off mike.)

REP. TOWNS: Let the record reflect that all the witnesses -- (inaudible).

Let me begin by giving some background on the various witnesses.

Mr. Mike Sullivan is director of acquisition and sourcing management at the Government Accountability Office, who Will testify about GAO's report entitled "Assessments Needed to Address V-22 Aircraft Operational and Cost Concerns to Define Future Investments," which is being released today and identifies operational suitability and cost challenges concerning the V-22 Osprey.

Welcome.

Mr. Dakota L. Wood is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, an independent, nonpartisan policy research center, who will testify about the CSBA's report "Strategies for the Long Haul: United States Marine -- (inaudible) -- for the 21st Century."

Welcome.

Lieutenant General George Trautman is the deputy commander for aviation for the United States Marine Corps. The general will testify about operational and cost issues regarding the V-22 and the current and future use of the aircraft.

Welcome.

Colonel Karsten Heckl is a Marine Corps pilot and a commander of a V-22 squadron. He will discuss his experience flying a V-22.

Welcome.

Dr. A.R. Rivolo is a retired Air Force pilot who flew combat operations during the Vietnam War, an aviation expert who worked on operational testing and evaluation of the V-22 for the Institute for Defense Analysis, which provides direct analysis and support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. He will discuss the current safety issues regarding the V-22, its operations and its limitations.

Welcome.

I will ask the witnesses to summarize their testimony in five minutes. The yellow light means you have a minute left, and then red light means stop. And then, of course, we will have time to answer -- to raise some questions and look forward to your answers.

So Mr. Sullivan, why don't we start with you?

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I begin, let me just, for the record, state that Mr. Jerry Clark is up here. He's a senior analyst with the GAO who headed up the work on this specific assignment and has significant institutional memory and knowledge on the V-22. He's here to help us answer any questions.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Issa, members of the committee, I'm pleased to be here today to discuss the status of the V-22. I'd like to make some brief points in my opening statement and ask that my written statement be submitted for the record.

REP. TOWNS: Without objection.

MR. SULLIVAN: We recently completed a review of the MV-22's operations in Iraq, recent testing and training results, and the program's past, current and future costs.

First, with regard to operations in Iraq, we found that the MV-22 successfully completed all of the missions it was assigned in low- threat operations and used its enhanced speed and range effectively to deliver personnel and cargo faster and farther than legacy helicopters.

Battlefield commanders indicated that they need more experience with the aircraft to better understand the limits of its role in some of the medium-lift missions because its speed cannot always be exploited, and these missions may be better performed by legacy helicopters.

The aircraft also had availability and reliability challenges in Iraq, as you had alluded to, Mr. Chairman. While the required availability rate is 82 percent, 12 aircraft with the three squadrons in Iraq were available on average 68, 61 and 57 percent of the time. In comparison, legacy helicopters were available about 85 percent of the time or greater on average.

Parts reliability was a major cause of the V-22's availability. Specifically, we found that 13 parts were in very high demand because they only lasted, on average, less than 30 percent of their expected life, forcing cannibalization of other V-22s and even from the production line in the United States. V-22 engines also had some problems. Expected to last 500 to 700 hours, they last less than 400 hours in Iraq.

Second, ongoing operational tests and training have identified other challenges to the V-22's ability to conduct operations in high- threat environments; also while transporting personnel and cargo operating on board ships and operating in extreme environments.

The program continues to work these challenges as it upgrades the aircraft, and we'll have three different component upgrades. However, this will be difficult since some of them arise from the inherent design of the V-22.

Third, the V-22's cost estimates have increased significantly from original baseline. Development costs have increased from $4.2 billion to $12.7 billion, over 200 percent. Procurement costs have increased about 24 percent, from $34.4 billion to $42.6 billion, even as the number of V-22s to be procured was reduced from over 900 to less than 500.

It is also clear that operational and support costs through the V-22's life cycle will be much higher than originally anticipated.

Moving forward, the program plans to spend nearly $25 billion to buy 282 additional V-22s, and the cost to operate and support the aircraft through its life cycle is now estimated at about $75 billion. Given these figures and the availability challenges we have discussed, we believe this is a good time for the department to stop and once more consider the proper mix of transport capabilities as it moves into the future.

This is why we recommended in our report that the secretary of Defense perform a new alternative analysis to clarify the V-22's role in transport operations and require the Marine Corps to prioritize necessary improvements for the V-22 to improve its suitability and operational costs.

Thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman. I can answer any questions -- (inaudible).

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much, Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. Wood.

MR. WOOD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Issa and distinguished members of the committee. It's my personal honor to appear before you today to discuss the V-22 Osprey. I've been asked to elaborate on various issues -- (inaudible) -- the Osprey originally outlined (in the paper ?) that you already mentioned.

The point of the larger project was to highlight a range of defense issues to be addressed and considered during the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review. This particular (monogram ?) from the Marine Corps examined readiness to the service to do its part meeting a set of emerging challenges; namely, the rise of large hostile powers, a greatly proliferated world, and -- (inaudible).

There were also the meat-and-potatoes missions typically associated with Marine Corps deployments -- non-combatant evacuation operations -- (inaudible) -- disaster relief missions, and other various security cooperation initiatives -- (inaudible).

Within the paper, we described the current state of the Marine Corps, discussed what the Corps must be able to accomplish in meeting these burgeoning challenges successfully, and briefly assessed the service's program of record and related developments within the service that -- (inaudible) -- would be impacted by these challenges -- (inaudible).

With specific reference to the MV-22 Osprey, we questioned the current Marine Corps plan to replace all of its medium-lift helicopters with the MV-22 and suggested the Corps revisit this plan to see whether a mixed fleet with MV-22s and helicopters might be better.

During the Osprey's long period of development, 25 years or more, changes in the operational threat environments, increasing budgetary pressures, and the various (complications ?) arising from the service's own strategic and operational concepts, suggest that a mixed fleet would provide more options and increased flexibility for the services at less cost than a fleet composed only of MV-22s.

As has already been mentioned, the Marine Corps is planning to acquire 345 of these aircraft at a total cost of $42 billion, or roughly $120 million each. Over the years, the aircraft has been the subject of controversy arising from engineering challenges and related developmental delays, highly publicized crashes -- (inaudible).

It certainly has strong supporters and equally passionate critics, both sides claiming that it is either better or worse than the conventional helicopter alternative. Those favoring the program cite its speed, range and altitude advantages over helicopters, characteristics that make it possible for Marine Corps forces to execute operations with consistency.

Those against the program cite its troubled developmental history and its high cost (relative to ?) helicopters, and argue that less expensive helicopters can just as effectively support ship-to-shore movements, amphibious planning operations and various amphibious assaults missions without having to coordinate with aircraft -- (inaudible) -- capability -- (inaudible).

The argument that -- (inaudible) -- critics of the Osprey appears to rest on the fundamental question, does the Marine Corps' commitment to field the MV-22's full medium-lift helicopter-like capability help or hinder its ability to perform anticipated missions at an acceptable cost, both in dollars and overall effectiveness in an operating environment, or should the Corps pursue a much less expensive path to get the ability to effectively execute the missions that we'll most likely encounter, even if this means it would not have the ability to conduct missions (at extreme range ?) in this timely a manner? Of course, not having the more advanced capability provided by the MV-22s precludes undertaking missions that would require it.

Mr. Chairman, I had planned on five minutes. I can jump right to the end and submit the rest of my comments for the record.

REP. TOWNS: Without objection.

MR. WOOD: In the end, the issue of the MV-22's value must be viewed within the context of the often competing demands of desired operational attributes, the nature of expected operational threat environments, and our experiences of how our forces are actually employed to achieve their objectives.

Achieving such a balance isn't easy, and it inevitably requires compromises -- (inaudible) -- carefully weigh the costs and benefits of various alternatives. The Osprey can certainly enable the Marine Corps to perform a variety of missions far more effectively than has been possible in the past and undertake missions we would not otherwise be able to perform. But this capability also comes with a steep price, both financially and in terms of the opportunity costs, (while ?) absorbing a major slice of the Corps' modernization budget (and starving ?) other badly needed modernization programs.

Mr. Chairman, with these issues serving as points of -- (inaudible) -- discussion, I would be happy to respond to your questions -- (inaudible).

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much for your testimony.

General Trautman, first of all, let me thank you for your many years of service. General Trautman.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Issa, distinguished members, as the current leader of Marine Corps Aviation, it is a privilege for me to appear before you today to discuss the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, its performance in Iraq, and our plans for leveraging this capability in the future for the benefit of the men and women who ably serve our Corps.

Last month the commandant outlined before this Congress his vision of the Marine Corps of 2025. That vision portrays a fast, lethal expeditionary force that is ready for the uncertainties of future combat operations, yet has the staying power of engagement in the most austere conditions imaginable.

At the center of this vision is the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. As always, your Marines are ready for full-scale theater war, we're ready for irregular warfare and insurgency, and we're ready for everything in between.

Today we have our foot in two different streams. We're drawing down our forces in Iraq while, at the same time, we are building up forces in Afghanistan. This past year your Marine Corps flew over 330,000 flight hours, with over 40,000 of these hours in combat zones in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.

With last month's return of VMM-266 and its 12 Ospreys onboard USS Wasp, Osprey squadrons finished their third consecutive six-month deployment to Iraq. We will now turn the Osprey toward sustained operations at sea, and later this year we will deploy to Afghanistan and the challenges that await us there.

The Marine Corps is not interested in airplanes for their own sake. We are interested in the capabilities that airplanes provide to the aviation combat element in support of the joint force. With that in mind, I want to give you an example of what this aircraft can do.

In 1988, one of our former commandants said, "If I am a commander operating off the coast of North Carolina, I want every bad guy from New York to Miami to be nervous." What he meant by this statement was that he wanted to find a way to keep an enemy force off-balance by giving our Marines the kind of asymmetrical advantage the Osprey brings to the battlefield.

Simply put, the V-22 has transformed the way we are fighting in a manner akin to the introduction of the helicopter in the middle of the last century. We can now project combat-loaded Marines, soldiers or special operators from a sea base or any forward site deeply into the battle space with the speed of a KC-130, and we can do it at altitudes above the ground threat that has tragically brought down so many conventional helicopters in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. And then we can land that payload anywhere it is needed, just like a helicopter. With its speed, range and survivability, the MV-22 is truly a game-changer.

For the past 20 months, the Osprey has been in the fight. Since its introduction to the Iraq theater of war in October 2007, the Osprey has flown nearly 10,000 hours in combat, lifted over 45,000 passengers, and carried more than 2.2 million pounds of cargo while completing every assignment imaginable. And it has done so flying faster, farther and at more survivable flight profiles than any other assault support aircraft in the history of military operations.

As we move into Afghanistan later this year and we're required to cover a larger country than Iraq, with Marines spread out even further, cut off from one another and on foot in the equivalent of the Rocky Mountains, this aircraft will not just be a nice new capability. It will be a crucial, critical necessity that saves lives and wins battles.

I've sent my staff around the world to speak with infantry battalion and platoon commanders, and their message is remarkably similar to that of our pilots: "Get more of these assets into the fight."

Our logisticians, infantry officers and our Marines have now seen what the Osprey can do. They've flown in the back of it. They've run down its ramp into landing zones in combat. They know that this capability means that we can move three times as many Marines, five times farther and twice as fast as they could move those same Marines, even in the most conventional helicopters.

They know that as they transit to the objective, they are flying as high as 13,000 feet, out of the range of rifle fire, heavy machine gun fire, rocket-propelled grenades and manned portable air defense systems that are the weapons of choice for both the regular insurgents and the conventional soldiers who intend to do us harm.

The infantryman in the back of the aircraft was a 19-year-old rifleman whose well-being is the focus of the commandant's vision, and mine, of getting where they need to go in half the time. And the majority of the flight takes place in an altitude sanctuary well above the prevalent ground threat.

Like other types of aircraft in the early operational phases of the life cycle, the V-22 has experienced lower-than-desired reliability of some components. However, these challenges are not unique to this program. Aircraft like the F-14, 53 Echo, H-60 and F- 18 have all had similar problems at this stage of the developmental process.

The difference between the desired and observed rates is typically the result that -- (audio break) -- for a new program based upon predicted engineering analysis. And when that analysis is informed by historical knowledge, improvement in availability and reliability occurs.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to speak with you today. Colonel Heckl is with me. He's one of our combat veteran V-22 squadron commanders. I look forward to answering any questions that you may have. I have provided a written statement and I request that it be entered into the record, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TOWNS: Without objection --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Thank you.

REP. TOWNS: -- your entire statement will be included in the record.

Colonel Heckl?

COL. HECKL: Sir, good afternoon. I'm just here to answer questions, so I have no opening statement, sir.

REP. TOWNS: Right. Thank you. Thank you.

Dr. Rivolo. (Second syllable stressed.)

Am I pronouncing that correctly?

MR. RIVOLO: Yes. Rivolo. (First syllable stressed.)

REP. TOWNS: Thank you.

MR. RIVOLO: Yeah. First, let me just say that I am not representing any organization. I have terminated my relation with the Institute for Defense Analyses. I'm here strictly as a private citizen.

REP. : Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry, but could the gentleman speak closer into the microphone? I cannot hear --

REP. TOWNS: Is your mike turned on? You push the button.

MR. RIVOLO: It is on. It is on.

REP. TOWNS: Okay, good. You keep it close. Yes, thank you.

MR. RIVOLO: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good afternoon.

The V-22, conceived as a transformative technology 30 years ago, promised extensive new capabilities. Today, the aircraft 30 years later is operational in both the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Air Force, but the promised capabilities have failed to materialize.

This much-awaited transformative aircraft has, in my opinion, turned out to be a disappointment, falling well short of its design goals. Additionally, two technical issues, autorotation and maneuverability in helicopter mode, make the V-22 problematic in a combat environment. I will address these issues one by one.

The design shortfall and low carrying capacity has resulted in a compromise in the configuration and the construction of the V-22. As a result, the aircraft fails to meet the requirements for the critical 50 nautical mile, 10,000 pound external load mission if all the safety operational requirements are imposed.

In operations at high density altitude, both the MV and the CV-22 have little or no capability above 8,000 feet density altitude. And such density altitudes are common and tactically relevant in the Afghanistan theater of operation. In many operational situations today, the Marine Corps would have to call on their few CH-53s or on the U.S. Army's CH-47s to meet mission requirements.

Similarly, the CV-22, if called upon to conduct non-combative evacuation operation at an embassy in Kabul on a hot day would have no more than about a 60 nautical mile range once lifting out of the compound with a full complement of 24 evacuees. Any mitigation alternatives would include much higher risk operational options or the use of H-53s.

The inability of the V-22 to safely autorotate, now firmly established, has serious implications. The V-22 would fail to meet basic air ordinance directives of the FAA if it were a civilian transport. Despite this, the U.S. Marine Corps leadership has shown little or no concern over this issue, and has no problem requiring young men and women to ride as passengers in the V-22 under combat operations.

I believe that this is reprehensible. It's a stand that the Marine Corps leadership should never have taken. And by passive consent, the acquisition executives of the Department of Defense and the Congress are essentially in that same category. The V-22 is susceptible in a combat environment to autorotation, because of its design and because of its vulnerabilities. The conscious disregard of this substantial and unjustifiable risk qualifies as reckless behavior, in my opinion, in the legal sense, on the part of these entities.

The significant lack of maneuverability in turning and changing altitudes while in helicopter or conversion mode makes the V-22 susceptible to hostile fire while on approach to landing. All operational testing of V-22 conducted to date has been scripted, that is, conducted without any opposing so-called "red forces" to add the element of surprise, essentially a non-threat environment. As a result, no data on the ability of V-22 to evade hostile fire while on approach to a landing zone are available.

Proponents argue that the V-22 has been combat proven, given its operational experience in Iraq. This, I believe, is either delusional or disingenuous. The V-22 mission in Iraq was largely one of combat circulation. That's a euphemism for logistical support of carrying passengers and cargo from base to base in bus-route fashion. Combat assault, the mission for which the V-22 was designed, remains unproven under realistic conditions.

Despite the rhetoric heard over the past five years about how V- 22 is the ideally suited aircraft for combat operation in Afghanistan, the aircraft has not been deployed into that theater to date. One could speculate on the reasons for this, and I will not at this point.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify. I'm prepared to answer any questions. And if I could have my written testimony placed into the record. Thank you.

REP. TOWNS: Without objection, your written statement will be included in the record.

Let me thank all of you for your testimony. And let me begin with you, General Trautman.

I understand there are no Ospreys currently in Iraq. If this is an aircraft that is so valuable, why isn't it being used?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Sir, we had Ospreys in Iraq for three successive deployments. As you know, at this point, Marine Corps operations in Iraq are starting to draw down. The situation in Al Anbar since October of 2007 had been significantly changed, and the Marine Corps was turning its attention to focus on Afghanistan.

But the small number of squadrons that we have, we've only been able to have one squadron deployed at a time up till this point. By the fall we'll able -- be able to have two squadrons deployed from North Carolina, and we look forward to having one squadron on board ship and one squadron in Afghanistan by the fall.

REP. TOWNS: Right. Is it the troops or is the Osprey that has a problem, in terms of -- I'm wondering, you know, you indicated you pulled them out. But the point is that -- was it the problem with the troops or was it a problem with the Osprey?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Oh, no, sir. It's a success of the mission. The Al Anbar battlespace has successfully been transformed by the actions of Multinational Force-West over the past seven years. The Marine Corps forces in Al Anbar are drawing down at this point, and we're reducing our force structure there commensurately. So we're bringing out AV-8s. We're bringing out attack helicopters. We're bringing out heavy lift helicopters. And we brought the V-22 Osprey.

So there's no problem. This is a success story, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TOWNS: In your written testimony, you state that the Marine Corps has accepted the delivery of 91 Ospreys. On June the 2nd, 2009, your boss, the commandant of the Marine Corps, told the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense that the Marines have 90 operational aircraft. However, we know that many of the Ospreys are not ready for combat. We also know that the Marines have had to cannibalize some of those Ospreys for spare parts. Isn't it true that only 47 Ospreys are even theoretically combat deployable?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Mr. Chairman, we have a training squadron composed of 20 Ospreys that we would not deploy. These are -- these are -- this is the place where new pilots are shown how to fly the Osprey. We have four Ospreys in a HX-21. This is a test squadron. We have five Ospreys in VMX-22, another operational test squadron. And so we have stood up a total of four squadrons, and we are in the process of standing up our fifth as airplanes are delivered.

REP. TOWNS: So the answer is yes.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I was trying to describe the situation with regard to the Ospreys that are -- that are in the fleet. I'm not sure what question the chairman is --

REP. TOWNS: Let me -- let me move on, then.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Yes, sir.

REP. TOWNS: I think you -- I think it was yes you answered.

Isn't it also true that of that number, on a good day, fewer than half of those are ready for combat?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: No, sir. Typically we've established about 63 percent operational readiness within the fleet by one measure, which measures every second of a 24-hour period. Another measure, which is what we call ready-basic aircraft, which is the number of aircraft that are ready for tasking on a day when the air tasking order begins, we're actually in the low 70s, which is not acceptable, but it's not -- it's not nearly as you describe, sir.

REP. TOWNS: Yeah. Let me go at this another way.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Sure.

REP. TOWNS: If the commander-in-chief, President Obama, asked the Marines to deploy today for a new special combat mission in a high threat environment, how many Ospreys would be fully mission capable and ready to deploy to combat? I'm looking for the answer, here. Go ahead.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: In the mid 40s. In the mid 40s, sir.

REP. TOWNS: Okay. I'm looking --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: We have four squadrons of 12, so four times 12 is the number. Yes, sir.

REP. TOWNS: I didn't hear you --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: We have four operational squadrons of between 10 and 12 airplanes, so it's in the mid 40s, approximately 45, 46, 47.

REP. TOWNS: Right.

Let me switch to you, Mr. Sullivan. Isn't it true that the Ospreys is incapable of performing in the way it was originally intended? Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, we looked at how it performed in Iraq, first of all. So it is true that it was not able to complete the full envelope, the performance envelope, that it was intended to perform in. However, it also wasn't asked to do all that in Iraq, mostly because there are things it can't do yet that they know it can't do.

REP. TOWNS: Right. Let me just come right back to you, General. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan.

Let me -- if it will not perform in hot areas and will not perform in cold areas, you know, what do you need it for?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can have Colonel Heckl -- he commanded a squadron through the hottest environment in the Middle East that I've ever encountered. He could probably talk to that question.

COL. HECKL: Sir, I deployed my unit over there in March of '08, and we departed in October of '08. Some of what I heard here today -- I didn't have any prepared statements -- but what I've heard here is kind of disturbing. Some of this is just blatantly inaccurate. I don't agree with a single thing Mr. Rivolo said.

I was over there, sir. We had days every day over 120 degrees. I don't know how much hotter anybody would want it to get. We had more dust storms -- the wing -- Third Wing -- Aircraft Wing commanded by then-Brigadier General Alles estimated they lost more than 10,00 flight hours due to weather, it was so severe. So it's operated in extreme heat -- extreme heat.

The hostile fire thing -- you know, I assume everybody here is aware that we classify zones based on color code -- green, red, black, yellow zones.

(Audio break) -- that I replaced, flew Senator McCain into a black zone in the middle of the day. That's just as high threat as it gets.

The maneuverability -- this is as old discussion from Mr. Rivolo proven years ago to be wrong. The demonstration is not scripted and anybody that's flown into Baghdad International Airport on night vision goggles knows how maneuverable the airplane is. All you've got to do is do a -- (inaudible) -- transition over to Liberty pad and you know how maneuverable the airplane is. It's blatantly false.

And lastly, the ability -- we already talked about the ability to operate in the heat again. I had the squadron over there for the entire summer and we had temperatures well in excess of 120 degrees every single day.

REP. TOWNS: I think it's appropriate that I allow Dr. Rivolo to respond because I think you did call his name.

Dr. Rivolo?

DR. RIVOLO: Everything the colonel said is correct, I mean, they'd operate in 120-degree weather constantly pretty much in a sea level environment.

My criticism is that at high density altitudes is when the problems will arise and that's also having to do with maneuverability, but the problems only exist under certain conditions but they happen to be conditions that are tactically irrelevant, certainly in Afghanistan.

The aircraft performs brilliantly at sea level. No one doubts that.

REP. TOWNS: GAO, what did you find because it seems to be some questions in terms of its ability to perform, I mean, did you find this as well?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah. I met let Mr. Clark fill in where I have gaps, but I believe what we found is that it was -- when it was over in Iraq with the three squadrons it was, for the most part, limited to low threat environments because of maneuverability problems or restrictions that they have that I believe they have even in the flight manuals themselves? And maybe Mr. Clark can fill in some of the gaps here.

MR. CLARK: Yes. Mr. Chairman, when we did our work, we looked at the flight manual, which is considered the -- (inaudible) -- manual and according to that manual, the aircraft is prohibited from conducting air combat maneuvering or defensive maneuvering issues. So while if Mr. Rivolo is saying that that is essential element in terms of survivability, according to that manual, it's something that the aircraft -- they're prohibited from doing.

In terms of operating in the environments that we were talking about, we relied on the after action reports that you, I believe, had asked for and, of course, we interviewed the unit that had deployed, the first unit that deployed -- interviewed personnel from that unit. But those after action reports of the first unit and of the unit, the third unit that was in Iraq, talked to issues that they had, problems they had operating in the desert environment, problems that the aircraft had in operating in terms of the heat and I think the capability rates seemed to reflect some of those problems if you looked at it on the months in terms of the hotter months would be lower capability rates versus the cooler months.

So there were those issues there that we did identify.

REP. TOWNS: Time has expired. I yield to the gentleman from California, the Ranking Member.

REPRESENTATIVE DARRELL ISSA (R-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I share the committee's entire concern that we want our Marines to have the best assets for each and every mission.

I would like to go through a couple of quick questions and I hope you'll indulge me if I ask that they be as quick as possible.

General Trautman, I understand that you're a Marine aviator, but isn't it true that the reputation of the C-5 is that any time it lands, it doesn't take off again for a long time? Just reputation, just something you may have heard over the years.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Yes, sir.

REP. ISSA: Okay. And isn't it incredibly a cost overrun aircraft and expensive to maintain? Isn't it true that it no longer does any mission that is unique to the C-5 at least in the unclassified world?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I'm not qualified to answer that.

REP. ISSA: But it's a big airplane that only carries one tank if you remember that part of it.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Sure.

REP. ISSA: It happened. Now, the AV8B, the B implying that it ain't the first, it killed a lot of Marines and some, what do you call it, British aviators before they got it right. Isn't that true?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Yes, sir.

REP. ISSA: And isn't it true, as far as I know, we haven't had a single mission as unique an aircraft as it is that only that aircraft could do in a combat environment leading to a successful battle in spite of the fact that they work the bugs out and it's able to do a mission that no other jet can do.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: That's right. It's performing exceptionally well in Afghanistan today.

REP. ISSA: Okay. So we can have a really great aircraft that meets its requirement and we may not have a war exactly suited to that requirement at the time that it's in the field. Isn't that true?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: The Marine Corps is worldwide deployable and has to be ready across the full range of military operational requirements.

REP. ISSA: I'll ask you the one softball. If in 1979 when we were trying to rescue our people in Tehran that had been taken hostage in violation of all international law, what would have been different in that mission if the Osprey had been the primary aircraft?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: It would have been a successful mission and we probably wouldn't be where we are with Iran today, Mr. Issa.

REP. ISSA: Because it could have flown, self-deployed, flown nonstop and, in fact, been able to hit the target without the cluster that occurred in the desert.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: It would have gone directly to the stadium; the Delta Force would have come out of the stadium and carried out the mission as described. It wouldn't have been a two to three day evolution of landing in the desert and having the situation that occurred.

REP. ISSA: Colonel Heckl, you've flown other rotor wing aircraft. Is that correct?

COL. HECKL: Yes, sir. My background -- about 3,000 hours in CH- 46s, my whole career and I flew an OIF1 back in '03 when we went into Iraq and in the beginning I was a 46 pilot.

REP. ISSA: Well, I'm not nearly as qualified a pilot as you are, but isn't it true that all aircraft lose lift at high density altitude, basically, a hot day, a hot, humid day, the higher you are and the hotter it is, the more likely you are at a fixed wing to need a longer runaway or rotor wing to simply have to carry less and takeoff?

COL. HECKL: Absolutely, sir, and that's one reason in Operation Tora Bora in the fall of '01, 46s weren't even take ashore.

REP. ISSA: Because, in fact, the high altitude there is a challenge to almost any helicopter made in the world.

COL. HECKL: To every helicopter, sir.

REP. ISSA: Okay. And in your estimation having flown the Osprey, with further development over time, can we, in fact, increase the at altitude liftoff capability just based on the record of rotor wings?

COL. HECKL: There's no doubt about it, sir. Absolutely.

REP. ISSA: So, in fact, even though a little bit like the AV-8 and a little bit like most of our other helicopters, generation one usually doesn't do as well. I'm a guy who was one of four pack in a -- (inaudible) -- every time it took off on a hot day at Fort Riley, and by the way, that's close to sea level, but that was about all we could carry in a UH-1.

COL. HECKL: Well, yes sir, and like you said, an AV8B, when I left the CH-46, we were on CH-46 Echo.

REP. ISSA: Okay. I'm going to ask you the tougher questions now and I am concentrating to a great extent on you two in uniform partially because some of the rest are you are more available to me all the time.

Isn't it true though that, in fact, many of the missions that we're doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, we, in fact, can do with other rotor wing aircraft?

COL. HECKL: Sir, I'll tell you, that could do -- (inaudible) -- aircraft?

REP. ISSA: Yeah, many of them. Yes. So when the GAO talks about perhaps a smaller fleet or a mixed fleet, that is something that this committee should look at tasking consideration of, just consideration of whether or not the mix is right, general?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well, yes, sir, and the commandant does that routinely. Let me take you back three years when the decision was made to increase the size of the Marine Corps from 175,000 to 202,000. We did a thorough, analytical look at what the aviation combat element of the Marine Corps should look like at the larger size. We looked at the Osprey and we saw that it performed at four times as well as the CH-46, but we also saw that we needed additional assault support assets.

So what we did is we decided to grow the size of our CH-53 fleet from six to nine active squadrons and the size of our flight attack helicopter fleet, which includes the UH-1 Yankee, a middleweight lifter that will round out the V-22 perfectly in the context of the aviation combat element and we increased our HMLA from six to nine.

Coming out of that deep dive, the commandant and I are absolutely certain that we have it right today, but each and every year I publish on the commandant's name an aviation plan and we do retrospective thinking, introspective thinking, pardon me, about where we should go with our Marine Corps to provide the best horse for the joint force commander in an ever-changing world.

REP. ISSA: In my opening statement, I mentioned Tazfell back in the '70s and the recognition that at least at that time the systems aboard the A-10 were not the best for killing tanks of the aviation assets we had in the field. There were changes made afterwards.

Do you welcome a similar test of all of the fixed and rotor wing assets periodically by the military by either joint or a particular branch in order to determine whether or not the mix is right and the assets meet the requirement as offered in real instrumented type combat situations where we can computerize and oversee, if you will, whether pilots and assets do what they say they'll do?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Sir, not only do we welcome it, we pursue it. Twice a year, a Marine aviation weapons and tactics squadron based in Yuma, Arizona performs a weapons attack instructor course where we bring the most capable aviators in the Corps and other services, bring them together and do quite a bit of instrumented training and testing and that's how we develop the ideas that enable us to go forward.

REP. ISSA: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much. I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts.

REP. TIERNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sullivan, the -- (inaudible) -- report is the V-22, still having problems with unreliability on component parts?

MR. SULLIVAN: That's true. Yes.

REP. TIERNEY: Can you explain that a little bit for us.

MR. SULLIVAN: What we found a over in Iraq was that despite the fact that they had taken more than the usual compliment of spare parts that they would usually take, they were running out of parts and having to cannibalize other V-22s and when we looked at the parts specifically, we found that there were 13 critical parts that were just not lasting long at all, in fact, as I stated in my opening statement, about 30 percent -- they were getting about 30 percent of the usual time out of those and in addition to that, the supply chain, the vendors supplying the parts -- that's a very immature supply chain on their part and they were having problems with that as well.

REP. TIERNEY: Thank you. General Trautman and Colonel Heckl, you don't dispute that, do you?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: No, sir, I don't dispute that at all, in fact, it's quite typical of other platforms that have reached about the 50,000 to 55,000 -- (inaudible) --

REP. TIERNEY: You've already testified you have low aircraft availability, lower than you would like and lower than would be estimated as ideal.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Lower than ideal, yes, sir. That's right.

REP. TIERNEY: So we have a plane here that in 1986 when they estimated in 2009 dollars, we were going to get 1,000 of them over ten years at $37.7 million each. Now, we're looking at some projection we're going to get less than 500 over ten years at about $93.4 million each, which is a pretty sizable thing.

What caused that overrun, general?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well, sir, the actual non-recurring flight weight cost of the Block B, MV-22 in FY '09 is $64 million. The cost increases throughout the years have been somewhat troubling. Projections in the 1980s for this platform, as well as other platforms as some of the members have pointed out have not come to fruition, but at $64 million a copy is much less than things like a Super Hornet which are in the mid-80s (million).

So in my view --

REP. TIERNEY: My mother used to say if everybody jumped off the Brooklyn Bridge, would you? That other program has had a problem I don't think diminishes the exact problem we're dealing with in this one.

Let me ask you, have any of the contractors been fined or at least not given their bonuses as a result of this?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: They haven't been fined to my knowledge. There are incentive fees that have been either given or withheld throughout the years and I'm not -- I can get that for you in a follow on.

REP. TIERNEY: Mr. Sullivan, do you have any information on that?

MR. SULLIVAN: I don't, but we'd be happy to look into that, too.

REP. TIERNEY: I would very much appreciate whether somebody is being held responsible for this, how many years program are we talking about here, '86, we were going to get 1,000 at $37.7 million, we didn't have it in '96.

We didn't have it in 2006 and we still don't have it today.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Right.

REP. TIERNEY: So the V-22 Rolls Royce engines -- one-half to two-thirds of their expected life spans is all that we're getting out of them, yet, general, I understand that the Marine Corps is contracted to buy even more of the same engine and negotiate a new engine sustainment contract with Rolls Royce that includes numerous exclusions.

So who made that decision?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: The decision was made by service acquisition executives and I contribute to that.

REP. TIERNEY: It's not just one person; it's a whole bunch of them that make that kind of decision?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: No. the service acquisition executives in the Department of the Navy makes --

REP. TIERNEY: Who makes the decision --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Research development acquisition, assistant secretary of the Navy.

REP. TIERNEY: Half to two-thirds of expected life span of an engine --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I believe it's a very wise decision. This performance, this logistics contract that we have with Rolls, the V-22 never goes without an engine. I wish I had a similar situation with another type model of series.

REP. TIERNEY: Will you describe for me the exclusions that are made in that contract with the additional engines and what the reasons are for those exclusions?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I'm not sure the contract has been negotiated. You're talking about the performance-based logistics contracts being negotiated now? The negotiations are not complete.

REP. TIERNEY: The contracts they've been negotiating with Rolls Royce.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: One example would be if the engineer particle separator is not working adequately, I think that's excluded. As you said, we're negotiating this year and we don't expect to finish negotiations until the December time frame.

REP. TIERNEY: Is it possible to have another supplier provided engine that would require significant design changes and thus, I suppose, would cost more or at least might work better.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: At a significantly increased cost and detriment to the program, there's a possibility we could go in another direction. If the performance based logistics negotiations don't go the way we desire, that says something that's on the table.

REP. TIERNEY: So it just sounds to me, general, that we're talking about having a choice, we can either pay for underperforming engines or start over again and pay even more for engines that are designed properly.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well, engines are staying on at about $600, which is typical of other similar airplanes operating in that austere, challenging environment.

REP. TIERNEY: Mr. Clark, is that the kind of -- (inaudible) -- getting $600?

MR. CLARK: Sir, when we looked at the data from the Iraq experience, it was not, it was less than $400. Again, I'm not sure if he's looking at other aircraft not deployed.

REP. TIERNEY: General, let's talk about deployed aircraft. Are you disputing Mr. Clark's testimony that you get less than $600?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I'm not disputing. I'm saying that it's about $687 as I recall, fleet-wide and in Iraq, I think it's approaching $500. We've instituted changes that have enabled us to get up to around the $500 mark.

REP. TIERNEY: You can talk faster than I can, general, but I'll slow you down a little bit.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Sorry, sir.

REP. TIERNEY: The question was, in Iraq, where the examination was done, they're not making even $500, $600, right?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Approaching $500 in Iraq. That's right.

REP. TIERNEY: Mr. Sullivan, what do we need to do? What does the Department of Defense and Marine Corps need to do to get this program back on track or is there anything that they can do?

MR. SULLIVAN: You know, I think one of the problems, most of the problems with this program are probably, you know, its been around a long time and it has taken most of its hits. At this point, it's not meeting all of its requirements, but I would agree a little bit with what the general says is that it's still relatively new. They're still doing some operational testing on it. Some of these things are growing pains and it will grow out of, however, I think that there are some inherent design features on the V-22 that are going to keep it from being the most optimal choice that the Marines are thinking they're going to have, I guess, is the best way to say that.

You're looking at; first of all, they've taken a big hit on the unit cost, so it's going to cost a lot more than they thought to buy the remaining 280 aircraft.

REP. TOWNS: The gentleman's time has expired. I now yield five minutes -- I thought he finished.

MR. SULLIVAN: I think what has to happen as we recommended it that they need to look at the proper role of the V-22 and a proper mix. There's a lot of things that the CH-46 and the 53s can do, as well as the V-22 and I think that we think that the mix should be looked at again.

In addition, the Marines have to stay on top of these reliability issues, you know, there's obviously a problem with some of the specific parts on this and the supply chain and we recommended that they take a good study of that as well.

REP. TOWNS: And there will be a second round. The gentleman from Maryland.

REPRESENTATIVE ELIJAH CUMMINGS (D-MD): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Trautman, I listened to your testimony very carefully. You know, we had asked the Marine Corps to compile a list of incidents and mishaps involving the V-22 since the aircraft was approved for full rate production in 2005. However, we discovered that many of the incidents involving the V-22 since that time were not included in the report by the Marine Corps, and general, I heard you say all these wonderful things about this aircraft. Why do the Marine Corps fail to include all of these incidents in their report to the committee?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Sir, I'm not sure what you're talking about. I have a 15 June 2009 information paper that was provided to the committee that, in my judgment, includes everything that has happened to the V-22 going back to 1992.

REP. CUMMINGS: Now, when you presented that information is that only dealing with damage to the aircraft or personnel or other mishaps included?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: All mishaps, Category B, C, A, C, B and A. All mishaps are included in the documentation we provided on 15 June.

REP. CUMMINGS: All right. And so do you consider the grounding of all your combat aircraft a minor incident?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Grounding the aircraft is never a minor incident, of course not, sir.

REP. CUMMINGS: And what about the forced landings in Iraq? Are those part of the incidents that you would have there?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Precautionary landings that take place? No, sir. If a precautionary landing takes place, that's actually a benefit associated with the Osprey and a conservative pilot can land and determine what's going on with his airplane in a way that regular airplanes cannot.

So no, I do not include precautionary landings, sir.

REP. CUMMINGS: Well, our staff compared your report to -- the gentleman who did a search of the Osprey and found that there were many, many more mishaps that we have reports on. So I'm sure perhaps you can clear that up for us.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Yes, sir. We will clear that up for you and I stand ready to do that with anybody, any time.

REP. CUMMINGS: Thank you very much.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Yes, sir.

REP. CUMMINGS: As I sit here, I was just thinking that there's probably some things that you all agree on, but there's a cardinal question here and that is that Mr. Sullivan and his group have made some recommendations and there's a question as to whether a country that is spending, that is in deep economic trouble can wait to work out all the kinks when perhaps we could get something much more effective, even if it's a mix with the Osprey and I think what is bothering me as I sit here and just looking at it from a very practical standpoint, I think we can get so hardened in our positions that it's hard for us to see anything else and this is just sitting up here and observing and this airplane, this Osprey, obviously, has some major problems. And I had an employee who only showed up 30 percent of the time, they could be the greatest employee in the world, but no job.

If I had somebody who I had certain expectations of that they were going to work 600 hours so and so over a certain period of time and they don't show up or they're not available, what good does it do me?

And so I'm just trying to figure out where does the defense of this airplane end and the beginning of getting what we bargain for, making sure our people are not harmed by the very things the taxpayers' dollars are paying for and getting our people the equipment that they need?

When does that defense of the plane end and we say to the manufacturer, manufacturer, we know that you're watching C-SPAN right now and we know that there are people that need jobs. Why don't you just correct and do the things that need to be done so that we can provide the very best for the men and women who I know you love? You've given your life for them and I know you wouldn't just put somebody in a plane that perhaps would do them harm. I know you wouldn't. But when you hear the testimony, it sounds like we don't end the defense and begin to say to the people who are creating this, come on, now, this is America, this is the greatest country in the world, we can produce a plane that can get around the things that you all talked about.

Are we that far behind? Are you following me, general?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I do, sir, and I would submit that we're doing precisely what you recommend. We're doing precisely what you recommend. You know, if you go back in history and you look at the F- 14 or look at the CH-53 Echo or you look at the F-18, you will see that about the 50,000 to 60,000 hour mark, which is exactly where the V-22 is, in every case, readiness drops below anticipated predictive modeling. We're exactly where those other type model series have been and now they're considered successful legacy performers, extremely successful performers.

We are engaged with the Naval Air Systems Command, the rest of the naval aviation enterprise and our industry partners to correct these issues that are staring us in the face. The reason we're defending the program is because this airplane will save lives; it has already demonstrated that it will save lives. It is a positive, positive thing for our nation and that's why we feel passionate about it.

REP. CUMMINGS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much. I now yield to the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Quigley.

REPRESENTATIVE MIKE QUIGLEY (D-IL): Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My colleague is correct. Sometimes when we have these discussions, positions get hardened and somewhat defensive. So I've asked the general and the colonel, looking at the other way despite the issues of reliability and so forth, from a sheer flying point of view, what would you like this to be able to do that it doesn't do?

COL. HECKL: Sir, to answer, you know, I agree. I'm a 46 pilot, it's where I come from, but in reality, I'm an assault pilot. I carry Marines.

I strapped an airplane on, sir, and I can assure you that there's not a minute of the hundreds of hours that I've accumulated in this airplane where I was concerned, not one. As a matter of fact, when Marines die in helicopter crashes, I guess, I would say on a regular basis. This airplane was designed from the ground up to be more survivable. There's no damage causing mechanism, no weight over the cabin, there's all kind of things that we could discuss offline that make it more survivable that a 53 or 46 or any other traditional helicopter does not have. All the weight is on the end of the wings.

The -- (inaudible) -- rotation thing, again, addressed years ago. I'll tell you, sir, the platform, the airplane -- (inaudible) -- every mission. I don't know where Mr. Sullivan or Mr. -- (inaudible) -- they weren't at my deployment. I was the middle guy, the guy that did it during the heat, March to October. Didn't have a problem. I operated for seven months filling combat line numbers and did not miss a mission.

I don't know what else we want. Do we want the raw ability improved? Yeah. I never want my car to break it down, but still it breaks down. Do I think it's going to get better? I do. But I'm going to tell you right now, sir, from an operational standpoint, which is my lane, I was three weeks in theater and we did a raid with Alpha Company -- (inaudible) -- Army guys out a single plane zone at Haditha, went and took down a zone that my 46 couldn't have even done.

I don't know what missions we're talking about here that it's not doing, I'm missing something and I must have been asleep in Iraq for seven months. It does it all. We did casevac (sp), we did Medevac, we did raids. What else do you want? We moved Senator Obama from Ramadi to Jordan, which would have taken me weeks in my 46.

I just want to make sure you guys -- because I agree with you.

Let's go into this thing eyes wide open and have an honest assessment. So an irrational defense? No. But an irrational offense, also.

So, I mean, in all honesty, the airplane performed very well. Were there areas we want improved? Absolutely. I have some ideas, that they have, about cleaning airplanes and stuff like that. But let's not go into this thing thinking the airplane couldn't do its mission. It's not true.

REP. QUIGLEY: Well, and I'm not -- I'm not trying to get you to think like that, or to suggest something that you don't believe in. But on the other hand, as I said, as these positions harden, it's just human nature. Sometimes it's hard to let your defenses down or -- and that may be, you know, taking it too far, but just telling us what you think. I mean, for example, originally, I was told that this was supposed to have a nose-mounted bailing gun. Is that correct?

COL. HECKL: Sir, I think maybe it may have. I'm --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well, let me comment on that.

REP. QUIGLEY: Fine.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: That was an objective -- anecdotal objective early in the program, and it proved to be not cost effective or technically feasible over 10 years ago.

REP. QUIGLEY: Oh, okay. With all due respect, the cost- effective horse has gotten out of the -- the fence here and is running all over the place. But for effectiveness, I guess I want to know from either one of you gentlemen whether or not it matters in those kind of situations that this might be in Afghanistan having a front- mounted machine gun.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: It does matter, and so we're doing two things, sir. One is we're up-gunning the ramp-mounted weapon system from a 7.62 to a 50-caliber. And when the squadron deploys in the fall, it will have a 50-caliber weapon system.

The second thing we've done is we've partnered with the Air Force to build a defensive weapon system that is mounted on the belly of the aircraft, and it will be an all-aspect weapon system that can shoot 360 degrees around the Osprey.

We finished developmental tests of that defensive weapon system, and I anticipate operational tests being completed in August. And the squadron that goes to Afghanistan will be -- I'm confident will be armed with the all-aspect weapon system that we've -- that we've been working on over the last few months.

REP. QUIGLEY: I'm sorry, could you repeat that? When will this be -- this whole system be implemented?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: The developmental test is complete. We're doing some software changes, and we will do operational tests in July and August. And by September, we should have a full-up, all-aspect weapon system. And we'll deploy eight of these systems with the squadron that deploys to Afghanistan in the fall.

REP. QUIGLEY: Well, I appreciate your candor, General. Thank you.

REP. TOWNS: The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly.

REP. GERALD CONNOLLY (D-VA): I thank the chairman.

Colonel, you clearly are an enthusiast for the V-22. And I take your testimony very seriously, having been in Iraq and in the combat zone. I'm just curious, when I was in Iraq, we had a very big sandstorm, back in February, and all helicopters were grounded. Could the V-22 have operated in a sandstorm?

COL. HECKL: Sir, I don't know if that was a staged question, but --

REP. CONNOLLY: I cannot hear you, sir.

COL. HECKL: Sir, I said I don't know if that was a staged question, because it's -- this airplane has a new capability called -- we -- it has an approach mode, with a hover capability. And we actually had a case where we had an emergency leave, trying to get a Marine out. His wife had been in an accident back state-side.

We had one of these sandstorms, which, if you were there over the summer, we had a lot of them. He was up in Walid, which is on the Syrian border. We were actually able to use the airplane to shoot an approach in less than a quarter-mile visibility at that pad at Walid. Not -- the 46 would have been struggling to even make the range, sir, much less the ability to operate in that kind of limited visibility.

REP. CONNOLLY: Okay. Were you aware of cannibalization for the V-22s in Iraq?

COL. HECKL: Sir, we cannibalized on (frogs ?).

REP. CONNOLLY: I cannot hear you.

COL. HECKL: I'm sorry, sir. We cannibalized on CH-46s. We -- we do cannibalization. It's something no commander ever wants to do with his airplanes. But sometimes if a part isn't there and we have a mission, we will cannibalize. We try to avoid it, because it's double work on the Marines.

REP. CONNOLLY: Okay. Let me ask the general. What's it cost, per copy, for a V-22?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: The non-recurring fly-away cost of a Block B MV- 22 in 2009 is $64 million.

REP. CONNOLLY: Not the 90-something million dollars Mr. Tierney referred to?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well, sir, as you know, there's many ways to cut -- to describe the cost of airplanes. I'm giving you an actual cost defined as non-recurring fly-away cost. Program cost, larger program costs take a different cut at the issue.

REP. CONNOLLY: Mr. Sullivan, would you agree with that cost estimate?

MR. SULLIVAN: I think probably we -- what we have in our report is the 93.4 million (dollars) --

REP. CONNOLLY: Ninety-three point four million (dollars).

MR. SULLIVAN: -- which represents -- that's strictly an average procurement unit cost. That's basically the procurement dollars divided by the number of --

REP. CONNOLLY: By the way, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Quigley and I have a little private bet. Where are you from originally, may I ask?

MR. SULLIVAN: You'll be wrong. Chicago.

REP. CONNOLLY: We're both right. Sorry. We heard those flat vowels; I had to ask.

MR. SULLIVAN: (Laughs.) But if I could just --

REP. CONNOLLY: Of course.

MR. SULLIVAN: -- because this is something that comes up all the time. And I'm not sure what the general's number is referring to, but it sounds to me like it would be -- if you took the last -- that the one -- the last one off the line right now, because the cost tends to decrease as they learn more, you would get the fly-away cost for the system. Sounds like that may be the number that he's quoting.

If you take the average from the first one you build to the last one, that's going to be less expensive. It would be about $93 million.

REP. CONNOLLY: That's the average.

MR. SULLIVAN: That's the average right now estimated, yes.

REP. CONNOLLY: Well, General, let's just say for the sake of argument it's somewhere between 64 (million dollars) and 93 million (dollars). When you cannibalize one of those things, that's a pretty expensive cannibalization, because of lack of spare parts, isn't it?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Cannibalization is not something that we like to do, but we do it in every type-model series from time to time.

REP. CONNOLLY: Yes, but in this particular case, we have a report from the GAO -- says that in this -- with respect to the V-22, this is a chronic problem. It isn't an ordinary problem only in the combat zone. It's actually a chronic problem with this particular aircraft.

Is that not true?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I don't think so. I mean, I don't think it's any more chronic or typical in this airplane that in other airplanes frankly.

REP. CONNOLLY: So you take issue with the GAO finding, with respect to that issue.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: No. I think the GAO probably found cannibalization and aptly criticized it.

REP. CONNOLLY: No, no, no. With respect to the problem of reliable supply of spare parts.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well, we do absolutely. We do not have the availability that we desire in the V-22 today. I have already said that.

REP. CONNOLLY: And to what do you attribute that problem?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I attribute it to several things, the first of which is that some components are not meeting the predicted mean time between failure that engineers several years ago said that these parts should provide. And that's probably the biggest issue.

The second biggest issue is supply, range and depth of supply, and the immature nature of the platform, which has just passed material support date on 1 October 2008, one year after we deployed it into combat.

So we've ridden this airplane far harder than any other airplane that I can describe in the last 30 years. And so the combination of riding it hard, having some predicted modeling not being as accurate as we would desire, has put us in a hole, with regard to availability and reliability.

REP. CONNOLLY: I see my time is up. And if the chair would, just indulge me with one last follow-up to that.

But General, given what you've just said, would you not agree that the cannibalization, with respect to this aircraft, is a little bit unusual, because of just what you said, that it's not your normal cannibalization?

Contributing to that cannibalization we're experiencing is this problem of supply chain for spare parts.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I'd have to do the end analysis to make sure that I was right, with regard to my answer. But I would say that any time you have an airplane that isn't providing the kind of availability that you desire, there are reasons for that. And I would say there's probably a connection to increased cannibalization associated with that particular problem. I think that's probably accurate, sir.

REP. CONNOLLY: I thank the chair.

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much, gentlemen. We've been joined by the gentleman from Ohio.

You have minutes then for questions at this time.

REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS KUCINICH (D-OH): General Trautman, would you be able to yield most appropriately to questions about the falsifying of maintenance records?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I'm not sure I understand, sir. Say that again, please.

REP. KUCINICH: The question deals with falsifying of maintenance records.

What was -- what was the reason? Does anyone here know what the reasons were, why people attempted to falsify maintenance records?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Are you talking about --

REP. KUCINICH: Why did they do that? I know there were convictions involved. But why was that done? Do you know?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Ten years ago; no, sir, I'm not qualified to respond to that.

REP. KUCINICH: But the culture has changed, I take it, about maintenance records. Is that right?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Absolutely.

REP. KUCINICH: What is that culture today?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I don't think you'll find an organization that is more upstanding and forthright than the United States Marine Corps, sir. That's my opinion.

REP. KUCINICH: And so the performance of the V-22s in Iraq, what is it your feeling has been -- the overall record of their level of performance?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: The performance has been outstanding. It's done things that no other airplane in the history of mankind could do. Its availability and reliability has fallen short of our desired ideal, but producing up above 70 percent on a daily basis adequately allowed it to perform missions that were needed to be performed in Al Anbar province.

REP. KUCINICH: Is it your judgment that they would be operationally effective in high-threat environments such as Afghanistan?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well, Afghanistan is not what we would characterize as a high-threat environment, sir. A high-threat environment, in the military vernacular, includes an integrated air defense system that typically includes radar-directed missiles. The Afghanistan environment will be, I anticipate, very similar to the Iraq environment, which we would characterize as low or medium threat. A low- and medium-threat environment has conventional weapons, small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and surface-to-air missiles, typically infrared surface-to-air missiles. So in that environment I think the Osprey will be just as effective it -- as in Iraq.

REP. KUCINICH: Have you yourself had the opportunity to be in one of those V-22s in any mission flights?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I haven't been on any mission flights. I probably have a little over 10 hours at the controls of the airplane in fairly sterile garrison operations.

REP. KUCINICH: Colonel Heckl, have you been in a V-22 in a mission flight?

COL. HECKL: Yes, sir. I had command of the 2nd Squadron in Iraq for seven months.

REP. KUCINICH: And can you tell me what -- have you ever had any operational difficulties with that in a -- high-threat environments?

COL. HECKL: Well, again, sir, by the definition, not high for us, but -- no, sir, I --

REP. KUCINICH: Well, in the Iraq environment, did you have any operational difficulties with it?

COL. HECKL: No, sir.

And, sir, I'll just paint -- to give you a real -- just a real quick anecdote: I think everybody's familiar about the CH-46 that got shot down a few years ago, killed everybody on board, and it was by a surface-to-air missile, a heat-seeking missile.

One thing in this airplane, the speed -- like, when -- we would go into Baghdad, sir, regularly, which was right on the edge of a black zone back in '08, so there were surface -- potential for surface-to-air missiles. The approach mode of this airplane, you're -- we call it thermally IR-cool, because you've got the power back, you're coming down at a real high rate of speed, and it's very difficult -- and it was proved in -- (inaudible) -- battle, very difficult for a heat-seeking missile to track the airplane.

So -- and you combine that with the aircraft survivability equipment on board, and the aircraft is very survivable. I -- sir, I would fly the airplane in any threat environment.

REP. KUCINICH: Were -- is there any problem with cabin visibility?

COL. HECKL: Sir, you know, that -- that's a whole -- the crew chief, the enlisted guys in back have difficulty; the windows are smaller. But what I will tell you, sir, to the pilots up front --

REP. KUCINICH: What is that like, though, when you're in a -- when you're in a vehicle moving at such a high -- you know, high rate of speed, if there's a problem with cabin visibility? What does that -- what -- does that cut down your possible response or your judgment in any --

COL. HECKL: No, sir. And the fact is, the -- again, the aircraft survivability on the -- equipment on the aircraft is going to indicate any threat coming at me, probably quicker than anybody in the back trying to look out of a -- out of a -- out of a window.

It's very similar to CH-53 Echo, sir. The windows are smaller than normal and they're a little bit higher and visibility's a little more reduced.

REP. KUCINICH: One final question, Mr. Chairman. I see my time's expired. The V-22 was originally designed to have a gun mounted in its chin, and I understand they changed the design to have a variant mounted on the aircraft's rear (ramp ?). Now, if you take that into consideration, what you just said about visibility, does that in any way compromise the ability of the craft to defend its crew in a combat situation?

COL. HECKL: No, sir, because the nose-mounted weapon, if we'd have ever gotten it -- which there was a lot of discussion at the tactical level about what good that would be on the nose of an aircraft that moves at 250 miles an hour -- it would be controlled by the pilots. So the visibility -- and the visibility up in the cockpit, sir, is very, very good, particularly compared to my old --

REP. KUCINICH: The rear quadrant of the craft is protected, then?

COL. HECKL: We have -- (inaudible) -- weapon now, sir, that I had in Iraq, and the crew chiefs man that off the ramp.

REP. KUCINICH: Thank you, Mr. --

COL. HECKL (?): And so most (revenge ?) shots at assault aircraft were rear hemisphere shots, and that's why we did that.

REP. KUCINICH: Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TOWNS: Sure. Thank you very much.

Let me begin with you, Mr. Sullivan. Your GAO report says the V- 22 may have problems operating in extreme temperature, and even aboardship. It is true that this complex, revolutionary aircraft has problems in hot and cold weather in operating (those ships ?). Now, Colonel Heckl says that's not true. So where did you get the information from? (Mr. Clark ?).

MR. SULLIVAN (?): Yes. Mr. Chairman. My team went onboard the ship with one of the Osprey squadrons and spent four days with them interviewing the shipboard people and the Osprey squadron. And onboard ship, the Osprey is a larger aircraft. It was intended to operate off of six operational deck spots on the flight deck. That was the desire. But two of those spots near the -- at the superstructure, for various reasons, are not cleared for it to operate off of, take off or land vertically. So that limits the aircraft.

And also, because of its size, the squadron -- the air combat element that would deploy on the ship in the past with the CH-46s would have deployed with 12 CH-46s, and the other elements of the air combat element, the CH-53s and AV-8s and such. But with the Osprey size, they are going only to deploy with 10. And we also found that the hangar deck, which is used to work on the aircraft out of the elements, because of the aircraft's size there were -- it restricted movement of other aircraft potentially around it if there was maintenance being conducted.

In addition, we found that the inventory of spare parts that the aircraft would deploy with, called the AVCOW (ph), that that was significantly greater in volume than the CH-46s, to the point that not all of the parts would be able to deploy with the ship, would have to be positioned somewhere else. And that was an issue.

In terms of operating in extreme environments, the full mission capability rate, which is not a requirement but is measured on the aircraft, on the first squadron it was, I believe, around 6 percent, and the problem there and essentially -- is it capable -- is the aircraft capable of meeting all assigned missions.

The problem was the ice protection system with the aircraft. It essentially has been a problem for some time. It doesn't work, and so in any situation where you might fly into icing conditions, that would be a concern. So that hindered that also.

And we also looked at the issue of -- at altitude. According to the NATOPS manual, there are -- there's a compromise between altitude and weight; that the aircraft certainly can fly at altitude in airplane mode, but in helicopter mode, landing -- that there is trade- off between the aircraft's -- the altitude and the -- and what -- the weight of what it's carrying, either fuel or troops or cargo.

REP. TOWNS: Fine. Thank you very much.

Dr. Rivolo, in your testimony, you indicate the V-22 has an inherent design flaw that affects the V-22 Osprey load-carrying capacity, indicating that the problem is so complex that the aircraft designers don't even understand it. That is scary.

Your chart is rather complicated, so please explain further, if you could put it up there, in a sentence or two, that -- tell us the details --

MR. RIVOLO: The intent of my testimony was to bring out the fact that the original designers had great hope for this aircraft.

REP. TOWNS: Yeah.

MR. RIVOLO: The initial wind tunnel runs and calculation showed that we would have a truly spectacular aircraft.

As a result of actually building the aircraft, the numbers fell well short. So as a result, the aircraft has a lifting capacity which is about 6,000 pounds less than was expected. And we have lived with this because it still has considerable capability. But that difference, that lack of efficiency which was materialized, has resulted in compromise after compromise, and the aircraft is not as -- performing as it was designed to be.

If you were listening to a briefing in 1988, the aircraft was spectacular in its anticipated performance. And I just wanted to bring out the fact that I realize that this is old news and there's not a lot of interest in it, but the aircraft is not as capable as it was designed to be. And we are living with that, obviously.

REP. TOWNS: Your testimony indicates that the V-22 may have problems conducting combat maneuvering. What do you mean by that?

MR. RIVOLO: Yeah, again that apparently is very old news. I have very serious concerns that -- we're talking about rare occurrences. We're not talking about day-to-day operations.

If you are making an approach to a high-density altitude and you're in helicopter mode, with a full load of Marines, and someone jumps out with an RPG, you're going to be very, very hard-pressed to get out of there. And that has been documented. It's not a debatable thing. The only option the airplane has: It can convert very rapidly going forward. But forward is usually where the bullets are coming from.

So my concern has been that in a real environment like Afghanistan, and I believe that once this aircraft deploys there, the reality of what's happening in Afghanistan -- things are not getting better, things are getting very much worse in Afghanistan -- that the aircraft will be asked to fly these missions. And it will run into some of its idiosyncrasies.

And until those happen, the discussions are not going to take place, because we have been raising those issues now for at least 10 years. And as I said, it's not only the Marine Corps. But I think the community at large sees is as passe information, and we're not interested in that.

Whereas to me, the aircraft -- the fact that the aircraft could not be certified by the FAA, and we are asking Marines to -- not pilots. Pilots know fully well what the risks are. They take them.

But for a Marine who's told, get into that airplane, when that airplane could not be certified as airworthy, there's a real problem there. There's a real, real problem with attitudes. And that's the reason why I'm here. I don't like to come down and get beat up. I get beat up all the time.

REP. TOWNS: Right.

Let me ask you then, General Trautman. You just heard Dr. Rivolo say that if the FAA examined the V-22, it would not certify as being flightworthy. He just said that.

By Federal Aviation Administration standards, the MV-22 is not safe for flight. Does the Marine Corps disagree with the FAA standard?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Absolutely, sir, or we wouldn't put our Marines in the V-22.

I can't -- I'm not an expert on the FAA. I have no idea what this individual is saying. I know that most of the other things that he says I don't agree with and find flaw with. But I'm not sure about the FAA's position.

REP. TOWNS: Mr. Sullivan, the GAO report indicates that the costs associated with the MV-22 are expected to rise significantly, due to operation and support. Why? I don't understand why.

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, one of the things that we looked at is that the costs now are about $11,000 per flight hour, which is much higher than they had originally estimated that and much higher than the expected. And with the problems that they're having now, with reliability, we think, it's prudent to expect that that cost, to operate and support that aircraft, through its life cycle, will probably go up some more.

It's at -- the total estimate now is at $75 billion for the 30-or-so- year life cycle of the V-22.

REP. TOWNS: I yield to the ranking member.

REP. ISSA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sullivan, following up on that, isn't the single greatest overrun cost the fact that the engines are lasting dramatically less time than originally planned?

MR. SULLIVAN: Could you repeat that? I'm sorry.

REP. ISSA: Isn't the greatest single up-cost the fact that the engines last roughly half what they were intended to last?

MR. SULLIVAN: I think that's, right now is a -- yeah, that's a huge cost that they have --

REP. ISSA: Then following up on that, do you recall the first Gulf War?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes.

REP. ISSA: I do.

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, I do.

REP. ISSA: Do you remember that basically our helicopters that were in the first Gulf War ingested and died like this, and they didn't last even a quarter of what they were intended to, and we almost -- we almost had to shut down in that relatively short time leading up to the campaign, while they were trying to figure out how to stop the ingesting of dust from killing those aircraft engines almost overnight. Do you remember at least reading about that?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, I do.

REP. ISSA: So if in fact Boeing and its partners do their job and -- with the Marines, and increase the longevity of that and a few other parts, isn't it true that, although that projection might be right, it also could be reduced considerably by those parts coming closer to their original intended life span?

MR. SULLIVAN: You know, I think that that's a possibility, yes. But it is just that, a possibility. Right now, it takes an awful lot to maintain those engines after they've been run through this --

REP. ISSA: General, have you charged your -- your partners in this, to get those times up on parts that are under-performing the original specs?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Oh, we have, indeed, sir, and we work very closely together. If I could just give you a couple of examples and reasons why they -- why I believe and our industry partners believe that these costs are going to come down significantly, not go up -- a flapper arm. In the beginning, we were removing and replacing flapper arms at a cost of 280,000 (dollars) per flapper arms. We've now figured out a way to repair these onsite for less than $10,000.

Another example is bleed air valves. They were a throwaway item, 27,000 (dollars) per; now we're repairing them at 5,000 (dollars) per.

I could give you many examples, but I don't want to eat up your time. That's the way that we're working together with the OEM to improve the cost and reliability of this airplane.

REP. ISSA: Colonel, before you flew the CH-46 -- 46, right? -- what was your primary flight trainer? What did you learn to fly on?

COL. HECKL: The CH-46. Sir, I learned how to fly a TH-57, and then I --

REP. ISSA: Okay, so you started with a light trainer?

COL. HECKL: Yes, sir.

REP. ISSA: You weigh 200 pounds?

COL. HECKL: Yes, sir.

REP. ISSA: How much could the light trainer carry before -- on a hot day? Just you and the -- the instructor?

COL. HECKL: That was about it. On a hot day, we actually -- because a couple of guys were large enough that we exceeded the CU (sp) on it, so, yes, sir.

REP. ISSA: Okay. I learned to fly on a 172. The reason I learned to fly on a 172 is that my trainer was 220 pounds, I was 205 pounds, and on a hot day it could -- a Cessna 150 wouldn't take off with full fuel. And we weren't allowed fuel management. Our rules for Army aviation is we had to have full fuel on takeoff. I think they may have changed it now.

So part of what you do, I'm assuming, on hot days is you manage fuel so that you're not always with full fuel. You're with the amount of fuel you need to help get those packs back up where they need to be when you're in high altitude on hot days.

COL. HECKL: Absolutely, sir. Fuel management is an issue in any rotorcraft.

REP. ISSA: And that was my next question and you anticipated it, is that all your aircraft, you're always dealing with -- on hot days at least, in high altitude, you're dealing with trade-offs between fuel and passengers.

COL. HECKL: Absolutely, sir. In the Air Force -- (inaudible) -- actually trains to manage fuel to a point where they will dump fuel if they need to to --

REP. ISSA: And you're not a fixed-wing pilot at all, but do you know of any Air Force aircraft, any jet, any prop, that doesn't have a (fuel to pack ?) to altitude limitation, where there's a trade-off?

COL. HECKL: Not that I'm aware of, sir, I know certainly in rotary wing.

REP. ISSA: Well, that kind of brings me back, I think, to a couple of questions on this. This aircraft is not a combat aircraft; it is a aircraft that operates in combat, meaning it's not an attack aircraft, it's not designed to fly into bullets and RPGs deliberately, right?

COL. HECKL: No, sir. It's -- actually, the design was that it would avoid those things.

REP. ISSA: So the little bit of chicken armor beneath your seat is not intended for you to take RPGs regularly.

COL. HECKL: I hope not, sir.

REP. ISSA: And that's true of the CH-46 and any other of that type of transport aircraft.

COL. HECKL: Yes, sir.

REP. ISSA: If you were flying any of the heavy lifts, but the CH-46, and you were just at that critical time -- final, heavy, coming in at altitude, and you suddenly started taking fire, how hard is it for you to get up and move in the opposite direction quickly?

COL. HECKL: Extremely difficult, sir. As a matter of fact, when I went into OIF in March of '03, we had Marines that were loaded because we thought -- you know, we were wearing all the gas gear and everything else, my aircraft. Even though I managed the fuel, I barely had a minimal amount of power to conduct a wave-off, which is a, you know, pretty standard procedure. So, very difficult, sir.

REP. ISSA: And Doctor, to be fair to you, because we have been sort of talking to the other side, isn't it true that if you were to evaluate any and all aircraft that the military operates, that they would all have some of these trade-offs?

And lastly, are you familiar with the DC-3, this -- (inaudible) -- CH-46?

MR. RIVOLO: Yes.

REP. ISSA: Are you aware that the FAA will not certify that aircraft today because it can't come out of a flat stall; it is an unsafe aircraft, even though it has the most amount of hours and the safest record of any aircraft in aviation history?

MR. RIVOLO: Yes, I'm aware of that.

REP. ISSA: So the FAA certification you spoke to, although important, is not always the only telling factor.

MR. RIVOLO: No. Not at all. But if I might say, that at some point we will be back to this committee with a different issue.

REP. ISSA: I have no doubt.

MR. RIVOLO: Because that rare event -- you know, it is a rare event; it will happen. And if you deliberately do not plan for that, then we will be called to answer. That's my only issue, sir.

REP. ISSA: It's a good one. And thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much.

I yield to the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.

REP. CUMMINGS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I tell you, if I was sitting here as a judge, I -- this is a -- to me, this is a continuation of this defense of mediocrity. And it bothers me tremendously. We got a spare-parts problem. We're cannibalizing planes that some say cost $64 million, others say more.

And how many people have been -- how many deaths have resulted from the use of the V-22, General?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: There was a mishap in 1992. I believe 4 people were there. Another mishap in 2000, nine years ago, where 19 were killed. And another in 2000, nine years -- less than nine years ago, where I think 4 were onboard.

REP. CUMMINGS: More than 30?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Just under 30, sir.

REP. CUMMINGS: And did -- there appears to be design problems with the V-22. It was designed with this forward-pointing chin gun, which was never mounted because of a lack of accuracy. Is that right?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Not a lack of accuracy, no, sir. I think we determined that the pilots had more important things to do than be attack helicopter pilots operating a chin gun.

REP. CUMMINGS: (Inaudible) -- couldn't be mounted on the side, since the rotors were in the way. And the windows were far too small for observational aiming. Isn't that right?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: That's why we're excited about the defensive weapons system all-aspect weapon that's made it through a developmental test. And it will very soon do an operational test this summer.

REP. CUMMINGS: Then we have an aircraft that -- it can be docked, take off and land from small decks and fly far inland, to drop off combat-ready troops, as the Osprey is supposed to do, would be particularly attractive to troops that deploy aboard ships.

However the V-22's turbo jet engines blow hot exhaust directly on the deck and burn away the no-skid surface and warp and sink the metal deck. As a result, flight operations have to be limited, so that V- 22s never sit in one place, with engines running, for more than a couple of minutes, an impossibility when launching over 30 aircraft.

Is that --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: That's not accurate, Mr. Cummings.

REP. CUMMINGS: Okay.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: You know, we have five weeks of sustained deployment operations now, from VMM-263, which was out on the USS Bataan. They are operating and doing a marvelous job. They carry more passengers, more cargo. Their readiness rates are higher than anyone else embarked with them.

What I think you're referring to, sir, is when -- (inaudible) -- are in a perpendicular mode to the ship, you don't want to leave them in a perpendicular mode for more than a few minutes.

REP. CUMMINGS: Right.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: You want to adjust them, which is fine to do on the deck. You adjust them after landing. And then you leave them pointed slightly. (Inaudible.) And you can do that for long periods of time, without any problem.

REP. CUMMINGS: How long can you do that?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Thirty to forty minutes. And if you're going to stay more than 30 to 40 minutes with your engines turning, on an LSD or an LPD, we've got to work around where we bring out essentially a hot plate that goes underneath. (Inaudible.) And then they can stay for an unlimited amount of time.

REP. CUMMINGS: But other than that, they could burn the no-skid surface of the --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well, they could if you didn't follow the techniques, tactics and procedures that we've developed, to accommodate that problem, which we've done.

REP. CUMMINGS: And General, you've said that there were -- you had concerns about availability of spare parts.

Now, I want to go to Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan, how significant is that? And where is that controlled in the process, the acquisition process? It seems to me that in the beginning of a process you figure out the spare parts that you might need. And the general has talked about how we're going through this evolution. And it seems to me that if we're truly going through an evolution and we are truly looking at the problems that we -- that are occurring, that we are -- you know, that are happening, that we would prepare for the spare parts, because cannibalization doesn't seem to be the best of alternatives. Where does it come in? Is that an acquisitions problem, or what?

MR. SULLIVAN: I think that is an acquisition problem. And generally speaking, in the best of circumstances, you would have a design maturity curve, so to speak, where you figure out your mean time between failure rates and your reliability rates, before you get anywhere near producing an aircraft. And then you work down that curve.

I think it's -- it's legitimate to say that, you know, this is somewhat an immature supply chain. But they have parts that are lasting only a third as long as they had predicted back when they had critical design reviews, 10, 15 years ago. So that to us should be a major concern. I mean, you know, they should be further down a design growth curve than they are today.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Sir, may I comment?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, I mean, if the chairman allows.

REP. CUMMINGS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: May I, sir?

REP. TOWNS: Please go ahead.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Sir, the issue is that you use engineering predictive analysis, so engineers predict how long parts will last. They predict mean time between failure. Every tight model series that enters into service, at about the 50,000- to 60,000-hour mark, which is exactly where the V-22 is, starts to develop an actual historical track record. The actual historical track record, when parts fail, is never the same as the engineering predictive analysis. And so when a part fails before it was predicted to fail -- which several parts on the V-22 have done -- you are not spared properly to immediately remove and replace those parts.

So there's a lead time involved. And that's what impacts all tight model series as they go through this particular stage of their life cycle. It's not something that I enjoy or appreciate, but it's typical of the way engineering predictive analysis goes in 2009.

REP. CUMMINGS: But I understand there's a storage problem, in that you had three times the number of parts needed and went through all of them. Is that true?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: No, that's not accurate at all, sir. I'm not sure where that -- who would say that.

REP. CUMMINGS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much.

I now yield five minutes to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly.

REP. CONNOLLY: I thank the chair.

Dr. Riv-OLO -- or is it RIV-olo?

MR. RIVOLO: Either way is fine, sir.

REP. CONNOLLY: No, no, it's your name.

MR. RIVOLO: It's RIV-olo.

REP. CONNOLLY: RIV-olo. Dr. Rivolo, you used some pretty strong language -- you used the word "reprehensible," you used the word "disingenuous" -- to describe the Marine Corps management of this project and this particular aircraft, in various contexts. You've heard both the colonel who actually operationally has maintained and flown the vehicle, and you've heard the general's explanation for cost overruns, cannibalization and operational capability. What's your reaction to what you've heard, in light of the strong language you put in front of this committee?

MR. RIVOLO: The strong language is feelings that I've had for many years, since 1999 when basically I discovered that the program was lying about the autorotation results that we were getting.

And these are official channels.

When I discovered that, it seemed to me that the whole program should have been reevaluated simply on this airworthiness issue. And instead, it was very quickly dismissed by a bogus argument that the aircraft can make engine-out landing as an airplane, which is true.

However, since the aircraft is both an airplane and a helicopter, it must meet airworthiness directives as an airplane and as an -- helicopter. So I have been very angry over this, because I've always looked at my job as looking out for the welfares of the people that ride in those airplanes.

I lost that battle. I had some very, very vicious, vicious fights with the acquisition executives, with the director of operational tests. And basically, I lost the battle. And my job is to bring it out. We had some meetings. We had meetings with the commandant. We had meetings with the secretary of the Navy. We had a horrible meeting in Duncan Hunter Sr.'s office.

All of that was hashed out and basically dismissed as irrelevant. And I don't believe that it is irrelevant to have an airplane that, when in helicopter-conversion mode, if there's a power interruption, everybody's guaranteed to die. And that is what we have in V-22.

REP. CONNOLLY: Well, let me ask you -- you know, all right, we've got an airplane that costs almost three times what it originally was estimated to cost. We've got an airplane that had some problems that had to be worked out that cost some lives. Yeah, we had some falsified records, but we're over that now. And the airplane seems to be -- and we've scaled back our expectations of the airplane. Maybe our expectations were too unrealistic.

And now it's performing well, though we have cannibalized it because we're not quite satisfied with the supply chain of spare parts. But it seems to be functioning and functioning well in a combat situation, even under extreme conditions, as the colonel indicated. What's wrong with that? Maybe we just need to scale back our expectations and accept the fact that the good should not be the enemy of -- perfect.

MR. RIVOLO: I think that that is exactly what we have been doing since the year 2000.

REP. CONNOLLY: But what's wrong with that? At least it's functioning and doing its job in Iraq.

MR. RIVOLO: There's the -- to different agendas, it has different meanings. To the operators, they -- V-22 is a phenomenal machine. It's an incredible machine. It has enormous capability, enormous flexibility. It is just a dream machine. But there are some idiosyncrasies that will come back to bite us at some point. And, historically, we in the aviation community have had rules, and we have abided by those rules.

REP. CONNOLLY: All right. Let me ask you a final question, because I'm about to run out of time. And I'll ask Mr. Sullivan to comment, if the chair will indulge, as well.

We had a question just a little while ago about, maybe the contractor should have been fined.

Assume -- the assumption behind that question is, the only people responsible for the problems with the scope of mission, design and operational capability and cost were the contractors somehow. To what extent did the Marine Corps, did the Pentagon, did the federal government -- to what extent should we bear responsibility for the acquisition process that turned out to be less than perfect? I mean, to what extent are we also culpable as the federal government?

MR. RIVOLO: We in the government? Oh, I think we're totally culpable. We are essentially saying, yes, your plane is not airworthy, but we're going to put Marines in it. It's okay because that rare event, it may happen, but it's not important. Okay? When it happens, we'll -- we'll talk about it, but it's not important, because the overall capability that this aircraft gives us is so great that we can do without that.

And I just think that's unconscionable. I'm sorry, but that's my position.

REP. CONNOLLY: I wonder if the chairman would indulge Mr. Sullivan to simply respond to that last question.

REP. TOWNS: Thank you very much. Let me begin by thanking the witnesses today.

At the outset of this hearing, I expressed strong reservations about the performance and cost of the V-22 Osprey, but I wanted to hear what our witnesses had to say before reaching a conclusion. What we have heard today convinces me that the dream of a viable high- speed, long-range, tilt-rotor aircraft has not been realized. Moreover, there is at least some evidence that the aircraft is inherently unsafe.

To sum up: It can't be used in hot weather; it can't be used in cold weather; it can't be used in sand; it can't be used in high- altitude locations; and it has restricted maneuverability. The list of what the Osprey cannot do is longer than the list that it can do.

Not only has the Osprey failed to live up to its initial ability, it has failed expensively as well. Our investigation indicates that we have gotten half the aircraft for three times the cost. That's not a recipe for longevity.

I'm looking to ask the staff -- I'm going to ask the staff to prepare a report on the finding of this investigation, which we will forward to the Appropriations Committee with recommendations for further action. It's time to put the Osprey out of its misery and to put the taxpayers out of their misery.

And without objection, the committee stands adjourned. (Sounds gavel.)

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