National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005

AMENDMENT NO. 3354

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 3354.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. REED] proposes an amendment numbered 3354.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To require baselines for and testing of block configurations of the Ballistic Missile Defense System)

On page 33, after line 25, insert the following:

SEC. 224. BASELINES AND OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

(a) OPERATIONAL TESTS.-(1) The Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall prepare for and conduct, on an independent basis, operationally realistic tests of each block configuration of the Ballistic Missile Defense System being fielded.

(2) The tests shall be designed to permit the evaluation of each block configuration of the Ballistic Missile Defense System being fielded by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

(3) The Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall carry out tests under paragraph (1) through an independent agent, assigned by the Director for such purpose, who shall plan and manage such tests.

(b) APPROVAL OF PLANS FOR TESTS.-The Secretary of Defense shall assign the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation the responsibility for approving each plan for tests developed under subsection (a).

© EVALUATION.-(1) The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation shall evaluate the results of each test conducted under subsection (a) as soon as practicable after the completion of such test.

(2) The Director shall submit to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees a report on the evaluation of each test conducted under subsection (a) upon completion of the evaluation of such test under paragraph (1).

(d) COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE BASELINES.-(1) The Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall establish cost, schedule, and performance baselines for each block configuration of the Ballistic Missile Defense System being fielded. The cost baseline for a block configuration shall include full life cycle costs for the block configuration.

(2) The Director shall include the baselines established under paragraph (1) in the first Selected Acquisition Report for the Ballistic Missile Defense System that is submitted to Congress under section 2432 of title 10, United States Code, after the establishment of such baselines.

(3) The Director shall also include in the Selected Acquisition Report submitted to Congress under paragraph (2) the significant assumptions used in determining the performance baseline under paragraph (1), including any assumptions regarding threat missile countermeasures and decoys.

(e) VARIATIONS AGAINST BASELINES.-In the event the cost, schedule, or performance of any block configuration of the Ballistic Missile Defense System varies significantly (as determined by the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Agency) from the applicable baseline established under subsection (d), the Director shall include such variation, and the reasons for such variation, in the Selected Acquisition Report submitted to Congress under section 2432 of title 10, United States Code.

(f) MODIFICATIONS OF BASELINES.-In the event the Director of the Missile Defense Agency elects to undertake any modification of a baseline established under subsection (d), the Director shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report setting forth the reasons for such modification.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, I think if I could have an hour on my side.

Mr. WARNER. I say to the Senator, an entire hour on your side?

Mr. REED. I would not attempt to simply fill the hour. I would yield back time if we have reached a point where we have sufficiently discussed it.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would request we have an hour on this side, with the expectation we will be able to yield time back.

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Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, the suggestion of an hour on this side relative to the Reed amendment, would that include the proposed time for the second-degree amendment to be offered by Senator Warner? Does the hour that you have estimated you would need include time for debate on the Warner second degree?

The next question is this: If the Warner second-degree amendment prevails, which is a substitute, then the question is, Would the hour that you are referring to, then-without seeing, knowing exactly what would be in the second-degree amendment that would be offered-cover the debate time for your second-degree amendment to the substitute?

Mr. REED. If I may respond, it would be appropriate if we took an hour debating both the Reed first degree and the Warner second degree. At the conclusion of a vote on the Warner second-degree amendment, then there would be no time agreement entered into. It would be my intention to offer-

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise to offer an amendment which would implement the recommendations of the General Accounting Office for missile defense testing and base alignment. Last month the GAO issued a report on missile defense entitled "Missile Defense Actions Are Needed To Enhance Testing And Accountability." In its report, the GAO makes some commonsense recommendations to improve the testing of missile defense and to increase accountability of Congress for missile defense programming.

The principal recommendation is that at some point there is developed and executed a plan for operational testing. That is a very critical point. As the GAO pointed out, they would recommend to the Missile Defense Agency that they prepare for and conduct, on an independent basis, not within the purview of the Missile Defense Agency but on an independent basis, operationally realistic tests of those missile defenses. This is the way we develop and deploy major weapons systems in the United States. We do initial testing. We prove out the technologies. But before we field them, we go ahead and do a test on their operational capacities. That is the basic approach. It is a good approach, a sound approach. The GAO recommendations would make the missile defense programs consistent in this regard with all other programs.

The second aspect of the proposed amendment would be to require the Missile Defense Agency to require course baselines so that we know how much we are spending with respect to missile defense. We know what the course goals are. We know when they are exceeded or when they are constrained by good planning and good management. These are two fundamental aspects of any sound military procurement program.

Missile defense is one of the most complicated programs we will ever attempt to field in the history of this country.

I believe it is appropriate at this juncture to take a look at this missile defense system as it exists today. I think you will hopefully concur with me that we do need some realistic operational testing.

First, this is the basic architecture of the system. The system we are deploying in Alaska is designed principally, if not exclusively, to counter one potential threat-the threat of a missile coming from North Korea. Now, the system is composed of several major elements. I will review them.

First is the DSP early warning satellite. This is a defense system that has been flying since the 1970s. It is well proven, but essentially all this system does is spot the lift-off of an enemy missile, or potential adversary missile, coming out of North Korea or anyplace else. It was put up in the 1970s as part of the cold war to identify a Russian missile or Chinese missile being ignited. That is a rather established technology. It provides just the cue that an enemy missile has been launched.

The next part of the proposed system is the Aegis ships. They have radar, but it was designed not to track ICBMs. Rather, it is to track cruise missiles and close-in aircraft. They are being essentially pushed into the role of trying to acquire the target after it lifts off and track it as far as it can. It really cannot track that far because of built-in limitations. Again, this version was not designed to track long-range ICBMs. Their radar doesn't seem to be powerful enough to protect and track accurately to places such as Hawaii. Also, these Aegis ships have never guided an interceptor to its target in a single intercept test. They have done preliminary activities but have not guided an interceptor to a target in a test. The operational tracking software of Aegis has never been tested in an integrated test. So you have one element that is still not quite up to the speed we would like it to be in terms of the Aegis system.

The next part is the Cobra Dane radar system in Alaska. Cobra Dane is another 1970s version. It has been updated, but it has no real discrimination capability in terms of determining what a missile warhead would be or what a decoy would be. It is incapable of tracking a North Korean missile bound for Hawaii. So, again, we have a problem in terms of providing coverage. It has never been used in an intercept test, and there are no plans to do so because we do not have an ICBM target that can fly in Cobra Dane's field of view. Then we were going to have to replace Cobra Dane and x-band radar on Shemya Island. We don't have the x-based, land-based system. We are working on a sea-based x-band radar, not primarily for operational use but for test use, to be ready in fiscal year 2005.

The final one is the interceptor with the kill vehicle on top. Both the interceptor and kill vehicle are brand-new, and neither have been tested together in an intercept test. The new version of the kill vehicle hasn't been flight tested at all. It is coming off of production. There are new systems within the kill vehicle. It is an improvement, we hope, over the previous prototypes but has not yet been flight tested. Problems with the kill vehicle are seen as delaying the next scheduled test. That is the IFT-13c. That test is being touted by the Missile Defense Agency as a fly-by. So the next test-the one before this system is declared deployable and deployed-is not designed to knock the missile down but to simply fly by it. If it does knock it down, I am sure the Missile Defense Agency will take great pleasure in it, with great claim. By declaring it just a fly-by, they will have wiggle room for saying the test succeeded and saying we didn't intend to knock it down either. Ask yourself, if we are deploying a missile system in a most recent test to fly by the missile, is that going to protect the U.S.? I don't think that is the case.

My amendment would require that we do operational testing, which is something done on every major system. It is under the purview of Dr. Tom Christie in the Office of Test and Evaluation at the Department of Defense. He is charged by Congress with independently evaluating these systems on behalf of the Defense Department.

Some argue that we need to go ahead and deploy this system right away, that we have done it before, and that is fine. It turns out that we have deployed systems before in emergencies, such as the Predator in Kosovo in 1999. That system had already on the books operational testing plans. Indeed, when this emergency deployment was completed, that operational test was carried out the following year, 2000. This system is a rudimentary system with huge gaps in technology, which has never been fully tested on an integrated basis. None of these parts have been put together in one intercept test yet. This system has no plans for operational testing, which denies the obvious point of the custom and practice and the law in many cases.

The JSTAR surveillance system is another one which individuals will say was put into the fray before it was operationally tested. That is also true. In 1991, JSTARs were deployed in Desert Storm. Following the deployment, even though the Senate Armed Services Committee was so impressed that they wanted to deploy it without testing, the Air Force insisted upon operational testing. They found defects because of the testing. They completed the operational testing in 1995, and this testing revealed problems with respect to the inability to operate at the right altitude and inadequate mission reliability. These were corrected, so the JSTAR system is much more reliable today than it would have been without operational testing.

Once again, this system is untested in a systematic way, and it is not even scheduled for operational testing. The point of my amendment is not to delay or defer this deployment; it is simply to say at some point in time-some point when the Missile Defense Agency feels they are ready for operational testing-we should at least have operational testing. I believe that is absolutely critical.

There are examples now, too, of the tests that have been conducted. These suggest that the tests are not up to the level of operational testing. For example, for the tests conducted so far on this system, all of the targets have had beacons on them, telling the National Missile Defense Agency and the shooters, if you will, the exact location of the missiles coming in. I don't think anybody believes that an adversary would put a beacon on the missile to warn us. Those are the types of rudimentary tests taking place today. They are important tests but not operational tests. Indeed, I asked the Director of the MDA in March when we would stop using beacons on our target vehicles. He simply said he didn't know. That is not exactly the kind of realistic testing the General Accounting Office called for.

I mentioned Cobra Dane, which is the radar that is a critical piece. It will track this target for a long way, and it would hopefully be able to discriminate between decoys and the actual warheads. But we have, as I mentioned before, no plans to test this radar because we lack an appropriate testing vehicle, ICBM.

The other point, which is very important-and it goes to the heart of realistic testing-is that every intelligence analyst who looks at this problem has suggested that if a nation is capable of putting a nuclear device on a long-range missile, and particularly if they are so motivated to use it against us, they are likely to be just as capable of having sophisticated decoys or even rudimentary decoys on the missile.

We have never conducted tests against very sophisticated or even realistic decoys. As a result, we are prepared to deploy a system that has not been adequately tested. But more importantly, there are no plans to adequately test it.

My amendment would simply ask the Department of Defense, through the normal procedures, through the Office of Test and Evaluation, to prepare such plans and conduct those tests when appropriate.

These are just some of the examples I have given with respect to this particular system. There is a whole laundry list of what should be done to ensure that this system, when deployed, is appropriately ready for the challenge. This chart shows yes and no in terms of obvious parameters for a system that is about to be fielded. Most of the parameters have not been accomplished. In fact, the vast majority have not been accomplished.

There is no full system operational test. There are no tests, to my mind, that have integrated every part of this system, from Cobra Dane, the Aegis warships, to the interceptor with the new-kill vehicle with the new booster attached and flying out and engaging a target.

There is no full system operational test scheduled. We are not talking about a situation where we have to wait a few months or a year and there is an operational test planned for. By the way, these operational tests are not something that can be done on 2 or 3 days' notice. These takes months and months to prepare and plan and are extremely costly.

I do not really know, because it is hard to figure out the budget for MDA, whether they have put aside money for operational testing. It is hard to tell. We are not even scheduling these tests.

It has not been tested in bad weather. It has not been tested at night. Experts in the field indicate that is a very important aspect of ensuring the system will work.

Again, I do not think there is any American who does not want to see a workable system in place, but we have to raise questions when we have not done the testing to assure the American public that this system will work and will work as it is designed to work.

Tested three-stage booster and intercept test: This new package of the booster and kill vehicle has not been tested yet.

Tested without interceptor knowing in advance warheads infrared and radar signature, I mentioned that before. All of the data of the enemy warhead is essentially given to the forces that are trying to engage it. That is not a realistic test.

It has not been tested against a tumbling warhead, when the warhead detaches from the boost vehicle and spinning. That has not been tested.

Tested against realistic decoys and countermeasures: Realistic decoys would be something that looked like a warhead; just one other body that looks like a warhead. We have not done that. The decoys that have been used to date have been large spheres that look completely unlike the warhead.

It has not been tested against complex decoys. These are much more sophisticated decoys. We certainly have not done that. We have not reached the realistic level, let alone the complex level.

It has not been tested against more than one warhead on a missile. Again, if there is a nation out there that is capable of producing a nuclear warhead and putting it on a missile, they are probably capable-it may take a little longer-of producing multiple warheads and putting them on a missile.

It has not been tested against more than one incoming missile. If North Korea is going to attack us, why would they do something that would spell doom, first because of our overwhelming power to deter them, but second, what makes us think they will fire just one missile at us? I would assume they would fire multiple missiles, and we have not tested against that.

Again I mention this, we have not tested this without a GPS system, a beacon on the adversary missile and warhead.

Tests have been conducted by the contractors and managers. That is the first "yes" accomplished.

Tests overseen by Pentagon's independent test office: No, and that is the core of our debate today, because looking at the chairman's amendment to my amendment, what they are essentially saying is: Listen, we do not want the independent tester to look at this; we want the Secretary of Defense to prescribe this. That is not the way to do this because it just invites all of the problems with individuals testing themselves.

This is not as much a technical problem as a problem of human nature. You tend to pass every test you give yourself, particularly if it is important you pass the test. That is why we set up, in the eighties, this Office of Test and Evaluation with an individual who is appointed by the President, not the Secretary of Defense, to conduct these tests.

SBIRS high early warning satellites: This will be the follow-on to the DSP satellites. SBIRS is not yet flying. The original plan was to have SBIRS in this system instead of the old DSP system.

SSTS space tracking and surveillance system: This is another system not in place.

Cobra Dane radar upgraded: Yes, it has been upgraded, but not the x-band radar contemplated for this system. It does not have the power of the x-band. Even with this upgrade, it is still not capable of the discrimination that you need to separate decoys from the warheads.

The ground-based x-band radar I mentioned is not deployed. It has been essentially canceled.

Sea-based x-band radar is being developed. It is not yet deployed.

Question: Will it protect Hawaii? It is a question because of the coverage of the Cobra Dane, because the fact the Aegis system is providing an important part of the tracking system.

Fly before you buy: We are certainly violating that. We are buying the system without flying. That is the fundamental problem we are facing today. Yet we are going to declare the system operational. We can argue about that, and we have. Senator Boxer had an amendment which talked to that specifically.

My amendment is not about deploying the system. My amendment is about conducting operational tests at some juncture.
I believe this operational testing scheme has hit a nerve because, as I saw the chairman's substitute to my amendment, he basically said yes, we will do operational-in fact, he specifies a date. I believe it is October of 2005. That is pretty ambitious since we are not planning for any tests yet. It is also pretty ambitious since we do not have a suitable missile target vehicle that could fly from the vicinity of North Korea and go through the space in which Cobra Dane operates.

As a result, in a very short time, we would have to build a target missile, we would have to plan for the test, and we would have to integrate all these other pieces. Yet that is what the amendment offered by my colleague from Virginia would say.

The problem with the amendment is that it takes out of the loop the one person who is there to guarantee the independence, the rigor, and the accuracy of this test, and that is the Director of the Office of Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon. That is something I think is critical.

Again, given this list of items to be accomplished, it seems stunning to me that we are actually debating about whether we should just authorize and require at some point-and at this point, after deployment-operational testing, or at least to plan it. But that is the substance of the debate, and just as importantly, not just the operational testing, but the fact it is going to be conducted by an independent agency within the Pentagon, not by the people who are graded by whether they pass or fail. Again, not high tech but human nature. I think more people are comfortable with having someone objectively design the test and supervise the test than having the people who have everything to lose and everything to gain do that.

There is one other aspect of my amendment I want to mention, which is important, and that is the notion of baselines. The GAO came back to us and said: No one seems to know how much the system is costing because there are no baselines.

They pointed out, for example, that there was a $1 billion overrun of the cost goal of missile defense to be fielded starting in September, but the Department of Defense never explained to Congress this overrun. Instead, they simply changed the cost goal.

How can we evaluate this system? How can we make difficult choices between investing in missile defense and increasing the end strength of our Army, if MDA suddenly says, well, our objective was X, but we found it cost us a billion dollars more, so now it is X plus one billion? We have to have a baseline. This is all designed to have appropriate control and appropriate notification to the Congress about the status of this very complex system.

Additionally, this cost goal change was surprising because the GAO also noted that originally the system in Alaska to be deployed in September was to have 10 interceptors, and now it is 5. So not only did they change the cost goal by increasing the amount of money they are spending, but they lowered the number of interceptors and also, I think by fair inference, the capability of the system. High cost, lower capability, but yet it was not communicated to us.

My amendment would ask them to prepare the baseline, to communicate to us when those baselines are exceeded. If we do not have that, then we will not have the ability to do our job, which is to supervise appropriately and oversee the activities of the Missile Defense Agency in the development of this very complicated system.

There has been a great debate about whether we should deploy this system. I found it interesting to note that President Reagan was approached years ago by some Congressmen and Congresswomen who wanted to deploy then the existing system. This was in August of 1986. According to the Frances Fitzgerald's book about President Reagan "Way Out There in the Blue," here is what he told those Congressmen:

I know there are those who are getting a bit antsy [to deploy a missile defense] but to deploy systems of limited effectiveness now would divert limited funds and delay our main research. It could well erode support for the program before it's permitted to reach its potential.

Once again, we are not debating today the deployment in this amendment. We have had that debate previously with Senator Boxer. We are not debating deployment. We are simply debating let us plan to do the operational testing. Let us get that operational testing done at some point because otherwise we are literally getting a system that is untried. No one wants the first time this system is fully operationally tested to be in the deplorable and horrific situation of a missile heading toward us.

So I would hope that we could, in fact, adopt the Reed amendment, have operational testing planned for it, have baselines established to be able to monitor this system as we should and be able, I hope, to assure the American public that when we say it is in service, it will work. There is a difference between telling them it works and proving it in operational and realistic testing. I hope we can do that.

I reserve the remainder of my time in response to my colleagues.

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, how much time do I have?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island has 35 minutes 38 seconds remaining.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, if you could interrupt in 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I was very interested in hearing about the letter from Mr. Christie. I have not seen it. I am getting a copy of it.

But as I heard my colleague from Colorado, Mr. Christie seems to be saying that this system is not ready for operational testing yet, that it was premature to operationally test it. But it is ready for deployment in September? I think the notion of deployment is this thing is ready to operate; certainly it is at least ready to begin the threshold operation for testing. So I can't think of anything else that more strongly emphasizes the need for operational testing.

We have all heard the terminology, evolutionary spiral development, new techniques, et cetera, but the basic question here is: Does it work? No evolutionary spiral jargon avoids that question. Related to the question, does it work, is: What can it do? What do we expect this system to do? And then, of course, you validate that by testing under realistic conditions.

None of this is taking place. None of this is planned. I believe my colleagues when they say they want to see this operational testing. But there is no plan to operationally test now.

I find interesting the notion that Mr. Christie says it is premature to test, yet in the amendment to my amendment offered by Senator Warner there is a specific deadline of October 1, 2005, that a test will be completed.

My amendment doesn't do that because I do recognize the fact that these are very difficult technological issues, that there is great concern about getting the system up and running. There are multiple pieces from space-based radar to ships at sea to land-based radar to booster rockets and kill vehicles. Yet interestingly enough, the Warner amendment would lock in a date of October 1, 2005, to test the ballistic missile system. Yet Mr. Christie is talking about it is too premature, et cetera.

I think the approach I have taken is simply saying at some time in the future we need operational testing. Please lay out a plan-a plan, of course, can be modified-and before these new steps in the process are put into effect, let's have the operational testing. I think it makes a great deal more sense.

Also, there is a question about limiting developmental testing and operational testing by saying, when you do operational testing, you can't do developmental testing. Actually both can be conducted in virtually the same test. I think one of the major differences between developmental testing and operational testing is that developmental testing is designed by the proponent agency and the contractors and they are supervised by the proponent agencies and contractors. Operational testing is designed by Dr. Christie's office, the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, and supervised and conducted by those individuals from that particular office. It is quite appropriate. It is done frequently.

The Patriot was an example of a system that had both operational and developmental testing taking place. Indeed, the Patriot is another good example of the need for operational testing.

The upgrade PAC-3 missile defense system had a very good record when it was in its developmental phase. It was just doing extremely well. Then they started the operational combat, realistic test phase, and the Patriot PAC-3 failed each of these operational tests. It had four consecutive operational test failures. What did that suggest to you about this system?
This system might pass all these tests, as some have argued watered down as they are, but it could pass all of them. Well, the PAC-3 system passed all the development tests and then had four consecutive failures in a row in an operational test.

If we have four consecutive failures in a real operational test of this system, I think the American people will be quite shocked, given the fact we are not planning any operational test, yet we are deploying the system.

Luckily, with the PAC-3, there was time to fix the problem.

These operational tests were not only conducted, but the problems were fixed. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the system was deployed. It worked very well when it engaged missiles. But again, there are still some difficulties. At least one friendly aircraft was engaged and destroyed by a PAC-3 system. Two were destroyed, suggesting that all the problems with the system in terms of target identification, in terms of proper response and enemy versus friendly targets in the air have not been fully resolved. It is a complex system. This system is much more complex and complicated. But the PAC-3 is a very good example of what we should be doing here-that is, operational testing, learning from those tests, fix the system, and keep doing it continuously.

Again, I think it is an interesting notion about this spiral development and everything else. There has to be consistent, constant testing because that is how you learn so you can make the changes. Yet, again, we don't have an operational test planned for this particular system. I believe we have to have something like that. Again, the national missile system is very complex. We have to have this system.

Part of the Warner amendment to my amendment takes out the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and lets the Secretary of Defense prescribe the criteria. Let me suggest that in the last several years, Dr. Christie has been advising and consulting. But nothing has happened in terms of operational testing. Each year, he reports to his superiors and to the public at large. In each one of those reports, he calls for more realistic testing. Apparently he is consulting and is not particularly effective. But that is exactly what the Warner amendment to my amendment would do-simply make him a consultant.

The reality is, as a consultant, his voice would be no more prominent than it is today. We don't have an operational testing plan. We have not conducted operational testing yet, and yet we are deploying the system. It seems to me that the Warner amendment waters down further the operational testing. He calls it operational testing, but then it takes out the operational testing, giving it to the Secretary of Defense.

We have seen that this Secretary of Defense is committed to getting this program into the ground by September of this year regardless. That doesn't give me and I don't think it should give the public the confidence that a rigorous realistic testing scheme will be developed. But then the amendment goes on to say within a year we are going to have that, we are going to mandate the test. It seems to be slightly schizophrenic. We don't want the normal procedures, we don't want the Director of Test and Evaluation to be doing it, we want the Secretary of Defense to do it, but he is going to do it by October 1 of 2005.

Again, I don't think the amendment really responds to the problem and the issue. The issue and the problem is developing, as we have done for every other system. PAC-3 is an excellent example of operational testing and planning, and then ensuring that the operational tests take place-not just calling for operational tests but having the independent operational testing agency within the Pentagon designing and conducting the test. That is what my amendment does. It doesn't call for any specific deadline. If the conclusion of Mr. Christie were to be that it couldn't be feasible for 18 months or 2 years, at least we have gotten an operational test plan, and we will conduct the test. That, to me, would be a vast improvement over the current situation.

I hope my colleagues will not favorably respond to Senator Warner's amendment and give me a chance to have this amendment agreed to.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am just a bit taken aback by the claim of flexibility. The Warner amendment actually sets out a date certain when the tests will be conducted. Particularly, since it is a year away, particularly Mr. Christie is talking about it is premature because it is in the developmental stage. I thought his letter was quite specific. The ground-based midcourse defense element is currently at a material level which requires continued developmental testing with oversight and assistance from operational testing personnel conducting realistic testing in the near term. I guess the question is, What is "in the near term"? I suggest it would be a year or more. It would be premature and not beneficial to the program.

Let me reiterate that this is an extraordinary letter. It says basically this system is not mature enough to test, but we are going to deploy it. I think that is very unusual, particularly given the history of having other systems where, even though they had not completed their operational testing-like the Predator and JSTARS-the plan for operational testing had already been sketched out-not by the Secretary of Defense but by the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

I think the flexibility is in my central amendment. It talks about before you deploy a block or a spiral-the new terminology might be "spiral," but what they are going to do essentially is what we do so often: build the system to a certain capability; then, through tests or experience or through actual field trials, develop new software, new technology, and new complements that can make it better. At a certain point, rather than just simply tweaking here and there, you go back in and you develop a new block. That is roughly to me what the spiral development is, minus the catchphrase. Before you do that, we should have operational testing.

I think this is a very critical aspect. My amendment does not intend to stifle flexibility. It has no correlation with deployment. That is an issue that is going to be determined-and has been determined. We had votes on that, but somewhere along the line we need to do operational testing.

I must say I would be much more impressed with the degree of commitment to this operational testing if at least we had a plan for operational tests, a plan prepared by Mr. Christie. We do not have that. At least that would signal that we are serious about operational testing. In fact, that should have been done. It says this system is so immature that we cannot even get to the point of developing a plan to test.

Once again, the amendment is not only reasonable but it is compelling. This is what we do when we develop systems. Again, I suggest it is something we should do.

There is another aspect of my amendment which is very important and that is the baseline. Again, we have to know how much is being spent, what are the cost goals, what are the capability goals with respect to the system.

The GAO discovered-we did not discover this because of the way the books are kept-a $1 billion cost overrun. Rather than reporting it, making it obvious or tracking it, they simply changed the cost goals. In conjunction with that, we find that rather than having 10 interceptors, as they originally talked about in terms of cost goals, they now have 5 interceptors. The situation is that the costs have gone up by $1 billion and capability has gone down by half. Now we have a situation where we were unaware of it until the GAO discovered this.

Call it spiral development, call it evolutionary development, that should not be. One would hope this sophisticated development process, this new form of development, would mean that costs are more transparent, more accurate, and the capability is more obvious. That does not seem to be the case.

Along with the notion of developing operational testing is developing the baseline. None of that is in the Warner substitute to my amendment. I cannot see any discussion of establishing baselines, of making sure the costs are appropriate, of alerting Congress to overruns, rather than just changing goals.

I hope my amendment would be adopted and could be adopted.

I yield the floor, and ask at the conclusion we might think about whether it is appropriate to continue debating or to yield back time.

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield 8 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. REID. Six minutes?

Mr. REED. Six minutes.

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, how much time remains on each side?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island has 7 minutes remaining. The Senator from Colorado has 29 minutes remaining.

Mr. ALLARD. Does the Senator from Rhode Island wish to draw this to a close and move to a vote?

Mr. REED. I think I will speak for about 5 minutes, and at that point we can call for a vote.

Mr. ALLARD. And I will make just a brief closing comment for about a minute or two. Why don't we go ahead. The Senator can make his statement, then I will make my brief statement, and we will move forward to a vote. I think we may have to go into a quorum call briefly before the vote and get things in order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, first, I want to emphasize, again, that this amendment does not affect the deployment decisions that have been made with respect to the missile system. Again, also, we have all talked about operational testing, its importance, and that you have to do it. I would be much more confident if, in fact, there was at least a plan today for operational testing. Mr. Christie and the Department of Defense could have developed that over the last year or two. His letter said this system is so immature that I cannot even begin to think about operational testing.

Once again, let me raise the obvious. If it is that immature, then what do we have up in Alaska? Is it going to be a deployed missile system or a test bed? Or is it going to be both? That is the real core of my amendment. The real core is that sometimes, unrelated to deployment, we have to have operational testing.

I argue that my amendment provides even more flexibility to the Department of Defense because it doesn't set a date certain of October 1, 2005, when this test must be conducted. I don't think we can make that date, frankly. I think we will find ourselves back here on the next Defense authorization bill striking that, extending it, or pushing it out because, to me, that is an unrealistic, inflexible deadline.

For that reason alone, I urge my colleagues to think particularly about the Warner amendment. There is a suggestion I would unduly hobble development. As I read Senator Warner's language, he directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that each block configuration of the ballistic missile system is consistent with the operational scheme, which is precisely what I am saying. But I am not dictating a specific time to do that. The real key difference between Senator Warner's proposal and mine is that he is reversing the customary and prudent way to do independent operational testing. He is taking away the independence.

The independence, institutionally, is found in Mr. Christie's office, the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, not in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Everybody here has to recognize that there is no more political, ideological issue than missile defense in terms of the national security debate. It has been that way for 20 years.

To suggest that the Secretary of Defense and members of the Cabinet are going to be as independent as someone whose job and career it has been to render objective judgments about weapons systems and deployability and effectiveness is, I think, defying logic. This is not rocket science, it is human behavior. Why are we going to build into the system all those objective judgments and objective pressures that any Secretary, regardless of party, regardless of administration, must feel when something this big is before him to decide?

That is why we created a system 20 years ago where there is an independent Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, with a director appointed by the President and who is not directly subject to political whims, the whims of contractors, or the needs of contractors to make sure the funds keep flowing. That is the big distinction between our amendments. We want operational testing, but we want it to be independent. That is the GAO recommendation-independent, realistic operational testing.

We are not specifying to do it next week. We are not saying you cannot deploy until you test. In fact, I am removing myself from the timing. As I said before, I think it is unrealistic to assume that there can be an accurate operational test by October 1 of next year. It is not going to slow down the deployment or development; I don't think so. It is going to make sure we learn from each step, each mistake, and each achievement. That is what good operational testing does.

I feel very strongly that the Warner amendment is trying to talk about operational testing, but the heart of it is not. It is subjective evaluation that has been going on now for years with respect to this missile program. I think we have to get back to independent evaluation. We can do it with my amendment, and we can also ensure that we get baseline information about how much is being spent, and the MDA cannot, in 1 year, decide that they are a billion dollars off in the cost estimate so they change the cost estimate. That is another example documented by GAO of the temptation to funding programs when you are the tester and the testee. That is what the Warner amendment would do.

So I hope, sincerely, that the Warner amendment can be defeated and that we can move on and adopt the Reed amendment. In the spirit of our prior comments, I will yield back my time.