Panel II of a Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - "North Korea: Back At The Brink?"

Statement

Chaired By: Senator John Kerry

Witnesses: Evans Revere, President, The Korea Society; Leon Sigal, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science Research Council; Nancy Lindborg, President, Mercy Corps; Victor Cha, Csis Korea Chair, Ds Song Professor of Government and Asia Studies, Georgetown University

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SEN. KERRY: If we could ask the second panel to quickly come up and take their seats so we can have a seamless transition, that'd be terrific.

I would ask each of the following panelists if they would try to summarize their comments in five minutes or less. Your full statements will be placed into the record as if read in full. And this way, the committee will have more chance to be able to explore the previous panelist with you and your own thoughts.

We're going to lead off with Victor Cha, Mr. Revere, Leon Sigal and then Nancy Lindborg.

So Victor, if you'd begin, that'd be terrific.

MR. CHA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee. It's a pleasure to appear before you again to talk about North Korea.

I've submitted a statement for the record, which I would like to be part of the record. And I wanted to focus my comments more on some of the discussion that took place during Ambassador Bosworth's testimony, in particular some of the questions, I think, that committee members were asking.

The first was that one of the committee members was asking how the financial measures worked that were used in 2005. And there, essentially what we did was the Treasury Department issued a financial advisory, something called a Section 311, to U.S. financial institutions to be aware of doing business with a particular bank in Macau that was thought to be holding North Korean accounts that were dirty.

That was a very isolated action, but it had the effect of causing many other banks around the world and regulatory agencies to ask, "Why is the Treasury Department doing this?" And when they understood the reason for it, they then, under their own initiative, started to either freeze North Korean assets or ask that these accounts not be held in their banks, so that you had a tremendous ripple effect in the world that greatly impeded North Korea's ability to do business.

Now, this isn't the average North Korean, because the average North Korean does not have an ATM card that they can take money out of the local Citibank. This affects largely the elite and the leadership.

The second thing I would mention with regard to these financial measures is that when the Bush administration did them, they were largely a U.S. action where the United States was then going to other countries and regulatory agencies in Europe and elsewhere, asking them to take certain actions.

The big difference now is that a U.N. Security Council resolution that calls for the designation of certain entities for financial sanctions makes this much more of a multilateral effort. And I think it becomes much easier to gain cooperation among other countries' regulatory agencies and banks.

The second point that I wanted to make, again, addressing some of the questions in the earlier session, is this whole question of the inspection regime. To me, although we don't know everything about the U.N. Security Council resolution, to me what's most interesting is the effort, the very strong effort by the administration and by the Perm 5, to develop an inspection regime to counter the proliferation potentially of weapons or fissile material by North Korea.

This is a very important step. And institutionalizing some sort of inspection regime would, I think, even have more value on the counterproliferation side than the financial measures themselves. You assume that the financial measures would be taken after the nuclear test. But to ramp up a strong inspection regime and counterproliferation regime that the Chinese and Russians would cooperate with would be a very useful thing for the world and for U.S. security interests.

The big question, how North Korea reacts to these sorts of things, I think, you know, clearly when the Bush administration undertook some of these financial measures, many people argued it led to North Korea's first nuclear test. And the question arises whether these financial measures will then lead North Korea to their third nuclear test. And I don't think we know the answer to that. We do know that they need to face consequences, as President Obama said, for their actions. And this appears to be the best way to do it.

I would agree with the points that were made earlier about China. I think China is very important on the pressure side to get the North Koreans to return to the negotiating table. There are all sorts of pressure that China can put on North Korea that is not reported in public trade figures.

There's a wealth of interaction that takes place between the militaries and the parties of these two countries, between the leaders, individuals in both the militaries and the parties, where they can do things and send very clear messages that are effective in terms of persuading the North Koreans to come back to the table, but at the same time, don't look like the Chinese are kowtowing to the United States, because the Chinese never want to be seen as kowtowing to the United States.

Finally, in the few seconds that I have left, while I was part of an administration that took North Korea off the terrorism list, I do think that the administration should seriously consider putting that back on the terrorism list. We've had ballistic missile tests, a second nuclear test, and then most recently the taking of these two American women as detainees in North Korea. And I think that we should do whatever we can -- the U.S. Congress, the administration -- to get these two women out of the country, because no American should be imprisoned in North Korea.

Thank you for your time.

SEN. KERRY: Thank you, Mr. Cha. We appreciate that. We'll get back to you on this.

Mr. Revere.

MR. REVERE: Chairman, thank you. I'm deeply honored to appear before this committee today.

I'm here as somebody who has spent much of the last 40 years working on the Asia-Pacific region, much of that on the two Koreas, China and Japan. I'm also here today as someone who's been a long- time advocate of diplomacy with North Korea. And through several U.S. administrations during my career as a diplomat, I made the case that diplomacy, dialogue and mutual respect were a lot more likely to yield the results that America sought and to yield them at a more acceptable cost than were policies based on confrontation.

And I base this judgment on years of studying North Korea and on hundreds of hours over some 12 years of negotiating with North Koreans. And through this experience, I came to understand what motivates the North Korean regime, its strengths and its weaknesses.

And my advocacy of negotiations with Pyongyang has always been based on two principles: The first, that North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons represents a direct threat to U.S. national security interests; and two, that eliminating this threat requires a concerted diplomatic effort and an effort aimed at determining whether North Korea was prepared to make a strategic decision to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions in return for things that the United States might be prepared to offer.

In the past, there were many times when American diplomats, including myself, had very serious reason to believe that such an arrangement was possible. And today I am disturbed to report that this may no longer be the case. Today there are disturbing signs that North Korea may finally have made a strategic decision about its nuclear weapons, and that decision may be that Pyongyang intends to keep its nuclear weapons and that the North will seek recognition by the United States and the international community that it is now a nuclear weapon state.

I'm drawn to this conclusion because of statements that North Korean officials have made to me over the last year and to virtually every American visitor to Pyongyang in recent months. It's also based on the DPRK's public utterances and actions with respect to its nuclear weapons capability.

I am delighted to have heard so many references to former Secretary of Defense Perry's comment with respect to dealing with North Korea as it is. I accompanied Dr. Perry to Pyongyang on his historic visit, and I could not agree with that assessment more.

And dealing with North Korea as it is, we are faced with the following, just since the beginning of this year. North Korea has abrogated the 1991 North-South denuclearization accords. It has ousted IAEA inspectors from Yongbyon. It has walked out of the six- party talks. It has begun to restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. It has conducted yet another nuclear test, and it has done so in contravention of its own formal commitment to denuclearize.

The Obama administration's response to all this has been measured and calm, but firm. And early on, President Obama appointed Ambassador Bosworth, my distinguished colleague of the last 30 years, as his special representative. And for anyone who knows Ambassador Bosworth and his reputation, that appointment clearly signaled a U.S. intention to deal with Pyongyang at a high level and in a positive and pragmatic way.

And many Americans who deal with North Korea, including me, were deeply impressed by President Obama's commitment to diplomacy and to resetting relations with adversaries. And as a result, we conveyed to our North Korean interlocutors in the strongest possible terms in recent months that the arrival of this new administration was an historic opportunity to put the U.S.-DPRK relationship back on track. Unfortunately, North Korea has thus far rejected these overtures.

In my longer statement, which I respectfully request be made part of the formal record, I discuss what may be behind Pyongyang's actions, and many of those points have been made earlier in this hearing. But to summarize, I think North Korea's recent behavior may have much more to do with its internal agenda than with its external relations. Whatever the reason, Pyongyang's actions do suggest that North Korea is seeking to establish a troubling and unacceptable new paradigm in relations.

So where do we go from here? I think many of the steps that the administration has taken so far are right on the mark, including closer consultations and the other steps mentioned by Ambassador Bosworth. And taking all of those steps that have been mentioned by Ambassador Bosworth will exert clear pressure on North Korea, maximize solidarity with our allies, and drive home the message to the DPRK that the path that it is on will lead only to further isolation and suffering.

Let me also say that I would strongly recommend that the United States keep the door open to people-to-people, cultural and other exchanges with North Korea. These are important ways of exposing North Koreans to the truth, and the truth is something that we can employ at great advantage in bringing about future change.

Let me wrap up my comments by just saying it is not too late for North Korea to halt this free fall in relations with Washington and its neighbors. Pyongyang can still choose to accept the outstretched hand that has been offered to it. The United States is prepared, as it should be, to build a better bilateral relationship with Pyongyang based on mutual respect, non-hostility, and the complete end of the North's nuclear weapons program; in fact, those principles used to form the core of the DPRK's own negotiating position, and I would strongly urge Pyongyang to return to those principles.

Thank you.

SEN. KERRY: Thank you very much, Mr. Revere.

Mr. Sigal.

MR. SIGAL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. KERRY: Pull the mike down and a little closer, please.

MR. SIGAL: How are we doing?

SEN. KERRY: Good.

MR. SIGAL: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee.

You have a written statement which I'd like entered into the record. It can be summed up in three very short points that leave lots of room for questions.

First, we do not know many things we need to know about the North's nuclear program, about the way the regime is working. We do not know what many people assert, which is that the North won't give up its nuclear weapons.

The fact is, the more we say they won't, it only encourages our allies to fear that we are not trying to get them to give them up through serious negotiations. So, I would say that the only way we can find out what we need to know is (through) sustained diplomatic give-and-take. And we do not know whether the North is ready for that, but we've got to find out.

Second, with respect to change inside North Korea, collapse is certainly a hope, but hope is not a strategy. It seems to me the only strategy that can bring about much needed change inside North Korea -- however gradual and grudging, is sustained engagement and people-to- people exchanges. Like the symphony orchestra that the Korea Society did, where the Korean -- North Korean people were exposed to something that undercut years of North Korean propaganda, of hostility to the United States.

There was the Philharmonic playing, and there were tears in the eyes of some of those North Koreans in audience. And everybody in North Korea was exposed to it on their own television. It's an interesting way -- however gradual, nothing grand, to bring about change.

Finally, it seems to me the heart of our problem is that -- despite all the talk about sanctions, and military possibilities, and all options remain on the table, the sad fact is that we lack leverage to force the North Koreans to do what we want it to. The only way I know to get leverage is through engagement that gets them dependent, over time, on us. And then, if they don't live up to their obligations, those things can be stopped or withdrawn.

I know of no other way to get leverage. It is a terrible fact that we're at the mercy, to some extent, of a regime that is hateful. But, we have to learn how to deal with it, and a diplomatic strategy seems to me the only one that has a realistic chance of getting anywhere. Thank you.

SEN. KERRY: Thank you very much. Thanks for the summary.

Ms. Lindborg, thank you very much.

MS. LINDBORG: Thank you -- thank you, Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished members of the committee. I'm pleased to be here today.

We're certainly gathering at a time of increased tension, and I would like to focus my comments today on a slightly different topic, as a representative of a non-governmental organization. I've submitted comments for the record, and I'll try to summarize in a few key points.

SEN. KERRY: Thank you.

MS. LINDBORG: The first is that there is an ongoing, continuous engagement with U.S. non-governmental organizations on meeting critical humanitarian needs within the DPRK. I've been involved in working on these issues since the emergence of the serious famine in the mid-'90s when my organization, Mercy Corps, responded to those very critical needs.

There have been a handful, perhaps a dozen of NGOs that have stayed engaged since then -- working on food security, health, water sanitation programs, and sponsoring delegations and exchanges that work on technical understanding, improved understanding between our peoples.

This decade-plus of experience have enabled us to understand the realities, the constraints, the opportunities of how we can work together, how we can understand the technical opportunities for improving the lives of the North Koreans, and improving mutual understanding.

Since the famine of the mid-90s, where estimates of those who died range from 280,000 to more than two million, the acute famine has definitely subsided. However, chronic food shortages remain, and the U.N. estimated, as of November of last year, that there was still an approximately 1.8 million metric-ton food shortfall, which would leave 8.7 million of the most vulnerable without adequate food intake and nutrition. It's not famine conditions, but it's chronic malnutrition. So, the need remains, is my second point.

My third point that I'd like to highlight is a brief description of the USAID supported food program that recently ended. This was a ground-breaking program that shows us a way of how we can constructively engage on meeting real humanitarian needs that we understand exist.

In 2008, USAID negotiated a protocol with the DPRK government in which there would be provision from USAID -- 500,000 metric tons of American food. Of this, 400,000 went through the World Food Program, and 100,000 went to a consortium of five NGOs.

Mercy Corps was the lead. We were joined by World Vision, Global Resource Services, Samaritan's Purse, and Christian Children's Fund. All five of us brought more than a decade of experience in working on the ground in providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea.

The groundbreaking aspect of this program was that the agreed- upon protocol between the two governments served as the basis for the NGOs' negotiated agreement with our counterparts in the DPRK. This enabled us to, in a more accountable way than ever before, identify the need. We identified 900,000 children, elderly, pregnant and lactating women, in the two provinces of our designated area, as the beneficiaries of the food.

We were able to indicate, at all points of the distribution, who the donor was, and people were very clear that the food was a gift of the American people. We had significant levels of access -- from the port, to the warehouses, to the institutions, including household visits; and we were able to field a team of 16 food monitors, in- country, for the entire nine months of the program.

Most importantly, this program serves how we can constructively work with our North Korean counterparts to develop and deliver a program that begins to meet international standards of food delivery, based on needs that we agree upon, and in an approach that we jointly implement.

As I note in my testimony, regrettably this program was ended early, at the request of the North Korean government, on March 31st. However, all five of the participating NGOs, as well as our other NGO colleagues, continue our work meeting humanitarian needs within North Korea, still focused on the very real needs around food security, health, water sanitation.

We all believe that humanitarian engagement is vital to maintain. The political tensions between the U.S. and DPRK governments remain well-known. Humanitarian assistance has been one of the few areas of continuous positive steps forward throughout the last decade. We believe these humanitarian programs meet critical human needs and demonstrate the best of the American people; maintain open lines of communication with the North Korean people.

Thank you very much.

SEN. KERRY: Thank you all very much.

So, Mr. Sigal, when Kim Jong Il gets his debrief on what the Americans are saying about him today, and they report that, "Well, you know, this guy named Sigal went before the Foreign Relations committee and said all they have to do is get some leverage on them, and then, you know, make them dependent."

Wouldn't they, sort of, have gamed that out? Isn't that maybe one of the reasons why they're very content just to remain isolated and not be dependent, and they went the opposite way when they were offered it a little while back?

MR. SIGAL: That may be. But, he's promised his people not just a strong country, but a prosperous one by 2012. He can't do that on his own. The only way he can do that is with a political accommodation with us, South Korea and Japan that allows him to reallocate internal resources; get aid and investment from the outside.

If he wants to give up on prosperity, I think that's trouble. And I think there is no sign he has changed that view -- the rhetoric remains the same. So, at some point, I think he will come and want to deal with us

. I also think he needs us for his security. He did not want to be dependent on China. His father didn't want to be dependent on China. That's why they reached out to us back when. I think those fundamentals don't change.

North Korea lives in a dangerous neighborhood. If it can turn the former enemies into friends, it is much safer. So, I think those things remain, and those things ultimately will make him dependent on us.

SEN. KERRY: Then, why do you think he's gone about it the way he has?

MR. SIGAL: I don't know.

I think it is possible to see what we have as a man who's trying to force us to be his friend -- doesn't trust us, has somewhat reasonable grounds for not always trusting us; much weaker country; and a Korean tradition where, for centuries, Korean leaders have made deals with the key neighbors rather than standing up to them.

What is father did, and what he did -- partly to legitimate their rule, is, "we are standing up to all the great powers." That's very bad if he chooses to do it just with weapons. But, as Colin Powell put it very well, "You can't eat plutonium."

If he chooses simply to stand up to the other powers, simply to go for strength and not for prosperity, that's not a very good solution for him. And it's certainly not a good solution for his successor whenever that person takes power down the road. So Kim Jong Il needs to move.

SEN. KERRY: Any of you can respond to this question. Is there any danger at all that, in just going back to the table and pursuing this other route -- incidentally, I think you have to do it, because I don't think you have many choices -- but what is the danger level with respect to the reward-of-bad-behavior argument?

MR. SIGAL: Well, clearly what we want to do is reward good behavior. And you only do things where -- as I suggested with one kind of series of steps, you only do things when they do things that you want them to, and you structure the deals that way.

The fact is we didn't always do that, and that's a sad fact here. North Korean behavior is inexcusable. What they're doing now, I don't have to tell you, is harmful to them, harmful to us; above all, harmful to our alliance relationships down the road, which is a very important reason why we have to get back to this negotiating table to see what we can get.

SEN. KERRY: The flip side of that question, Mr. Cha, is -- so it goes to your proposal with respect to redesignating them as a terrorist country. First of all, are there not specific legal standards that apply to that designation? And do not these steps he's taken actually fall outside of them?

But equally importantly, wouldn't that designation at this moment in time potentially just escalate the ladder of tit for tat and perhaps undermine the ability to get to the table where you need to do the constructive work of diplomacy, i.e., premature?

MR. CHA: Well --

SEN. KERRY: If it applies.

MR. CHA: Right. Well, in terms of getting back to the table, I think everybody wants to get back to the table. The only way we get closer to anything resembling a freeze and a cap on their capabilities is through negotiation. So as bad as that might seem at the current moment, it's something that we eventually have to get back to.

You know, having been a part of these negotiations for about three years as our deputy head of delegation, I can tell you, sir, that I have very little confidence that the North Koreans are wanting to give up all their nuclear weapons. I think they're willing to give up some of them, for all the things that we've talked about -- assistance, normalization, peace treaty. But in the end, they're not willing to give up all of them. And that's a difficult thing for a negotiator to have to deal with as they go into a negotiation. You still have to have negotiation because you want to maintain a cap, freeze, disable and be able to degrade their program.

On the question of the terrorism list, there are legal criteria for being put on and taken off this list. But I think it's also fair to say that there are also political -- there's a political environment in which a discussion of putting a country on or taking them off the list is quite relevant.

And I think when North Korea was taken off the list, there were criteria that justified their being taken off the list, but there was also a broader framework in which that was happening in which many people expected the North Koreans would live up to their end of the second phase of the six-party agreement, the verification protocol, and they did not.

Since then, as you know very well, they've done a nuclear test, the second nuclear test. They're threatening a third nuclear test. And most recently they've taken these two Americans and threatened to throw them for 12 years into a labor camp. That's not the right political environment. So I would appeal, both on legal grounds as well as on the larger political grounds.

SEN. KERRY: Senator Lugar.

SEN. LUGAR: Mr. Cha, you mentioned that in 2005 other countries voluntarily closed North Korean assets. You had the (single ?) situation in Macau, and -- (inaudible) -- important, because you point out if, in fact, we had Security Council resolutions and clearly a multinational-international idea here, that the sanctions, at least through that forum, would be much more comprehensive and complete and that the -- (inaudible) -- leadership, which is important. I suspect we can make some headway with some of the followers, but the leadership is what counts, unfortunately, at this particular moment, even thinking about negotiations.

I'm really struck by the fact that after the negotiations we've been involved in, after Yongbyon is partially disassembled and so forth, this reversal is really striking; and then, beyond that, nuclear test, missiles flying over Japan, all the rest of it. We can speculate whether they're having an internal problem politically, but the effects on the rest of the world are very severe.

And I would be in favor, really, of moving very strongly toward the economic sanction route -- (inaudible). I think that made a difference (in the beginning ?). I think that's why we got to the table to begin with, in fact. There had not been really much movement prior to that point.

But I'm also intrigued by your thought about an inspection regime. Now, describe really what an inspection regime, a counterproliferation regime, means or how that is set up.

MR. CHA: Sure. Well, I mean, the first point on that, Senator Lugar, is, as you know well, I mean, for denuclearization, we need a negotiation. If we don't have a negotiation, we have to focus on counterproliferation. And I think what often gets missed in the media discussion of the inspection regime is they focus on the high seas interception, where a comprehensive inspection regime, that would just be one small piece.

SEN. LUGAR: Yes.

MR. CHA: The bigger areas would be cooperation by the Chinese and Russians at ports in terms of container cargo, in terms of the practice of bunkering at third-country ports, as vessels that may be carrying bad North Korean things need to stop on their way to their final destination.

If all of these things become part of a U.N. Security Council resolution, and then, as Ambassador Bosworth said, there is an enforcement or a monitoring mechanism within the U.N. Security Council of countries who are abiding by it, that would be a much more effective way of trying to counter proliferation than if the United States, on its own, as we were doing during the Bush administration, trying to go out individually and persuade countries to do this, that was a much harder route. And I think this process would be much more effective and would position the United States much better.

SEN. LUGAR: I agree. And it seems to me the essential diplomacy, right for the moment, is with all the rest of the world.

MR. CHA: Yes.

SEN. LUGAR: Now, in due course, we may get some diplomacy because the North Koreans do find it necessary. But our job right now is the Security Council, to make certain that if we go the economic- banking route or if we try to set up a nonproliferation (team ?) -- because, after all, the items that the North Koreans are getting revenue from, their major exports appear to be through these very dangerous substances, information, weapons.

So this is another essential cutoff, and a very important one in terms of the security of the rest of the world, quite apart from whether we ever get to the table with the North Koreans, just in terms of our own safety and others in the process of all of this. And that's why it seems to me your idea of a counterproliferation regime really needs some more explanation on your part, perhaps some greater information, if you published such, to give us some outlines in terms of our own thinking of how these things work, so the American people understand how they work.

Now, at the end of the day, the North Korean leadership may still say, "We're simply going to keep threatening the world," as they are. They're claiming if we put any of these sanctions on, we can expect war on their part. This is not a regime that looks to me like it's headed to the table happily and willingly. And you're saying even if we got to the table, the reticence to give up all nuclear weapons, to have some accountability for this, you think is clearly a place too far. Why do you reach that conclusion?

MR. CHA: Well, I just -- I feel as though -- and this isn't just the second term of the Bush administration -- we've been negotiating with North Korea for some 16 years. Evans Revere and others have been involved in this process during the Clinton administration. There have been several high-level envoys that have gone to North Korea.

And yet this process still leads us only to the point where we got at the end of the Bush administration of freeze and then beginning a process of disablement, in spite of the fact that all the things the North has asked for have been put on the table -- peace treaty, normalization, economic and energy assistance, a negative security assurance in the 2005 joint statement which says that the United States will not attack North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons.

So if security was driving their need for nuclear weapons, the negative security assurance and everything that came with the political and material incentives should at least offer them enough of an incentive to push harder forward on the process. Yet in our negotiations they continued to falter when we got to the most crucial moments.

SEN. LUGAR: Thank you.

MR. SIGAL: If I might, Senator, without taking issue at all with port inspections and other things, I think we really have to keep our eye on the plutonium. The North has a likely response -- nothing certain about the North -- to what's going on right now, which is to restart the reactor at Yongbyon, which would generate more plutonium.

I think we have to try to prevent that from happening. And I don't know a better way than negotiation. I think we can't risk a war here. We have Seoul as a hostage. And I think if you keep your eye on plutonium, right now they have a very limited supply, limited enough so that they had to reprocess in order to have enough for another test. They're going to have to test some more if they want to prove their weapon.

I think we have some very serious stakes here that go beyond the narrow issue of the plutonium. Think about an unconstrained North Korean nuclear program and its effects on the politics of Japan and how that plays back into the politics of China. That is the real security risk to the United States of America. And I don't know any other way to stop it -- guaranteed, it might not work -- than through a negotiating process.

SEN. LUGAR: I see my time, but I would just say, especially, Professor, of course we want negotiations. The whole point we're trying to make is the North Koreans have deliberately walked away from it, have shot missiles across Japan and done a nuclear test. Of course you want negotiation. But until we really do something as an international community, I don't see much movement in that respect.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. KERRY: Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator Corker.

SEN. BOB CORKER (R-TN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this most timely hearing, and for all of you all being here.

I obviously sense, Mr. Sigal, then, that you, Professor Sigal, that you think the outline that Mr. Cha has put forth, then, is counterproductive to those -- (inaudible).

MR. SIGAL: I didn't say that.

SEN. CORKER: So you think that the broadness of sort of keeping proliferation from occurring is -- that's too broad and we ought to focus only on plutonium? Is that what you're saying?

MR. SIGAL: No, what I'm saying is you have to do both. We need to be able to impede the North from getting things it needs to make more nuclear weapons and missiles and from sending things abroad. We do need to do that. But we can't stop there, nor should we consider that the pressure we're putting on them now will have the immediate effect of stopping them from making more plutonium. That's part of our problem.

I have no objection to part of what he said. I think we have to do that. And I'm glad that the Chinese are willing to join with us. But we should not see that as a solution. And I think, if I heard Ambassador Bosworth say this, I think that's his view as well. I think that's the administration's view, if I heard it correctly. I think that's very important here. And it is very hard. We should not -- there's no grounds for optimism. It's just we don't have an alternative.

SEN. CORKER: And I sense, in another breath, your concern about war. You talked about the South. So it seems to me that there's a slight variation in what you're saying. I mean, what is it, do you think? You're talking about Mr. Cha's efforts and what he's put forth and how you feel that may lead to war.

So what it sounds like to me --

MR. SIGAL: I'm sorry. I didn't mean to be misunderstood that way.

SEN. CORKER: Okay.

MR. SIGAL: No, no. I think if you are trying to get rid of the plutonium facility by attacking it, that's a risk. That's a different thing -- that's a different thing from --

SEN. CORKER: Yeah, I would be pretty sure that would lead to war.

Let me just --

MR. SIGAL: Thank you.

SEN. CORKER: -- let me ask you this: What is it that we have, specifically, that you think they truly want at this time? I guess, I hear you talking about the security issue. Certainly, it seems to me that their actions do not indicate creating partnership with our country, as it relates to their security, is what they're trying to achieve.

So, that doesn't -- it doesn't seem sane that they would take the course they're taking, if that's their objective. So, could you outline what you truly think they're after, that we have today? Maybe they want in a circuitous route and I'm missing something, but what is it today you think they're after that we have?

MR. SIGAL: What this has been about -- and we do not know if it is still about that; what they have told U.S. officials -- the earliest I know is 1999, they told Arnold Kanter that, under secretary of State in the Bush years, was they wanted a strategic -- They wanted to be our ally, to put it in plain English. That was the way for them to get security.

Do they still want that? I do not know. But, if you think about -- if you put yourself in -- and it's very hard to do -- (laughs) -- put yourself in Kim Jong Il's shoes, how can he feel secure? Do nuclear weapons alone make him secure? I don't think so.

But, if he has a fundamentally new relationship with us, Japan and South Korea, that's a different story. Okay, but he can't count on that. And he has seen that we've been reluctant to move that way. And, therefore, he keeps threatening us with the nuclear.

But, in the end, if you look, what we can't have a good explanation of -- if we think it's just about nuclear weapons is, why did he limit his production of plutonium over these years? It is very hard to understand. It is very hard to understand why the North Koreans have not tested missiles over and over again until they have reliable missiles. They certainly have the capacity to do that.

Something else is going on here, and what I don't know is if it's still going on. But, we have to find out.

SEN. CORKER: Ms. Lindborg, you know, the notion of talking about prosperity in the year 2012 -- from his point of view, what was your experiences inside -- what was your experience inside the country, and your sense of his "desire," if you will, based on what you saw, what your organization saw in working with these other groups, that there was a better well-being, if you will, for the citizens of his country?

MS. LINDBORG: Well, from the perspective of the last 13 years, there's no question that North Korea is better off than it was in the mid-'90s when they were gripped with a very serious famine. Things have definitely improved since then, but, as I noted, there's still a significant food and security, particularly when you go into to rural areas, which is what our programs have focused on.

SEN. CORKER: But, is there any -- I mean, this would be -- is there sense within the agency that there's any desire on the part of the leadership of North Korea that the standard of living, that the quality of life, that the people there -- who are living there, that they're even concerned about that? Is there any sense of that, as you deal within that country?

MS. LINDBORG: You know, we are not dealing at the highest political levels, so I would actually defer to my colleagues who may have better informed opinions than I do on that.

SEN. CORKER: Mr. Revere, you want to -- ?

MR. REVERE: Over the years, in discussions with fairly senior DPRK officials, we have repeatedly encountered opportunities in which we've discussed the welfare of their people and America's desire to help.

And it was my experience over the years that -- at least the people that we were dealing with were genuinely concerned about the welfare of their people. Many of the negotiations that I participated in in the past focused on the issue of food assistance. and humanitarian assistance, and new projects designed at helping the North Korean people.

And I would say I have never encountered a DPRK official who brushed aside the needs of their people. The people that we were dealing with -- the officials that we were dealing with took this very seriously. So seriously that hours and hours and hours of negotiations were devoted to this topic of, 'how can we best improve the lives of their people.'

MS. LINDBORG: Actually, Senator Corker, if I could just add onto that.

It is undeniable that the recent food program that we just conducted had very high levels of approval and support. And that was, in and of itself, I think important evidence of the desire for the -- ensuring that there was well-being.

SEN. CORKER: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And thank each of you.

SEN. KERRY: Thank you very much.

We need to wrap-up in a couple minutes. Just one quick question.

The proliferation threat is the threat to the United States of America right now, barring some missile development that we're not aware of. But, even then, strategically, fundamentally, the proliferation issue is the challenge to us.

China, however, Russia, South Korea and Japan have far more immediate and, frankly, pressing strategic concerns. Why can they not summon a stronger response, given their surrounding clout and already existing leverage -- particularly China?

Mr. Revere?

MR. REVERE: Senator, I've been talking with the Chinese since the late '70s about North Korea. And I find today a remarkable difference in the tone and content of our dialogue with the Chinese -- my conversations with the Chinese, from those days.

I find, more and more, Chinese officials, but particularly senior think-tank representatives and former officials, with whom I've had long relationships, looking at North Korea in a very different way today. And I've had a couple of Chinese officials actually use the term "security liability" in their descriptions of North Korea today. That's a remarkable thing for even semi-official Chinese to say.

The bottom line to this is that I think attitudes in Beijing are changing. We're starting to see op-eds. We're starting to see publications come out very clearly questioning past policy with respect to the DPRK.

I think we are at an important turning point, in terms of Chinese attitudes towards North Korea. I don't want to overstate this, but I think we are at a turning point.

One final point on Japan. Japan has been very much focused on one issue in recent years -- the abduction issue. A serious, and emotion and important issue? Yes. But, I think it has focused to such a degree on that issue it has not focused as much attention as it should on other very immediate and important threats to Japan, such as North Korean missiles.

When the United States started to move away from fulfilling our part of the bargain on the missile moratorium that prevented North Korea from launching medium- and long-range ballistic missiles for the better part of seven years, we did not hear great cries of opposition and anger from Tokyo that I had expected we would hear. That was very unfortunate.

And one of the things that I hope we do when we get back to the table with the DPRK -- and I believe we will eventually get back to the table with the DPRK, is put the missile issue back on the agenda.

SEN. KERRY: Well, let me -- did you have a comment? I'm just --

MR. SIGAL: No, I just --

SEN. KERRY: No, I (wasn't ?) --

MR. SIGAL: Just one thing with respect to China. I don't think fundamental Chinese interests have changed yet. Instability is a problem, not simply nukes. And I think that means that to expect China -- for instance, as some people hope for, to cut off all food and fuel to North Korea is to make it act contrary to its interests.

And I would say -- I think the chairman, and certainly Senator Lugar knows, this is hardly the time to put our relations with China in jeopardy over North Korea. If we decide to push it too hard --

SEN. KERRY: (Inaudible.)

MR. SIGAL: -- but, China's going to do a lot more, I think, to get tough with North Korea. And we will not always see it, but they're going to do that. That, I agree with -- totally with Evans.

SEN. KERRY: Well, I don't think we're -- I don't think we're going to put our relationship in jeopardy over it. I don't think we're going to need to.

MR. SIGAL: Right.

SEN. KERRY: You know, it's interesting, in diplomacy and in international relations, sometimes the biggest opportunities are staring you in the face when things look the bleakest.

I do not agree that just because of all this saber-rattling, and internal succession game going on, and so forth, I'm not, frankly -- I'm concerned about the proliferation issue, but I'm not concerned that there is an impasse that we can't get over, or there isn't a way to get back here.

I believe, ultimate -- I think there are mistakes that have been made on our side of the fence over the last few years too. And they don't get heralded enough but -- you know, there were some promises made about certain things being delivered, and they were never delivered; there were misinterpretations about -- (inaudible) -- the post-9/11 atmosphere altered; "the axis of evil;" and other kinds of things; you know, Iraq had perceptions of regime change in other countries. A lot of attitudes shifted and people responded to those things.

And, personally, I believe that if we behave as confidently as we ought to, given the superiority of a number of strategic fronts in which we're sitting here, not to mention the presence of Russia, China, South Korea -- and South Korea and China alone are enormously strong, and we will remain committed to South Korea's strength -- we got a lot of, you know, we've got a lot of cards to play here.

And so I'm really quite confident that if we play them adeptly and intelligently, I think South Korea -- North Korea's longer term interests, with respect to a security arrangement -- a treaty, not an armistice from '53, but an understanding of where we go; an economic future, I think there are ways to get through this. And so I think the key here is to get back to the table, and not do things that make it harder to get there rather than easier.

So, that's just a quick-summary take on it. I think your views have been helpful, important. I think it's been to air this. And we have a distinguished visitor coming in about five minutes, and so we've got to get over to the Capitol to meet him. And I apologize.

I will leave the record open for a week, for colleagues who'd like to submit any questions. And we will certainty -- if you want to articulate any further, in answer to what I just said, or anything any other senator said, we will invite that, because we'd like to have as complete a record as possible. And we may just follow up with you to that effect.

So, thank you very much. I think it's been very helpful. We stand adjourned. (Sounds gavel.)

END.

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