Hearing Of The Subcommittee On African Affairs Of The Senate Foreign Relations Committe - "Develping A Coordinated And Sustainable Strategy For Somalia"

Statement

Copyright ©2009 by Federal News Service, Inc., Ste. 500, 1000 Vermont Ave, Washington, DC 20005 USA. Federal News Service is a private firm not affiliated with the federal government. No portion of this transcript may be copied, sold or retransmitted without the written authority of Federal News Service, Inc. Copyright is not claimed as to any part of the original work prepared by a United States government officer or employee as a part of that person's official duties. For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service at www.fednews.com, please email Carina Nyberg at cnyberg@fednews.com or call 1-202-216-2706.

SEN. FEINGOLD: The hearing will come to order. On behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, I welcome all of you to this hearing entitled, "Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable U.S. Strategy for Somalia."

I'm honored that I will be joined by the ranking member of this subcommittee, Senator Isakson, and I'll invite him to deliver some opening remarks in just a moment when he arrives. Last month, the problem of piracy off Somalia's coast hit home for a lot of Americans with the attack on the Maersk Alabama and the capture of Captain Richard Phillips after his courageous actions to ensure the safety of his crew. I was pleased that Chairman Kerry of the full committee quickly organized a full committee hearing to examine this growing problem. And in addition, several other committees held hearings to assess this problem and also potential U.S. responses to it.

Now, this heightened level of attention to the Horn of Africa is long overdue, but in order to truly understand and address the piracy problem we need to know what's behind it. We cannot ignore the conditions on land that have made the waters off Somalia a haven for pirates. The recent spike in piracy is an outgrowth of the state collapse and lawlessness and economic desperation that have plagued that country for well over a decade.

That's why I decided to hold this hearing today. I have held many hearings over the years to examine how we can best address the crises in Somalia. And I am hopeful that today's hearing will look at the situation in Somalia from a new light, ensuring any short-term measures we may take to eliminate the problem of piracy are sustainable and coordinated with broader efforts to establish stability and the rule of law.

We also cannot and should not isolate piracy from the many challenges the United States faces in Somalia. These challenges include the growth of the terrorist group al Shabaab, some of whose leaders have links to al Qaeda, the staggering humanitarian crisis in the country, and the standing problems of instability and the lack of a central government.

And in addition, I've been greatly troubled by reports over the last two weeks of intensified fighting in and around Mogadishu that has left hundreds of people dead and displaced tens of thousands of people. Over the weekend, there were reports that al Shabaab and their allies were gaining momentum and had overtaken Jowhar, a strategic town in central Somalia. They've pledged to overthrow the government and their ranks reportedly now include hundreds of foreign fighters.

More recently, the press has reported that some Ethiopian military forces have crossed back into Somalia. Although the Ethiopian government has denied these allegations, the prospect of a return of Ethiopian forces into Somalia is very alarming and would greatly change the dynamics of the situation.

For months now, I have encouraged the Obama administration to engage at the highest possible level to help establish stability and inclusive governance in Somalia. But if these recent events continue, we may miss a major opportunity.

I have called on the president to personally call Somali President Sheikh Sharif and to indicate a clear commitment to work with the new government on security and governance issues. To my knowledge though, neither he nor Secretary Clinton have yet made that call or issued such a statement.

We must take steps now to seriously and consistently engage at senior levels with the transitional government in Mogadishu. Now, while I recognize of course the fragile nature of this government, I am concerned by some reports that the government is losing both popular support and momentum.

Helping to build stable institutions, expand effective and inclusive governance, and provide economic opportunities must be at the heart of any truly comprehensive strategy toward Somalia. At the same time, engagement and support for the government alone does not constitute a comprehensive strategy.

We need a more sustained diplomatic push to communicate regularly with a wide range of non-governmental actors within Somalia and help bring more groups into the political process. We also need to engage with stakeholders and partners in the wider region, both across the Horn of Africa and in the Middle East.

It is impossible to separate Somalia's situation from wider regional dynamics, especially the historic tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the instability in Yemen. To that end, I have proposed that the administration consider appointing a senior envoy for the Horn of Africa. Now, I of course appreciate that the administration has many pressing priorities and also know there is an inter-agency policy review process underway, which I look forward to receiving an update about today.

Now, of course, all this is an awful lot to ask for our first witness today. He's only been on the job as assistant secretary for African Affairs for two weeks. Of course I want to first congratulate you, sir, on your confirmation. But while he may have only had this position for two weeks, I know that Assistant Secretary Carson has been thinking about and working on these issues for a very long time.

In his testimony before confirmation -- for his confirmation hearing, he wrote about the need for a comprehensive U.S. strategy towards Somalia. So I'm very eager to hear what he sees as the key components for such a strategy, where the inter-agency strategy reviews stands and how the administration and the Congress can work together.

Then on our second panel, we will hear from two non-governmental experts on the latest developments in Somalia and how the United States can address the many challenges there in coordination. We will hear from Dr. Ken Menkhaus, a professor of Political Science at Davidson College and arguably the most prolific U.S. scholar on Somalia. Dr. Menkhaus is also a former special advisor to the United Nations in Somalia.

He has testified before this committee before and I welcome him back.

We will also hear from Shannon Scribner, the senior policy advisor on humanitarian issues at Oxfam America. Ms. Scribner has worked on several humanitarian emergencies on behalf of Oxfam programs and staff on the ground including in Liberia, the DRC, Iraq, Ethiopia, and areas affected by the tsunami. She currently serves as the co- chair of the InterAction Somalia working group.

So I want to thank all of you for being here. I look forward to hearing your brief testimony and ask that you do keep your oral testimony to five minutes, so we can have plenty of time for questions and discussions.

But it's now my pleasure to turn to the distinguished Ranking Member Senator Isakson for his opening comments. Not only is he a superb ranking member, but his timing is exquisite. Senator Isakson.

SEN. JOHNNY ISAKSON (R-GA): Well, I apologize for being late. I never want to be late for anybody named Johnnie Carson; I can tell you that we are -- Mr. Carson, welcome, we are glad to have you here today. And look forward to meeting with you later today preceding our trip to Africa.

My opening remarks will simply be this, Mr. Chairman -- Somalia, as I heard you saying as I came in, is a critical issue before us. And it's important that we develop a strategy with regard to Somalia. And in fact within that -- the larger region of Africa that Somalia lies.

So I'm looking forward to hear from our witnesses today. I appreciate your allowing me a statement. And I'd really go on and get to the testimony. So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Johnnie.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, sir.

All right, Secretary Carson.

MR. CARSON: Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Isakson, thank you very much for inviting me to testify at this important hearing to discuss the development of a coordinated and sustainable strategy towards Somalia. I do have a written testimony which will be longer than my brief statement, which I will submit for the record.

This is my first appearance before you as the assistant secretary of State for African Affairs. And I went to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Isakson, for again showing your strong support for my nomination and rushing my hearings through to completion. I look forward to working closely with this subcommittee on the various issues that fall under your jurisdiction.

Mr. Chairman, you have consistently raised our interests in Somalia and the Greater Horn of Africa and the importance of the health of our relationship with the countries and peoples in the region. I know also, Mr. Chairman that you've traveled in the Horn of Africa extensively, and that Ranking Member Isakson has also visited Djibouti, one of the key capitals in the Horn of Africa.

Somalia is located in one of the most turbulent, violent, and complex regions in the world, and finds itself embroiled in a cycle of violence and instability despite promising efforts in recent years by the international community and Somali leadership to create an inclusive and stable government.

In the past two weeks, the Somali government has come under intense military and political pressure. Despite the best efforts of the violent extremists to overthrow the Transitional Federal Government, the TFG, by force, the TFG remains standing and determined to move forward.

This latest round of fighting occurs as we enter into a new chapter in the recent history of international efforts to assist Somalia in solving its long-standing crisis. Since the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, there have been several distinct approaches taken by the international community to address the many crises that have enveloped Somalia.

In 1992, the international community authorized the United Nations Operation in Somalia, known as UNOSOM I, in an effort to prevent starvation and a wider humanitarian crisis caused by a civil war. This effort proved ineffective, and a second U.N. operation entered Somalia in December 1992. It was called UNITAF.

While this operation successfully restored some order, UNITAF was eventually replaced by a third mission, also known as the United Nations Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM II. It was during the United States' participation in UNOSOM II, in October 1993, that the tragic events described in "Black Hawk Down" occurred, leading to an eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces and the ultimate withdrawal of the majority of the international community from Somalia.

To be very blunt, the international community pulled down the shades, turned out the lights, closed the door, and walked away from Somalia. U.S. reengagement with Somalia did not begin again until 1996, when our policy shifted to one of containment.

For the next decade, U.S. policy focused on managing or containing Somalia's problems within the country's borders so that the instability did not further destabilize the region. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union defeated an alliance of militias known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, and became the first entity since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime to exert control over most of South-Central Somalia.

This change in the balance of power in Somalia was significant, as we faced a government in Somalia that was unfriendly to the United States and provided sanctuary to a number of known terrorists. Ethiopia's intervention in late 2006 was another turning point that resulted in increased American interest in Somalia. Given the threats posed by the ICU's harboring of terrorists, the United States government's Somalia strategy focused on immediate terrorist threats.

The Djibouti Peace Process began in 2008 and led to the formation of the current Transitional Federal Government, an expanded transitional federal parliament that includes members of the Djibouti faction of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, and the election by parliament of President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. These are all significant steps forward for Somalia.

Somalia now has at least the start of a government that is broadly representative of the Somali clan and societal landscape. However, Somalia is clearly in crisis today. Approximately 43 percent of the Somali population relies on humanitarian assistance to survive, and nearly 500,000 Somalis have fled their country and now live in overcrowded refugee camps throughout the region.

The TFG controls only a small portion of the territory and the vast majority of Somalia is controlled by militias, clans, warlords, or terrorist organizations. The blight of piracy off the coast of Somalia is without question a symptom of the instability and insecurity within Somalia.

Without stability in Somalia, there can be no long-term resolution of the piracy problem. Furthermore, al Shabaab, a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization continues to harbor terrorists, target civilians and humanitarian workers, and threatens to overthrow the TFG through violent means.

The resolution of these problems calls for a comprehensive solution that provides stability and promotes reconciliation, economic opportunity, and hope for the Somali people. The Obama administration is working to address these challenges. The National Security Council has brought together the Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, the intelligence community, and a variety of other agencies to work to develop a strategy that is both comprehensive and sustainable.

Such a strategy must be built around our work with international partners, including the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, the International Authority on Development, IGAD, and the International Contact Group on Somalia.

Our effort is to achieve our foreign policy goals, which are to establish political and economic stability, eliminate the terrorist threat, address the dire humanitarian situation, and eliminate the threat of piracy.

We are also working with other states in the region, as Somalia's challenges are intertwined with other regional conflicts throughout the Horn.

But to make it clear, our comprehensive strategy is to promote a stable and peaceful Somalia to support regional peacekeeping efforts, to create a functioning and effective central government capable of delivering services to Somalia's citizens, administering its territory, and providing security to its people.

And finally, to create a country that is at peace with its neighbors and does not harbor rebel groups from neighboring countries or regional or international terrorists. The core of this policy effort is based on internal political reconciliation.

The United States continues to assist the TFG in the development of a Somali security sector, which is crucial for the success of governance efforts throughout Somalia. With Congress' assistance, we have already committed to providing $10 million to support the creation of a National Security Force in Somalia and we are also working to strengthen the TFG's capacity, so the United States and others in the international community can provide additional assistance.

We are also the largest supporter of the African Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, which facilitates the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, protects key installations in Mogadishu, and provides political space for a Somali-led reconciliation process. Since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007, the United States has provided $135 million for logistical and equipment support and pre-deployment training for the Burundian and Ugandan forces on the ground.

We plan to continue this level of support in the future. Additionally, the United States remains the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, having provided more than $137 million in emergency food and non-food assistance to date.

Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of time in Somalia. In the past two weeks, violent extremists, including al Shabaab and a loose coalition of forces under the banner of Hizbul al-Islam, have been attacking TFG forces and other moderates in Mogadishu in an attempt to forcefully overthrow the transitional government.

We have clear evidence that Eritrea is supporting these extremist elements, including credible reports that the government of Eritrea continues to supply weapons and munitions to extremists and terrorist elements. We have publicly warned Eritrea to desist and stop its illegal arming of terrorists immediately as such support threatens the stability of Somalia and the wider region.

There is also clear evidence that there is an al Qaeda presence in Somalia. In 2008, East African al Qaeda operative, Saleh Nabhan distributed a video showing training camp activity in Somalia and inviting foreign fighters to travel there for training. A small number of senior al Qaeda operatives have worked closely with al Shabaab leaders in Somalia, where they have enjoyed safe haven.

We have credible reports of foreign fighters with al Shabaab. This further underscores the importance of urgent and decisive support to the TFG, and engagement with states across the region and beyond to help stabilize Somalia.

The collapse of the TFG would be detrimental to the long-term stability of Somalia, and it would negate the tremendous progress that has been made to date in the Djibouti Peace Process and in restoring a semblance of normalcy and peace in Somalia. The administration is considering ways in which we and other international partners can continue to help and support and bolster the Transitional Federal Government, and we will continue to support AMISOM.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. I look forward to your questions.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Secretary Carson. We will do seven- minute rounds. Thank you for your testimony.

I want to first ask you about our public diplomacy efforts in Somalia. As you know, there is a growing mistrust and even resentment of U.S. intentions that had developed among Somalis over the last two years. In my view, this lingering mistrust undermines our ability to engage constructively with different parties there, and of course can be easily manipulated by al Shabaab. I've encouraged, as I said, the president to consider some kind of public statement to indicate his intention to break from past policies towards Somalia, a move which I believe could make a tremendous positive impression on ordinary Somalis.

In your thinking, how serious is this mistrust of U.S. intentions in Somalia? And what public diplomacy efforts are being made or could be made to address this problem?

MR. CARSON: Mr. Chairman, thank you for your question. There is no doubt that al Shabaab and others have helped to generate the distrust that some Somalis have of the United States. We are working very hard to improve our image and to give Somalis a very -- a more comprehensive understanding of what the United States is doing and wants to do in Somalia.

I have myself spoken to a number of media groups that have access to Somalia, in order to indicate to them that our primary goal is to promote political reconciliation, peace, and stability. And that our desire is to see a strong, stable, Somalia that we can work with.

We continue through our public diplomacy efforts to reach out to the media, to talk to people, to issue press statements. And I certainly will take into account and consult with whether it is feasible for the secretary of State of make a statement that can be used on VOA, can be used on Al Jazeera and other media groups in Somalia. That sounds like a good idea and something that we should certainly consider.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I appreciate that and I look forward to the results. I appreciate the efforts you've described, but what I'm also talking about here in addition to what you've said is high-level public diplomacy. My sense is that well-timed statements and phone calls and engagement from senior government officials, be it the president, secretary of State or even members of Congress, could help bolster ongoing U.S. efforts in Somalia.

I wrote to the president about this. I spoke directly to the secretary of State about this. I spoke directly to the ambassador of the United Nations about this. No one has given me a reason why this wouldn't be a good idea nor suggested anything with regard to any intelligence which suggests that this would be a bad idea.

I've seen nothing in my work on the Intelligence Committee suggesting this isn't a good idea. So I'm wondering what the holdup is in terms of reaching out to this government that is trying to stabilize Somalia and that is under siege?

MR. CARSON: Mr. Chairman, I think those are all good suggestions. And I certainly will pursue them, but let me also say that we are in contact with President Sheikh Sharif's government, have reassured him of our support. We have underlined this to others.

Our ambassador in Nairobi, Mike Ranneberger, has been in regular contact with Sheikh Sharif. I myself last week met with the TFG foreign minister who was in town. One of my deputies met with him on Monday of this week.

I have been in direct consultation with the U.N. Secretary General Special Representative Ould-Abdallah to reaffirm our commitment to support the TFG. We have provided financial assistance in the last two weeks to the TFG and we continue do as much as we can to assure governments in the region that we support them.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Have you spoken to Sheikh Sharif?

MR. CARSON: I have not spoken directly with Sheikh Sharif.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, if you do, I think, obviously, that would be one step ahead. I've spoken to him, you've spoken to him, Ambassador Ranneberger, who I have enormous regard for, has spoken to him, but there are actually people in higher pay grade than all of us, who I'm talking about.

And I believe not only you need to reach out, but --

MR. CARSON: Yeah.

SEN. FEINGOLD: -- people at that level as well. Secretary Clinton has announced several new measures to combat piracy off Somalia's coast, which I strongly support. However, how can we ensure these measures are coordinated within the overall Somalia strategy and do not somehow exist in a vacuum?

MR. CARSON: I think that's an excellent -- I think in my statement I noted that the National Security Council is undertaking a comprehensive review of Somali policy. That review has not been completed, but I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the issue of Somali piracy has been folded into that review and does not in fact stand out alone. It is subsumed under a broader strategy towards Somalia.

I underscore that our overall policy efforts are aimed at promoting political reconciliations in Somalia, political stability in that country, which will generate a functioning and effective government capable of delivering services to its people, administering the central government, and providing security. We don't have a separate strategy on piracy that is distinct from the issue of where we are going on Somalia. It is being wrapped into the review that is underway.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you. As part of a comprehensive strategy for Somalia, I know you and I agree that we have to re-examine our relationships with regional players. And these press reports of Ethiopian troops crossing back into Somalia are very alarming to me and I've been concerned for quite some time by Eritrea's unconstructive behavior in the Horn, whether it's in Somalia or along the Djiboutian border.

How can we better engage the Ethiopians so they play a constructive role on Somalia? And what about our relationship with Eritrea? What direction do you see that moving in?

MR. CARSON: First of all, with respect to the presence of Ethiopian troops, we have no formal confirmation that Ethiopian troops have actually gone across the border. There have been a number of press reports suggesting a small incursion. We are asking our embassy in Addis to determine what the Ethiopians are doing there.

We agree with you, Senator, that the return of the Ethiopian troops inside of Somalia will only inflame and worsen the situation rather than lead to an early resolution of the problem. We hope that the Ethiopian government will not in fact do anything which will further complicate the effort to find a solution to Somalia's problems.

We are engaged actively in Ethiopia. And our ambassador is in constant contact with Prime Minister Meles, warning and expressing our concerns about what Ethiopia's actions inside of Somalia might result in.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I'm going to turn over to Senator Isakson now. But I have a couple more questions for you.

SEN. ISAKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since you mentioned that subject, I traveled to Ethiopia in 2002, spent a good deal of time both in Addis Ababa as well as Awasa, south of there.

Are the terrorist-related organizations or support organizations in Somalia a threat to the Ethiopians? Is that one of the reasons for the Ethiopian concern is the fact that there are terrorist organizations in Somalia that they fear might come into Ethiopia?

MR. CARSON: No question. One of Ethiopia's concerns is support that Somalia or Somali groups might provide to groups in the Ogaden. They are concerned that weapons and support might flow from Somalia into the Ogaden.

SEN. ISAKSON: My experience there, if you look at a map for a second, between Eritrea, the Sudan, and Somalia, Ethiopia is in a very difficult neighborhood. And the country has tried and over the last decade has made a lot of improvements.

So I'm sure part of their concern is they don't want to redress and go back, or have happen there what happened in Somalia in terms of the breakdown of the countryside. In terms of Sheikh Sharif, how strong a leader do we see him or is he kind of battened down in Mogadishu with the parliament trying to protect themselves?

MR. CARSON: Sheikh Sharif was elected as the president of Somaliland through the Djibouti process. We think that he was a compromise candidate, who represented the views of the largest number of clan participants in that election.

We think that he offers the best chance for a possible reconciliation and peace in Somalia that we have seen over the last decade. He is not a warlord. He is not a militiaman.

He is from a rather humble background, an educator, and is a man who has sought to unite the various clans in Somalia in a more inclusive government. We believe that it is important to do as much as we possibly can to support this TFG government as one of the last opportunities for bringing about stability in that country.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Let me just interrupt, Senator Isakson, to say that -- I know the secretary intended to say that Sheikh Sharif was elected president of Somalia and not Somaliland.

MR. CARSON: Yes, that's right. Pardon me.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Understood.

MR. CARSON: Thank you.

SEN. ISAKSON: He was elected by the parliament, not by the people.

MR. CARSON: That's correct.

SEN. ISAKSON: But the parliament was elected by the people, is that correct?

MR. CARSON: Yes.

SEN. ISAKSON: Okay, so he is a pretty representative compromise candidate between all the factions you think?

MR. CARSON: Yes.

SEN. ISAKSON: Okay.

MR. CARSON: But there -- it is, you know, a very divided society, and divided deeply along clan lines. The success of any leader is based on his or her ability to bring in clans and sub-clans into the central government.

SEN. ISAKSON: In your testimony, you made reference to the fact that we had credible reports of foreign fighters fighting with al Shabaab. Is that correct?

MR. CARSON: Yes, sir.

SEN. ISAKSON: Are those foreign fighters by any chance Iranian or in any way affiliated with Hezbollah or Hamas?

MR. CARSON: We don't know the precise nationalities of these foreign fighters, and we don't know their political affiliations. But we do have a growing body of information passed on to us that there clearly are foreign fighters operating in Somalia. This information comes to us via the Ugandan military, which is a part of AMISOM. It comes to us via the U.N., it comes to us via Sheikh Sharif's government, it comes to us via observations by the media.

But yes, a growing body of information. We do not know how many people -- how many foreign fighters there are. There have been claims of upwards of 400 people. We think that these are probably a significant exaggeration. But there are clearly non-Somalis who are there.

SEN. ISAKSON: And we do have evidence that al Qaeda is there as well, correct?

MR. CARSON: We know that individuals who are directly affiliated with al Qaeda have been in Somalia. These individuals are principally Fazul Harun, and Mohammed -- Nabhan Mohammed.

These are individuals who were responsible for the destruction of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998, and the destruction of the Paradise Hotel in 2002.

They clearly are the leaders of the East Africa al Qaeda cell. They have been in Somalia, but they've also been in -- and along the North Eastern coast of Kenya as well.

SEN. ISAKSON: Now, we are assisting the African Union troops at AMISOM with regard to the distribution of humanitarian aid into Somalia's countryside. Is that correct?

MR. CARSON: Yes.

SEN. ISAKSON: And we are doing the same thing in the Sudan, but we have had great difficulty. We've had -- recently a month ago we had two NGOs killed in the Sudan. What is the activity against AMISOM and the humanitarian aid? Are they -- are the troops, the African Union troops able to protect those NGOs?

MR. CARSON: No, the -- let me just correct. The AMISOM troops are there to carry out several missions. The first is to protect key installations -- the airport and the harbor in Mogadishu; to provide security to key government buildings, the presidential palace and the parliament; and thirdly to protect key TFG government ministers; and lastly to train, to do limited training of TFG security forces.

SEN. ISAKSON: So there is no protection effort on those NGOs that are there?

MR. CARSON: No, there is not.

SEN. ISAKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Senator. I think I will just start another round.

Secretary, when can we expect the inter-agency review to be completed and will be -- Congress be notified when that happens?

MR. CARSON: I can't predict the precise time. I know that the process is being carried out in an expeditious manner. I would hope that we would see something in the next 30 to 60 days. And yes, I would feel comfortable and would recommend that we come and brief you and other members of the committee once that review is completed and carried out.

You have clearly demonstrated an interest in seeing the strategy and learning what it is. I think that we will share that with you and I will certainly encourage it.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Just to add a point to the very effective questioning by the ranking member who has been fleshing out the background of Sheikh Sharif. I certainly can't vouch for this man, nor attempt to. But to have an accurate picture, this is the man who was the head of the Islamic courts, which, you know, we identified as being a, you know, obviously problematic entity, who has now taken on the task of trying to unify the various elements within Somalia at an enormous risk, because al Shabaab is, I'm sure outraged that he has done this. So it's an interesting aspect of what he has done that I think should help inform our view of him and our willingness to work with him.

The State Department's report issued this month on the implementation of our strategy towards Somalia describes the importance of providing operational support to Somali security forces loyal to the transitional government. And I agree that building the security sector is important and the U.S. should have a role in this.

We have to ensure that steps are taken to improve the accountability and human rights record of the security forces. Obviously, the past record of those forces is pretty appalling. How can we ensure such steps are taken as we provide any assistance to a security sector in Somalia?

MR. CARSON: We are doing as much as we can to vet the individuals who are part of the Somali security force leadership. This is an ongoing process. It is a difficult process given the fact that we are not present on the ground, but we are extremely -- we consider this to be extremely important. And we are attentive to it in trying to do as best we can to ensure that any assistance that we give is given to individuals who have not in fact engaged in atrocities or war crimes or any violations of civil rights.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Also I am very concerned by these reports that al Shabaab and its allied militias are gaining momentum in the territory including strategic towns in Central Somalia. Beyond simply arming them, are there specific ways we can help the transitional government to peel off moderates and fracture the insurgency?

And what about the foreign fighters that Senator Isakson was talking about that are being reported? What can be done to confront their role on the insurgency?

MR. CARSON: Well, one of it, with respect to foreign fighters, we are working with neighboring countries to encourage them to make sure that their capitals, their airports are not used as a conduit for foreign fighters going in. We have demarched the Eritrean government and strongly encouraged them to desist from providing any support to al Shabaab, not to allow foreign fighters to come through their territory to enter Somalia and to play a more constructive role in trying to find a solution to Somalia's problems. We will continue to work with neighboring states including countries like Kenya to make sure that they are not unwittingly used as way-stations for people coming in from outside, transiting their airports going into Somalia to work for al Shabaab.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you.

Anything further, Senator Isakson?

SEN. ISAKSON: Just a question out of curiosity. We talk about a coordinated policy for us to support the Somali government, the temporary government that has been formed. Is there a coordination of all the factions outside of Mogadishu?

You referred to the clans, you referred to al Shabaab, you referred to some al Qaeda influence and foreign fighters. Are these people with different and separate interests that are disruptive in the country or is there some degree of coordination between them against the government?

MR. CARSON: Well, over the last two weeks, and certainly beginning around May 8th and 9th, there appeared to be a concerted effort by al Shabaab and a number of groups to work together to unseat the TFG. That degree of coordination seems to be fading away as the TFG has been able to maintain its control over most of Mogadishu.

The core element of unity inside of Somalia is clan and sub-clan. As clan and sub-clan interests over time appear to trump everything else in terms of loyalty, it's more important than religion. It's more important than politics. It is frequently more important than the central government and the state. What we have seen over time is that some issues will bring clans together, groups together, to work against an issue and then they will fall apart once that threat and issue has been resolved.

SEN. ISAKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Johnnie.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Senator Isakson.

Secretary, thank you, it's a pleasure to be working with you. We can now go to the second panel.

MR. CARSON: Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you.

Thank you very much.

Dr. Menkhaus, would you like to begin?

Again, I would ask that these witnesses limit your remarks, oral remarks to five minutes. Of course, we'll put your full statement in the record.

Go ahead, Doctor.

MR. MENKHAUS: This hearing has been convened at a moment when Somalia is undergoing yet another dramatic political crisis, the latest in a long 20-year history of state collapse, warfare, and human suffering. Whatever the outcome of this latest round of fighting, Somalia will very likely remain a front-burner foreign policy challenge for the Obama administration.

We are very fortunate to have the experienced leadership of Ambassador Johnnie Carson, the new assistant secretary for African Affairs, at this time of crisis in Somalia. He understands the intricacies of the Horn of Africa better than anyone in or out of the U.S. government, possesses invaluable diplomatic experience in the region, and has the leadership skills to help forge and maintain inter-agency consensus which is essential for a coordinated U.S. strategy towards Somalia.

In recent years, the U.S. and its regional and global allies have struggled to forge a coherent and effective strategy for Somalia. In part, this has been a function of the uniquely complex problems associated with the Somali crisis. As the crisis has lengthened, the difficulties have grown. Reliable information on which to build policy is scarce.

The resilience of internal spoilers has increased, while many of the country's most dedicated civic leaders and peace-builders have been silenced, killed, or forced to flee the country. External actors have created additional impasses by playing out proxy wars in Somalia, or funding jihadist violence.

In this increasingly complex environment, external state- building, peace-building, and counterterrorism initiatives have at times been based on flawed analysis and have produced unintended consequences, which have left Somalia and its regional neighbors even more insecure. The U.S. also faces the challenge of de-conflicting its multiple objectives in Somalia. Over the past decade, American counter-terrorism, state-building, and humanitarian initiatives have generally been un-integrated and have at times worked at cross- purposes.

The impact of the 2007-2008 Ethiopian military occupation of Southern Somalia has created still more challenges. That occupation, and the destructive insurgency and counter-insurgency violence that it triggered, helped to fuel an unprecedented level of radicalism in Somali society. Because the U.S. is widely blamed by Somalis for backing the Ethiopian occupation, anti-Americanism has been very high in the country and trust of American motives and policies, low.

This has been ameliorated somewhat by the January 2009 Ethiopian withdrawal, the establishment of a more broad-based transitional government, and Somali expectations of a shift in U.S. policy under the Obama administration. But there is still a high level of mistrust of American policies and residual anger at the U.S.

In addition, formulation of a coherent strategy towards Somalia is complicated by the fact that the Somali crisis is entangled in a regional conflict complex, which includes the Ethiopian-Eritrean impasse, the insurgency, and counter-insurgency in Ethiopia's Somali region, and the long-running tensions between Ethiopian and Somali security interests and territorial claims.

Stand-alone strategies to deal with Somalia have been repeatedly undermined by these other regional dynamics. A final challenge to creating an effective and coherent strategy is the fact that Somalia is currently in the midst of a major crisis, which could result in one of several very different scenarios.

The U.S. government can and must prioritize its broad objectives and desired outcomes in Somalia, but in the face of considerable uncertainty about the political trajectory of the country in the weeks and months ahead, a fully developed country or regional strategy may currently be beyond reach.

In weeks and months to come, one of several scenarios could emerge. In a best-case outcome, the TFG will succeed in rallying support and pushing back the Islamist insurgency, negotiating with some insurgents and marginalizing or defeating the rest. This outcome would open the door to a U.S. strategy privileging timely and well- targeted state-building support to the TFG as a means of consolidating those gains. It would also produce improved security for delivery of badly needed humanitarian assistance.

In a worst-case outcome, the Shabaab and Hizbul Islamiya defeat the TFG and take control over most or all of south-central Somalia and the capital. Because of Shabaab's ties to al Qaeda and the presence of foreign advisors and fighters in Shabaab, this scenario promises to draw Ethiopian forces back into Somalia and will create pressure for the U.S. to privilege counter-terrorism interventions into Somalia as well. Somalia could then become the site of regional or even globalized armed conflict.

An insurgency victory over the TFG could also produce a different outcome, one in which two rival Islamist groups begin fighting among themselves. There are sharp tensions over leadership, ideology, foreign patronage, clan interests, and tactics, both between and within Shabaab and Hizbul Islamiya, and many Somalis anticipate a battle between them.

Armed clashes pitting Shabaab and Hizbul Islamiya would present the U.S. with no obvious protagonist to support, and would instead place emphasis on the need to avoid taking actions which would bring the two warring parties, hardline groups, together.

A final scenario is a reversion to status quo ante, in which no one side consolidates control over the country, which is left divided up into a variety of warring fiefdoms, some controlled by the TFG, others held by Shabaab, Hizbul Islamiya, clan militia, warlords, armed business groups, independent city-states, and others.

This outcome would pose a major problem for U.S. state-building initiatives and would tempt counter-terrorism operations to forge alliances with local non-state actors, as was the practice in the past. That policy came at some cost and was in many respects counter- productive, however, and would need careful scrutiny.

In the interest of time, I won't share some of the remarks that I had, which I hoped would contribute toward a discussion of U.S. strategy towards Somalia. But I refer you to my written remarks. Thank you.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Doctor.

Ms. Scribner.

MS. SCRIBNER: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Isakson, and thank you for the opportunity to testify today, on developing a coordinated and sustainable U.S. strategy towards Somalia.

Oxfam is grateful for the work this committee has done, and in particular, you, Senator Feingold, for your leadership in drawing attention to the humanitarian situation affecting almost half of the country.

Oxfam has been working in Somalia since the 1960s. Since the start of 2008, we delivered aid -- we have been delivering aid to over 400,000 Somalis. Through a network of Somali partner organizations, we provide over 80,000 hot meals a day to the people in Mogadishu, water and sanitation services to over 200,000 people in the Afgooye corridor, which is about 18.5 miles south-west of Mogadishu, and we are helping 70,000 people rebuild their livelihoods in central and southern Somalia.

In my testimony today, I will be focusing on the humanitarian situation and making recommendations on steps the U.S. government can take to address the situation as part of a coordinated U.S. strategy. Somalia is the site of the world's worst humanitarian crisis. The combination of conflict and drought have led to the displacement of up to 1.8 million Somalis and more than 3 million people are dependant on aid.

Somalia is also one of the worst -- world's most challenging environments for aid workers, 40 aid workers have been killed since the beginning of 2008, and most of them have been Somalis. Half a million Somalis are finding refuge outside Somalia's borders and approximately 250,000 of these refugees now inhabit the overcrowded Dadaab camps in Northern Kenya.

The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops at the beginning of this year initially improved civilian safety in some areas, evidenced by the tentative return of up to 65,000 people to Mogadishu and marginally improved access for aid workers.

But, over the last few weeks, as we have heard, recent fighting between the Transitional Federal Unity Government and opposition groups in Mogadishu has claimed civilian lives and sparked a new wave of displacements.

Beyond the obvious humanitarian impact of the ongoing conflict, the country faces drought conditions unseen since the 1991 famine, which is killing livestock at an alarming rate. Despite the many operational challenges and the shrinking operational space, Oxfam is still responsibly delivering a program.

We work through proven and trusted local Somali NGOs which come from the beneficiary communities making them accountable not only to us but also to their communities. These communities are often involved in the design, implementation, and monitoring of programs and as a result, they protect their programs from parties vying for control over territory.

It is critical to underscore that in order to successfully continue our work, aid agencies must be perceived by communities and the warring parties as neutral and impartial. As the United States sets out a new strategy for Somalia, it is important that the strategy does not undermine aid operations and preserves, at a minimum, the limited operating space that we have.

In the past, air strikes in Somalia have negatively impacted humanitarian access by casting suspicion on aid workers, which is often followed by threats and retributions. Likewise, restrictive Office of Foreign Asset Control licensing could slow down the delivery of urgently needed aid.

It is important to note that there are a range of actors, al Shabaab, which -- there are many factions within the al Shabaab, the foreign fighters that have been mentioned, clan militias, and criminal groups fighting for control of territory. And while the conflict over who is in control is negatively impacting aid operations, the control over day-to-day administration of aid is to the most part done through local clan structures.

My submitted testimony touches on other issues affecting humanitarian response, such as widespread abuses by all parties, security sector reform, peacekeeping, and the importance of a regional approach. But with the minutes I have remaining I would just like to make six recommendations on how a coordinated and sustainable U.S. strategy towards Somalia can improve the humanitarian situation.

As mentioned, it must preserve the limited humanitarian operating space. It should address the serious public health crisis unfolding in Dadaab by pressing the Kenyan government to authorize UNHCR to start work on a new refugee camp and ensure that the border remains open to those that are fleeing the conflict.

Need to hold parties accountable for abuses. All parties have committed abuses and acted with impunity on the ground. They must prevent security sector reform and peace-building from becoming part of the problem.

While efforts to bolster security are necessary, support to security forces must be transparent and accountable to prevent abuses. And any U.N. peacekeeping force should have a wide acceptance by Somalis and a peace to actually keep. Otherwise they risk being drawn into the conflict.

It should foster a credible, Somali-led political and governance processes; this means doing things the Somali way through a consensus building and power sharing. And the U.S. should not support specific individuals or factions.

And finally, ensure that any strategy for Somalia has a regional approach. Somalia shouldn't be dealt with in isolation, as peace in Somalia means engaging and resolving issues with their neighboring countries. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. And I'm happy to take questions.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I thank both of you. I thank Senator Kaufman for his attendance also Senator Risch has joined us, members of the subcommittee. Let me start a seven-minute round for this panel.

Dr. Menkhaus, I'll start with you. No one will dispute, I don't think, that the situation in Somalia is far worse than it was two or three years ago, and that the threat posed by terrorism as well as piracy is far greater now.

Looking at the administration's -- previous administration's approach, as well as that of the international community, what lessons do you believe can and should be learned so we don't repeat the same mistakes again?

MR. MENKHAUS: First, I would argue for a more nuanced analysis and understanding of the political dynamics in Somalia. I think there's a great temptation on the part of decision makers across world when confronted with the extraordinary complexities of Somalia to oversimplify them and that usually comes at a cost in terms of effectiveness of policy.

Second, I would caution against careless use of state-building initiatives to a transitional government in the context of a war. This needs to be very calibrated assistance to the extent that security forces of the Transitional Federal Government are controlled by the transitional government authorities to the extent that there is a sense of local ownership of those security forces. And to the extent that those local security forces are accountable to both the people and the government; that opens the door toward external assistance.

But in conditions where the security forces are essentially a paramilitary, a law unto themselves, and are a source of insecurity and predation against the local community, our assistance, our meaning, international assistance in the past, essentially meant we were taking sides in an open civil war. And that was one of the reasons why the U.N. and international aid agencies became targets in this insurgency and counter insurgency.

SEN. FEINGOLD: You know I'm very concerned that the fledgling transitional government is losing support as well as losing ground with this recent fighting I described.

In your view Doctor, what specifically does the government need to regain support and momentum toward uniting the country? Are there important groups, or clans, or constituencies that should be engaged more and who would make a big difference if they are brought into the government?

MR. MENKHAUS: I share your concern about the loss of ground that the TFG has experienced. The insurgent offensive in recent weeks has been alarming. I don't know that there is a lot that the international community can do to shape the outcome of this current crisis at this time.

There may be some calibrated financial support. There may be some diplomatic initiatives that would facilitate the TFG's current effort to negotiate with some elements of the armed insurgency, those that we consider groups that have rehatted as Shabaab that are not in any serious way indoctrinated, committed jihadists.

Bringing as many of those into the TFG is certainly a viable strategy on their part. And if there are things we can do to facilitate that, we should. I would caution against an impulse to provide direct military support at this time, because that would play into the hands of the Shabaab. The Shabaab have every interest in framing this current fight as Somalis versus foreigners.

They would love to attract Ethiopia back in. They would benefit enormously from U.S. air strikes, were that to happen. To the extent that this is a Somali internal political struggle, Shabaab actually faces real challenges, because what they stand for is very unappealing for the vast majority of Somalis.

SEN. FEINGOLD: And your view specifically about, sort of, a pivotal figure here, Sheikh Hassan Aweys who recently returned to Somalia. How do you assess his role in all of this? And what are his intentions?

MR. MENKHAUS: Hassan Dahir Aweys is on our list of designated terrorist suspects, and that's very problematic when it comes to efforts to on the part of the Transitional Federal Government to dialogue with him as a potential partner in this government.

He is actually of greater concern to Ethiopia than he is to us, because he was in the group al-Itihaad al-Islamiya in the mid-1990s when al-Itihaad launched several terrorist attacks against the Ethiopian government. That may well make him a nonstarter for Ethiopia were he to be brought into discussions. He is currently leading --

SEN. FEINGOLD: Nonstarter for Somalia?

MR. MENKHAUS: For Ethiopia.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Or you mean, from the point of --

MR. MENKHAUS: Ethiopia would reject this.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Would reject it out of hand.

MR. MENKHAUS: Exactly. And we have to take careful account of Ethiopia's legitimate security concerns in this. Aweys is currently heading up the Hizbul Islamiya faction, which is a hardline Islamist group, but which tends to embrace more nationalist rather than globalist agendas, and therein lies the tension. I think, between Hizbul Islamiya and Shabaab, Shabaab having forged closer links to al Qaeda.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Scribner, I'm glad you're here to give the humanitarian perspective and to highlight the great constraints which agencies like Oxfam are facing. As the U.S. government considers a new strategy for Somalia, how can we ensure that we're not further impeding humanitarian access and independence?

In your view, how should addressing the humanitarian situation in Somalia connect with the efforts we've been talking about to support political reconciliation in governance?

MS. SCRIBNER: I think, in terms of things that I mentioned in my testimony that the one thing would be air strikes on the ground have really impacted aid operations on the ground, because suddenly it casts suspicion on NGOs in terms of their alliance with the West, with the governments, or with the U.S. military.

So -- and we've had aid organizations that had to suspend the operations in some of those areas. So that would be really -- that is one thing that's very critical for operating space on the ground.

And then the other thing is just holding parties accountable on the ground. I mean, there is really lack of holding anyone accountable for abuses that have been documented by human rights organizations and groups on the ground. So if we could somehow start holding people accountable that would be helpful to our access on the ground as well.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you.

Senator Isakson.

SEN. ISAKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Menkhaus, in your bullet points toward the end of your printed remarks, which you didn't really get to, one of them I'm reading, seems to sum up everything we've been talking about. It is on the next to last page.

You say, "U.S. interests are best served by maximizing the extent to which the current conflict in Somalia is defined as an internal Somalian affair. By contrast, Shabaab and Hizbul Islamiya's interests are served, best served when the conflict is regionalized or globalized, framed as a 'Somali versus foreigner fighter' situation."

And I don't want to get to Ms. Scribner's segment. She has a statement essentially, so I take it Ethiopia is a -- and when we talk about a coordinated effort in Somalia that needs to be coordinated in part with Ethiopia, in cooperation on their part. Is that correct?

MR. MENKHAUS: That's correct. And this -- we've spent a lot of time, this morning, talking about a coordinated strategy just within the U.S. government. And that's not an easy thing to do. When you add all of the external actors whose interests matter, from western states, Islamic and Arab states, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya this gets to be even a greater challenge.

The key with our -- with bringing Ethiopia in as a full partner to a solution in Somalia is, first, there are very high levels of distrust between Somalis and Ethiopia. This is a long historical issue. They do have common ground. When you talk to them privately they do see opportunities for coexistence.

Somali business people would benefit enormously from access to such a large internal market. Ethiopia would benefit, obviously, enormously from having a stable country on its long border. But they haven't gotten to that point yet, so trust-building, confidence- building measures are really critical.

And the other aspect of bringing Ethiopia more fully into these discussions is recognizing that while our interests overlap closely with Ethiopia's, and we are allies with them, our interests are not identical. They have different sets of security concerns and different ways of going about them. And we have to be frank with one another about those differences.

SEN. ISAKSON: Well, I know Ethiopia's difficulty with Eritrea was primarily over their border. And if I'm not mistaken, is there a border dispute with Somalia and Ethiopia?

MR. MENKHAUS: Yes. That border has never been formally recognized by Somalia. It was the source of a major war, the Ogaden War in 1977-'78. Periodically, Somali groups, including al-Itihaad al-Islamiya embrace irredentist claims, territorial claims, on Somali region in Ethiopia where about 4 million ethnic Somalis live. So this remains a source of enduring concern for Ethiopia.

SEN. ISAKSON: So to have a coordinated strategy would it have to include some settlement of that border dispute?

MR. MENKHAUS: Absolutely. At a minimum, what we would have to start off with, by way of confidence-building measures, would be to ensure that any new government in Somalia and any partner in a new government in Somalia accept the premise of peaceful coexistence with Somalia's neighbors.

That is a painful pill, a bitter pill rather, to swallow for some Somali nationalists who have -- who continue to embrace the notion of a greater Somalia. But under the circumstances that's going to have to be one of things they're willing to concede on the table if Somalia is going to get out of this 20-year impasse.

SEN. ISAKSON: In Ms. Scribner's point six, you said, "Ensure any strategy for Somalia has a regional approach. Somalia shouldn't be dealt with in isolation as peace in Somalia means engaging and resolving issues with its neighbors."

So I'm getting the drift that you both agree, from two different perspectives with the same conclusion that a coordinated strategy needs to be coordinated with Ethiopia, with Somalia. Is there another bordering country that needs to be coordinated with as well? Or is it primarily the Ethiopian-Somalian difficulty?

MS. SCRIBNER: Definitely the Ethiopians, the Eritreans, but also the Kenyans as well, and that has to do a lot with the refugee flows and to Kenya and the Dadaab camps, and also the closing of the border off and on with the Liboi Reception Center, which is where refugees go to be registered. That center has been shut down so there's no process to register Somalis that are fleeing into Kenya at this point. So Kenya is also a very important country in terms of coordinated strategy.

SEN. ISAKSON: Is the Transitional Federal Government stable enough to actually sit down at the table with those two neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia, and try and reach an agreement in your judgment?

MS. SCRIBNER: I think that there is an effort by the new president to reach out to all parties on the ground. And I think right now the focus has been on parties within Somalia, so the different warring parties.

But I think as a next step, definitely reaching out to the other, you know, to Kenya and to Ethiopia, but I think right now on his plate is reaching out to the different groups on the ground.

SEN. ISAKSON: And I take it that the two organizations, the two terrorist organizations -- what's the name? Al Shabaab and the other one that you were mentioning, they really play on the nationalist pride with the Somali people and kind of pitted us versus Ethiopia to whip up the locals to keep the uncertainty going on. Is that correct?

MR. MENKHAUS: That's exactly what Shabaab's successful formula was in 2007-2008. They conflated a radical Islamist ideology with a nationalist anti-imperialist liberation ideology against the Ethiopian occupation.

And that won them a lot of support, at least passive support, from Somalis who didn't accept some of the elements of their Islamist agenda, but who saw them as the legitimate leading freedom fighter force against the Ethiopian occupation.

Now that the Ethiopians are out, and now that there is a new more broad-based government that's actually led by their former leader and a moderate Islamist, Sheikh Sharif, Shabaab doesn't have anything to fight against.

They have been trying to use the African Union forces and their presence in Mogadishu as the one remaining rallying point of the Somalis versus the foreigners. But that doesn't have as much attraction in Somali society.

SEN. ISAKSON: Is al Shabaab's ultimate goal Shari'a law and control of Somalia? Is that what they really want?

MR. MENKHAUS: It's difficult to say what Shabaab wants, because it's actually quite internally divided. But what it certainly --

SEN. ISAKSON: Shabaab is?

MR. MENKHAUS: Yes. What it certainly wants is to block and prevent the Transitional Federal Government become -- from becoming operational. It wants to take control. It is definitely a power seeker in that sense. What its policies would be beyond that, we can only speculate.

SEN. ISAKSON: Thank you both very much for being here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Senator Risch.

SEN. JAMES E. RISCH (R-ID): Ms. Scribner, you made reference to the fact that you, I think, you said that you would like to see those who commit the human rights violations or other violations held accountable. How do you do that under present circumstances? Certainly everyone would agree with that, but pragmatically that seems like a difficult thing.

MS. SCRIBNER: What the -- well, a lot of human rights organizations have been calling forth the Commission of Inquiry, and you could do that through the U.N. where you have people going in to investigate abuses on the ground.

And a lot of those investigations could be done in the bordering countries where refugees have flown. So talking to people in Dadaab camp, most of those people in the camps are from Somalia. So you could actually get a lot of information.

And then, when the situation or security on the ground allow to go into the country and do some of the investigation, which would be helpful in terms of some -- in moving towards reconciliation, holding parties accountable, and also looking ahead at any further abuses that are committed had set up a system on the ground.

SEN. RISCH: And I guess, I apologize for my parochial view of holding people accountable. But to me holding people accountable is dragging them into court and inflicting a punishment on them for what they have done.

I gather that's not what you were referring to. You're more -- you're referring more to an inquiry, and then a publication of the bad things that someone did, not necessarily a punishment or something along those lines?

MS. SCRIBNER: I don't think we can get to that yet, but yeah, exactly something similar to what's been done in Burundi, or Rwanda, or East Timor even, where it's more of a publication of, kind of, the wrongdoers on the ground just to give people a sense that, you know, you cannot act with complete impunity. That people are watching; that people do care about this -- about the abuses being committed on civilians and aid workers, journalists, and human rights defenders.

SEN. RISCH: I guess, it depends on your point of view, but you know, from my point of view, it's almost counterproductive. If you do publish this and say look, this is what these bad guys did, and then don't do anything about it, it doesn't -- it's not the kind of thing that helps in the future, that is, people say, well, who cares?

You know, they discovered all this, and then did absolutely nothing about it. These people did act with impunity. They're still walking down the street. They're still doing whatever.

So I guess that -- I just haven't -- I just need help here understanding this. I understand what you're saying, and I think the frustration is you want to do something about it, but yet, just investigating it and then publishing the results of the investigation, it would seem to me is not a good deterrent either individually or from a general deterrent standpoint.

MS. SCRIBNER: But it does set up a system for people to feel like their concerns are being heard, they are taken into consideration. And also it depends on who is committing the abuses, if it's within the police, you know, that are part of the Transitional Federal Government. And that's something we talked about with security sector reform in terms of holding people accountable.

You can hold those people accountable, because you can fire them. So there are certain parties that will be held more accountable than others and that actions could be taken. But in places where there is conflict, it does serve as a forum for people to have grievances, and also just to have, you know, their voices heard, and the problems that they have experienced at the hands of different parties heard as well.

But again, very complicated and not an easy thing to do, but a first step, you know, towards actually holding people accountable. More needs to be done in the future. But we need to take that first step.

SEN. RISCH: Thank you. I appreciate that.

Mr. Menkhaus, I was fascinated by your comment about some people have a vision for a greater Somalia. Could you expand now what you meant by that?

MR. MENKHAUS: This is part of an old Somali desire to reunify ethnic Somalis who live -- who were divided by colonialism into five different colonies in the Horn of African; Djibouti, British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The two of those five did unite; British Somaliland and Italian Somalia had independence. Now, of course, Somaliland has issued a unilateral cessation or a termination of the unity between the two.

But that's -- it's a core function or a core belief in Somali nationalism, which is paradoxically very, very strong, despite the fact that they're internally driven by clan and other divisions.

SEN. RISCH: Does that go away over a period of time? Or does that get worse?

MR. MENKHAUS: It's been around since the 1950s. It has -- it's far less significant today than it has been in the past, when it drove wars in the 1970s. But it's still there, not so much for the Somali Kenyans who really have no interest in reuniting with the Somalia, but it's -- and nor with Somali Djiboutians who are enjoying all of the fruits of having an independent state.

But it's Somali Ethiopians who are treated as second-class citizens in Ethiopia frankly, and who are currently bearing the brunt of a very heavy-handed counter-insurgency campaign by the Ethiopian government.

SEN. RISCH: What percentage of the population is that in Ethiopia?

MR. MENKHAUS: It's about 4 million of a population of roughly 80 million in Ethiopia, if I'm remembering my numbers correctly.

SEN. RISCH: Okay. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Senator Risch. I will ask more questions.

Scribner, I'm glad that you raised the problem of refugee flows to neighboring countries, have been very specifically about overcrowding, lack of adequate resources in Dadaab, what you were mentioning in Kenya, one of the world's oldest, largest, and most congested refugee sites.

Earlier this week, Doctors Without Borders said that hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees at this camp are finding the camp conditions so unbearable that some are considering returning home. And I know that there's been an effort over the last year to work with the Kenyan government to secure some new land to accommodate the refugees. But it's my understanding that a solution still hasn't been reached.

What is a workable solution to this situation? What's the greatest obstacle, lack of leadership, resources, or something else?

MS. SCRIBNER: In terms of the Dadaab camps, there are three camps, existing camps right now, and the negotiation right now is to build a fourth camp. And while the Kenyan government has agreed with UNHCR in principle, they've announced that they would actually authorize land for this fourth camp. They haven't officially authorized it. They haven't given it up to them, as of yet.

And it's going to take about six months to construct that fourth camp. So in the meantime, as Doctors Without Borders, and even Oxfam did an assessment report of the camps, we're finding there's not enough latrines. The latrines aren't separate between women and men. So a lot of the women and children aren't using the latrines because of the cultural sensitivity of using the same latrine.

There's not enough water for people. So those demands need to be immediately met, and then that fourth camp needs to be up and running as quickly as possible. There's also an appeal, I believe, it's $91 million for -- UNHCR appeal. And that's really important to get funding for the existing camps and then this fourth camp as well.

SEN. FEINGOLD: You expect this fourth camp will be available in six months? Or is that --

MS. SCRIBNER: It's going to be six months from the time the Kenyan government actually authorizes the land.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Okay.

MS. SCRIBNER: And as we hope that it's -- I mean, they have agreed in principle, but again they haven't given that specific authorization as of yet.

SEN. FEINGOLD: All right.

Doctor, in terms of the piracy off Somalia's coast, you said previously that naval operations might help, but they cannot possibly stop this piracy when the risks are so low, the rewards so high, and alternatives, in your words, "so bleak in desolate Somalia." That was very well put.

And I want to ask you specifically about possible alternatives and the importance of economic opportunities in thinking about U.S. and international assistance to Somalia. How important is economic revitalization in promoting livelihoods?

Obviously, some of this is very difficult with combat violence going on in some regions of Somalia. And I'm thinking here also about Puntland or even Somaliland.

MR. MENKHAUS: In the long term, economic revitalization to provide opportunities, alternative opportunities for pirates and their financial backers are the solution. In the short-to-medium term though, the on-land solution can also, and must also come from political authorities that are both willing and able to stop the piracy, which I would add, is a second-order security threat for us, compared to what's going on in Mogadishu. And I think we have to be careful not to allow any of our anti-piracy efforts to compromise our policies toward counter terrorism and state-building in the south.

We do have two instances in Somalia where piracy has been prevented or stopped by local political authorities, because they had a political interest in demonstrating their utility to the international community. One is Somaliland.

Somaliland has the ideal coast along the Gulf of Aden for pirate layers. And yet when pirates have attempted to use those shores, Somaliland has prevented it. And that's again, because they are trying to demonstrate their legitimacy and their utility to the international community in a bid for international recognition.

The other instance was the Islamic Courts Union in 2006, which put a quick end to piracy along the Indian Ocean coast. Again, that was in part because the pirates and their financial backers were political rivals of the Islamists. So they had incentive to put an end to it.

But also because they wanted to demonstrate that they were a source of rule of law, someone that we would want to work with. And for me that's instructive; it means that they don't have to have a large coast guard, it means that they don't have to have the immediate economic revitalization.

What they have to have is the political interest, the will to put an end to it on shore. And if they have that they will do it.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, Doctor, I particularly appreciate your candor and your directness, you know, it is exactly what you said; that the piracy is important as it is; it is not the first order of security risk here.

Of course, we don't have a full room here, just a few weeks after the piracy. We don't have the heroes here who saved the people, and so we revert back to this, sort of, okay, Somalia is a terribly difficult place. And we forget the most elemental thing which is that the pirates do not live in the water.

They live in the land. And if we're foolish enough to just let this go and move on to other things and the next crisis of the day we will seriously involve ourselves in a, I think, one of the greatest crises in the world. There's a tendency that people say, oh, the president's got so many things on his plate. How can he possibly have Somalia be at this level?

Well, the fact is it may well be at that level. And it requires that kind of attention. It requires that attention now. So I greatly appreciate your comments.

Senator Isakson.

SEN. ISAKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one question of Ms. Scribner on -- I'm going to be in Kenya next week. And so I need a little education. The Dadaab camp; is that -- it's there under the auspices of the Kenyan government allowing it to be there. But is that operated -- who operates the camp?

MS. SCRIBNER: Excuse me, UNHCR does, so does the U.N.

SEN. ISAKSON: So it's under the auspices of the U.N.?

MS. SCRIBNER: I believe it is under the auspices of the U.N. But I -- they are the ones in charge and operating those camps there, but with the permission of the Kenyan government.

SEN. ISAKSON: And there are half a million refugees, you said, in that camp?

MS. SCRIBNER: There are 250,000 refugees in three camps.

SEN. ISAKSON: In three camps?

MS. SCRIBNER: Yes. So there is 500,000 refugees in surrounding countries and half of those, 250,000 are in the Dadaab camp.

SEN. ISAKSON: And which U.S.-based NGOs are providing assistance in that camp?

MS. SCRIBNER: I believe, Doctors Without Borders, Mercy -- I'm sorry, International Rescue Committee is also in the camps, excuse me. And Oxfam has done assessments in the camps and we've agreed with the government that if a fourth camp is opened, that we would provide water and sanitation for that fourth camp.

SEN. ISAKSON: The Kenyan government?

MS. SCRIBNER: Yes.

SEN. ISAKSON: Thank you very much.

Thanks to both of you for your testimony today.

MS. SCRIBNER: Thank you.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Sen. Risch.

SEN. RISCH: (Off mike.) Who provides the securities? Is it the Kenyan government or the U.N. that provides security in the camps, local policing, if you would?

MS. SCRIBNER: I think it's the Kenyan police, but there have been some allegations of abuse by the police on the population within the camps. And I think it Human Rights Watch, in particular, did a very detailed report of abuses within the camps and the problems, not just with the humanitarian situation, but with the security situation.

SEN. RISCH: Is it a result of ethnic prejudice or that sort of thing? What's the source for that?

MS. SCRIBNER: I think it has -- it's many issues, it's many different issues; part of it is, maybe, the police is not making enough money. So it's preying on the population. It may be that they are Somalis and not Kenyans. But I don't know specifically all the different issues of the preying, but I know that there have been a lot of reports and concerns about the treatment and half of those 250,000 people are women and children. So that's really important too to point out.

SEN. RISCH: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I want to thank the panel very much, and particularly, I want to thank my colleagues for their diligence on this, and other issues relating to Africa. It really has made the work on the subcommittee so far this year a pleasure. And I want to thank everybody who was involved in the hearing.

That concludes it. (Sounds gavel.)

MS. SCRIBNER: Thank you.

Source