Hearing of the Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee - Piracy on the High Seas: Protecting our Ships, Crews, and Passengers

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR FRANK LAUTENBERG (D-NJ)

WITNESSES: PHILIP SHAPIRO, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, LIBERTY MARITIME CORPORATION; CAPTAIN RICHARD PHILLIPS, CAPTAIN, MV MAERSK ALABAMA; MICHAEL PERRY, CHIEF ENGINEER, MV MAERSK ALABAMA; ROY KIENITZ, UNDER SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; REAR ADMIRAL BRIAN SALERNO, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP, U.S. COAST GUARD; THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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SEN. FRANK LAUTENBERG (D-NJ): This is the Surface Transportation Subcommittee, and the subject today is piracy on the high seas. And I thank all of you, those of you who are appearing as witnesses for being here today, for helping us understand what we've got out there by way of a threat, and what we do to deal with it.

Many of us thought that pirates were something from the past, found only in history books and movies. But pirates are back on the high seas. And on April 8th, the U.S. flagged ship Maersk Alabama was transporting food to hungry people in Kenya when it was attacked by four Somali pirates. The 20 crew members stood up to the pirates and eventually retook their ship. But their captain was taken hostage.

So, we look in wonderment. I had a chance to talk to Captain Phillips and his wife the other night, and she assured me that she had all the confidence in the world, and there wasn't any doubt that the captain was going to stand up to these people and lead his ship and his crew and himself back home, and we congratulate you for that.

The U.S. Navy Special Forces were called upon to secure the captain's release, and they succeeded. Captain Richard Phillips and chief engineer who are pleased to be with us, Michael Perry from the Alabama are with us today, and I thank you both for being here and commend you for your bravery at sea.

But as the nation focused on the Alabama incident, another attack on a U.S. flagged ship occurred. Only five days after the Alabama attack, Somali pirates again attacked a U.S. flagged ship, the British Sun. The vessel and its crewmen were fired on by pirates, and they escaped by out-maneuvering them. We have video footage, which you'll see in a couple of minutes, from that attack that we're going to play today. And while the video is not Hollywood perfect, it certainly shows how the crew acted decisively to ward off the attack by the pirates.

Despite the Liberty Sun's daring escape, the ship was stuck at a port in Kenya as the attackers waited offshore for its return to the seas. They were waiting for their quarry to show up. It's outrageous. The Liberty Sun was docked in Kenya for nearly three weeks, and the ship finally left the port this past Sunday.

So, today I hope the Navy can tell us how they can ensure safe passage in the future. In 2008, since last year, there were 111 pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa. Almost double the number in 2007. And this year alone, there have already been 86 attacks. As a result of these attacks, nearly 300 non-U.S. crew members are being held prisoner by Somali pirates. Pirates are now attacking ships over more than two million square miles of ocean, more than half the size of the United States. In addition to the lives they threaten, these pirates threaten supplies for American troops who are serving abroad, humanitarian relief bound for East Africa and commercial shipping across the world.

These bandits have to be stopped. Violence and lawlessness will not be tolerated, whether on land, in the sky, or at sea. We have a duty to protect the ships that proudly fly America's flagged, and our nation's military is our partner in fulfilling that duty. And we're going to talk about that in just a little bit.

A timid approach, an agreement, acquiescence will not do it. We need to take bold action to keep our seas and our ship crews safe. And I understand that the Coast Guard is in the process of updating their security policies for commercial ships in the program known as MARSEC Security Directive. This is long overdue, and it needs to be completed. And the international community needs to have a strong, united front against these bandits of the sea.

The International Maritime Organization has 168 member nations. They must all join together to prosecute and stop piracy in this region. Now, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses so that we can learn what appropriate steps we can take to eliminate these threats to our passengers, the ships, the crew, the cargo. And we are delighted to have you here, and we'll start with ? just want to make mention of all of those who are here with us, and that's Mr. Philip Shapiro, who we'll hear from first, president and CEO of Liberty Maritime Corporation, whose ship, the Liberty Sun, was attacked by pirates on April the 14th. Captain Richard Phillips, captain of the Maersk Alabama and his colleague, Michael Perry, the chief engineer of the Maersk Alabama. And we thank you both for showing us the way to get out of a situation like that.

Both the captain and the engineer, Captain Phillips and Mr. Perry, faced incredibly trying circumstances. I commend you for your leadership, your courage and your commitment to your crew. The career of a merchant mariner is often under appreciated. But these incidents remind us that the role you play in our nation's security and commerce. And Mr. Roy Kienitz, Under Secretary of Transportation for Policy at the U.S. Department of Transportation is here. We welcome you. And Rear Admiral Brian Salerno, Assistant Commandant for the Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship at the U.S. Coast Guard. We have Ms. Theresa Whelan, who's a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs.

Now, we're going to try and keep the testimony up to five minutes. If you run over a little bit, you have a tolerant chairman here. But not too much. And, first, what we'd like to do is hear from Mr. Shapiro. And Mr. Shapiro also has a film that he's going to show us when he finishes his remarks. And it will not be charged to your time at the table.

MR. PHILIP SHAPIRO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the important issue of piracy. As you know, one of our vessels, the Liberty Sun, was attacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia on April 14th, just two days after the incredible rescue of Captain Phillips of the Maersk Alabama.

Thankfully, no one on the crew of the Sun was injured despite the vessel having been hit by flow rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons fire. And the Sun arrived safely in Mombasa, Kenya on April 15th. The Liberty Sun was on a mission of mercy, to deliver much needed food aid to East Africa. The vessel carried 47,000 tons of food as a gift from the American people. The Sun's cargo alone is enough to feed more than a quarter of a million people for a year in several African countries, including Somalia.

Without revealing the operational details for fear of assisting the pirates, I can say that one of our vessels is almost always in or near the danger area at any given time. And, so, we take the threat of piracy very, very seriously.

Our company and our crew implemented enhanced precautions to make our vessels difficult pirate targets prior to the recent incidents. Captain Don Gross and the rest of the crew followed the company security plan and kept their cool under fire. No boarding occurred. And the crew did everything that could reasonably be asked of them.

We also wish to thank the U.S. Navy for their prompt and effective response to the incident. We're especially grateful to General Duncan McNabb and Vice Admiral Ann Rondeau of U.S. TransCom, as well as Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Admiral Tom Barrett and Admiral Thad Allen, the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, at this point, I'd like to introduce and show a short video of the attack on the Liberty Sun, taken by the chief mate, Bill Kenneweg.

(Video shown.)

MR. SHAPIRO: Well, initially, you saw one of the skiffs, and the second one appears later in the video. As you can see, Mr. Chairman, pirate attacks come out of nowhere and end just as suddenly. The video is dramatic and showcases the type of risk our crewmen face everyday when delivering food aid in this part of the world.

It also demonstrates the preparation, training and courage of our crew in responding to lethal fire. They only thing they could not do was shoot back, Mr. Chairman. And, so, with the balance of my time, I'd like to address what I regard as the pressing the U.S. flagged piracy issues.

First, we've heard some suggestions that U.S. flagged shipowners have not done enough to protect their vessels. That view, with all due respect, sir, is flat wrong. Our company adopted every measure recommended by the International Maritime Organization and required by the Coast Guard's approved security plan for making the vessel a difficult piracy target and more. And the fact is, they did not board our vessel. For example, the crew of the Sun had rigged fire hoses to cover the stern of the vessel to create a virtual flood wall of water coming off the ship. When the Bainbridge arrived, their crew informed Captain Gross that none of them had ever seen so much water coming off a vessel.

Critics have also charged that U.S. flagged vessels should carry firearms for the crew or private security teams. Please let me address this issue directly. Merchant vessels simply do not routinely carry firearms in this day and age. In my view, however, the Maersk Alabama incident constitutes a game changer in this regard. After the incident, self-proclaimed pirate leaders issued direct threats of violence against American merchant mariners.

It is true that U.S. flagged vessels and their crews have an unquestioned right of self-defense under a United States statute dating back to 1819. However, more recently enacted State Department arms export regulations effectively prohibit the arming of vessels. Additionally, ship owners risk being second-guessed in both U.S. and foreign courts for self-defensive measures that were common in 1819.

In light of the recent threats to U.S. merchant mariners, we respectfully request that Congress consider clearing the obstacles that currently block ship owners from arming our vessels in self defense to protect our crews when it is appropriate. I believe that U.S. flagged ship owners have done all they can within the law to protect their crews. I look forward to working together with you, sir, and other members of the committee and other congressional leaders to bring U.S. law up to date and give us the legal framework we need to be able to protect ourselves.

I also hope that we can come to an understanding that private industry cannot switch from a no firearms regime to an armed protection regime overnight. Our ships need protection now, not months from now. In the interim, we will lead either naval escorts or government security teams for U.S. flagged vessels on high risk transits. And in that regard, we are grateful to both the Department of Defense and the European Union for their cooperation which we have received to date.

The piracy problem has correctly been described as an international problem that needs an international solution. But we should not let the complexity of that problem deter us from addressing what we can do in the United States right now to protect American merchant mariners on U.S. flagged vessels.

Thank you again, sir, for inviting me to appear here today. And I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: Thank you very much, Mr. Shapiro. I won't start the questions right now on the routine. But just to say ? the observation that one makes in seeing this is that they kept changing course and accelerating speed. And I assume that the Liberty Sun was able to outrun these people, even though they were in the light skiff that usually has plenty of power to accelerate rapidly. But they were able to ?

MR. SHAPIRO: Absolutely, sir. They were able to outrun it. The skiff is faster than the boat, the ship. The boat is much faster than a ship. However, with the freeboard that we had, having discharged 17,000 tons in Port Sudan before we headed down to Mombasa. We had 32,000 tons still in the vessel, but this is a large boat carrier, and there was 26 feet of freeboard. That is the distance between the water and the deck. And with the water going over the sides from the water cannons and fire hoses, with the evasive maneuvering, we were not an easy target to board at that point, sir.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: Very good. Well, thank you very much for your testimony and for bringing us that video. And now I would ask Captain Phillips. Welcome and we ask you to give your testimony. And, again, try and keep within the five. I'll be the watchman here, but I won't be too harsh, I promise.

CAPT. RICHARD PHILLIPS: Okay, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Captain Richard Phillips. I'm a graduate of the Massachusetts Maritime Academy.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: Pull that microphone a little closer, please.

CAPT. PHILLIPS: Okay. A member of the International Organization of Master Mates and Pilots and licensed American Merchant Mariner. I was the captain of the Maersk Alabama when it was attacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia on April 8th. Thankfully, that episode ended with the successful return of the ship, its cargo of U.S. food aid for Africa, and, most importantly, my crew.

All of us have returned home safely, and for that we all appreciate the actions taken by the Administration, the Department of Defense and most especially the U.S. Navy, the Navy Seals and the crew aboard the U.S.S. Bainbridge. I want to thank the management of Maersk and Waterman Steamship Corporation who handled the situation, the crew and our families with great care and concern. Equally important, I want to commend the officers and crew aboard the Maersk Alabama who responded with its typical professionalism in response to this incident. The deck officers, who are members of the Master Mates and Pilots Union, the deck officer engineers who are members of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, and the unlicensed crew who belong to the Seafarers International Union, dedicated, well-trained merchant mariners who acted to protect the interests of our country.

In fact, I want to make sure that everyone understands that due to the quick response by the crew led by the chief engineer Mike Perry and chief mate Shane Murphy, the pirates never took control of the Maersk Alabama. Chief Engineer Perry, Chief Mate Murphy and the entire licensed and unlicensed crew of the Maersk Alabama did what American mariners are always ready to do. Put themselves at risk to protect the vessel and its cargo.

I am honored to come before you and your subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, to discuss my views on making commercial shipping safer and worldwide sea lanes more secure from the threat of piracy. I cannot, however, discuss various specific details of the Maersk Alabama incident because itself is an ongoing investigation and pending legal action against one or the pirates. Therefore, the focus of my comments will be my beliefs based on my years of experience at sea as to what can or should be done to respond to piracy and to protect American vessels and crews.

I believe that the best solution for protecting U.S. and foreign vessels from the threat of piracy is to end piracy itself. I know that this would require an intensive international effort to address the root causes of piracy within Somalia. But unless the root causes of piracy are addressed, piracy will continue to expand and evolve into an even greater threat for American and foreign seamen.

I also ask that Congress consider what steps should be taken to address the issues of piracy. You remember that there are almost 300 foreign mariners who are still being held captive by pirates. Like the crew of the Maersk Alabama, these merchant seaman were simply trying to do their jobs. But their families, unlike ours, are still living with the stress and pain of not knowing if or when their loved ones will be returned home safely.

Our government should use every resource at its disposal to encourage the International Maritime community to come together in a strong showing of support of international response to piracy. In this way, all mariners, America and foreign, will have the same protections and an equal chance to do their jobs in peace. Of course, there's an immediate need to protect American vessels and their crews. This needs to protect U.S. flagged vessels which are, by definition, an extension of the United States, should be met first and foremost by our government.

I believe that the most desirable and appropriate response to piracy is for the United States government to provide protection through military escorts and/or military detachments aboard U.S. vessels. That said, I am well aware that there may be a limit to any government resources, even America's. In fact, due to the vastness of the area to be covered, and the areas of threat are continually growing larger, our navy and the coalition of other navies currently positioned in the gulf of any region may simply not have the resources to provide all the protection necessary to prevent and stop the attacks.

So, what other things can be done? My opinion, the targets, that is, the vessels, can be hardened to make them even more structurally resistant to pirates. In addition, more can be done to develop the anti-piracy procedures. Tools and training for American crews beyond the up to date training they already receive at their educational training facilities jointly run by the maritime unions and shipping companies.

As for armed security details aboard vessels, I believe that this could be an effective deterrent. My preference would be government protection forces. But as long as they are adequately trained, I would not be opposed to private security on board. Of course, I realize the very clear protocols would have to be established and followed. For example, as a captain, I am responsible for the vessel, cargo and crew at all times. And I am not comfortable giving up command authority to others, including the commander of a protection force. In the heat of an attack, there can only be one final decision maker. So, command is only one of many issues that would have to be worked out and for security forces to operate effectively.

Finally, I've heard a suggestion that all we have to do to counter piracy is just arm the crews. In my opinion, arming the crews can not and should not be viewed as the final and only solution to this problem. Rather, arming the crew should be viewed as only one component of a comprehensive plan and approach to combat piracy. It would be my personal preference that only a limited number of individuals aboard the vessel have access to effective weaponry, and that these individuals receive special training on a regular basis.

I realize that even this limited approach to arming the crew opens up a very thorny set of issues. I'll let others sort out the legal and liability issues. However, we all must understand that having weapons on board merchant ships fundamentally changes the model of commercial shipping. And we must be very cautious about how it is done. While there is much discussion going on about how to deal with piracy, I would respectfully ask the subcommittee to be mindful that seafarers I've met and worked with over my career are resourceful, hard working, adventurous, courageous, patriotic and independent. There are a great many other masters, mates, engineers and crew who have the knowledge and insight to help this subcommittee and the Congress address the issue of piracy.

In fact, I am pleased to let you know that one such individual, Captain James Staples, is with me today and is available to answer some committee's questions. Captain Staples is the master of American flagged commercial vessels, and he has the seafaring and command experience and the perspective that the committee may find useful. Merchant mariners appreciate whatever help you can offer to make the sea lanes more secure and our work environment safer. But we realize that while preparation is absolutely critical, not every situation can be anticipated. And as merchant mariners, we accept this as a part of the seafarer's life.

So, I will just close with a request for you to please continue to include us in your discussions and debates. Thank you for this opportunity to speak, and I look forward, as does Captain Staples, to answer any of your questions.

MR. MICHAEL A. PERRY: I appreciate the opportunity to come before you to discuss measures that will protect our ships, crews and passengers. My name is Michael Antony Perry, and I was the chief engineer on board the Maersk Alabama on April 8th when it was attacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia. I am the last in a long line of proud U.S. mariners. My grandfather was a sailor in the U.S. Navy. My father was a U.S. merchant marine throughout World War II. Attaining the rank of Lieutenant Commander, I served in the United States Navy for 23 years, receiving a meritorious commission in 1989. I'm a member of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and have been a licensed U.S. Merchant Marine since 1995.

First and foremost, I would like to extend my gratitude toward my colleagues on board the Maersk Alabama, including my fellow licensed engineers, deck officers and crew. The skills, training and bravery were integral in maintaining the highest possible level of safety and security. Further, the leadership and determination demonstration by Captain Phillips attests to a strong character.

Second, the personnel and Maersk and Waterman Steamship Corporation handled the situation with the highest level of class and professionalism. From the moment they knew the vessel had been boarded to the moment I arrived at home, I knew that me, my fellow crew members and our families were their top priorities. Finally, it goes without saying that the Administration, the Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy operated with skill, expertise that they have proven to possess time after time.

The views that I express in my testimony are my own. And I hope that all sectors of the industry will be considered and included when performing a comprehensive policy to address the issues of piracy. As demonstrated by the incident involving the Maersk Alabama, when called to action, the U.S. government military personnel are the best equipped and most able to provide security to U.S. flagged vessels. They possess the training, the weaponry and authority to provide the security needed in order to address the immediate threat.

Further, it is the obligation of the American government to protect the vessels that fly the U.S. flag, carry U.S. mariners and transport U.S. cargo. Military escorts or detachments should be implemented as part of a comprehensive international plan to combat piracy. Unfortunately, we have seen that the pirates' methods have become more sophisticated and unpredictable. This coupled with the increase in pirate attacks has made the issue more urgent. Our government must step up and act now to ensure that the U.S. flagged vessels that operate in these waters have the force resources necessary to protect the vessel, its cargo and crew.

As demonstrated by the attack on the Liberty Sun, the pirates are no longer solely interested in financial transaction. They are willing to use deadly weapons. And that put the crew, cargo and vessels in immediate danger. I recommend that straightforward procedures be put in place.

A well trained watch team can spot danger far in advance, which, coupled with strengthened piracy procedures, would help to minimize the risk to the vessel, cargo and, most importantly, the crew. The long-term comprehensive solution calls for a response both at sea and ashore.

The root cause of piracy must be addressed internationally. There are hundreds of mariners being held hostage aboard pirated vessels across the world, and the U.S. government's resources alone are not enough to fix the problem.

I am very proud of my colleagues on board the Maersk Alabama. Although the crew was able to survive the incident relatively unscathed, the threat posed by the armed pirates is very real; in fact, Captain Phillips was taken hostage and spent five days aboard the lifeboat within AK-47 in its back. Due to the heroic actions of the entire crew, however, the pirates were at no time, at no point, in control of the vessel. Although the U.S. government threw the last punch in the fight, the battle was won much earlier by the combined efforts of the crew.

I would like to express my gratitude to them. 0vercoming extreme fatigue due to heat exhaustion, they willingly carried out their duties in order to rescue their shipmates throughout this 33-hour ordeal.

Thank you again for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: Thank you very much. Now from the honorable Roy Kienitz who is the Undersecretary of Transportation for Policy from the U.S. Department of Transportation. Mr. Kienitz, thank you.

MR. ROY KIENITZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators. Once again, it's a pleasure to be here today to add what we can to this.

The Department of Transportation is involved in these matters, principally through the U.S. Maritime Administration, which is an agency that has liaison with and regulates in certain ways U.S. flag commercial shipping. And so, in my testimony today, I think I'm principally going to reference the work that Department of Transportation has done to help promulgate management practices throughout the industry for U.S. flag vessels and at the international level, to try to make commercial vessels resistant to piracy to the greatest degree possible.

Obviously this problem right now is -- the worst place in the world is in the Gulf of Aden, which is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. On a given day there might be 50 commercial vessels in this area. But a very small percentage of these vessels are U.S. flag vessels, but there still may be approximately one per day in the area. Over the course of last year, our data show that we had probably about 55 United States ships pass through that area, for a total of several hundred transits, one way or another.

Currently, at least 18 commercial ships are being held hostage in this region, and there were, I believe, two more successful ship- takings this weekend and the last several days, so that number may be higher now. Ransom taking obviously has been traditionally the economic model that the pirates are pursuing here, and we believe that that's what primarily motivates them.

Data we've looked at from this busy period has shown several things, the first of which was mentioned briefly. The ships most vulnerable to attack are those with low top speeds, both proceeding slowly through the highest risk areas and unable to accelerate to a higher rate of speed, which both -- it doesn't necessarily allow them to outrun the vessels, but allows for aggressive maneuvering when attempts to board are occurring.

The second thing was also referenced by the gentleman, which is, ships that are low to the water, with a low free board, making boarding over the side easier. So in the case of ships that have both of those characteristics, which is to say, speeds under, say, 18 knots and low to the water, that's where we see the greatest success rate in pirate attacks. Estimates are that it's perhaps one-third of one percent of the ships transiting through this area are subject to attacks, but the effects are serious nonetheless.

Obviously, ship owners and captains and crew experience great risks. There is also costs involved, both due to increased staffing costs, increased insurance costs, and in some cases some ship owners are diverting ships to avoid the region, including diverting around the southern end of Africa, which adds many days to the transit going that direction. And that can have a significant cost.

To address these challenges the U.S., acting through our sort of commercial shipping arrangements, has been part of the leadership of the international effort to promulgate best management practices, and that's something that we have done by virtue of the UN process that's involving 25 other nations. And I might, for a moment, go through what some of those best management practices are.

For example, they fall into several categories. Number one, there are recommended defensive preparations for ships before they get anywhere near a high-risk area. And that includes putting together security plans, making sure members of the crew are properly trained about what to do in a certain situation, making sure the proper communications channels are known to everyone on board.

Second, there are protocols for proper communications with naval forces, both several days out from the highest risk areas and while in the region. There are navies of at least 12 nations operating in this zone right now, and so there's obviously a significant coordination challenge that occurs there, and so relatively streamlined procedures have been made available to ships of various nationalities in order to communicate their position and plans so the various navies are aware of them. Obviously, there's operational practices that have been recommended while in high risk areas, things like whether it's having fire hoses prepared and to eject water over the side, extra manning for watches, particularly during dawn and dusk when attacks might be more difficult to detect, maneuvering during an attack, things like that; obviously, contingency plans about what to do if attacked or boarded, and finally, what are the protocols for personnel on board ship if military action ensues as a result of a pirate attack.

Much of this activity is created through international institutions, the Maritime Security Center for the Gulf of Aden, which is located in the United Kingdom, as well as the United States Navy presence in Bahrain, and the U.K. Maritime office in Dubai. Obviously, one potential set of security measures that has received significant attention including here today has been the presence of armed security on board ships, whether provided by a government or a ship owner, or the arming of crews. Obviously there are with the arming of crews, I think some of the obvious issues have been raised, among those including: many foreign ports don't allow vessels with armed crews to enter into their territorial waters, and so that could be a real hampering effect. With private security forces, some ship owners have chosen voluntarily to embark armed security, and we saw an example of that with an Italian ship about ten days ago.

But that obviously raises issues. There's liability issues for ship owners, there's liability issues for the masters, training issues. And so I think it's the job of the government here to try to provide guidance as best as possible to ship owners, at a minimum, about what the best practices are for deploying persons like this.

I will leave the questions of our diplomatic and military responses to the folks who know more about that. Thank you sir.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: -- (Off mike.) -- we anxiously await, your testimony, because it's also have been raised on all sides or so.

REAR ADMIRAL BRIAN SALERNO: Senator, thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss maritime piracy and the Coast Guard's role in addressing this threat to freedom of the seas and to the safety of shipping, and, most importantly, to the mariners themselves.

In response to the threat of piracy off the Horn of Africa, the U.S. Coast Guard has been working very closely with our government and industry partners, with the International Maritime Organization, and through the International Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia to strengthen protective measures for merchant ships and to develop international regimes for the prosecution of apprehended pirates. We've also been involved operationally, by providing forces to U.S. Central Command, which have in turn been assigned to on-seeing counter-piracy efforts.

Although many nations have provided naval forces to the region to counter the threat of piracy, it remains equally important for merchant vessels to take appropriate measures to reduce their vulnerability to attacks. To best identify realistic measures, particularly in light of evolving pirate tactics, the Coast Guard has been working closely with the domestic and the international maritime industry, leveraging long-standing relationships forged in our transportation, safety, and security roles.

As new security guidance is developed, the Coast Guard updates its requirements for U.S. flag vessels to modify their vessel security plans, plans which are required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act. The mechanism by which we convey specific anti-piracy planning requirements is the Maritime Security Directive. The most recent directive pertaining to anti-piracy measures was issued approximately one year ago. We are presently updating that directive with new information and anticipate releasing it in the very near future.

It's important to note that the Maersk Alabama and the Liberty Sun each had self-protective procedures and plans in place. Their crews were prepared, and they took the appropriate actions. It exemplifies the type of pre-planning that we want all U.S. ships to undertake.

Internationally, the International Maritime Organization has been very active on this issue. As head of the U.S. delegation to IMO, the Coast Guard has been deeply involved with other flag states and industry NGOs to revise anti-piracy guidance applicable to the international merchant fleet. The Coast Guard has also actively participated in IMO-sponsored regional initiatives to improve international governance, including the development of the Djibouti code for regional cooperation.

We've assisted the State Department in the development of bi- lateral agreement with Kenya for the prosecution of apprehended pirates, and we've been having engaged in the contact group on piracy off the coast of Somalia. In this latter effort, we co-led, with the U.S. Maritime Administration, a working group focused specifically on industry's health protection measures. Many of the details were just relayed by Undersecretary Kienitz.

When piracy events do occur, swift communication among involved U.S. government agencies is extremely important. The mechanism for doing this is the Maritime Operational Threat Response protocol, or MOTR. MOTR has been used in over 600 cases since it was first established in 2005. However, the recent Maersk Alabama and Liberty Sun cases were the first ones related to piracy. Post-incident debriefs with the inter-agency indicate the process worked extremely well. It ensured complete coordination among multiple agencies having direct responsibilities for different aspects of the government's response.

As mentioned earlier, the Coast Guard has forces in the region under the operational control of central command. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments have been specifically assigned to Combined Task Force 151, where they augment U.S. Navy vessel-boarding teams. These teams have been directly involved in the apprehension of pirates in several recent cases. Our experience in law enforcement boardings, in particular, collecting evidence, providing witness statements, and handling suspects, has been an asset to CENTCOM.

Coast Guard Activities Europe, a parent command, located in Rotterdam, is responsible for the safety and security compliance of U.S. flag vessels operating in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Marine investigators and investigators from this unit routinely interact with vessels operating in the region. This extends to performing immediate post-incident interviews with the crews.

In closing, I'd like to assure you that the Coast Guard is committed to fulfilling its statutory responsibilities for the safety of U.S. merchant vessels and crews. Thank you for this opportunity to be here. I look forward to your questions.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: -- (Off mike.) -- Secretary of Defense for African Affairs. We look forward to your testimony.

MS. THERESA WHELAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to testify about the growing problem of piracy on the high seas.

Reducing incidents of piracy is important both to the United States and to the international community. As a general matter, freedom of the seas is critical to our national security and international commerce, and it is also a core principle of international law, one that all nations have a stake in supporting. Piracy endangers innocent mariners, disrupts commerce, and can cause severe economic damage to shipping companies and contribute to instability ashore.

Recent pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and along Somalia's east coast have targeted U.S. and U.S.-supported ships transporting food aid and other humanitarian supplies to Somalia and other vulnerable societies, disrupting the flow of aid to those who need it most. Recent incidents, including the dramatic rescue of Captain Phillips by the U.S. Navy, have increased public and international attention to piracy, and resolve has grown for finding durable solutions to this problem.

At the Department of Defense, we are working closely with other agencies and departments to develop comprehensive counter-piracy strategies. And the United States is not alone in this effort. Already, more than 28 other nations are conducting counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. From a Department of Defense perspective, our strategic goals with regard to Somalia piracy include deterrents, disruption, interdiction, and prosecution. Achieving these goals will be challenging for several reasons.

First, the geographic area affected is vast. The pirates operate in a total sea space of more than a million-square nautical miles, making it difficult for naval or law enforcement ships and other assets to reach the scene of a pirate attack quickly enough to make a difference. In that vast, expansive ocean, tracking a few dozen low- tech pirate skiffs and intervening to stop attacks that can last only a few minutes, is exceptionally difficult. When they are not actively engaged in piracy, pirate vessels easily blend in with ordinary shipping. When they return to land, pirates become still more difficult to locate.

Second, there is no effective and reliable central governing authority or capacity in Somalia. Consequently, pirates can operate with impunity from coastal fishing villages, as long as they have support of the local Somali clan leadership.

Third. Even when pirates are captured, serious gaps remain in the international community's ability to prosecute them for their crimes, and thus create an effective legal deterrent. Although all states may exercise jurisdiction over pirates as a matter of international law, some states still lack the appropriate domestic laws to prosecute pirates in their own courts when the act of piracy occurred on the high seas. Other states have appropriate domestic legal frameworks, but lack the prosecutorial and judicial capacity to effectively hold pirates accountable.

These varied and complex challenges should make it clear that there will be no simple solution to the growing problem of piracy off the Somali coast. That said, a few statistics help keep the problem of piracy in perspective. Each year, more than 33,000 vessels transit the Gulf of Aden, and in 2008, there were 122 attempted pirate attacks, of which only 42 were successful. In other words, pirate attacks, less than one-half of one percent of shipping in the Gulf of Aden, and their attacks have succeeded only about a third of the time.

While it's important that we find effective ways to address the growing problem of piracy, with particular attention to preventing piracy from becoming a funding source for violent extremist groups, we need to ensure that effectively addressing piracy does not come at the expense of other ongoing critical defense commitments. We believe that this can be done. Already we are taking effective steps to address the challenges outlined above.

Through the creation of the Combined Task Force 151, which focuses exclusively on counter-piracy, we are actively seeking engagement from other states, and we are pleased that so many states are beginning to play a role in counter-piracy efforts. Denmark, Singapore, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom have joined our efforts in CTF-151. Others have indicated they will do so as well. Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and others have all contributed forces, either individually or through NATO or the European Union.

Most important, in the short run, we are actively working with merchant shipping lines to help ensure that all vessels take appropriate measures to protect themselves from pirates. Here again, some statistics are instructive. When we look at patterns of pirate attacks in the region, we see that of the unsuccessful pirate attacks, a full 78 percent were thwarted simply by effective action taken by the crews of the ships under attack. Only in 22 percent of unsuccessful attacks were military or law enforcement interventions related to the positive outcome.

This highlights the fact that the single most effective short- term response to piracy will be working with merchant shipping lines to ensure that vessels in the region take appropriate security measures themselves. In so vast an expansive ocean, and with so many other critical national security priorities, it is not possible for our military to prevent or intervene in each and every pirate attack, but with the appropriate on-board security measures in place, the vast majority of pirate attacks can be thwarted without any need for military intervention.

We will continue to be prepared to respond, as appropriate, when U.S. flag vessels and U.S. citizens are involved, but the context in which our actions will be most effective exists when private partners take pro-active measures themselves. Most pirates are opportunistic criminals. When possible, they will focus on the easy target and avoid the difficult targets. Our main task is to assist commercial carriers in making their ships "hard" targets.

Thank you for offering me this opportunity to testify, and I welcome your questions or comments.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: Thank you very much, Ms. Whelan. To my colleagues, what I propose to do is to give each member six to seven minutes, including any part of that they chose, to do for an opening statement, and what I'll do is, I'll start off with some questions and then go to Senator Thune, who is the ranking member, and then Mr. Isakson and Mr. Udall.

Ms. Whelan, we heard your comments. We listened with interest. And when we say, only a third of the time that pirates were successful in some of these attacks, that's not very reassuring, I must tell you. And what I'm trying to figure out is, why the timidity to these acts of theft and brutality? I mean, when they're shooting those guns, they're not saying, "Oh, these are only meant for the deck, or for the bridge, or --." They're out to kill people. That's what the threat is. And it's really hard to understand.

We know there was an incident with the Portuguese navy when they prevented takeover. One of their ships captured all of them, the pirates, and took them home to Somalia. What does that say? It says: "All right, we paid the ransom, now we gave you your lives back." It's outrageous. They wouldn't have done the same, and we commend the courage and the ability of all the merchant mariners and all, particularly singling out those who avoided a takeover or responded as did the crew, the captain, and the engineer from the Maersk Alabama.

Now, Ms. Whelan, recent comments by General Petraeus seem to suggest that it's outside the U.S. military's responsibility to protect our U.S. flag vessels. Now, is that the position of the Department of Defense, or does the U.S. military have a different obligation? Is an American flag ship something that resembles a piece of American territory, a sovereign condition? Or, do we say as was suggested in your testimony, and I don't mean to add any sarcasm to it, but you said, we respond as it's appropriate to do so. That's not very comforting, and so what is the position of the Department of Defense? Don't they consider that an extension of American, and I'll use the term "territory," is to be protected?

We've sent in crews all over the world. Marine helicopters have landed in foreign lands, picked people up off of the roofs of the embassy, done all kinds of things to protect our citizens. Why here are we saying that we're like an alarm company, and you sound the alarm, we'll get there as soon as we possibly can. I don't want to extend your remarks, but please give me your view of what it is that enables, that doesn't permit out naval forces to intervene, or other forces. The Air Force, perhaps. I don't know.

MS. WHELAN: Thank you for the question, Senator. Of course, the United States Navy certainly has its Title 10 mission to advance U.S. national security interests by protecting and advancing and promoting freedom of the seas and free sea lines of communication. And certainly, under international law, we have the right to provide protection and use proportionate force whenever necessary in order to protect U.S. citizens, U.S. flag vessels, U.S. aircraft, if they come under the attack, and as demonstrated in the case of the Maersk Alabama, we moved quickly and expeditiously to do so as soon as there was notification that the Maersk Alabama was under attack.

So most definitely, we do, when we are able to do so, move, on the Defense Department side, to protect U.S. flag vessels. There are some legal issues with regard to whether or not a vessel is technically sovereign, immune. Commercial U.S. flag vessels that are not carrying U.S. government cargo are not sovereign immune.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: Ms. Whelan, when is it, the Navy, unable to provide that support? You say, "when able." That qualifier is very disturbing, I've got to tell you.

MS. WHELAN: What I mean by "when able," sir, is simply the physics of being in the right place at the right time in order to address an attack, whether the attack is in progress or at whatever stage. The issue with the Maersk Alabama, we fortunately had our vessels in at least reasonable proximity so they could react quickly, although unfortunately they were not close enough to be able to react upon notification of the attack.

Normally we, if notified of an attack, we can deploy helicopters and other mechanisms to improve the speed of our response, but there is a physics --

SEN. LAUTENBERG: I hear you, and with all due respect, the comments by General Petraeus seem to suggest that that's not the Navy's responsibility, to talk about being short of resources. I think that letting our crews know that they are going to be protected by all of the might that the United States can bring to the situation, can bring, and to suggest that -- and, by the way, the largest percentage of ships in those waters is material being sent by the government to relieve hunger and suffering in these areas. So we say, okay, we'll pay you to carry this, but listen, if it gets taken along the way, that's your risk.

I'm going to defer my questions now to my colleague, Senator Udall, from New Mexico.

SEN. TOM UDALL (D-NM): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I very much appreciate you, Mr. Chairman, having this hearing. I'd like to put my full statement in the record and then ask a few questions and make a few comments here.

First, let me say that, to Captain Phillips, I think one of the -- and I thank the entire panel here today for your testimony -- but I think, Captain Phillips, one of the things your capture and rescue have shown to us is obviously your courage, and has also shown us the courage and bravery of our naval forces and the U.S.S. Bainbridge and the Navy SEALS that were involved in that. And so that's something that I think we should think about and contemplate and understand here.

I'm very proud that there's one New Mexican serving on the U.S.S. Bainbridge, and we have, I think, 24-hundred New Mexicans serving in the United States Navy. So the issue I wanted to focus on with you has to do with, you know, what is -- and it goes to what the Chairman's asking -- what is the solution here? How do we get our ships protected? And you mention in your testimony, you probably discussed it a little bit earlier, the idea that some have advocated, all you have to do is arm the crew. And you've talked about the corresponding responsibilities of a captain when you have an armed crew and the trade-offs there and the tension that goes on. Could you talk a little further about what you think the solution really is, in terms of this kind of shipping, and whether you think arming the crew is the solution to the problem?

CAPT. PHILLIPS: Senator Udall, as I said, it's going to take a comprehensive, multi-faceted plan to combat this. There is no silver bullet. There is no one way that will solve it. We talk about the international response. That's required. I believe arming the crew -- and by this I think there's a misnomer here. This isn't the wild West. Crews aren't walking around with holster and guns in their pockets. The guns are under lock and key by the captain.

He's the only one who has access to it.

It's a misnomer that you can't bring certain weapons into these countries. I've been to these countries. I have done it. But just arming the crew is not. That's just putting the onus on the crew. I believe the primary step would be military and/or civilian if they're properly trained as the military are, as Chief Engineer Perry has mentioned. If they are properly trained, they are the primary preventer. Armed crew would be backing them up, and by armed crew I mean a limited number of trained crew and assets, which I don't want to go into, to not to divulge anything.

The third thing would be more training and hardening of the ship.

I'm a firm believer in training and I think we can do more on the ship side, but to put all the onus onto the ship and its crew will not solve it. We have to get the non-lethal capabilities, an LRAD, long range acoustic device. We talked about other preventive measures: fire hoses. The Maersk Alabama had fire hoses. They go to where they aren't there. We talked about speed. I think the parameters, you can throw them out the window.

The Maersk Alabama was going 18 at point four knots when we were boarded. We had a free board very much close to the Liberty Sun. I was three miles from the Liberty Sun when the Navy got there and our free board was probably around 22 to 25 foot, in that area, so you can throw that parameter out because they had a wonderful brand new ladder, which I questioned them frequently about where did they get it. And if that's the evolution, a brand new ladder doesn't cost as much here in Sears as it does to the Somalis, and they are evolving.

As one of the panel members said, they're now doing a night, or what I call a stealth attack, which is our most vulnerable, and they have started that for the first time in the last few days, so it is evolving. There is no silver bullet. Each of these steps must be taken and in unison and in concert. That will help, not eliminate. That will help prevent these and it will be a pre-incident, not a post-incident reply, and I think Chief Engineer Perry or Captain Staples could further some of those items, but that's where I believe there's not one answer. It's a comprehensive, multi-faceted plan that will vastly, much lower than the one point five percent or so we've heard today; we'll make it close to zero, which I think we all want.

SEN. UDALL: Captain Phillips, what would you say to other captains that operate in the Horn of Africa and in the particular area today about what they should be doing, what precautions they should be taking? What recommendations do you make in that respect? I ask this question thinking of, you know, we saw your rescue, but we also know today that there are 300 people that are captive, that are in a situation that you could have very well been in, and we don't know when they're going to be freed. It's hard to tell and I'm just wondering if there's any preventive advice you could give to other captains or what you would have to say to them.

CAPT. PHILLIPS: I would never presume to tell a captain anything, to be honest, but I think—

SEN. UDALL: I thought you might say that.

CAPT. PHILLIPS: But I will say, Chief Engineer Perry and Captain Staples can say their words, but I would say the things that we've learned and many of the things we put in place, as Chief Engineer Perry can say, were done during our security drills, where we listened to what mariners thought, from the cook to the third mate to the third engineer, to the QMED. We listened to everybody's ideas when we did our drills and critiqued our drills, and that's where a lot of the things that we came up with in our incident actually were derived from. It's the imagination, the capability of the individuality of the seamen. We actually came up on these ideas as a critique of our security drills.

SEN. UDALL: Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: We established one thing in these moments here is that you don't have to be in a coastal state in order to be concerned about the well-being of our sailors and our vessels and our reach to do the right thing. And with that, Senator Thune, also not from a seacoast—

SEN. THUNE: I'm a long ways from the coast, Mr. Chairman, but I appreciate you holding the hearing today and I want to thank the panel for your input and your insights. This is not a new problem, of course, but I think the recent attack has really captured the nation's attention and focus and sort of underscored the increasing violence and the range of Somali piracy that's operating off of the Horn of Africa, and, again, fortunately, thanks to the courageous efforts of Captain Phillips and his crew and the heroic action of the U.S. Navy, the merchant mariners were returned safely to their families, but it does continue to threaten the vital shipping interests and the freedoms of navigation for all nations. And the numbers have already been alluded here today, but you've got 309 U.S. crew members on 18 hijacked vessels in Somali captivity currently.

The range of the pirates is now expanding with attacks on merchant ships taking place over more than 2.2 million square miles, so, and I think we all agree that the absence of stable government in Somalia remains the single greatest challenge to regional security, but that's probably not likely to change in the near term and so I think it's appropriate for us to consider what steps we can take to protect against the immediate threat of piracy, and while we work with the international community to try and resolve the larger humanitarian issues in the region. So I do appreciate very much the testimony of our witnesses today and hope that you will continue to give us your best suggestions about how we can address this situation and further protect U.S. shipping interest.

I'd like to pose a couple of questions if I could and start with Admiral Salerno. The Coast Guard establishes and enforces requirements for vessel security plans under the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the International Ship and Port Security Code. Do these security plans include anti-piracy measures and how frequently are those plans updated or adjusted?

ADM. SALERNO: Senator, both the MTSA and ISPS requirements both include vessel security plans. They do not specifically talk about piracy, but the language in each of them is written broadly enough so that piracy can be included as a security concern. The way we've structured that under MTSA, the plans are on a regular refresh rate of every five years. However, when specific security threats are identified, a maritime security directive can be issued which would direct the updating of plans to address the specific threats. That is exactly what we are doing in the case of piracy so that with the measures that have been identified, the best practices, some maybe unique U.S. practices would be conveyed to the U.S. flag fleet. They'd be directed to update their security plans.

What happens then is, each company would assess their own ships' vulnerabilities, apply the appropriate measures, work it into their plans, train their crews, conduct drills, as was described by Captain Phillips routinely occurred on his ship, and that way when a ship is entering a high threat area, those measures are required to be put in place. That's the basic process.

It is something that you don't just do it once and you're done because pirate tactics do evolve. You have to continually watch this, update the maritime security directives as needed, and keep in constant dialogue with the industry, the people who are operating in the area, as well as naval forces and other government entities that have a stake in this.

SEN. THUNE: So typically it would be every five years, but in circumstances like these, it's going to be in a continual state?

ADM. SALERNO: That's correct, sir. It's done more frequently, as needed.

SEN. THUNE: The Coast Guard's deployed at least one law enforcement detachment to the U.S. Task Force currently patrolling off of the Horn of Africa, combined Task Force 151. I'm interested in, and maybe you could explain to the committee, the role of the Coast Guard and how many, for example, boardings has it conducted? Does the Coast Guard law enforcement detachment function primarily as a reactionary force or as a protective force, and do you see the use of these teams or other military teams most effective as boarder teams or boarding teams or they could be better used as protective teams on board U.S. merchant vessels?

ADM. SALERNO: Senator, the Coast Guard is a force provider to geographic combatant commanders, so when our U.S. Coast Guard capabilities are in theater, they work for CINCOM or more specifically NAVSAT, so we actually have two redats (ph) working for NAVSAT, we have half a dozen patrol boats in the Northern Arabian Gulf and even have a high endurance cutter currently assigned in theatre.

The mission assignments actually come from the combatant commander, not directly from the Coast Guard. They're basically on loan, and the reason they're over there is because they have certain capabilities which are useful to the combatant commander.

In this case, the law enforcement detachments are located on U.S. Navy vessels and they integrate with U.S. Navy VBSS teams, that's Visit, Board, Search and Seizure teams, so when the boardings are conducted, it's a combined team of Navy and Coast Guard personnel. So far, Coast Guard personnel have been involved in four interdictions of pirates and have apprehended, I believe it's 28 pirates, which are pending disposition. I think some of have actually been turned over to Kenya.

The capabilities they provide are really drawn from their law enforcement expertise. This is what we do domestically in the drug trade in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. That's what they're trained to do, to apprehend pirates, make sure they are accorded their rights, protect evidence and chain of custody and make sure that we have a good, solid package that can be used in prosecution, so that's the value that they offer, sir.

SEN. THUNE: Do you see that, though, that role as protective in nature or is it more reactionary?

ADM. SALERNO: Well, the way they're being used now, it could be either. Predominantly they are responding to, when they're on board the Navy vessels and the Navy vessel is responding to an incident or a potential threat, that's when they're being inserted and boarding either pirate skiffs or, I don't know if they board the mother ship, but that's basically the kind of activity that they would be used for. They're not there to be used as a special forces team that would go and try to retake a ship that's been overcome by pirates. That would be left to other capabilities within the U.S. government.

SEN. THUNE: Mr. Shapiro, beyond ransom demands, the Congressional Research Service reports that Lloyd's of London has designated the waters adjacent to the Horn of Africa a war risk zone.

MR. SHAPIRO: That's correct, sir.

SEN. THUNE: And as a result, subject to special insurance premiums that could cost shippers ten to 20,000 dollars more per ship through the area. To what extent have insurance and operating costs for the U.S. merchant fleet operating in the area increased as a result of the piracy threat?

MR. SHAPIRO: Well, Senator, they have increased dramatically over the last few weeks. Obviously since the Maersk Alabama, the rates have increased. The problem, though, is not just related to the Gulf of Aiden. We're now talking about the entire Indian Ocean coast of Africa. This is expanding well beyond the original million miles that they were talking about to an area much bigger.

And I think one of the witnesses, if I can just relate that, talked about the difficulty of getting naval assets to respond, you know, in a timely fashion, but an embarked security team that was on each American vessel going through that area would protect the crew and would prevent, I believe, the hijackings or the attempted hijackings that are taking place.

There is also a discussion about diverting to avoid that area. The problem for our company is, our destination is that area. We're bringing cargo into the danger pirate zone to be distributed to governments there to relieve famine. So we don't have the ability to reroute our ships to another discharge port because we're bringing it to the area where the food is required.

Insurance costs go up, but insurance is not -- I think from my perspective—I'm not as concerned about the cost of insurance, the increase in the cost of insurance as I am the protection and safety of our crew. They're American citizens and they're entitled to be protected, and I believe that fundamental to the notion of sovereignty is the obligation of a sovereign to protect its shipping and if they can't do it, if our military can't do it, then we need to have the statutory framework, the legal framework, in which we can arm our vessels with either private security or arming the vessels for the crew, although personally I must tell you we do not, as a company, believe that the crew should be armed; maybe one or two people or a few people, a select group of the crew. The way to protect these vessels is to put an armed security team on.

Mr. Kienitz spoke about the Italian cruise ship. Well, the Italian cruise ship had an Israeli security team on and the reason it had an Israeli security team on is, it's not encumbered by United States law, which prohibits you from putting on an armed security team.

SEN. THUNE: Just one more question, Mr. Chairman, if it's okay. I direct this to Captain Phillips. You mentioned earlier in response to questions about having security teams that you can only have one captain of the ship, which I appreciate in terms of the chain of command. What do you, as the captain, as you think about this issue, what concerns you the most? You're the person with ultimate responsibility for the vessel and its crew. As you think about the whole issue and other ships that are going to be moving through that area, what's the thing that probably concerns you the most in terms of just what would keep you up at night about, you know, the whole, I guess, general security situation?

I'm guessing that you're probably prepared to answer the question, but I guess maybe I'd come back to the point about the thing that can be done, if there is anything, beyond some of the things that have been talked about today. I mean, what do you consider any other options that might be out there? Maybe if I phrase it that way, in terms of protecting U.S. mariner interests in that region.

CAPT. PHILLIPS: Well, as I said, I believe it's a comprehensive, multi-faceted program you'd have to do, and we've talked about many things here. There are other non-lethal assets that are out there. And that's why I encourage more people in the industry to come forward because they have ideas, too, but there is no silver bullet here, and I can't stress that enough. It has to be, you know, to the limit of the danger that we can use certain forces and assets.

And I think one thing here is, usually before an incident you know at a certain time that you are in that incident. There's no question. There are fishermen out there. There are other boats out there doing legal things, but by actions that we take on, as any captain would take, you have identified a threat and know what the threat is. In our case, we knew well over a mile what the threat was by certain things we did, so that's why I would say the thing that is most important is the force protection team. And this force protection team could be two or three people, and I think they would stop an incident before it ever got to even a boarding situation. They would have that capability and that would eradicate the notion that you're actually shooting at people who are doing legal things. As I said, well at a mile you'll know.

The day before we were taken we were chased by three boats and pirates also. And we knew then what the incident was, so well before they get in any kind of range, you know what the situation is, ongoing, and what's happening.

SEN. THUNE: Okay, and do you subscribe to the same view that Mr. Shapiro expressed about arming the crew?

CAPT. PHILLIPS: I subscribe to a multi-faceted regime of force protection team, two or three people talented and trained, arming the crew to a certain extent, and, again, it's not the crew walking around with guns in their pockets. It's the captain with, much like some of us have at home, a gun cabinet. He unlocks the key, and there doesn't have to be a lot of arms. I believe in deterrents. I'm a firm believer in making a hard target. I thought we were a pretty hard target and we weren't. I believe in, as we've talked about, evolving.

Now there ere night-time or stealth activities going on, so that's why I say there is no one silver bullet. There's no one answer. It has to be multi-faceted to evolve with the danger and the danger is out there, and I believe with some of the things we've talked about, that it will not stop. I don't think anything will eradicate it, but it will prevent and lower the number of incidences.

SEN. THUNE: Thank you. I'm sure you're getting weary of answering all these questions, so thank you for your indulgence. Thank you all very much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Thanks, Senator Thune.

Captain Phillips, we all admired the courage that you and your chief engineer showed and the composure that you showed in this circumstance. Of course, we didn't feel it and we didn't know what was going on in your mind, but we know the stories are now legendary about you were in the water and out of the water and, fortunately, the Navy applied its resources and they did one incredible job.

Now, you said that you were aware a couple of days, three days before, that pirate activity was around? Did I understand what you just said?

CAPT. PHILLIPS: No, earlier, what I just said is the day before we had an incident with three boats, and it was a pirate situation.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: It was --

CAPT. PHILLIPS: Yes, but the activity had increased. I mean, I am inundated on the ship, as all captains in that area are, with report, a many-paged report, and to be honest I can't even read them all, there's so many reports about incidences, everything that's happening, report of some mother ships --

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Do you dial 9-1-1?

CAPT. PHILLIPS: I wish we had 9-1-1. We talked about that at the other committee, and there is no direct call to the Navy. I basically had to call UKMTO, United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Good thing you paid your cell phone bill, huh?

CAPT. PHILLIPS: Well, the company paid that bill. Yeah.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Because I don't get it. I mean, we now know that there's all kinds of radar attachments to aircraft to tell them when they're getting too close on the ground, too close in the air and so forth, and I don't know whether that kind of equipment—I think it's kind of basic equipment, isn't available for ships, to say hey, these guys are getting too close and we ought to take a second look, but the—you know, it's odd to me.

We have air marshals. Everybody knows it, no secrets, who carry guns. They're welcome on an airplane. Heaven forbid they have to shoot in that airplane. The damage can be total, but, nevertheless, we feel a compulsion as a country to say that when people are flying American airlines that we want to protect them to the fullest extent possible, and yet here it seems that we kind of say, okay, listen, when available, you know, and I don't trivialize the Navy's obligations here. They're severe and distant and a very tough assignment, but part of their mission, I think, and I address this directly to Ms. Whelan, you're part of the policy team there.

When does it suggest that for the mission that we're undertaking, especially in this area, a humanitarian issue, that we've got American citizens who are doing their job under the American flag. At what point do we say it's our responsibility. We have to let -- I don't mean to trivialize cops on the beat there because we know that there is trouble on these streets. What is wrong with our organizing ourselves to protect these ships, whether they're two-person squads or whatever they are, or helicopters nearby or what have you?

MS. WHELAN: Senator, there is actually a very active discussion under way right now within the interagency involving the Department of Defense, Coast Guard, DOT, NSE, State Department on exactly the issue you just raised. What is the most appropriate way to ensure the security of U.S. flagged vessels? And there are a number of potential ways to address this problem. The U.S. Navy or the U.S. military certainly may have a role to play in this, but it is not necessarily the only solution to the problem.

There are, of course, resource, time, distance, space issues with regard to the U.S. Navy's ability to cover vast amounts of territory that we're talking about, and that was really the issue with regard to the Alabama, the Bainbridge, the time-distance ratio between the Alabama and the Bainbridge was such that the Bainbridge responded as quickly as it possibly could, and that's what I meant when I said the vessel is available. The Bainbridge was one of several Navy vessels, U.S. Navy vessels, and a number of international vessels patrolling in this area as part of the counter-piracy mission, but the location of the Maersk Alabama when it was attacked versus the location of the Bainbridge was just too far for the Bainbridge to react to deter the attack.

But there have been numerous occasions when the U.S. Navy and other navies have reacted in response to distress calls and have successfully deterred attacks. They have chased them away, either by the destroyer or the frigate or whatever vessel is there showing up on the scene or, oftentimes, more effectively, with a helicopter that has been dispatched from a vessel being able to chase the pirates away.

This is one method of protection, but there are many others, as I think Captain Phillips has implied.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: I never criticize the bravery, the courage, the loyalty to duty that our service people have, our military people, the present war and Iraq and Afghanistan, our people are subject to the most difficult conditions, but we feel it's our responsibility and shouldn't we feel a responsibility to say those who are crew members, go ahead out and we're going to be looking out for you or do we say, listen, that's the risk of the business.

I don't think that's the way we want to react, and I would ask both the captain and the engineer, what kinds of things do you recommend to others who are operating in high-risk areas off the coast of Somalia? You know, this underlies the question. The question is, how valuable is it to America to be able to send ships out there, ships of mercy, military ships, whatever it is, to not be satisfied to stay within our borders but, rather, to reach out and say to Americans across the globe, you are an American citizen. We have obligations to tend to your needs, to protect your lives, to rescue you if you're taken advantage of, no matter where that is, whether it's in the high seas or whether it's—and we know that the capability is there, the bravery is there of our troops.

Is it easy to get crews today on your vessels, Captain?

MR. SHAPIRO: It has been easy. I think people are getting a little more nervous in the last three weeks, Senator. If I could just—I know you directed it to Captain Phillips, but I would just like to say, I agree. This is a multi-faceted approach and we need to clean up alongshore. I'm reminded of the Marine Corps hymn, you know, from the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli. That was the Barbary pirates, the Barbary coast, and they were cleaned out by, I believe it was Thomas Jefferson.

There is an obligation of a sovereign to take care of their ships and I think all I'm asking for as a ship owner today flying the U.S. flag and employing wonderful American seafarers is to have the tools available that I can arrange for protection for them if our government can't. And that's why we're asking for a change in the legislative framework to allow us to do that.

MR. PERRY: Senator, if I may answer your question. I'm the engineer, and to me it's inevitable we're going to be boarded again. We can take all the action we want to prevent it and protect us, but they are going to come on board the ship. Having said that to all sailors, to all shippers, the houses must be fortified, you know, strengthened. More locks. We need at least three layers of doors coming down to safe rooms. All ships do not have safe rooms. We did not have a safe room in our plan. That was something we improvised right then and there. Other ships have safe rooms. Everybody needs safe rooms. They need to know how to use them and at least three layers of armored doors to get there.

To the point of arming people or putting, I may have to have, and I'm glad to see the Navy around. I may have to have them on board and I was glad that they were there. I will never, ever want to see a rented cop on board my ship. They don't have the vested interest that we have. Having said that, there are people that should never, ever have a weapon. There are people that will never, ever pick up a weapon. I have sailed for them and with them. They will not unlock that safe no matter what. They've told me so. There are people that are trained, people that are wired and know how to do these things, that are willing to go through certification programs to continue to be certified to carry weapons.

Let's say they must be within the officer corps of this merchant marine. Those people need to be identified, not by position but by character. They need to be trained, they need to be certified, they need to be allowed to have a weapon.

That weapon needs to be under lock and key in their cabin or in the safe room because when that third door gets breached and those people are coming in the safe room, I don't want to have to meet them with a pocket knife. The ball game's over at that point.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Well, we thank each one of you for your appearance here and for your testimony. We will keep the record open for some time and submit questions in writing, for which we'd ask the prompt response. My hat is off to all of you. I once sailed on a troop ship. It was in 1944 and we were a large ship, about 800 feet, I think, 8,000 soldiers aboard. And we went fast. That was our protection. And we went though some pretty funny waters, so speed, all kinds of things can be employed, but there is nothing, in my view, like making sure that someone who is trying to take your life stands a chance of losing theirs, and that goes beyond all the written codes and everything else.

SEN. : Clarification, if I might. Am I right in what you're saying is that you don't have authority-we would need a change of the law to allow you to have firearms on the vessel?

MR. : Can I clarify that, Sir? Senator, there is an 1819 statute which permits vessels to defend themselves. The problem is twofold. There is a subsequent State Department arms regulation which requires you to get a license in order to take a weapon out of the United States and part of the requirements are that you get a certification from every port that you're going to that it's legal to import them. Out of curiosity, I called indirectly the embassy from Kenya and found out that in order to bring a weapon into Mumbasa legally one has to have the handwritten permission, the personal permission, of the Minister of the Interior, so there are regulations which prevent us from going into certain ports, Captain, with weapons. Moreover, we can't go through certain canals and most canals with weapons unless they're declared. The crew is allowed to bring a single, or I guess it's up to three, weapons, correct? But it's got to be less than 50 caliber. It can't be an automatic weapon, so I think the line of defense that is being talked about for weapons for officers is a last line of defense. I don't think that's the first line of defense. At least it's not from my point of view.

We need embarked security teams, armed escort security teams. I understand the issues that the captain and the chief have with surrendering command and control of their ship because the military embarked teams are not responsive to the captain. They respond to the military people that are on board that they report to. And I think with private, well vetted, well trained security, we would be able to have the captain and the chief in charge of the ship, which I think would solve the problem. It's not going to solve the entire problem, but it will certainly save American lives.

SEN. : But, Captain, you and the engineer both said the last resort, if you have a gun case. Not everybody packing heat on the vessel.

CAPT. PHILLIPS: Yes.

SEN. : But if you had a gun case, is that something that's allowable today?

CAPT. PHILLIPS: I've been on ships where you've had it and gone to many countries. I've been to Mumbasa with a weapon. I won't say what kind. You do have to declare it and then you have to put it in bond or seal it. I haven't been to too many countries including Japan that caused a problem. It's basically you declare it, it goes in bond or in my safe usually, and it's locked up and sealed till you sail.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: We can't continue to go like this, but we will—one more thing, if we've had successful missions in preventing or interrupting piracy attacks, then how come the numbers continue to escalate so rapidly about these attacks taking place? There's obviously not a sufficient deterrent out there. Maybe there can't ever be, with hungry people or what have you, but certainly we're not offering deterrents in any way that would say to them, hey, you could pay a heck of a price for this, maybe your life. We don't do that.

We thank each and every one of you. You have contributed a lot to the debate and we'll follow on with this. Thank you very much for being here. With that, this committee is over.

END.

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