FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009

Floor Speech

FAA REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2009 -- (House of Representatives - May 21, 2009)

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Ms. HIRONO. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of the Kilroy amendment to H.R. 916, the FAA Reauthorization Act, which directs the GAO to study, within one year of enactment, the effectiveness of FAA oversight activities related to preventing or mitigating the effects of dense continuous smoke in the cockpit of commercial aircraft.

There are several incidents every week where an aircraft must land due to the presence of smoke in the cockpit. In the great majority of these cases, pilots are able to land the aircraft or disperse the smoke before a catastrophic accident results. There have, however, been several accidents over the years caused by the inability of pilots to see due to the presence of unstoppable, dense, continuous smoke.

Interestingly, the aircraft of the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, senior military leaders, and the Federal Aviation Administration have technology aboard that ensures that, even in cases of dense unstoppable blinding smoke, pilots can see.

I was surprised to learn, however, that there is no FAA requirement that passenger airliners or military aircraft have an equivalent system to ensure that pilots can see under these conditions. The technology in question costs approximately $25,000 to $30,000 per aircraft--which equates to a penny or so per ticket over the life of the system.

As I understand it, the FAA's minimum safety standard is that any failure of systems or components that result in catastrophic consequences must be ``extremely improbable,'' and that ``extremely improbable'' is defined by the FAA as not one catastrophic event in one billion flight hours.

According to Boeing data, American certified planes have not flown one billion flight hours worldwide in the last 50 years. There have, however, been numerous catastrophic fatal airliner accidents in which smoke in the cockpit has been a cause or a factor during that period.

Like with U.S. Airways Flight 1549, seconds count. Fortunately, in that case the pilot could see to land, even if under very difficult conditions. If the emergency had been continuous, unstoppable smoke in the cockpit and the pilot had been unable to see, it is unlikely we would have had such a happy outcome.

I raised this issue during a Transportation and Infrastructure Committee hearing on the bill in February. The FAA contends that existing systems and procedures are adequate. I am not convinced, and I welcome an investigation of this issue by the GAO.

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