Sen. Cornyn's Daily Question for Judge Sotomayor

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Sen. Cornyn's Daily Question for Judge Sotomayor - Question 4

What is the role of statutory text in statutory interpretation?

Explanation: Although the Supreme Court's constitutional cases draw the most public attention, the bulk of the Court's work involves the interpretation of legislative enactments. Different Justices have articulated different approaches to statutory interpretation. Some Justices look solely to the text. They interpret the law based on what the law says. Others look to legislative history to attempt to determine the intent of Congress when the law was passed. Others try to identify Congress's general goals in enacting the law, and they interpret the law to try to further those general goals. Some mix and match approaches: They will rely on text in some cases, try to determine Congressional intent in others, and try to identify the purpose of Congress in other cases.

InShi Liang Lin v. United States Department of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d. Cir. 2007) (en banc), Judge Sotomayor joined a concurring opinion by Judge Katzmann that took an unusually clear perspective on these questions. Judge Katzmann's opinion, joined by Judge Sotomayor, announced the following approach to the interpretation of a 1996 law:

I believe one question is fundamental: What was Congress's purpose in enacting the 1996 amendment? Cf. Ai Feng Yuan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir.2005) (noting the "canon of statutory construction that requires us to reconcile a statute's plain language with its purpose"). In answering that question, we should not limit our inquiry to the language of the amendment; instead, we must look at the statutory scheme of which that amendment is a part and the legislative activity that led to its enactment.

Because judges sometimes mix and match methods, it is important not to reach any premature conclusions about Judge Sotomayor's approach to statutory interpretation. In my view, however, trying to follow Congressional "purpose" rather than statutory text is troublesome. The United States Constitution specifies how new laws are enacted. Those new laws contain text, not purposes: If Congress wants judges to follow its purposes, it can write those purposes into text. More broadly, judges who try to identify and follow Congressional purpose often reach the results they like rather than what the law requires. Statutes are often the result of many purposes held by many different legislators, and there is often no one purpose that judges can follow. In my view, the most objective guide to the law is the text itself.

Given the importance of these questions, I hope Judge Sotomayor will shed light on her views of statutory interpretation and the importance of statutory text.

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