Hearing Of The Seapower And Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee Of The House Armed Services Committee - Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request For Department Of The Navy Aviation Programs

Statement

Hearing Of The Seapower And Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee Of The House Armed Services Committee - Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request For Department Of The Navy Aviation Programs

Chaired By: Rep. Gene Taylor

Witnesses: Vice Admiral David Architzel, Usn, Principal Military Deputy To The Assistant Secretary Of The Navy For Research, Development And Acquisition, U.S. Navy; Rear Admiral Allen Myers, USN, Director, Naval Warfare Integration, U.S. Navy; Lieutenant General George J. Trautman, Usms, Deputy Commandant For Marine Corps Aviation Programs, U.S. Marine Corps

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REP. COURTNEY: The hearing will come to order. As some of you probably noticed, I am not Congressman Gene Taylor from Mississippi. I'm Joe Courtney, who usually sits much further down on the dais up here from Connecticut. And Mr. Taylor had a sudden call out of the building and asked me just to fill in to get the hearing started. Hopefully, he'll join us in a short period of time. And I'm very pleased that the former chairman of this subcommittee, Congressman Bartlett, is here to make sure I don't do anything that will damage the committee's processes. Mr. Taylor has prepared an opening statement, which he asked me to read into the record, and I'm going to do that right now, and then we'll proceed with Mr. Bartlett's opening comments.

Today the subcommittee meets to receive testimony from Navy and Marine Corps officials on their aviation programs contained in the fiscal year '10 budget request. Today we have with us Vice Admiral Architzel --

MR. ARCHITZEL: Architzel.

REP. COURTNEY: -- serving as principal military deputy to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Stackley for the Navy and Marine Corps research, development and acquisition programs, Lieutenant General Trautman, serving as deputy commander -- commandant for the Marine Corps aviation programs, and Rear Admiral Myers, serving as the director for integration of all naval warfare programs.

Gentlemen, thank you for taking the time out of your busy schedule to be with us.

Much like the Department's shipbuilding programs, aviation programs of the Navy and Marine Corps are not without issues. The most apparent issue is the amount of the budget request and the number of aircraft requested. The aviation budget request for this year is $4.6 billion greater than last year's plan for the fiscal year 2010, but the overall quantity of planned aircraft purchases has decreased by 20. Very similar to shipbuilding, the amount of funding requested has steadily gone up, but the quantity of aircraft purchased has steadily declined.

I'd like to outline the program and policy issues that, at a minimum, I would like our witnesses to address.

First, the primary policy issue that I would like to address is that of the Strike Fighter inventory of the Navy and Marine Corps. Over the last three years, all four congressional defense committees have had a steady stream of Navy and Marine Corps witnesses testify before them about an impending Strike Fighter shortfall. This shortfall is predicted to peak in the middle of the next decade.

Right now, current analysis puts that peak at 243 aircraft in fiscal year 2018, but if you account for the accepted risk that each service has informed Congress that they are currently incurring, the peak shortage of aircraft climbs to 312 in that same year. What is more troubling is that it appears that there is a disconnect between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Navy.

Officials from OSD have recently briefed this committee that there is no Strike Fighter shortfall, but that the totality of Strike Fighter inventory is a matter of analysis in the Quadrennial Defense Review. In other words, OSD has already predetermined the answer and now they'll use the QDR to build the equation.

I request that the witnesses explain today what the position of the Department of Navy is regarding the Strike Fighter shortfall and if they are aware of any new analysis by the Joint Staff or OSD which would contradict what is apparently simple arithmetic. Because, the last time I checked, an aircraft carrier is only worth its weight in gold if it has an embarked air wing. In other words, 90,000 tons of American sovereignty becomes 90,000 tons of American helicopter transportation.

Next, there are a number of programs, and I know we may not have time to discuss all of them today. They're of high interest to members of this subcommittee.

The first program is the F-18 Super Hornet, which ties directly with the strike fighter inventory discussion, but I would like to understand -- what I would like to understand is why the Navy reduced its program request by nine Super Hornets in fiscal year 2010 over the predicted request in last year's budget.

It is our understanding that the program is executing very well, on cost target and on schedule. Yet with the Super Hornet line executing well, the Navy and Marine Corps have opted to increase their fiscal '10 buy of Joint Strike Fighter F-35 aircraft by two at an estimated cost of $236 million each.

I know the Department prefers the advantages of stealth, but given the high-risk and high concurrency regarding the development, testing and production of the F-35, we need to understand at what point that putting combat-proven "rubber-on-the-ramp" Super Hornets is more advantageous than waiting for an experimental aircraft that is behind its original schedule by more than two years, over its original program budget estimate by more than $65 billion, and has already reduced its planned inventory quantity by more than 400 aircraft.

The GAO has noted in its most recent F-35 report to Congress that the program estimates an additional $2.4 billion is needed to cover cost overruns on the air system and engine contracts and to incorporate the one-year extension to the development schedule. The prime contractor has already extended the manufacturing schedule three times, and due to ongoing manufacturing inefficiencies and parts supply problems with its subcontractors, has only delivered three out of 13 aircraft. Nine aircraft should have been delivered by now.

I would like to understand why the Department wants to accelerate F-35 procurement between 2010 and 2015 by purchasing 28 additional aircraft above its current program of record. It is my understanding that F-35 contracts are planned as cost reimbursable instead of fixed price, and this magnifies the financial risk to the government.

Has the Department learned nothing from the fiascos of the VH-71 program and the Littoral Combat Ship program? The F/A 18 Super Hornet can be purchased for somewhere in the neighborhood of $50 million on a fixed price contract. For the F-35 the cost growth per airframe alone is $38.3 million. I think we have a great airframe in the F/A 18 Super Hornet. It is affordable, it is multi-mission, and it is flying off our carriers in combat today. I would like our witnesses to explain why this committee should recommend removing funds from a proven program to increase procurement in a developmental program.

And briefly, I would like to address the VH-71 program. The Navy invested over $3.2 billion, received nine test and pilot-production aircraft, yet was unable to successfully execute this program that ultimately was cancelled by Secretary Gates. I would like to understand what the plan is for the current aircraft assets that have already been delivered, and what is the plan going forward, and how the mistakes of the original program will be prevented from happening in the next program.

I understand the E-2-D program may be on the verge of a significant Nunn-McCurdy breach. I would request the witnesses to comment on the health of that program.

Finally, I understand that although the MV-22 has performed extremely well in combat operations in Iraq, the aircraft is having sustainment issues and unforeseen additional costs associated with maintenance. Are there ongoing efforts at design changes to address some of these maintenance issues?

I realize I have outlined a number of issues facing naval aviation. I believe these are fair concerns and deserve an open and public accounting of the costs and benefits of these programs. What I am not willing to do is sit by as program after program breaks the bank on costs. I have seen enough of that in shipbuilding programs. We can no longer afford unaffordable programs. I believe it is time to step back and build what we know works, make it better if we can, and get the capability to the sailor and Marine who need it today, not ten years from now.

Again, I thank the witnesses for joining us today, and now I would like recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

REP. ROSCOE BARTLETT (R-MD): Thank you very much. I will read our ranking member's opening statement into the record. As you will see from line of questioning later, if it were my opening statement, it would be a bit different.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our witnesses. We meet this afternoon to receive testimony on Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs, which is an area with many challenges. Naval aviation has been a major component of our mighty -- military might since World War II. Our ability to project power great distances onto shore from any ocean in the world has been vital to U.S. national security. Our aircraft carriers have become a symbol of American diplomatic power and freedom and are the heart of our modern Navy. As the saying goes, when a crisis arrives, the first question on everyone's lips is where is the nearest carrier?

Unfortunately, our Navy faces a significant Strike Fighter shortfall in the near future. And what good is an aircraft carrier without aircraft? Last year, the CNO testified to a Fighter shortfall of approximately 125 planes for the Department of the Navy by 2017. This year, based on an updated analysis, the Navy has told Congress that a more realistic estimate is a shortfall of over 240 planes. And this assumes that the Joint Strike Fighter delivers on time and the Navy will continue to resource its carrier air wings with fewer aircraft than is called for in the national military strategy.

If the Joint Strike Fighter program is like most of our programs, it will not deliver on time, and so the real shortage will be well over 240 planes. For the Navy -- resource to its full Strike Fighter requirement, the shortfall would be greater than 300 aircraft. What does all this mean? Simple math shows that at least five of our 11 carriers would be without Fighter aircraft, or we would be forced to severely limit the number of aircraft per carrier and available for training. In either case, a solution may pose a significant strategic risk.

I'm deeply concerned that this budget actually makes the shortfall worse by cutting the number of Super Hornets the Navy is buying. Facing a gap of at least 243 planes, the Navy is only asking for nine Super Hornets. In a few months the Navy has gone from considering another multi-year procurement of Super Hornets to cutting the buy of F/A 18's in half. This makes no sense. As I told the CNO last week, we either need more planes, or fewer carriers. I do not think anyone in this room believes that fewer carriers is the solution.

Unfortunately, as Congress has tried to wrestle with this issue, the Department of Defense has refused to obey the law and has been anything but transparent. The DOD has not delivered a report on cost and benefits of a multi-year procurement of F/A 18's required by law by March 1, 2009, not delivered the 30-year aviation plan required by law, not delivered a future years defense program with a budget as required by Section 221 of Title X United States code, and has refused to brief Congress on the apparently differing estimates on the size of the Fighter shortfall.

Is this the transparency that President Obama promised? Does the Department of Defense consider itself above the law? Let us be clear. The mere existence of a Quadrennial Defense Review does not exempt the Department from filling its legal obligations. While I understand that the witnesses this afternoon are not responsible for these decisions to violate the law, let me say at the outset that the Department cannot expect to use the QDR as a get out of jail free card. Our witnesses should understand that this committee expects and deserves answers, not evasive maneuvers.

Before closing, let me briefly mention a few other concerns that I hope the witnesses will address. First, the development and testing of the Joint Strike Fighter remains uncertain. The fact that we are already spending billions of dollars to buy these planes when we have only completed a fraction of the testing deeply concerns me. I believe that we will continue to see costs and schedule slips, and I'm concerned that in a constrained fiscal environment we will continue to see growth in this expensive program.

The Joint Strike Fighter may be a great weapons system, but it seems to be the 99 percent solution that Secretary Gates said we should avoid. I would also like the witnesses to comment on where we stand in terms of electronic warfare capabilities today. Are we meeting the needs of this combatant -- of the combatant commanders? What are the Marines doing about electronic warfare? Will the Navy continue to provide expeditionary electronic warfare capability on behalf of the Air Force? There's much work to be done in the area of naval aviation.

Let me again thank the witnesses for being here today, for the work they're doing for our nation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I yield back.

REP. COURTNEY: Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. We've been joined by Mr. Coffman. Do you have an opening statement?

REP. MIKE COFFMAN (R-CO): No, I don't, Mr. Chairman.

REP. COURTNEY: Thank you. The buzzers are going off. There is votes. The good news is these are the final votes of the day, and there's only three. Why don't we have -- admiral, why don't you submit your remarks, and then we can take a brief recess for the members to go vote, and we'll come back, and we'll -- we should have the rest of the afternoon clear.

MR. ARCHITZEL.: Mr. Chairman --

REP. COURTNEY: And again, you can have your statements entered for the record.

MR. ARCHITZEL: Chairman Courtney and Congressman -- ranking members, distinguished committee members, it is my honor to be appear before you today to discuss the Department of the Navy's aviation procurement program. I would like to have my written statement submitted for the record.

REP. COURTNEY: Without objection.

MR. ARCHITZEL: As the Department of Navy's acquisition lead, we develop and test and acquire our country's naval aviation weapons systems by balancing performance, schedule and cost effectiveness.

The fiscal year 2010 budget supports the Navy Marine Corps' Joint Forces -- capable of meeting the wide spectrum of threats to our nation, both today and in the future.

The Department continues the development (and low rate ?) initial procurement of the F-35 Lightning 2 and E-2-D Advanced Hawkeye CH-53 Heavy Lift replacement helicopter, the P-8A Poseidon Unmanned Aviation and New Strike weapons capabilities. We will procure our first full rate production in 18 Growler aircraft this year and continue procurement of the F and 18 Super Hornet, the V-22, the T-6B (JPATS), UH-1 and AH-1 Zulu helicopters, the 60 Romeo and Sierra helicopters. In total, Navy/Marine Corps aviation will procure 98 tactical and fixed wing aircraft, 100 rotary wing aircraft, and five BTUAVs for a total of 203 aircraft with the fiscal year 2010 funding.

The Navy's acquisition professional workforce, dedicated men and women of civilian and military career fields, are working to bring the most capable and affordable weapons systems to the fleet. By developing new technologies, testing, and integration of systems and the procurement of equipment and support for these weapons systems, they execute the funds and policies of this budget request. I am proud to represent them before this committee.

The Navy is committed to funding and fielding the Joint Strike Fighter as a highly capable fifth generation multi-mission Strike Fighter. JSF is in the eighth year of design -- of its design, development and test program. Three STD aircraft are in ground and flight test. All F-35 variants are projected to meet their respective key performance parameters, or KPPs. The F-135 engine has completed 11,300-plus test hours on 16 engines through mid-April 2009. Systems integration testing continues on plan via flight tests, flying lab, and over 150,000 hours of ground laboratory testing. A fully integrated mission system jet flies in 2009.

I'd like to note the good news of the P-8A Poseidon acquisition program. We are leveraging the efficiencies of the commercial production bulk product, Boeing 737, to realize the technologically advanced product in a shortened acquisition timeline. This aircraft will be delivered only nine years after program initiation, and will be both extremely capable and affordable. In FY '10 we will procure six LRIP Lot 1 aircraft. The program will commence flight tests later this year in IOC and FY '13.

Another good news story -- the N18 Growler has completed its operational test and is preparing to go before the Defense Acquisition Board for a product decision later this summer for reproduction. We have delivered 16 aircraft to Whidbey Island, and are on track for IOC in September of this year. In FY '10, we will procure 22 production aircraft.

The E-2-D Advanced Hawkeye has completed over 92 percent of its STD program in operational assessment, and currently has two aircraft in flight tests that have flown more than 1,000 flight hours. The aircraft has already demonstrated that its advanced radar delivers three times the range of Legacy radar, and provides the detection required against advanced threats of today and tomorrow. The program we presented to the Defense Acquisition Board for Milestone C decision by the end of this month -- we need to award a contract for two LRIP Lot 1 aircraft by June 5th to keep the (pilot ?) program on track.

We are continuing the vision to meld Manned and Unmanned Air Systems, or UAS, in the future of tactical aviation by exploring an Unmanned Combat Air System, or N-UCAS, technologies and capability. Our current demonstration efforts include maturing technologies for actual aircraft carrier catapult launches and (rested ?) landings, as well as carrier control to airspace integration, including area refueling through a hybrid Navy or Air Force refueling system.

I'd like to thank the committee for your continued support of the Navy and Marine Corps aviation and the opportunity to testify for the committee. I welcome your questions regarding the Department of Navy's acquisition programs.

REP. COURTNEY: All right, thank you, admiral, and if the other witnesses have statements, we'll take them up when we convene after the recess. Okay, the committee stands -- brief recess. (Recess.)

REP. : Everything's cool.

REP. : Okay.

REP. GENE TAYLOR (D-MI): The subcommittee will come back to order. We're now going to hear from Lieutenant General George Trautman, (sir ?).

MR. TRAUTMAN: Good afternoon, sir. Chairman Taylor, Congressman Akin, distinguished members, it's a privilege for me as the leader of Marine Corps Aviation to appear before you today to discuss the President's 2010 budget submission.

Sir, in the interests of time, I'll truncate my remarks and just -- if it's all right with you, put -- submit them for the record.

REP. TAYLOR: Without objection, your statement will be submitted for the record.

MR. TRAUTMAN: In both the chairman's opening statement and the ranking's opening statement mention was made of the V-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. If I could, I'll just read that part of my statement for you.

First, the MV-22 Osprey -- we've just finished the three highly successful combat rotations to Iraq, and just last week a fourth Osprey squadron sailed toward the fight with the Marine expeditionary unit that will be deployed for the next six or seven months. The Osprey has transformed the way we are fighting in a manner akin to the introduction of the helicopter in the middle of the last century. We can now project combat loaded Marines, soldiers, and special operators from a sea base or any forward site deep into the battle space at the speed of a KC-130, and we can do it at altitudes above the ground threat that has claimed so many helicopters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. And then we can land the payload anywhere it is needed, just like a helicopter. With its speed, range, and survivability, the MV-22 is truly a game changer.

Another game changer for us will be the F-35, the short takeoff and vertical landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. In the fall of 2012 when the Marine Corps stands up its first operational squadron, the MFA-332 -- this fifth generation stealth aircraft will begin replacing our F/A 18's, 88's, and the A-6B's with a single platform that far exceeds the operational capabilities of any of the tactical aircraft being flown today.

The Joint Strike Fighter gives us the operational agility we need to support the Joint Force in the hybrid battles that loom on our nation's bow. Most importantly, we intend to leverage the unprecedented censor capability this machine offers for the benefit of the entire Marine Air-Ground Task Force, allowing us to accelerate the decision cycle and fighter smarter than we ever have before. Just three short years from now, our operational commanders will be able to combine the effects of these two machines, the MV-22 Osprey and F-35 Lightning 2, from a sea or land base to unleash a tempo, agility and speed of action that has never been possible in the past.

Regardless of the future threats we will face, our unvarying mission remains to be the Marine Corps' aviation force and readiness across the full spectrum of combat operations. I pride in the accomplishments of our Marines, past and present, and the staying power of our military families is only exceeded by my confidence that we are properly poised to meet our future challenges.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I look forward to answering your questions, sir.

REP. TAYLOR: Thank you very much, general.

The chair now recognizes Rear Admiral Allen Myers.

MR. MYERS: Good afternoon, sir. Mr. Chairman, Representative Akin, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss Navy aviation. Would like to submit my written statement for the record.

REP. TAYLOR: Without objection, sir.

MR. MYERS: I'm delighted to share this time with my colleagues from the Navy and Marine Corps to convey the contributions of Navy aircraft in our Armed Forces. Our aviation community comprised of aircraft ships and weapons systems has proved to be a stabilizing force with the capacity to span the globe. If we can take a look back to the days following 9-11, just three weeks after the attack -- two carrier -- the Enterprise and the Carl Vincent were in theater ready to provide continuous strikes and close air support. In fact, the Enterprise reversed course while steaming out of theater for home port. No need to refuel, no need for immediate replenishment.

That Strike Group commander with the best training crews in the world was ready to respond. Navy carrier-based F-18's provided the first tactical air strikes in-country. Our response and support of 9- 11, Operation Enduring Freedom, continues today. In fact, as recently as a few days ago our chief of naval operations cited a statistic that I would like to mention because I believe it bears repeating on the value of our carrier fleet.

He said that a single Navy aircraft carrier provides 46 percent of the fixed wing aircraft sorties in Afghanistan. That one carrier provides close air support, airborne recognizance, and airborne electronic attack to our troops in contact with the enemy. By the way, the response time to those troops in contact with the enemy is often less than ten minutes. Augmenting the carrier support to our troops ashore -- the Navy deploys land-based airborne electronic attack via the EA-6B. These aircraft conduct critical missions that protects U.S. forces and support offensive operations.

Is it really any wonder that in a moment of crisis we hear the phrase where are the carriers? Often the first to arrive in response to a crisis -- Carrier Strike Group provides credible capability and assured access with the speed, agility, persistence, all that's needed without the reliance on shore infrastructure. Seapower projects persistent combat capability ashore while facilitating the building of partnerships as we've seen in our combined task forces at sea, including the Horn of Africa. Seapower -- it is disrupting insurgents on land as well as disrupting smuggling and piracy at sea. Our fixed and rotary wing Navy assets have been engaged in counter-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa.

Last month, during the Maersk Alabama incident, the first U.S. military asset on scene was a Navy P-3, and our helicopters have been integral in the apprehension of a number of pirates by providing necessary surveillance to locate, track, and intercept vessels on behalf of the Visit Board Search and Seizure teams. Our carriers and ships remain on-station around the world providing presence in other places as well; the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, the South China Sea, the India Ocean, and the Red Sea. Our forces provide the (effects -- ?) shore at sea and strengthening relationships and building regional stability throughout the area.

Fiscal year 2010 President's budget maintains our ability to meet our wartime needs today and contend with future security challenges. The aircraft that are fighting today's war are being recapitalized or sustained to ensure relevancy across the spectrum of threats. We are thankful to our predecessors for investing in programs that we are benefiting from today, and those that will meet future security challenges tomorrow.

Our budget continues the development of the F-35, the E-2-D, the P-8, Unmanned Systems, as well as New Strike weapons capabilities. The Department of Navy will produce 98 additional tactical and fixed wing aircraft, 100 rotary wing aircraft, and five VT-UAB's for a total of 203 aircraft.

I would like to offer my appreciation to this committee. Without the committee's tireless devotion and significant contributions, the great successes of our force would not be possible. We are truly grateful, and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and thank you for your support for what you do for us today and what we will do tomorrow. And I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you, sir.

REP. TAYLOR: Thank you very much, admiral.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin.

REP. W. TODD AKIN (R-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate your all being here today. And there have been a number of themes that have -- we've heard throughout a series of hearings on where we are, and probably wouldn't surprise you that we would pick up on one of those, and that is the situation with the lack of aircraft, particularly because of the planes having to be retired with over 8,000 hours on them. And I understand that the 10,000 hours doesn't really work, that it costs too much to try to take care of the changing, the different parts of it be stressed. So that resulted this year in a estimate of -- instead of 120-some aircraft shortfall on our aircraft carriers to about 240-some.

I guess my question is -- and everybody is saying -- and I guess really what they're saying is give us more time to figure this out, but what they're saying is or we've got to do this Quadrennial Review. Well, it isn't like this is too complicated. We say we're going to have 11 aircraft carriers for a certain brief window. We're going to be down to ten. You got 44 aircraft on an aircraft carrier. If you're 240-some aircraft short, you got five aircraft carriers with no planes on them.

So my question is, one, first of all, how does that affect the number of missions that you have to fly just to practice? 'Cause I was watching night landings of these things. It looked to me like that was pretty tricky business, and I would think you would want to have plenty of practice for your pilots. And if you've got fewer planes, then I would think it would affect your training schedule. That's the first question. Second question would be let's say that you can't have 44 aircraft on an aircraft carrier. Is an aircraft carrier just about as good if you've got 20 aircraft so you could split the aircraft half and half? If that's not the case -- so let's just answer those two first questions.

MR. MYERS: Representative Akin, I'd like to take a -- the first stab at that. First of all, go back to your numbers. Last year in DB '09 I briefed that we were forecasting in the later teens starting in 2016 through 2018 a Strike Fighter shortfall with the U.S. Navy of 69 aircraft, and the Department of Navy -- 125. That was assuming that all of our Legacy F-18's, A through D, could get to 10,000 hours. So that was sort of a bookend. The other bookend was if none of those aircraft got past 8,600 hours -- that it would be 125 and a 243 shortfall.

Now, that was last year, and what I'd like to do is talk to you for a few minutes and outline what's changed.

REP. AKIN: Okay, it's got to be pretty short because -- so just a minute or so on it. Just get to the numbers. That would be --

MR. MYERS: Okay, I --

REP. TAYLOR: Again, I want to remind the ranking member that as the ranking member you have all the time you want.

REP. AKIN: Well, I appreciate that. Okay. (Well, proceed ?).

MR. MYERS: Okay, those were the bookends, and what we've discovered since then is that doing the analysis for the service life extension as -- informed us that there are a number of areas that we want to be focused on when we open these aircraft up when they go to the depot. So the cut to the end -- we're not sure exactly the number of aircraft --

REP. AKIN: (Inaudible) --

MR. MYERS: -- that we're going to be able to get through. And the reason we're not sure --

REP. AKIN: But you're guessing it's between about 125 and 240. It's somewhere between there, would be your guess?

MR. MYERS: We're not sure right now, Representative Akin, and the reason is because we're still discovering a lot by looking at these aircraft when they go through the depot.

We've had 39 aircraft that have gone through the depot to date. We thought there were about 159 focus areas or areas of interest on the airplane. We've got about nine that have come through the depot, and what we found is there were 50 additional areas. Each airplane is going to be a little bit different, but as we go through a three-phase process to determine what the limits are on service life extension, we're going to be able to refine the technical baseline and understand more.

Now, currently today, the Navy has the -- currently has the aircraft necessary to fulfill the missions that co-coms have laid upon us. So we have the aircraft that we need today, so the focus is how do we get through the next summer? What are the levers that we need to look at to understand not only what the Strike Fighter shortfall is, but how to mitigate it. And there's four ways to mitigate it. One is to maintain our continued unwavering support for the Joint Strike Fighter. Second is to maintain our buys of F-18-EF's. Third is to maintain the funding in terms of logistics for our current Legacy aircraft, our Striker Fighters. And four is to understand how many of these F and 18 A through D's we can get through the (SLAT ?) process. And it's going to take time.

Now, you had another question about the number 44 on our carriers. Forty-four is the requirement for the Navy for Strike Fighters on our aircraft carriers. Forty-four represents the number that the combatant commanders are expecting when those carriers show up overseas to provide the necessary effects for everything from contingency ops to major combat operations. And it also represents the most effective use of a Nimitz-class size flight deck. So 44 is the number that's required for our aircraft carriers, and that's what we intend to do.

REP. AKIN: So then following up, you're saying you would not deploy a carrier that had significantly -- a number less than 44 planes on it. You'd want to keep that number pretty close if you haven't carried this out. Is that what you're saying?

MR. MYERS: Congressman, what I'm saying is that 44 is the requirement, and that's what we're basing -- from the Navy staff and from a programming perspective, that's what we program towards.

REP. AKIN: Okay, but if you had a shortfall, then you're saying you would rather have some aircraft carrier left behind than to have one with half the planes on it or something. You wouldn't consider that probably. Are you saying that that's -- you just don't know, or --

MR. MYERS: That's a fleet commander decision on exactly -- if -- how he loads out a carrier air wing. We understand the requirement. We understand the way that we're deploying ships and our aircraft carriers and their air wings today. But how that would be done in the future would depend on the needs of the combatant commander and the fleet commander. But currently, the requirement is for 44, and that's what we're doing right now.

REP. AKIN: Right. Now, what I heard you say, though -- you gave me a lot of detail, but what I heard you say was still the shortfall is probably going to be between the 125 number and the 243 number, because 243 was worst case. That's assuming you can't get anymore than 8,600 hours, and the 125 was assuming that you could get 10,000 hours. And you're saying until you actually look at the planes, you won't know exactly how many of them fit into which category, but it's going to fall in that number. Is that correct?

MR. MYERS: There is the possibility that some of them could fall outside that number. And that's part of the analysis. The second phase of the analysis that's ongoing right that NAVAIR is doing in working with their depots to understand exactly the extent of whether or not it's going to be exactly in that --

REP. AKIN: In that bracket even.

MR. MYERS: Yes, sir.

REP. AKIN: So you're not even sure of that bracket is what you're saying.

MR. MYERS: The bracket is the best information that we have at this moment, but we've still got work to do, congressman.

REP. AKIN: Now, what would it cost -- let's say that you find some aircraft that are 8,600 hours and they're going to need some repairs? Do we have any idea of what that would cost? My understanding was it was prohibitive to do that, that it would be cheaper just to get some new ones. Is that true or not necessarily, or -- (inaudible) --

MR. MYERS: It's not necessarily true. What we know is that a center barrel costs about $5 million. And a center barrel is going to be required on the earlier Lot aircraft, meaning Lot 16 and earlier. What we know is that the inner wing could cost as much as $4 million or $5 million. What we know is that the inner wing is a focus area of the aircraft that have gone through the depot in terms of the additional hot spots, or focus -- so -- but what we don't know is whether or not all of the aircraft that go through are going to need all of those repairs. So it could be expensive, and it might not, and right now that's what the second phase of --

REP. AKIN: So we don't have a current cost estimate of what it would take if we wanted to extend the service life on them. We don't really know what that number is, is what you're saying. It depends on the individual plane. Is that what you're basically saying?

MR. MYERS: Yes, sir. It depends on the plane. We have programmed some monies because we do know about the center barrel replacements, and the analysis that will go on through the summer and is expected to finish in the March 2010 time frame is set to be a POM 12 issue, and that's the way that we've set up the analysis, to feed into POM 12, and that would be -- give us enough time to buy the equipment and make sure that we programmed and placed everything we need in the depots for the (SLEP ?).

REP. AKIN: I think the Navy is -- completed its analysis of the benefits of the multi-year procurement of the F-18A's. What's the minimum number of aircraft required to be purchased over the contract period that would result in a savings of at least ten percent as required by law? Is there some particular number that you've got to get? 'Cause we saved, what, a billion dollars on that before, on the multi-year two?

MR. ARCHITZEL: Sir, if I could take that question -- you're correct on the multi-years for the Hornets. There have been two. The first multi-year was for 210 aircraft. It resulted in about a $710 million savings. That was a five-year program. We followed that with a multi-year two, which just ended in nine. That savings about $1.1 billion over the same five-year period. To make a multi-year of value, we need economic quota quantities, which means we have to have volume. We've also got to have a length of -- period of time. It wouldn't do us any good to give volume and put it in one or two or three years. We need to have some length of time to make that -- to get that return on investment.

So to answer your question, if we looked at multi-year one, we had a 7.5 or 6 percent savings that equates to. Multi-year two -- about 11 percent savings. You have those kind of savings when you can go five years and get economic quota quantity by -- we want to have a significant savings, which -- on the order of ten percent or $500 million would be those kind of -- the bookends, if you will -- we'll be using that term here -- that we'd seek to get in a multi-year procurement, sir.

REP. AKIN: Well, that was -- you still -- I didn't hear the answer to my question. I guess the question is, is what number do you have? Let's say we're starting 2010 right now.

MR. ARCHITZEL: Yes, sir.

REP. AKIN: And let's see, JSF is scheduled to be ready to go at 2015. Are we sure that that's going to happen on time? That gives you five years, right, ten to 15.

MR. ARCHITZEL: Yes, sir.

REP. AKIN: So let's assume JSF actually is there at 2015. So you do have the five years. So what would the number be to get to the ten percent? Have you figured that?

MR. ARCHITZEL: Sir, let me -- FY '10 is a single year buy of Hornets. As you know, the Growler we put into the multi-year for multi-year two, and we were able to take advantage of that. With a single year buy, we don't have the economic quota quantity to do it, so '10 is in the books.

We don't have that ability to incorporate that into a multi-year now.

REP. AKIN: So we're talking '11 then, '11 to '15?

MR. ARCHITZEL: Yes, sir, and that would --

REP. AKIN: Are you sure that we're going to have JSF at '15?

MR. ARCHITZEL: I know that the -- we -- I can speak to the IOCs we have today, which is for the Marine Corps and the Navy, and say that (on the planning ?) we have today, we will, sir. I mean, we are developing those programs to go forward on those timelines. But I also will say -- and we have to -- we will have to wait to find out what the Department's direction is on aircraft. We need to know the numbers so we can get the economic quantity and the time frame involved before we could enter into a multi-year. But if we were to -- the multi-year is certainly something we do aggressively go after when we can on multiple programs, as you're aware. B-22 is an example. The 60 Romeo, 60 Sierra -- so we definitely want to get multi years when we have them there.

REP. AKIN: Man, I'm having a hard time getting anything -- I feel like I'm trying to nail Jell-o to a wall, gentlemen, you know? I'm asking about a time for a multi-year, and you're saying no, we really don't know what the requirements are. We've talked about the requirements. I thought we were looking at 125 and then 243, and now you're saying, yeah, but it could be this other way. Somewhere along the line we've got to make a plan as to what we're going to do, and we -- I mean, maybe JSF's could be there at 2015, and that's obviously something that's very important. I know that Marine Corps has a keen interest in the STOVL version because you're kind of putting all your eggs in that basket where the Harriers I guess are getting older and older.

But somewhere along the line we've got to be able to do some planning, and it seems like no matter how you look at the numbers, you're coming out short on fighter planes. So I guess that's the reason we're having the hearing, is where are we?

MR. MYERS: Yes, sir, and congressman, for the record, just want to correct the -- the correct number that we should be referring to is 69 to 129 for the U.S. Navy, and that's what I briefed last year. Those were the bookends of 10,000 hours for 300 aircraft and 8,600 hours, no aircraft (SLEPT ?). So that gives you about a 70 aircraft shortfall, and that number is still --

REP. AKIN: Okay, but let's start with 70. If you had 70 additional aircraft over a five-year period --

MR MYERS: Yes, sir.

REP. AKIN: -- would you get 10 percent then?

MR. ARCHITZEL: Sir, I'm not trying to be anything but direct -- (inaudible) -- I can. From an acquisition standpoint, if we were to get to a few things, we need to have an economic quota quantity. We need to have an economic rate of production, which would be -- a minimum sustained rate for the -- is about 24 aircraft to go through. The economic requirement is somewhere between 30 and 36 depending on the numbers we have. So if you could generate on the order of 30 per year for five years, you would be able to enter a multi-year that would product ten percent savings. Sir, that's --

REP. AKIN: You're saying 30 per year, so that would be 150 then?

MR. ARCHITZEL: If a scenario of the multi-year -- that's what would happen, sir, regardless of what aircraft we're dealing with. When you can get those type of quantities and be able to produce them to allow economic quota quantity buys over a five-year period, or some significant period of time -- and you will definitely get savings in a multi-year. That's the only reason we're allowed to enter a multi- year, is if we can assure significant savings.

REP. AKIN: Right.

MR. ARCHITZEL: Yes, sir.

REP. AKIN: So are you saying the minimum you'd have to buy would be about 150 over five years total in order to get that ten percent?

MR. ARCHITZEL: Sir, in the scenario you present to me, yes, sir, that would be what we've had to do. I would say that. But again, I don't set the requirements. This is from an acquisition standpoint. You asked me to give you the numbers as they apply to a multi-year, and that's what I've done, sir.

MR. MYERS: Yes, sir, and to reinforce Admiral Architzel, the requirement is 44 Strike Fighters on our carrier wings, and based on the PB '09 data, the shortfall for USN is still about 70 aircraft, best case right now. But we still have some discovery to do this summer as we go through (SLEP ?), and we still have some levers to pull.

REP. AKIN: The number was higher because you had Marine Corps F-18's that you were including also. Is that correct?

MR. MYERS: What I gave you was an inclusive Department of Navy and U.S. Navy number before. The 69-129 is a U.S. Navy number, and the 125-243 is a -- was a Department of Navy number, and it included Navy and Marine Corps, and that's what was briefed last year. Yes, sir.

MR. TRAUTMAN: Sir, if I may comment, maybe help with some variables that are involved here -- first of all, the PB '09 numbers are no longer relevant to this discussion, in my opinion. For example, if the program purchases more Joint Strike Fighters than we did in PB '09, which it does, the Strike Fighter shortfall would come down by a commensurate number of F-35's, both B and C models. Secondly, this issue of the Service Life Assessment Program and the Service Life Extension Program is very much filled with variability at this point. We're about part way -- we are part way through phase B of a three-phase process of examining these airplanes to decide how many of the 623 existing A through D Hornets can be extended. Talking to NAVAIR as recently as Friday, there are approximately 330 A through D's, which she -- they identify as prime candidates to be extended.

And so we will extend bureau number by bureau number, making wise business case decisions associated with the choices that will have to be made to extend those aircraft going forward.

REP. AKIN: So you say you've identified 130 A through D --

MR. TRAUTMAN 330.

REP. AKIN: Oh, 330.

MR. TRAUTMAN: 330 of the 623 existing are prime candidates for extension.

REP. AKIN: (Inaudible) --

MR. TRAUTMAN: There are no technical impediments to extension at this point.

REP. AKIN: So are you saying -- does that mean you wouldn't have to put more money in them, or they would be prime candidates to put more money into to get them to 10,000?

MR. TRAUTMAN: You said it right, sir.

REP. AKIN: The second time?

MR. TRAUTMAN: Candidate -- yes, sir. Put more money into them to -- on a case-by-case basis to decide how much would need to be extended. But even that has variability. For example, the majority of the interest areas are in the center barrel. That's the majority interest area. We already have $1.14 billion in the budget to pay for 417 center barrels to be replaced. The second most are in the wings. There are options with regard to the wings. One is repair.

Two is to remove and replace, and the admiral gave you the cost of a new wing. The third is to take wings out of AMARC, which we're doing right now, and replace those wings with wings that are essentially free. And then the third large area that we're concerned about as we go through the assessment program is in the aft end of the A through D's. That's probably where most of the uncertainty lies right now with regard to the cost.

REP. AKIN: Well, I appreciate the chairman's patience, and I'd go ahead and wrap up with that. Thank you.

REP. TAYLOR: Okay. The chair thanks the gentleman, and if need be, there will be a second round. You've asked -- you've had a great line of questioning.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Massa.

REP. ERIC J.J. MASSA (D-NY): (Inaudible) -- no questions at this time.

REP. TAYLOR: The chair then recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.

REP. COURTNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In Mr. Taylor's opening statement he sort of walked through a number of issues that -- he was asking for some responses from the witnesses. I think the last item was on the presidential helicopter. He referenced the fact, obviously, that Secretary Gates on Friday announced the cancellation of the program, and I was just following on his comments. And I don't know which witness would be appropriate to respond, but, you know, what do you sort of see as the next steps and the way forward? Obviously, we need a new helicopter.

MR. ARCHITZEL: Yes, sir. Congressman Courtney, let me start, and I'll turn it over to someone else. You're correct. Secretary Gates did announce -- recommend cancellation, and his basis for that was the original $6 billion program, which had -- headed toward $13 billion, six years overdue. It does not meet the requirement of the White House, and Increment 1, in fact, is a long way to meet that requirement.

So this has been a very -- extremely challenging requirements in this program complicated and exacerbated by us trying to bring this program to meet a need earlier when we weren't really -- defined what we had to do. There were mistakes that were made. We drove significant developmental efforts forward at a time when we weren't certain of what those impacts would be, and we grossly under estimated the cost and schedule required to deliver this. As a result of that, Undersecretary of Defense Carter directed the cancellation of the program to Mr. Stackley. We are taking those initiatives now to cancel that program and bring it to resolution.

And the path forward is within 30 days we will come forward with a high-level plan of what we will -- how will we anticipate going forward in the future? That's not all the details that go with every facet of the program to understand, but it is a high-level, if you will, plan of action, how we're going to go forward to meet the direction, also to have a program developed so we can do the Presidential Replacement Helicopter Program.

So in this case, I believe what we need to do now is we need to meet the requirements. We need to understand what those requirements are going to be, understand the impacts of those requirements, begin with requirements, take them through to the impacts of that, and do the (due rigor ?) we needed to do -- we need to do to make an executable program, sir.

And I'll turn it over to -- other comments.

MR. TRAUTMAN: Well, then me add, then, sir -- two things come to my mind. The first is are the Legacy VH-3's and VH-60's preserved and remain safe for carrying our President? And the answer to that is yet, and this budget includes requested dollars to make that a reality. The second is these airplanes are going to need to be replaced. The VH-3 is 40 years old by 2017, even with the Service Life Extension Programs that we are assessing now. They're at the -- near the end of their life. So I'm very anxious to get back into the requirements generation process, work with the White House Military Office to decide what requirements they will lay out, and then help move those requirements up to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and into the acquisition community so that we can get started on a new replacement for the VH-3 and the VH-60.

REP. COURTNEY: Great. And I realize you said 30 days from now you'll come out with a -- I guess a new position or a new plan. And I don't want to get ahead of that, but one argument that's been out there -- The New York Times had a column about it the other day, about -- that we shouldn't cancel because there's so much -- some costs already into the VH-71. And I guess I was wondering -- thinking that through. The Navy is not going to just sort of walk away from the research and the development and the investment that's already taken place. I mean, there are some ways to recoup some of what has already been paid for. I mean, is that a safe assumption to make so that the taxpayers won't feel like it was just completely thrown away?

MR. ARCHITZEL: Well, Congressman Courtney, if I could, let me begin, and then I'll offer for my colleagues to comment. But first (off ?), what I mentioned to you was a high-level (come back ?) -- (inaudible) -- plan to go forward, but we have to -- and simultaneously with that we have another course of action we have to follow, which is we have to -- following the cancellation of the program, we have to bring about what we do with this program and how we bring it to closure. So the first thing that was done was -- for example, stop work to allow us to -- a contracting officer to issue actions that then would result in the -- us to be able to bring the -- (inaudible) -- bring the closure.

That involves understanding all that we have invested in -- and where we are and be able to close out the books, be able to make sure we understand where we are in funding, be it '09 or '10 funding, et cetera, and what we need to do to follow through once a contracting officer takes actions on a termination as of the -- so understanding what we want to do in the future -- obviously, we will take advantage of anything we can from a technology standpoint that would go into future helicopter programs or other programs of a similar nature.

Again, as we start back into this program, we have to understand the requirements. We have to begin with the requirements, understand what they mean and what we have to do to meet those -- mission that's set in front of us. And that was fundamental to it. But to your point, the investments that were made and the -- understanding of the technology investments that were ongoing -- certainly, we'll take advantage of that as we go forward.

REP. COURTNEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TAYLOR: The chair thanks the gentleman.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

REP. BARTLETT: Thank you very much. You know, you would think from the discussion we've been having that we hadn't spent $3.2 billion and a number of years building the 71. The original requirements document for the VH-71 program. The Navy gave a litany of reasons why a Legacy fleet was in urgent need of replacement, so urgent that we were working around some of the usual procedures to get a plane more quickly so the President could have it. The planes, the Navy said, was overweight. They lack all weather capability. They have extremely limited range, speed, and payload. And I quote from the document: "The Legacy aircraft is no longer capable of implementing upgrades for mission requirements."

And now we're told that the current fleet is okay, that it can indeed be upgraded and that the cost of doing so will likely -- might be enormous. We've already spent $3.2 billion to produce the nine Increment 1 helicopters. They meet or exceed their performance requirements. They were always intended to fly the President, so why isn't it reasonable that Congress would expect the Navy to field these aircraft to meet the highly urgent need we have been briefed on for years? But instead, Congress has given a list of reasons why flying the 35-year-old Legacy fleet for another decade is preferable to fielding the modern VH-71 helicopters we have already paid to produce. For instance, we're told that Increment 1 only has a five-year service life, even though the committee knows that it was designed for a minimum of 30 years and that the Navy has not even performed a basic airframe fatigue testing to make a sound determination.

We need real answers when we consider the budget request. Frankly, Congress has been ignored for too long on this critical program, and I'm concerned that the -- in the stop work order we're now being ignored. The Navy said that we needed a new aircraft to fly the President. We bought that. We asked the Navy to build that aircraft.

And now without coming back to the Congress for consultation, the Navy has issued a stop work order. This very -- limits our options because there will be cost involved in the stop work order if we decide that we really ought to continue building these building these planes, and there's additional cost involved in making the line hot again.

First, what is the estimated cost of extending and maintaining the current Legacy fleet if the VH-71 is terminated? How much will it cost to provide to service life extension for the current fleet? And what kind of new improvements will be made and at what cost? We were previously told that we really couldn't make the necessary improvements, which is why we needed a plane so urgently that we were bypassing some of the usual procurement procedures.

And second, are you telling this committee the Increment 1 helicopters do not, in fact, provide a better overall capability than the current VH-3?

General Trautman, you have flown the VH-71. Would you not agree that on its own it represents a more capable, modern, and safer aircraft?

MR. TRAUTMAN: Yes, sir. Let me start -- I've flown both the VH- 3 and the VH-71 Increment 1 aircraft recently, and there's no doubt that the VH-71 Increment 3 -- Increment 1 aircraft is a better aircraft than the VH-3. The challenge has been, sir, that the VH-71 Increment 1 aircraft does not meet the requirements that were passed to us by the White House Military Office. And the requirement -- (inaudible) -- towards -- (inaudible) --

REP. BARTLETT: General, if you would let me comment for just a moment -- we know that. We know that the Increment 1 was designed to provide what we were told was essential transportation for the President while Increment 2 was being developed. We know that Increment 1 is deficient in -- a little deficient in payload capability, in speed, and in how far it can go in range. But the essential reason, we were told, for moving away from the current fleet was to have better communication capability we understand VH-71 provides, the Increment 1.

Mr. Chairman, just a moment. I'd like to go through some numbers that I think are absolutely compelling that we ought to continue -- and now invested $3.2 billion. If now shut down, it's going to cost about half a billion and the industry to shut down. It's going to cost about a tenth of a billion in the Navy to shut down. And for another $1.3 billion we could make ready five of the nine planes so that the President could use them, and I am told by the manufacturer that for roughly $100 million each, which comes well under the original figure of $6.8 billion, that they will -- (inaudible) -- a firm, fixed price contract to deliver another 14, which means we would have a total fleet then of 19 planes.

The additional cost to provide 19 planes is small compared to the investment we've already made. Why isn't it in the taxpayers' and the President's best interest to go ahead and provide these extra planes? We'll have essentially nothing if we simply terminate and shut down.

REP. TAYLOR: If the gentleman would answer the question, please --

MR. ARCHITZEL: Congressman Bartlett, if I could -- the -- part of what your discussion -- is on the Increment 1. As I mentioned before, the VH-71 -- it's an extremely challenging requirement -- (inaudible) -- significant (developmental ?) efforts that were grossly underestimated. On top of that, we went to a two-increment approach in an effort to deliver near-term as well as long-term solutions. So we are not delivering on the capability with Increment 1. The program does not meet the requirements, and that was what the recommendation for cancellation was for.

REP. BARTLETT: But, sir, if I might interrupt for just a moment, it was going to be sufficiently superior to the present fleet that it was deemed desirable to spend the money to produce and to use it for five years while we produced Increment 2. Why isn't that analysis still valid?

MR. ARCHITZEL: Sir, the second estimate -- you're referring to numbers on -- in terms of operational use, and quite frankly, the VH- 71 Increment 1 -- the additional weight -- and was with these -- that has to do with the aircraft itself -- would be a different aircraft than the one you're talking to when you talk a 30-year aircraft life. That's another factor in the Increment 1 in terms of its not being able to make more than approximately -- estimates now -- a 1,500-hour life. But the overarching consideration was not to -- not making the requirements needed for the helicopter and the decision to cancel Increment 1 and 2 from Secretary Gates, sir.

REP. BARTLETT: Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I think that the original five-year life was not what the plane was expected could do. It was just that -- well, they only needed it for five years until they had Increment 2. But nobody doubts that this plane is built as well as other helicopters, and it should have the usual 30, 35, 40-year life, should it not?

MR.: My understanding is the Systems Command would have to inspect the airplane and go through a rigorous Service Life Extension Program, seeking hot spots and areas of interest, (somewhat ?) the discussion we had previously about the F/A 18 A through D. That work has not been done yet.

REP. BARTLETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. We are trying to be generous with the time, but I would hope everyone keep in mind we do have a pretty good crowd today, and let's try to give everyone a chance to ask their questions.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Washington State, Mr. Larsen.

REP. RICK LARSEN (D-WA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and first off, let me apologize and prepare everyone. I'm bound to -- I'm ready to ask some fairly non-controversial questions.

So I want to just kind of warn everybody about that. -- (Laughter.) -- But it does have to do with a shortfall, but it has to do with a shortfall in the electronic military wartime expeditionary wing. And right now we do not yet have, I do not yet have an idea from you all what we plan to do in 2012 to fulfill the expeditionary gap, and I would like to have an understanding if yet a decision has been made to have the Growler fill that gap, or if, with additional Growlers, or if a decision hasn't been made, what kind of timeline are we on to make a decision so we can get there, so that by the time the gap is there, we've made our decisions ahead of time to fill that gap.

Who would be the best one to answer that?

ADM. MYERS: I'll take the first shot, Congressman. The EA-6B for the Navy is currently planning to sunset or sundown their expeditionary capability starting in '10 and ending in '12. So from the period from 2012 to about 2016 to 2018, the Marine Corps will have the only expeditionary ALQ-99 capability out there. There is a gap in that the next-gen Jammer, the follow-on, we do not anticipate the initial operating capability on the Joint Strike Fighter or an FA-18 G type of aircraft until the 2018 time frame.

So right now there's an acknowledged gap in terms of expeditionary capability that could occur, depending on what happens with the sundown of the Marine EA-6s. In terms of what are our opportunities to mitigate this gap, we still have a hot production line with FA-18s, and that is a hot production line that goes through the next few years. I know that there's dialogue and this is a discussion topic in the building, but for the time being there is no plan to recapitalize the Navy FA-18 Growlers in an expeditionary role.

REP. LARSEN: So, and that gets to the point. At what point does it change from a discussion item to an action item?

ADM. MYERS: What I can tell you is that it is an item that I know that the Department of Navy is discussing with the other services, and I can't answer the question about exactly when there is going to be the next step or when there is going to be a dialogue that would lead to a decision either to be capitalized or not. Currently there is no decision to recapitalize.

REP. LARSEN: General Trautman, with regards to the EA-6Bs flying for the Marine Corps, as I understand, again, you plan to keep those until about '18 and then the one-year 35 variance will take over the airborne electronic attack.

Is that, have I got that about right?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: You're close, sir., if I may.

REP. LARSEN: Yeah.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Our plan is to keep our EA-6Bs going for another decade and sundown the last of ours in 2019. We believe that's the prudent course to take as we bring F-35 on line. And we won't stand up an electronic warfare version of the F-35. What we'll do is we'll take advantage of the inherent capabilities resonant in all F-35 variants across the board.

We have also taken steps that ensure that next generation Jammer is not just a replacement part for the ALQ-199 on the Prowler and Growler, it is also going to be a threshold capability on the F-35. So by 2019 you should be in a situation where you can fly F-35s in very low observable mode, or, if called for, you can fly F-35s not very low observable with next-generation Jammer pods on them.

Now, we're also looking at opportunities to not even have it be a part of the capability, but somehow using their conformal antennas and other ideas that are resonant in the analysis of alternatives going on right now, maybe even make it a very low observable capability with that F-35.

REP. LARSEN: Sure, and I'm looking forward to seeing the results for that. Can you talk a little bit -- very short time -- but can you demonstrate to me now or to the committee now that you are confident that the fleet of Prowlers that you have will be flying up until 2019? And, second, can General Trautman -- I'm sorry I can't see from here -- Admiral Architzel, can you talk a little bit about what the timeline on the next generation Jammer is going to meet, at that timeline, or when you want to put it on the F-35? And when it's ready for being put on the Growlers?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Yes, sir. First, with regard to the Marine Corps' sundown plan a decade from now. The answer is yes, and principally because we will be able to take advantage of the Navy's sun-downing EA-6B. So there's a population somewhere above 100 to outfit our 32 Prowlers that we want to keep flying until 2019. In addition, we have funded and will take some of the Navy's Improved Capabilities sets III (three), which will improve our ability to provide Prowler support to the joint force commander for the next decade.

So we're very confident that we'll be all right despite the fact that our Prowlers are flying at a one-to-one dwell right now. They are one of the most popular capabilities in the expeditionary environment that we have.

With regard to the next generation Jammer timeline, I think that remains to be seen how quickly that program can come to the fore, but about a decade from now I think we should be able to do it. The ideas are picking up more and more energy and steam in recent months than -- I'm surprised but gratified that they are.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: So you asked about the, first of all, again to the Growler, as we go forward we have a very successful program meeting all performances. It's out of test now, finished from its OPEVAL. We'll get results coming forward from that in the near term. We have 12 aircraft out. We're getting ready to actually go forward on first deployment IOC of the aircraft this year.

As you go forward into the next generation Jammer, that's an analysis of alternatives. It's funded. And we'll go back and I don't think we should, we can't, that's not what analysis alternative does, in order to predicate what the result of that is. There will be alternatives that will be put on the table about how to take airborne electronic attack forward, and from that analysis alternatives, it will come back to requirements folks to say which way we want to head. Then we will proceed with that.

The timeline to your question isn't supporting of the Prowler, and that would be to me somewhere around a 2018 time frame, 2019 time frame. I would offer comments from Admiral Myers as well.

ADM. MYERS: Well if the analysis of alternatives for the next- gen Jammer, as Admiral Architzel, is ongoing. There is 128 million in that program. Originally, the design to deliver in 2016 and it's slid to about 2018 right now. So it's moving in the wrong direction in terms of the delivery in time for the sunset of the EA-6 to your point, sir.

REP. LARSEN: Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP: TAYLOR: The chair thanks the gentleman and would remind him that we're going to try to have a second round should the need arise. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman.

REP. MIKE COFFMAN (R-CO): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A question, I guess, for both the Navy and the Marine Corps. What is the status of the CH-46 right now, and what's the timeline for that?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Let me start, sir, since the CH-46 is principally a Marine Corps aircraft.

It's better than you would imagine. I mean, we have done some very wise things with the CH-46 over the past decade and a half. We have improved the engines through the engine reliability improvement program about a decade ago. We've changed out the cockpit; we've changed out the drive train. We have spent our dollars wisely in the CH-46, and it remains a workhorse today.

We have CH-46s deployed on our Marine expeditionary units around the globe. We have them forward deployed in III MEF in Japan, and we have them operating in Iraq today. Thank goodness the venerable frog is continuing to perform just as we had hoped that it would.

As far as its sundown, as long as we can keep the V-22 Osprey on track, we hope to be out of the CH-46 business by the end of the next decade. And we're on track to do that. What we've been able to do, similar to my answer on the EA-6B previously, we have been able to take best of breed as the V-22s arrive now at 30 per year. We've been able to use best of breed on the 46 and sundown and put the ones in the bone yard that no longer need to be used, and so we actually have a pretty solid fleet of CH-46s at this time.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: If I could, you know it's interesting, the frog, as we talk about it, maybe is out of the CH-46 business, but I just, to share with you all, when I was executive officer of the great ship Dwight D. Eisenhower back in the early '90s, and the (verb rep ?) evolution which I was up on the bridge and reconning the carriers were doing it, the first lift of the day was from an H-46 bringing a missile load over from this Serabatchi (ph) alongside. That helo was older than the ship we were on, and the first lift had an engine stall, lost engine, lost lift, impaled itself on the back end of the Serabatchi (ph). That ended the unrep, so we had to cancel the ammo offload. And we came back and did all that later.

My reason I'm telling this story is that I came back to be a SEAL of the USS Guam in LPH9 three years later, made two deployments, so that on my second deployment the -- (inaudible) -- that came out to be on my detachment was that same bureau number that impaled itself on the back end of the Serabatchi (ph). So I'm an advocate for keeping things around, but the frog's time had come and gone, and today, you know, we have this, it's been a venerable airplane, but it's long past its service life as we go forward.

REP. COFFMAN: Admiral, I think you mentioned a new variant for the 53. Can both of you tell me where we are with CH-53?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well I can start, sir. The CH-53 kilo is what you're referring to. This is an airplane. It's a heavy lifter that will replace our existing CH-53 Echos. The requirement that we laid out for this airplane was to carry 27,000 pounds, 120, 10 miles round trip in a Navy high hot day. That's about three times what the CH-53 Echo can carry today.

The need for this is because, unfortunately, the Marine Air Ground Task Force is getting heavier. GLTV and some other things have caused us a degree of concern, but this 53-kilo will be the load- carrying machine that we need.

The program has resolved, to my knowledge, all of the technical risks associated with bulking up and becoming this heavy lifter that I described. It got off to a slow start, about a year late on preliminary design review. That's going to make them late for critical design review. We are in the process now of assessing with the program manager and the contractor, what impact that may have on cost and schedule.

Our desire is to have initial operational capability of the 53- kilo in around 2016. And we'll see if we can hold that as we get more fact-based analysis on the program in the coming two or three months.

REP. : (Off mike) -- you may respond, certainly.

REP. TAYLOR: The chair thanks the gentleman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Larsen.

REP. : Connecticut, Rhode Island.

REP. : To Rhode Island, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TAYLOR: I apologize. The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.

(Cross talk.)

REP. JAMES R. LANGEVIN (D-RI): -- sometime. You won't forget it.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony today. I just want to turn for a minute to -- (inaudible) -- to the EP-3 is the Navy's only land-based signal's intelligence reconnaissance aircraft, and the EP-3s have been heavily engaged in supportive operations in Bosnia, Korea, Iraq, and Afghanistan. And clearly the planes are wearing out right now.

The president's budget contains $12 million for the EP-3 replacement program, the EPX. So my question is, what is your plan for replacing these critical assets, and where does EPX stand today?

ADM. MYERS: Thank you for your question, sir. The EP-3 is, currently we have 18, and they will be in our inventory through the 2020, 2021 time frame. Currently, we are undergoing an analysis of alternatives to determine whether or not a follow-on EPX would be a manned replacement platform? or an unmanned or distributed platform or a series of family of platforms.

So that analysis is ongoing, and that's an issue for FY '11 and POM 12, to make sure that we understand and are focused on and funded so that if it is a follow-on platform, and we can program for it and make sure that it's mature enough before we sunset the EP-3, and if the decision is to re-man the EP-3 and keep it in the same manned platform, then we need to make a decision by POM 14 so that we can take advantage of some of the Zone 5 kits, SSIK, and the outer wing work that we've been doing for the EP-3.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Just this morning, sir, if I could. I participated in a acquisition governance meeting which was the follow- on on the EPX, what we would do, and it's at the very early stages, as mentioned. This is really the setting of where we go from the program and setting requirements up front. Part of what we have learned over the past years is understanding exactly what it is we want to procure and what are the challenges before we go into any kind of procurement program.

So this set the stage for what Admiral Myers said about entering into an analysis of alternatives. This is a decision to go forward to that to set in place that motion. So, we are working closely on the acquisition side with the requirements and with OPNAV, the entire OPNAV staff, to go forward, and the programs to go forward, sir, just from an acquisition standpoint on where we stand.

REP. LANGEVIN: So EPX is still at the very very earliest stages of evaluation, then?

ADM. MYERS: Yes sir.

REP. LANGEVIN: Okay. Turning my attention to another issue. I've been off the, had leave for two years while I was serving on intel, and just for my own knowledge, I know the V-22 program had an initial bad start. We lost a number of good soldiers in crashes. Can you give me an update on the safety record right now of the V-22 and what the reasons were? I assume those were made, a lot of human error in the flying of those birds. Can you give me just an update of the safety record right now, and how we are doing?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Sir, if I may take that. Those two mishaps you referred to occurred nine years ago. One in April nine years ago and the other in December not quite nine years ago. Those were tragic mishaps. We learned a lot from those mishaps. We, I mean in the airplane, put the airplane through the most intensive engineering scrutiny, I think, of any airplane in the department's history. And thank goodness we did because the proof has been in the way the airplane has performed since then: 55,000 hours on V-22s in the fleet, to include the last 20 months of combat operations in Iraq, flying in the most severe, hostile environments you can imagine, the V-22s that perform miraculously.

Last Friday, we launched a squadron of V-22s out on a Marine expeditionary unit, sailing towards the fight, from Carolina, and by the Fall we'll have a squadron of V-22s in Afghanistan. Since then, thank goodness the safety record has been superb. We've had a couple of minor challenges on the deck that we've resolved. And we know the causes of those. But beyond that the safety record has been absolutely superb for the last nine years.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Sir, if I could, just to add, although perhaps not as current as you, but you went back and talked about the history of the program, and I happen to have been the commander of OPTEVFOR, Operational Test and Evaluation Force for the re-testing of the V-22 as it came back into its OPEVAL. I can tell you that the rigger put in from NAVAIR on the technical side as well as from the Marines in training and bringing it in forward was nothing short of impressive as we got that through its OPEVAL, and now as you can see the result of that in its performance.

REP. LANGEVIN: I thank you for your answers and the reassurance, and I'm glad the program is working well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

REP. TAYLOR: The chair thanks the gentleman from Rhode Island. Now recognized is the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.

REP. DUNCAN HUNTER (R-CA): Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen for being here. I just have a really quick question. General Trautman, when it comes to the golden hour in Afghanistan, are we good to go now on that?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well the Marine Corps is good to go. As you know, sir, the Marine Corps is expert at task organizing to provide the right capabilities to the Marine trade. We have ground task force commanders many needs. And as we grow the force in Afghanistan from its previous 2,000 up above 10,000, we made quite sure that we had the right number of assault-support platforms in theater to ensure that we can provide the support that we need to our Marines.

REP. HUNTER: We've met that standard now?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well, I believe we will meet that standard inside the contiguous battle space that the Marine Corps has been given with the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade. I'm not sure, and I'm not up to speed on the rest of Afghanistan at this point.

REP. HUNTER: But for RC South. I'm just asking about the Marine Corps.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: For the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade, my understanding is that we can and will meet that standard with the assets that we have.

REP. HUNTER: When we have the Marine Corps surge.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: When the surge is complete. When we finish this month's rotation. That's right.

REP. HUNTER: And that, does it coincide with the V-22 getting there?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: The V-22 will arrive in the Fall. Right now, we have CH-53 Deltas, CH-53 Echos, and UH-1Ns in the battle space, and they will provide the capability that we need. We are also, as I said, sending a squadron on the Marine Expeditionary Unit, and they are sailing towards the Central Command area of operations.

So it would be up to the combatant commander whether he wanted to employ them in that environment or not.

REP. HUNTER: Are they going to be used in the V-22 for MEDEVAC or CASEVAC?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: From the Marine Expeditionary Unit?

REP. HUNTER: No. In the Fall.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: In the Fall, absolutely. I mean that's one of the main reasons that we lean forward, and as soon as have enough range and depth in the 22 community, we want to get two squadrons -- (cross talk) --

REP. HUNTER: -- the golden hour --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Yes.

REP. HUNTER: -- is going to sink and coincide with the V-22's getting to Afghanistan and being used for CASEVAC and MEDEVAC.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: No, that's not true, sir. The golden hour inside the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade's battle space will be met with the existing assault support platforms that we are putting into theater, is my understanding.

REP. HUNTER: In the Fall.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: No, now.

REP. HUNTER: Now.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Now. That's right.

REP. HUNTER: So it is being met.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: As we grow to 10,000 and more, yes. Yes sir.

REP. HUNTER: I'm not trying to mince words, I'm saying, you're saying that it will be met. I'm asking, do we have the golden -- is the golden hour standard being met now, with the Marines we have there now?

(Cross talk.)

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I believe it is met now. Let me take a comeback to make sure I'm right. I believe it is met now. We do not have all of the assault support forces there yet. I think we have six more CH- 53 Echos to deploy. But the 53 Deltas that are in that battle space are quite capable of supporting the golden hour inside the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade's battle space. Let me have a take away to go confirm that I'm right about that, but I think I am.

REP. HUNTER: Okay. Along those lines, are you happy with the way that the infrastructure is being built for air at Camp Bastion and Kandahar. Is it going to be able to support you? Because you aren't building it, right? The Air Force is building it, and you'll be using some of it, right?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: That's right.

REP. HUNTER: So, is it going according to plan to support you?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: We'll be bedding down our aircraft, a combination of Kandahar and Bastion. We're working side by side in Bastion with the Air Force to --

REP. HUNTER: You are, now?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: We are. We are. And we ship 6 million square feet of AM-2 matting to Afghanistan --

REP. HUNTER: That makes good border fence, by the way.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: (Laughs.) I hope it's not being used for that. We need to lay it down to create FOBs, FARPs, and airfields, and I think we are. I know we are. We also provided the subject matter expertise for our Marine Wing support squadrons that actually showed both the Army and the Air Force had expeditiously laid down that matting.

So the progress is being made as best it can be. There have been times in the last two months that one of my principal concerns was the pace at which this was being done, but as I sit here today, I'm satisfied that we're on track.

REP. HUNTER: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TAYLOR: Gentlemen, as you can tell by some of the questions, we are facing an affordability problem in the very near future. For the record, I'd like to ask each of you your personal opinions as to how many aircraft around the world would you rate is superior to the F-18 E and F?

If you would name them. Name the country of origin and whether they exist, in a ball park figure, of how many of them would exist in each of those countries.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: To get to your question, I'm an (F-3 ?) aviator, but I'll tell you I do not know today of an airplane, and F- 18 is certainly a superior fighter. There is no question about it. So I really don't have the -- I can't give you a number in comparison, but I'll tell you that the F-18, E and F in particular, is a stand-out fighter among fighters today. But it is also not a fifth-generation fighter.

REP. TAYLOR: I understand, sir. Admiral Myers, would you like to address that?

ADM. MYERS: Yes, sir. And I would say that of all the aircraft that are in production from foreign nations, that I would much rather be in the cockpit of an F-18, E and F, than any one of those other aircraft.

REP. TAYLOR: General, would you like to offer an opinion?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well I think it is difficult to parse among all OF the fourth generation airplanes that exist in the world. The F-18 E and F is certainly tied with them. It doesn't stand a chance against an F-22 or an F-35, though, and I think that's the key reason the Marine Corp is trying to -- (cross talk) --

REP. TAYLOR: Well hopefully we will not be shooting at each other any time soon.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: That's right.

REP. TAYLOR: So again the question was, nations other than our own. And I'm asking your professional opinion.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I think there are airplanes out there that our return ratio would not be what we would want for our young men and women, if we had to go against them. And hopefully we won't have to go against them.

REP. TAYLOR: Well is there any of them that you would care to mention at this point?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: F-29, for example.

REP. TAYLOR: You know, are they being produced in any sort of significant numbers by any country?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: No, I don't think so, sir.

REP. TAYLOR: Okay.

And again, I'm, with that, I'm going to yield to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin.

REP. AKIN: I have just a couple of more questions.

General Trautman, my understanding is that the Marine Corps currently has four F/A-18 fighter squadrons that are supposed to have 40 aircraft allocated to them, but actually have no aircraft allocated to them. And the Marine Corps does not apparently include those in the short-fall. And if so, why did you not include them in the shortfall?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Sir, about three years ago we made a pro-active decision to COD grade two active and two reserve fighter attack squadrons.

We did this in anticipation of the arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter. We learned, when we transitioned to the V-22 from our large medium lift population of CH-46s, that one thing you need to do when you have a large population changing, as our tactical aircraft are going to change beginning in 2012, is to create a manpower pool, from which you can draw. Because, particularly when you are changing from a 46 to a V-22 or from a Legacy Hornet to a Joint Strike Fighter, it's not a light switch, it's a rheostat, and you have to have time to train and prepare both air crew and maintainers.

So we set aside those COD grade personnel, and now thank goodness we did because over the last few months we picked the squadron commander for our first fleet readiness squadron, a VMFAT-501, which will stand up beginning this summer. We picked the first six aviators that will go into that squadron. We're detailing the maintainers that will go into that squadron, and beginning in 2012 and 2013, we'll bring back those two active COD grade squadrons as Joint Strike Fighter squadrons, and that's been our plan.

With regard to the two reserve COD-grade squadrons, we'll bring them back three, four, or five years into the Joint Strike Fighter transition about the time that reserve aviators and maintainers are looking for a place to go if they decide to remain engaged in the Marine Corps via the reserves.

So we think we've got this laid out right, and that's why we did what we did.

REP. AKIN: So in a sense, your strategic decision of three years ago was, while you started with four squadrons, you're going to go down to two, so in the transition you've got just less aircraft available to you. So you realize that you are at a lesser strength, and you accept that risk because you're transitioning from one aircraft to another. That's what I think I'm hearing you say.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: That's exactly right, sir. These transitions are challenging, and that's why we take the decision that we took to set aside that manpower pool to make arrangements --

REP. AKIN: -- And as long as the other plane comes online, you're saying we could live with being at half strength for some, a few years, to make that transition. If they're not online in time then that becomes increasingly problematic, I suppose.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well it does. The good news is that we are meeting our current obligations with the force structure that we have. The challenge is, of course, that Marine Tac-Air is at a higher op tempo than either the Navy or the Air Force Tac-Air. And so, in some ways, we're playing out the risk on the backs of our Marines and we don't like to do that. But we think it's a corrective step that was worth taking in order to get to the Joint Strike Fighter in 2012 and 2013.

REP. AKIN: Yeah, okay, so those 40 are not counted in the shortfall then that we were talking about before.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well they are not really a shortfall, sir. For example, if we decided to have those squadrons up and we didn't we to take the manpower, we could take the 30 lot 10 and 11 F-18Cs that we are putting into preservation, and we could have those round out those squadrons in the near term if we chose to do so. I think that would not be a very wise decision though. I prefer the decision we made.

REP. AKIN Oh you're saying there are aircraft around, but they're just old.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Lot 10 and 11. That's right.

REP. AKIN: Yeah, okay. And you also mentioned the idea of reworking some of the F-18s. You're saying that's a possibility depending on the analysis of what those look like. The numbers we're seeing on that is, is you're looking at what about $15 million if you've got to put that rework in, and that gets you whatever it is, a thousand (dollars), $500 or something. It seems like to me that's almost costing you twice the cost per hour and a lot less capability than if you just got a new F-18. Is that, would you ever look at doing that?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: I was advised that putting any kind of number on the cost of extending a Hornet from 8,000 to 10,000 at this point would be premature. As I said, we're only halfway through phase B of a three-phase process. Until we get through that process, there are too many variables associated to put a number on it.

I haven't heard a number as high as $15 million. That's a new one to me. I've heard lower numbers.

REP. AKIN: I thought that was, what's the engine? About five or is it ten? What was the engine? The central component, what was, I forgot --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: The center barrel?

REP. AKIN: Yes.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Yes sir. We already have $1.1 billion in the budget. It's already paid for to do 417 center barrels. So the good news is, that's a risk mitigator against the challenge that we face in order to do the service life extensions. And as I said, most of the areas of interest are in the center barrel area.

REP. AKIN: It still costs money though, whether it's, all right --

GEN. TRAUTMAN: No doubt, sir. You are exactly right. And we'll have to make wise, case by case, bureau number by bureau number assessments and then decisions about how to expend our systems --

REP. AKIN: If you had to do the center barrel and you had to do the wing sections, what are you talking in actual dollars to do that on a plane?

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Well, for example, if we already have the center barrel budgeted, if we went to AMARC as we're doing this year to get 24 wings out, we could do both of those for no additional dollars. If we had to buy a center wing, I'm not sure what the current costs of that is. I would have to defer to Admiral Architzel or the admiral, Admiral Myers.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Sir, I could give it to Admiral Myers -- (inaudible) -- but, what you have to do with the center barrel, that's lot 17 and prior. If you do a center barrel replacement, which we funded in the first SLEP, taking about 6,000 hours, that, for those number of Hornets, and I think the number is somewhere around 400 plus numbers we have there, that's funded in the budget we go forward. That runs at about, just for the center barrel, two and a half billion, two and half million, excuse me.

REP. AKIN: Okay.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: So, if you then add in --

REP. AKIN: If two and half million for a center barrel then you got the -- (inaudible) -- to do the wings, the --

ADM. ARCHITZEL: The number I have is two and a half, so I'll have to get back to you, they are being quoted four and a half, so but, the center, if you get the wing sections, the center filling, its about five million for those. Now as General Trautman says, if you take wings off an existing aircraft with -- (inaudible) -- you're still going to have to rework those wings. So I mean you're going to have some costs involved. You're absolutely right, sir.

If you want to look at what we go to get above to the 86-hundred hours, and you want to go past that to 10, we have a high flying hour inspection. That inspection alone is running around about $475 million. That's, you get to the point where you can open and inspect and look at the airplanes to see what you have.

And I agree with General Trautman. We don't know what we'll have in those airplanes, probably in those, what we designed into the center barrel on that lot 18 and beyond, we should not expect to replace center barrel, but in those areas that are fatigue hot points on the aircraft, we have to do, we have to expense the war corps maybe more than we have. So fatigue, stress, cracking or issues on the empanage or tail, and then on top of that you also have to do system work on the airplanes.

So, that's I think the quandary comes in, is what is set an exact cost of each aircraft you won't know until you open them up and find out what you have, sir.

REP. AKIN: All right, you basically, I think you've made it clear to me today that you don't really know what the fighter aircraft shortfall is. You're saying it's somewhere, and I thought it was variable between two numbers. You said that you can't even count on that. When will you know for sure what your shortfall is? When will you actually have a number?

ADM. MYERS: The shortfall right now, is, it is about 70 aircraft. And that's based on the analysis that I brought to you --

REP. TAYLOR: Would the gentleman yield?

REP. AKIN: Yes sir.

REP. TAYLOR: Seventy aircraft? when Admiral? Give me a year.

ADM. MYERS: It's in the 2016 to 2017 time frame.

REP. TAYLOR: Okay. And when does your shortfall kick in? What year?

ADM. MYERS: The shortfall starts to develop in mid to later 2013 time frame. Now, that's, chairman, and congressman, that's based on the analysis that was brought last year. What's ongoing right now is, as General Trautman mentioned, we're in the second phase of a three- step process, and we're refining the technical baseline and cost estimates to see exactly what we want to SLEP and what's in the realm of the possible.

What we knew last year was a conceptionally what the cost would be and a preliminary estimate on what it would take. And that's why we gave bookends. What we're starting to do now is better understand. Last year when we came to you, 86-hundred and 10-thousand numbers, the 69 and 129 was based on 295 aircraft being able to be SLEP'd. Right now the number is about 330 aircraft that we think might be candidates or are targeted to be SLEP'd, but through the summer we're going to have a lot more information, and the second phase is set to complete next March.

We've got lots of work to do. And I want to make sure that everybody understands that it's not just SLEPing the aircraft that is our focus on mitigating the shortfall. It also means that we maintain our buy of the JSF. It means that we maintain the logistics support of the current fleet. And it also means that we maintain the current buy of our F/A-18 E and Fs.

REP. TAYLOR: I appreciate the gentleman yielding. Please continue.

REP. AKIN: That, I mean, I've got a chart here that shows the number you're talking about; 69 it says here for '17, and I think that was the Navy.

ADM. MYERS: Yes sir.

REP. AKIN: The total number is 125. And then I think the chart also says what happens if you can't get to the 10,000 hours and then that jumps it to 129 and 243.

ADM. MYERS: Yes, sir. Exactly.

REP. AKIN: Have you seen this, particularly?

ADM. MYERS: Yes sir, I have.

REP. AKIN: That's what I was pulling my numbers off of, was this chart.

ADM. MYERS: Yes, sir, and --

REP. AKIN: Are these numbers still the best we know for the moment?

ADM. MYERS: Those numbers have not been officially changed and updated. We are currently doing analysis and looking at assumptions that might impact those numbers, and that's also ongoing. We're taking a look at --

REP. AKIN: And so the answer to when we'll know pretty sure is going to be a year or next March? Would that, would we have a pretty good handle on it, at that point?

ADM. MYERS: We will know a lot more through this summer, sir. And through this summer we will also be able to better understand what the assumptions are if we are to go into that model in terms of our productive ratio or the efficiencies that we use on the air wings that are not deployed.

There's a lot of things that go into the model besides just 44 in the Marine Corps requirement. And that's one of the things that the Marines and the U.S. Navy are currently undergoing is an understanding of ways that we can more efficiently get aircraft out to the war fighter.

GEN. TRAUTMAN: Congressman, if I could add to Admiral Myers' excellent answer about the variability. That chart that you held up last year is no longer relevant. It is not an accurate depiction at this point. And I can just give you the simplest example I can is, if we have decided to buy additional F-35, Bs and Cs, compared to last year, which we have done, that changes all of those equations, just for example.

REP. AKIN: You could picture yourself in our shoes. We got this information from you in March. And I'm hearing you say that its increasingly irrelevant right now. It's hard for us to get a number on it. I'm just saying, when are we going to have something that we can understand what we're planning?

ADM. MYERS: We owe you better and more current information. And in March, sir, that was the best that we had.

REP. AKIN: Right.

ADM. MYERS: And we owe you the benefit of understanding what we think the future is going to hold in terms of F-35 production and in terms of the ongoing SLAP and SLEP analysis.

REP. AKIN: So, are you saying then the end of this summer you think we're going to have some pretty reliable numbers, or is it going to be March of next year? I mean, where are we going to be within plus or minus 10 percent of the number?

ADM. MYERS: I'll have to get back to you sir and take that back to our leadership, not only in the fleet, but also in the systems command to make sure that we -- (inaudible) --

REP. AKIN: Well when we try to put a budget together we got to have something to work with. Thank you very much.

ADM. MYERS: Yes sir.

REP. AKIN: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. : Would the gentleman yield, really quick? I just have a quick question just listening to this. Wouldn't the numbers have already been put together for the internal DOD budget with this? Isn't there a number --

REP. TAYLOR: They are both very fair questions. I would remind both gentlemen that we tend to go through this at the beginning of every new administration. That it is my memory that the Bush administration did not submit a DOD budget until July of '01. And so although this is taking longer than anyone wished it had, they are still a little bit ahead of that mark, which was eight years ago right now.

So, with that the chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland.

REP. BARTLETT: Mr. Chairman, relative to your question about competitive aircraft around the world, it's my understanding that the only aircraft we have that might be competitive with the latest Russian SU fighter aircraft, is the 22. Is that also your understanding?

ADM. MYERS: I'm not an F-22 pilot, so I'm not read in on a lot of the F-22 programs, sir. So my perspective comes from the Navy, and what I know of the F-18 and had it not been for an open hearing, but a more private discussion, that's the aircraft I would prefer to be in.

REP. BARTLETT: I think, Mr. Chairman, it's not a certainty any more that we will always have the best fighter aircraft in the world. I think most people now feel that the latest SU Russian fighter is probably as good as or maybe better than our best plane. And they are selling them. India has bought them. Thank you very much.

REP. TAYLOR: Sure. The chair thanks the gentlemen, and for the record, since that is Mr. Bartlett's observation, I would appreciate you gentlemen getting back to us within two weeks if possible with how many of those aircraft have been produced, and how many are around the world. I think that is, is that a fair request, gentlemen?

MR. : Sure.

REP. TAYLOR: The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California.

REP. HUNTER: No more questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

REP. TAYLOR: Mr. Akin?

REP. AKIN: No, thank you.

REP. TAYLOR: Well gentlemen, I think it's been a very very productive hearing. I very much appreciate your time. We apologize for the delay at the beginning because of votes, but I think you've made your case very very well, and we know we have a lot of work to do. Thank you very much for being with us.

MR. : Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. TAYLOR: The subcommittee is adjourned.

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