Panel II of a Hearing of the Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee - Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region: Experiences, Capabilities and Weaknesses

Panel II of a Hearing of the Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee - Disaster Capacity in the National Capital Region: Experiences, Capabilities and Weaknesses

PANEL II OF A HEARING OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: DISASTER CAPACITY IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION: EXPERIENCES, CAPABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES

CHAIRED BY: DELEGATE ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON (D-DC)
WITNESSES: DANIEL NICHOLS, ASSISTANT CHIEF, UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE DEPARTMENT; MAJOR GENERAL ERROL SCHWARTZ, COMMANDING GENERAL, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NATIONAL GUARD; VERNON HERRON, DEPUTY CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY/DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY EXECUTIVE, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND JEFF DELINSKI, DEPUTY CHIEF, SPECIAL OPERATION BUREAU, WASHINGTON METRO AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY POLICE

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DEL. NORTON: Chief Nichols is going to stay for the next panel.

And I could I ask the second panel to come up, in addition to the chief. Mr. Jeff Delinski, deputy chief, Special Operation Bureau, Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority; Major General Errol Schwartz, commander general, D.C. National Guard.

And because my good friend and colleague has another important engagement and must leave before the next panel, I'm going to ask Mr. Vernon Herron, who is the deputy chief administrative officer of Public Safety and director of Homeland Security for Prince George's County, if he would come forward in this panel.

And instead of my asking the first questions, I'm going to ask that Representative Edwards ask the first question of this panel.

Perhaps we should proceed with Mr. Herron, in case Ms. Edwards has to leave early.

MR. HERRON: Good morning, Chairwoman Norton. Thank you for allowing me to be here today.

I am Vernon Herron, deputy chief administrative officer for Public Safety and director of Homeland Security for Prince George's County, Maryland. I appear before you today on behalf of one of the largest counties in the National Capital Region.

But before I begin, I also would like to take this time to thank Congresswoman Donna Edwards for her leadership on the critical issue of National Capital Region public safety and for recommending that I appear before you today.

If time permits, I would like to offer testimony on the incident legislation.

First I want to take a moment to recall that Prince George's County has testified on this issue before. In July of 2006, Prince George's County Sheriff Michael Jackson testified before the House Energy and Commerce Committee on H.R.5758 -- the Warning Alert and Response Network Act. In that testimony, Sheriff Jackson explained that warning the public of an impending disaster is a good first step, but not nearly enough to address the total reality of public safety in response to a large-scale disaster. We are pleased this hearing goes further than debating how we warn the public, and discusses how we can lead and coordinate masses of people to safety.

Prince George's County Maryland is located in the heart of the Baltimore/Washington corridor. The county borders Washington, D.C. and is just 37 miles south of the City of Baltimore. The county's population exceeds 820,000 with a daily work population of well over 1 million people.

Covering an area of close to 500 square miles, the county is home of many business as well as state and federal agencies. Some of these federal agencies include NASA-Goddard Space Flight Center, Andrews Air Force Base, U.S. Department of Agriculture's Beltsville Facility, a federal records center, a large Internal Revenue Service office complex and the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration Center for Weather and Climate Prediction. Additionally, a large part of the region's Metro system and Interstate-95 pass through Prince George's County.

Fortunately, for most communities in America, the threat of terrorism remains just that -- a threat. However, the United States has experienced several acts of terrorism and widespread natural disasters which caused devastation and catastrophe and 9/11 was an example of this devastation and catastrophe for New York, the National Capital Region and the entire United States.

Therefore, Prince George's County is in a prime position to offer perspectives on how to address the need, impact and practicality of orchestrating large-scale public safety response.

Coordinating planning across the National Capital Region would greatly assist the utilization of limited resources available to support evacuation and sheltering of residents, citizens and visitors to the National Capital Region. Actual emergencies are inherently unstable and consist of rapidly changing events whose outcome may be difficult if not impossible to predict. Resource sharing will be necessary in order to ensure that regions can efficiently manage a major evacuation or sheltering event.

Prince George's County works closely with the Maryland Emergency Management Agency and Federal Emergency Management Agency to ensure all resources needed are being utilized in a most efficient and effective manner. Locally, we have executed MOUs with the Board of Education to provide emergency access through the use of 260 public schools located throughout the county. Although there is adequate number of public schools to shelter thousands of citizens, we do not have enough resources to open every school or multiple schools simultaneously and also handle our daily responsibilities.

In the event that multiple shelters will be needed to house large numbers of citizens for an extended period, we have preselected two mega shelters: Ritchie Coliseum in the north portion of the county; and Showplace Arena in the southern portion of the county. Both are capable of sheltering several hundred people.

Prince George's County has also pre-stocked mobile caches consisting of cots, blankets, pillows, personal hygiene kits ready for transport to any shelter. For larger shelter needs we have prepositioned FEMA tractor trailers loaded with emergency shelter supplies ready to activate.

Having immediate access to emergency supplies enables Prince George's County to mitigate, respond to and recover from a disastrous event. Disasters require coordination between public safety departments, our Health and Human Services Department, as well as the other emergency support function agencies. Having these train and exercise together ensures that social service support and agency collaboration is available to assist during this trying time.

In the event that a full evacuation of the county is necessary, the county's Transportation Department has traffic cameras located at major traffic intersections. Using these cameras can alter the time of the traffic lights to reduce gridlock and facilitate smooth traffic flow. The experiences from past incidences reveal vehicle evacuation requires a unified effort and this will be required for the National Capital Region.

Regional coordination is paramount in any effective response and recovery plan. To facilitate an effective recovery plan, the National Capital Region has developed a regional videoconference system. This videoconference system uses its own data network labs, which provide a direct link to every emergency operations center throughout the National Capital Region. The ability for senior officials from each jurisdiction to directly reach out and communicate with their neighbor in the National Capital Region will not only enhance the recovery process, but expedite the use of resource sharing and mutual aid.

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments -- also know as MWCOG -- has played a major role in fostering regional communications. Through MWCOG, senior officials and public safety chiefs and directors of each emergency support function meet regularly to discuss issues and concerns that greatly impact jurisdictions' ability to coordinate, communicate and collaborate through emergencies and disasters.

Prince George's County communicates directly with MEMA during any major event. MEMA is advised of the event and place on alert that mutual aid may be required. Prince George's county also depends on several federal funding mechanisms to support the county's operations. Those mechanisms include the Urban Area Security Initiative, COPS Law Enforcement Technology Program, the Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants, the Byrne Discretionary Grants and the American Recovery Reinvestment Act funds.

These funding streams are critical to our continued ability to deliver public safety services and response capability. Some of the grants require a matched dollar amount from the jurisdictions. For example, the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program lies dormant due to the fact that jurisdictions cannot provide the 20 to 25 percent grant match. This grant requirement cripples the ability of the jurisdiction to obtain the available funding -- especially during this difficult economic time.

Also, the FY 2010 House Budget Resolution decreases the Public Safety Function Authority by 5 billion (dollars), while increasing the outlay by only 1 billion (dollars). This discrepancy gives us pause, as we are not able to provide as much public safety response to the National Capital Region, which cuts through important programs such as the ones I listed above.

In examining the state of operations today, we would make the following recommendations: First and foremost, we must keep UASI whole and urge the FY 2010 budget to not be set below $900 million; strive for greater coordination and communication between local governments and FEMA -- including conduction of unified NCR drills and exercises; establish clear and efficient reporting structures between local governments, FEMA and the Executive Office of the President; establish mechanisms for emergency expenditure reimbursement. If local governments are going to assist federal emergency response activities, there needs to be a clear path which those local government can seek reimbursement for those costs.

Hurricane Isabel, 9/11, Hurricane Katrina and the massive crowds of this past inauguration have all taught us valuable lessons regarding large-scale public safety response. However, if we are to move forward in the entire National Capital Region in sync, then more coordination will need to be established and the critical federal support cannot be stripped away.

All of our local government fully interoperable within themselves and are all jurisdictions of the NCR? Is there a coordinated National Capital Region Plan for FEMA, and are all local government entities completely verse with this plan? These are the questions we should ask moving forward.

Prince George's County will continue to partner with the NCR to make our country safe. Each day, we want to be able to inform our citizens that we are better prepared today than we were yesterday.

I want to thank the subcommittee for calling this hearing today and for the chairwoman for allowing us to speak regarding this important matter. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

DEL. NORTON: Thank you, Mr. Herron.

Let's move to Major General Schwartz, D.C. National Guard.

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, and the members of this committee for the opportunity to testify in front of you today.

I've submitted by testimony for the record, but please allow me to make some highlighting remarks concerning the District of Columbia National Guard and their contribution to the National Capital Region.

I've been a Capital Guardian now for 32 years and we continue to provide excellent support to this city. The District of Columbia National Guard consists of the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard and we are housed with the District of Columbia, Andrews Air Force Base and Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

These installations outside of the District of Columbia provide us the support that we would need to perform our missions in the District, such as our air assets, our schoolhouses and other important venues.

The District of Columbia National Guard has a federal and a district mission. It does not limit us to the way we perform our duty from the limited actions during a nonemergency all the way to martial law where we can support the District.

I would like to emphasize the primary role of the District of Columbia National Guard and let you know that it is in support of local authorities. We will only respond based upon the request of local authorities.

The District of Columbia National Guard is like no other National Guard in the nation. The 53 states and territories have a governor that they report to as their commander in chief. The District of Columbia's commander in chief is the president of the United States. He has delegated that responsibility to the secretary of Defense, to the secretary of the Army who has oversight for all local missions. The secretary of the Air Force also has oversight over our air assets.

We provide excellent air support to Congress by housing three B- 40 aircraft out of Andrews Air Force Base to move congressional delegations around; two C-38 jets and other support equipment.

The District of Columbia National Guard also performs its federal mission -- that is supporting the war fight Army or air, not matter what part of the world it is.

My responsibility is to make sure that the District of Columbia's National Guard can rapidly respond to any homeland initiative. The Office of the Mayor will contact the Guard. I will do the necessary coordination with senior officials above my level to make sure that the District of Columbia gets all it needs in a very short period of time.

We support 16 ESFs from the response plan and that is transportation, communication, mass care, search and rescue, oil and hazards response, agriculture and natural resources, public safety and security. The District has added a 16th ESF for donation and voluntary management, which we are supporting them with our field kitchens and other resources that they may need from the Guard.

We are working very closely with the District of Columbia Homeland Security Emergency Management Agency and other agencies within the FEMA Region III area. We are housing the FEMA region trailer and the American Red Cross trailer in the parking lot of our armory, because we envision the armory with its 58,000 square-foot capacity can house -- can be a shelter in case of an emergency here in the District -- like we did for the Hurricane Katrina where we housed several individuals who came in from Louisiana.

We have the ability to build capacity through our partnerships in the region. The Maryland National Guard, Virginia National Guard, Pennsylvania, Delaware and West Virginia offers support to the District of Columbia when needed.

An example of that support, which stretched beyond that space, is our support for the presidential inauguration in January where 30 states and one territory provided over 7,000 troops to the District. Our objective is to remain in the background, but to make sure that the events are safe and secure.

In our capacities from Fort Belvoir, we have just received new UH-72 helicopters for MEDEVAC regions. We are picking up an additional three helicopters in a week or so and we will be using those in case of local emergencies.

I yield back my time, Madame Chair, and I will be happy to answer any of your questions at the end.

DEL. NORTON: Thank you, General Schwartz.

Mr. Delinski.

MR. DELINSKI: Good morning and thank you, Chairwoman Norton, for inviting me to testify on behalf of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.

My name is Jeff Delinski. I'm a deputy chief of the Metro Transit Police.

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, otherwise known as WMATA or Metro, is a far-reaching system servicing 3.5 million people living in an area of roughly 1,500 square miles. We provide on average over 1.2 million rides on weekdays, making WMATA an important contributor to the health and vitality of the regional economy.

WMATA has a history of providing emergency response training and outreach to our regional public safety partners. WMATA opened the Carmen E. Turner Training Facility in 2002 -- a first of its kind facility in the United States dedicated to transit. The facility includes a 260-foot tunnel, two Metrorail cars, a simulated electrified third-rail for mock fire and rescue exercises and a passenger rail emergency evacuation simulator. Since its opening, nearly 15,000 people have been trained at this facility, which has earned a national reputation.

In 2004, the Metro Transit Police launched a training initiative entitled "Managing Metro Emergencies". During a two-year period, this course provided over 5,000 regional law enforcement, fire and rescue, Department of Transportation and WMATA operations personnel enhanced training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting and recovery from a major service disruption in our system.

WMATA has recently intensified its focus on emergency management activities by creating an office of emergency management. In December of 2008, Mr. Peter LaPorte was hired to oversee this new office and is a direct report to Metro's chief of police. With the recommitment of six internal staff and hiring of five personnel, Mr. LaPorte has created a team that has over 200 years of transit based incident response and emergency management experience.

The Office of Emergency Management will oversee a new training initiative involving the delivery of incident-command system training to an estimated 8,000 Metro employees. Funded through the Department of Homeland Security's Transit Security Grant Program, and the regional urban area security initiative funds, this program will raise awareness of security-related issues and instruct operational employees to implement the proper response procedures and command system structure during the initial and developing phases of a Metro- specific incident or emergency.

Above all, partnerships with first responders and regional stakeholders are the foundation of effective emergency management. WMATA would not be able to manage emergencies without capitalizing on the strength of our partnering agencies.

Continuance of frequent training and exercises -- as well as ongoing involvement with the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments -- are the primary ways for building and improving our relationships with external agencies.

WMATA is critically tied to the success of the numerous special events that take place in this region. The most recent of these large-scale special events was the 2009 presidential inauguration, which resulted in the largest crowd served in WMATA's history, providing 1.5 million individual trips on both bus and rail.

The success on Inauguration Day is proof of not only WMATA's ability to work within the region, but the region's propensity to work together.

When an unplanned incident does occur in the national capitol region, it is our responsibility to ensure customer safety, minimize the delay, and get people moving again.

WMATA's actions on September 11, 2001, provide a good example of our ability to move large numbers of people during a regional emergency. However, it must be said that while WMATA is willing and prepared to operate in less-than-ideal circumstances, we do have limits in our capacity to move passengers. Even in the best conditions, the region always faces traffic management challenges.

To address this, WMATA in conjunction with its regional partners has been active in the development of the Metropolitan Area Transportation Operations Coordination Program, otherwise known as MATOC. MATOC is an area-wide situational awareness effort that enhances coordination between the region's transportation providers.

Thanks to funds appropriated by the federal government that make emergency management a priority, WMATA and the region have done a great job dealing with and responding to emergencies and planning for events. Continued investment in emergency management initiatives such as proper equipment, training efforts, planned processes, response measures, recovery protocols, and overall prevention techniques is imperative for enhancing the national capitol region's mobility, safety and quality of life.

The men and women of WMATA will continue to strengthen our capabilities and relationships with our local, regional and federal partners to ensure a safer, more secure and better prepared region.

Thank you.

DEL. NORTON: Thank you, Mr. Delinski.

Mr. Nichols, do you have any additional statement at this time?

MR. NICHOLS: The only thing I'd like to add, ma'am, is that I obviously already submitted a statement for the record, but the one thing I'd like to highlight is that you'll hear today in the previous panel and this panel the need to coordinate and share resources within the Washington Metropolitan area. There is no one agency that is well- suited to work in an unilateral manner to handle the types of emergencies that occur in Washington or could potentially occur in Washington. We've seen that even something with the evacuation of the Mall to coordination for the inauguration and the events on 9/11.

One of the priorities of Chief Morris, myself, and Gloria Jarmer (sp), our CEO, was to make sure that the United States Capitol Police is able to obtain a new radio system that allows us to be a full partner with interoperability. To have plans is fine, but the lifeblood of the agency is in this region to coordinate is our ability to communicate with each other. And when you have a key partner who has limited interoperable capabilities to talk to the people who are seated at this table certainly it causes a concern.

We're working very closely with U.S. Capitol Police Board and the communities of jurisdiction to make sure that we have the authority and the appropriations to obtain this system and make sure that we can fully integrate with the Washington Metropolitan Area law enforcement public safety agencies should there be a major situation develop that requires an evacuation of the area or an event that caused us to bring resources into our jurisdiction so we can communicate and coordinate those rescue and law enforcement activities.

DEL. NORTON: Thank you, Mr. Nichols. Let me understand your testimony. Your radio system is not now fully integrated with even the D.C., the Metropolitan Police Department, which is the largest police department in the region. Is that so?

MR. NICHOLS: We have limited interoperability with Metropolitan Police Department, but we don't have full interoperability. When we bring some of our other partners who are seated at the table here on line, we have limited interoperability.

The other problem that we have with our current radio system is, it's not encrypted so that when we're handling an emergency situation everybody's little brother with a scanner can listen to what we're doing and that therefore compromises our operation.

DEL. NORTON: I'm going to go now to my good friend Representative Edwards for the first series of questions. I just wanted to make sure I understood what you were saying. And this testimony is that even as we speak the capitol police are not fully interoperable with the region or even with the D.C. police department located right here.

Ms. Edwards.

REP. EDWARDS: Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And also thank you for enabling Mr. Herron to come to this panel, as I have to depart.

It's exactly this point of operability of systems that I wanted to focus on, and so I appreciate Assistant Chief Nichols your raising that. And I want to direct this question also to Mr. Herron because my understanding is that Prince George's County Police Department also has a radio communications operability concern and deficit. The Montgomery County Police Department also has an interoperability problem in addition to the Capitol Police and the District of Columbia Police. And I'm not sure, Mr. Deli ski -- perhaps you can tell me whether WMATA suffers the same deficit—because this is a huge concern.

Here we are in a region and our major law enforcement agencies have limited capacity in an emergency situation to communicate with each other and to do it in a secure fashion. This is perhaps, and this is a tremendous deficit for one of the most significant regions in the country. And I think that as we look to—and this is an authorizing committee and not an appropriating committee, but I would say to my colleagues that as we go forward this is a huge deficit that needs to be cleared up. And it can't go any longer.

We are perhaps just lucky that we haven't had the kind of emergency event that would require us to draw on our communications capacity and then suffer for that deficit. And so I'd appreciate, Mr. Herron, first, your comments about the Prince George's County interoperability deficit.

MR. HERRON: Yes, ma'am. If an emergency occurred today, Prince George's County first responders would not be able to seamlessly communicate with our partners in the national capitol region. As you know, during the 9/11 attacks our first responders responded to the Pentagon and had to be handed out radios so we could communicate with those first responders.

We recently purchased a new radio system to replace our existing 40-year-old radio system. We're hopeful to be on line with that system within the next 15 months. It is the latest and the greatest encryption, and we will be able to communicate effectively with our partners in the national capitol region.

REP. EDWARDS: Mr. Delinski?

MR. DELINSKI: I share your concerns with interoperability as well. It's certainly a problem that's been challenging the Metro Transit Police Department. As you know, we operate in all three major jurisdictions here and communicate with the local police departments. We have some limited capacity to do so. Metropolitan Police for one on limited basis and U.S. Park Police come to mind.

However, this issue has also been brought up through the Council of Governments here in Washington, D.C., and using Urban Area Security Initiative funds we've purchased several thousand radios that obviously do communicate with each other in their storage caches strategically placed through this region. So if there is a major event we do have that option of pulling out those several thousand radios and distributing them to the first responders on the scene of a major incident.

So we have that option while we wait for technology to be able to bring our radio systems together.

REP. EDWARDS: And Major General Schwartz, can you describe your communications capacity with the law enforcement agencies and other first responders in the region?

MAJ. GEN. SCHWARTZ: Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. First of all, let me talk about the framework in which we communicate. Our joint operation center in the District of Columbia is tied to the D.C. Emergency Management Agency through several communications mechanisms, (rebioC) (sp) being one of those and radios if you have to be deployed to the streets.

It's further tied to other EOCs or JOCs within the region, within the FEMA region 3. So we have a 24/7 capability to communicate to our joint operation centers within this region.

If we are deployed to the street to assist the Metropolitan Police Department or the Park Police or whoever requires our service, we are then issued land mobile radios or hand-helds to communicate back to our JOC and then out to different regions so that they can report back what is going on.

So because we are not on the streets 24/7 the pressures that the law enforcement agencies may feel are not realized by the Guard.

REP. EDWARDS: Thank you. And then finally, Mr. Herron, what would be the cost for a fully interoperable communications system for Prince George's County in this really critical metropolitan region?

MR. HERRON: The cost is $65 million, and as I indicated we did sign a contract with a vendor. We're moving forward with the placement of the towers and the testing and so forth. And I must say that there have been the Burn Grant accounts and the UAC's funding has helped us facilitate the purchase of this equipment. And hopefully within the next 15 months barring any other issues we will be able to go live with this radio system.

REP. EDWARDS: Thank you. And then lastly before I have to depart, my other question was also about medical emergency services. I have been really concerned that at a time we need to step up and think about our regional medical emergency services and how we would handle a disaster, we're seeing for example at Andrews Air Force Base, Major General Schwartz, where some of your units are supported. Malcolm Grove Medical Center will be declining actually in its medical services at that facility. Prince George's Hospital Center is under great strain even though it has the region's trauma unit there.

And I worry about the capacity of -- and we will hear from Washington Hospital Center and the American Red Cross later on about our capacity to deliver the kind of medical emergency services that we need, especially outside of the District of Columbia presuming an event that might require movement of great masses of people out into the suburbs, and particular the southern suburbs in Prince George's County that are more adjacent to the capitol complex.

And so I wonder, Mr. Herron, because I'm looking right now at how we actually might support a much more regional approach on medical service delivery for the purposes of homeland security.

MR. HERRON: Yes, ma'am. In the national capitol region we have been working together over the past couple years to deal with the capacity in the hospitals, our search capacity to speak. We rely heavily on MOUs to support one another, and our hospitals have these MOUs in place as well.

We have purchased several mobile medical buses to transport large numbers of victims to hospitals. We are not at the place where we really need to be to address a large capacity, so to speak. We have moved, are moving in the right direction, but there is plenty of work to be done.

REP. EDWARDS: Thank you. And Madam Chairwoman, I yield, and I look forward to both reading and looking at the testimony of the remainder of this panel and the subsequent one. And I appreciate your enabling me to ask this line of questions. And thank you all for your presence here today. Thank you.

MR. HERRON: Thank you.

MR. DELINSKI: Thank you.

DEL. NORTON: Well, thank you Congresswoman Edwards. We're very glad you live in the region so that even when Congress is dismissed you're willing to travel from Prince George's to offer the very important and helpful comments and questions you have offered this afternoon.

Let me follow up on the Congresswoman's questions on interoperability because it may involve a real life circumstance. That involves the enforcement, what we understand to be a multi-law enforcement approach to events like the inauguration. Now there's been a report issued thus far, and I've indicated that we are not prepared until the GAO report is issued to go very deeply because we haven't had an independent report on what happened. But we do know that from constituents from around the country that there were people who could not get out of the 3rd Street Tunnel. And some have identified this as perhaps the most important, if not the only, Homeland Security issue that arose during what was an extraordinarily successful event in other ways.

And yet there were perhaps hundreds of people who were told to make their way by walking through the 3rd Street Tunnel; did and could not get out.

I'm wondering if this was a question of interoperability, whether any of you participated in communication with one another so that these people -- and we are told were not even told why they were being held. Did the Capitol Police know about this? Did Metro? Did you, General Schwartz? Did you, Mr. Herron? How did this occur, and was there any communication among the agencies who appear to have coordinated so well in other regards the inauguration?

MR. NICHOLS: I can probably, in the best position to answer that right now. There was a joint report that was done by the agencies who were involved in the planning of the inauguration that addressed this, and some of the other issues we found which turned out to be rather significant challenges with regard to the security plan and then balance the security plan with the level of access that we wanted to provide people to the various venues in the city.

Essentially everything was compounded by the fact that there was an unprecedented, almost 2 million people in the city. Since that had never been experienced before, we didn't really have an historical perspective on how that would strain infrastructure, how that would test the communications capabilities of the law enforcement public safety agencies, and just generally the security plans that we put in place that day.

I'll be happy to send the report over to you if you haven't had a chance to --

DEL. NORTON: Well, actually, I'm trying to find out from all four of you whether you had any communication during the time that people were in the 3rd Street Tunnel. I'm trying to find out whether interoperability or the communications system was partly at fault here. Did any of you know that there were people?

I'll go down. You knew, Mr. Nichols?

MR. NICHOLS: We knew there were people in the southbound to the 3rd Street Tunnel because that was a designated pedestrian route. The command level officials at the various multi-agency command centers did not know that there were people in the northbound tube. The northbound tube was never intended for pedestrian queuing.

DEL. NORTON: Well, how did they get in there?

MR. NICHOLS: Officers on the ground level, in order to overcome crowding challenges that were taking place in the northwest sector of the city, directed people down there to relieve pressure. Unfortunately --

DEL. NORTON: This is interesting because this is the kind of unplanned circumstance -- and the officer on the ground has to make a decision. And actually, if you think about it, it would seem to be a good kind of on-the-ground decision, but you'd expect it to be made -- the nothing that you're getting a lot of crowding: "look, here's this tunnel that is closed, it won't have vehicular traffic, let's send them through this tunnel." It makes perfect sense as long as everybody knows it.

Was the failure of communication related at all to interoperability?

MR. NICHOLS: Yes. I believe that was one of the factors. We had a multi-agency command center going on, but in a multi-agency command center what we're really doing is listening to about 15 or 20 or even more independent radio transmissions from the independent agencies --

DEL. NORTON: Including for example, anybody can get on that now because you're tuning in to other systems rather than having your own system?

MR. NICHOLS: That's correct. So there was no one radio system that you could monitor to get a global view of what was going on in the city that day. Conversely, should there have been a major situation develop, the same would have been true. We would have had to have listened to all these multitude of different agencies' transmissions in order to coordinate our activities and tie operations together. So --

DEL. NORTON: Including, for example, Mr. Nichols, if somebody, you know, these incidences we had here and the one which is most indelibly in our minds of course is the incident that occurred here in the Capitol. Here you had the tunnel open, you had millions of people here almost none of them with real tickets. Now if among them there had been someone with a military style weapon who decided to open fire, what would have been the consequence there? When would you have known about it? How would that have been handled?

MR. NICHOLS: Well, we had contingency plans in place to handle any number of situations that could occur including active shooter. We'd actually had tabletop exercises on how the various agencies would respond depending on whose jurisdiction the event was taking place at any given time. But again, the potential for something like that to occur, occurs every day. It's compounded exponentially when you have large crowds at a national security event like that where you have instant media attention of what's going on.

DEL. NORTON: And of course it would be compounded if in fact there was free access to military style weapons which would make it much easier to mow down people in such a crowd if you happened to be either a crazy person or a person intent upon doing harm.

MR. NICHOLS: That's an important point because obviously our focus is on continent, enduring constitution government and protection of the leadership of the United States because everybody was outside of the west door of the Capitol.

You had the entire top level of the government at one place at one time. That's certainly a significant security concern.

But, you can't discount the fact that there doesn't necessarily have to be an attack upon that area in order to completely disrupt and overtake the inaugural activities of that day. And we were very cognizant of that. We always are.

The agencies that are involved in the inauguration have a Constitutional requirement to make sure that the president is sworn in at noon on the 20th, like the Constitution says. And anything that has the potential of disrupting that -- whether it's an active shooter on the Mall, or something that occur(s) here on the Capitol grounds, we have to guard against that.

And as the threats proliferate -- through access to weapons, or whatever, the difficulty of making sure that we hit that Constitutional requirement for the inauguration is even more difficult.

DEL. NORTON: So, would you be as alert today, in looking for the lone gunman, single shooter, as looking for somebody carrying a nuclear device -assuming that was possible, into this area?

MR. NICHOLS: Yes, ma'am. We have a -- we run a spectrum of threats; and we look at, we look at threats based upon the probability and the consequence; and we weigh our resource allocation toward that scale.

DEL. NORTON: Well, let's talk probability and consequence. Isn't there a greater probability for a single shooter to come in spraying a crowd or a motorcade than it is for someone to bring in a nuclear device today?

MR. NICHOLS: Yes. I think if you look at some of the terrorist attacks that have taken place just recently -- Mumbai is probably the best example of what a small group of people who are heavily armed can do to disrupt an entire city, we are not immune from that.

We've seen, and you've talked about it, talked about it also, what happened on January 24th -- I'm sorry, July 24, 1998, where we had one individual with one handgun, and the disruption that he caused, and two police officers dead and a citizen wounded.

So, yes, it's a significant concern. It's a significant test of the planning and response capabilities of the law enforcement agencies in this city, and it's something we have to be cognizant of every single day.

DEL. NORTON: Thank you, chief.

Now, I'd like to go down the line and ask any of you if you knew -- because you have all the things that happened, most of the things you would expect to happen. I think what people didn't expect was that officers would have to make an almost instant decision about the crowding and sending people through a tunnel. As it turns out, some of those had tickets. In fact, many of those had tickets and did not get out. I'm trying to learn whether or not, with the present system of operability, if any of you were informed of the fact that there were people in the Third Street tunnel.

Mr. Delinski.

MR. DELINSKI: I will say that communications, up to and including the inauguration itself, were very robust. The planning was tremendous. The event was tremendous.

We had officers and officials assigned to many different command posts throughout the region that were able to feed back information to our EOC at Metro, so we'd get real-time information, and so forth. So, an extensive antenna out there, getting as much information as we could.

However, to my knowledge, we were not notified of the Third Street condition. There was no request made to help alleviate that. Of course, we had our hands full with Metro-related issues -- transporting 1.5 million people --

DEL. NORTON: You would have had your hands full, Mr. Delinski, if there had been a shoot-out in there, but I bet you would have dispatched Transit police to help in the event that there was such an event.

MR. DELINSKI: Absolutely.

DEL. NORTON: I'm just trying to hear -- I'm not casting blame. If anything, we're trying to help, because we are shocked, amazed and awed that there would not be interoperability among all those related, and that you'd have to do what it looks like a jerry-built system if you want interoperability.

Major General Schwartz, you had a major role to play. In fact, you were the commander of all the forces, not only the D.C. National Guard but all forces at the inauguration. Were you informed, through radio or other kinds of contact, that people were stuck in the Third Street tunnel?

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Ma'am, the Joint Task Force, D.C. was not missioned to provide support to the tunnel. We had 7,000 --

DEL. NORTON: Yes, sir. I'm just trying to know if you knew about it.

GEN. SCHWARTZ: No, ma'am, we did not know about it.

Now, do we point towards a physical communication problem or just failure to communicate? And that's what we have to look at. The officer who was probably sending folks down into the tunnel probably had no situational awareness of what was happening in the tunnel. Therefore, was it a failure to communicate or a communications problem, physically?

DEL. NORTON: Well, we'll find out. But, in this age of high- technology, it doesn't seem to us, if there were a state-of-the-art system available to officers, that there would have been lack of notice of all officers. And, again, although there were people who got sick in the tunnel -- handled very well, you hardly heard anything about it.

Although people were -- continued to be joyful about the inauguration, our job and your job is to think of worst-case scenarios. The worst case scenario, that I know from speaking to a number of you about planning, was not that there would be a lot of folks there -- you've already, you had already shown you could handle lots of people, but that something unforeseen would happen.

As it turns out, this was the unforeseen event. And it happened, in part, because officers were trying to relieve crowding, not because of some outside force. And yet some outside force could have taken advantage of the failure to communicate.

Mr. Herron, you are a public safety officer as well. Do you know whether Prince George's officials, or you, were informed that people -- I'm sure some from your own county, were stuck in the Third Street tunnel?

MR. HERRON: Madame, I was in the Emergency Operations Center during the entire event and we were not informed.

DEL. NORTON: And this is the Emergency Operations Center of where -- of what location?

MR. HERRON: Prince George's County.

DEL. NORTON: And you were not informed?

MR. HERRON: No, ma'am.

DEL. NORTON: I think that the testimony here, of very competent officers, is all that needs to be said about this appropriation period and interoperability.

Chief Nichols, isn't it true that some funds have been allocated to begin, at least, on interoperability among the region and the District of Columbia police?

MR. NICHOLS: Yes, ma'am. I believe that there are -- there's a lot of money that was given to the Department of Homeland Security to distribute across the nation with regard to grant money for local and state law enforcement agencies.

The U.S. Capitol Police, because of the fact that we're Legislative Branch, can't receive grant money. So, we were appropriated a supplemental appropriation to begin planning for our new radio system, and we have requested additional funds in the current bill --

DEL. NORTON: So, how far along are you, sir?

MR. NICHOLS: We're pretty far along in the planning stages right now. We're being monitored very closely by the committees of jurisdiction to make that we are within the realm of --

DEL. NORTON: Chief, does that mean not only the D.C. police department, but Metro? Does that also mean the region -- that you'd be interoperable with the entire region?

MR. NICHOLS: Yes. We would be interoperable with the entire region.

We project right now, if we get the funding that we're requesting and the authority to move forward, it would still be about three years before we get our system completely on-line and up and running. That's why the chief has made this such a priority, because nobody can predict, in the span of three years, what we're really going to be facing, not only within the Capitol Complex but within the region.

So, this is something that has a very high priority, so we can get it on-line and get down the road with fulfilling our mission.

DEL. NORTON: Yes, General Schwartz?

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Madam, may I just add that if the system is going to be delivered in three years, we have to look at upgrades to the existing system to make sure that they can all interoperate or upgraded together.

DEL. NORTON: And it looks like, between now and a fully interoperable system, we're into jerry-built systems at some considerable risk, I take it, to homeland security?

MR. NICHOLS: You're right.

Right now we're making do with what we have. I believe that, obviously, from the testimony today, we're not the only agency that's in this position. But, the agencies in the region have to continue to bridge the gaps that we experience with regard to our communications capabilities.

DEL. NORTON: Mr. Herron, could I ask you a question.

Once there was evacuation of New Orleans, everybody talked about, how can we evacuate? Some of us have emphasized "stay in place," that there are few events where there would be a need to evacuate whole populations.

For example, we have floods in this area but seldom have we had a 100-year event, as they are called. However, it could be that there would be the need to evacuate people from the District of Columbia.

It's a pretty big jurisdiction. You've spoken of a place -- a shelter. I want to make sure I have the -- the places that are mentioned, which have been mentioned. Got these out of order, okay.

MR. HERRON: Ritchie Coliseum and Show Place Arena?

DEL. NORTON: Ritchie Colisetum (sic), Show Place --

MR. HERRON: Arena.

DEL. NORTON: -- Arena. How many people could be sheltered in these two facilities?

MR. HERRON: I think, combined, we can probably shelter up to -- probably 3,000 people.

DEL. NORTON: If more than 3,000 poured out, think about where Prince George's is located.

MR. HERRON: Then we're in trouble. To be quite honest with you, we're in trouble.

You know, we've asked our citizens to be prepared to make a plan to shelter-in-place, to prepare for the future. In Louisiana, we had more than 2,000 residents migrate to Prince George's County to stay with relatives, which impacted our capacity. They self-evacuated and stayed with relatives in Prince George's County, and it was a -- it was a strain on our resources.

DEL. NORTON: So, do you advise shelter-in-place unless told to evacuate?

MR. HERRON: I think every citizen should have a plan to shelter- in-place; they have alternative housing with friends and relatives that they can migrate to in case of an emergency.

Of course there will be that segment of society who will not have the resources to do that, and that's when the government must be prepared to respond to the needs of those citizens.

DEL. NORTON: Most of the time, when there's been an event of some kind, you don't know what it is. The Chief has -- Chief Nichols has testified that it is likely to be a spraying event of somebody -- some shooter, as we had here in the Capitol, as it is to be some exotic event.

Let me ask -- so, therefore, the first thing is we don't know anything. That's why the questioning that Ms. Edwards and I have done on operability in the first place. I mean, before we tell people to stay in place -- (laughs) -- we would like to know what the event is so we can know what we're talking about.

It puts us in a terrible position, you in a terrible position, to tell people to stay in place or to go, without being able to speak to one another -- with everybody trying to get on these little jerry- built systems that you have concocted. And, by the way, in case of a terrorist event, others being able to listen in to what it is you are saying.

I'd like to know, in the event of an emergency, whether known or unknown, whether you would expect a unified command. Who is in charge of making decisions?

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Ma'am, I would think the local incident commander is in charge. That's the first person on the scene.

DEL. NORTON: That would mean whoever in the jurisdiction, like Mr. Herron?

GEN. SCHWARTZ: I think the first responders, which is normally police or fire, would be on the scene. And then the supporting packages will come in to assist that incident commander.

MR. DELINSKI: He's exactly right -- if I could follow up on that.

When there is an incident, such as an active shooter, the first law enforcement official on the scene would set up an incident command. Any responding units, whether it be from that particular agency or other agencies, would report to incident command and ask for directions, get information, and so forth, and feed that information back to their departments as well.

If it's a rescue situation -- like, there may be a fire, or something like that, or if it was a rescue situation, it would be in the hands of the fire department. At that point, law enforcement would respond to incident command, and then work with them to mitigate the situation.

DEL. NORTON: Could I ask you this question, Mr. Delinski.

I noted in your testimony -- if I can find it, 2008 Metropolitan Transit Police Department investigated 224 suspicious packages and people, nine unknown substances, 20 bomb threats in your facilities -- "investigated," it doesn't mean you found anything --

MR. DELINSKI: Correct.

DEL. NORTON: -- and I do appreciate that. Did any of these -- did any of these investigations involve guns?

MR. DELINSKI: There were a few incidents that were reported of suspicious people that were seen carrying weapons.

DEL. NORTON: When you see -- of course, your system transmits, transports people throughout the region, and especially to the District of Columbia, which is the hub of the region -- if you see a person with a weapon in one of your facilities, how do you respond today?

MR. DELINSKI: If the weapon is concealed, obviously you approach that person and get as much information -- obviously, maintaining a safe distance; watching the person's hands, and so forth; doing the --

DEL. NORTON: How would you know if it were concealed, sir?

MR. DELINSKI: Because of the bulge, maybe, in the side. Maybe someone else had seen it previously. It may have been moderately displayed underneath his jacket, that where it was sticking out -- the butt of the gun, or something along those lines.

Obviously, if the weapon is out, we make the immediate police challenges to, you know, "raise your hands, stop what you're doing." And we have the person, if the weapon is in their hand, "drop the weapon on the ground;" move it away from them; and then spread them out in a prone position on the ground to where we can go and secure them; and then investigate the circumstances that led us to that point.

DEL. NORTON: I believe, if I'm not -- I believe that Virginia does allow concealed weapons --

MR. DELINSKI: Correct.

DEL. NORTON: -- how do you handle the fact that one part of the -- I'm not sure Maryland does, however --

MR. DELINSKI: No, it's illegal.

DEL. NORTON: Maryland does not.

MR. HERRON: You have to have a permit issued by the Maryland State Police in order to carry a concealed weapon.

DEL. NORTON: So, you can have one with a permit.

MR. HERRON: Yes, ma'am.

DEL. NORTON: It may require a permit, for that matter, in Virginia. But, the point is, you can conceal, carry -- carry, in many places, in Virginia, for sure. How does the Metro handle three jurisdictions -- all with vast amounts of the federal presence, who have their own quite different gun laws?

MR. DELINKSI: It's complicated, to say the least. I mean, that's one of the reasons why our recruits are selected through a vigorous background process. We go through three training academies. We're certified in all three states, as we referred to -- (audio break) -- the District of Columbia --

DEL. NORTON: So, you have to know the laws, essentially, in all three states?

MR. DELINSKI: We have to learn the laws in all three states -- correct.

DEL. NORTON: So, you would, if we passed a whole new gun law in the District of Columbia -- so new that it said, you don't have any more gun laws in the District of Columbia, would you have to retrain every officer?

MR. DELINSKI: All 450 sworn members we would have to retrain -- yes.

DEL. NORTON: Are you funded to retrain all sworn officers of the Metropolitan Transit Authority?

MR. DELINSKI: There is currently no funding available for that now.

DEL. NORTON: How would you handle bus travel? Do bus drivers assume any responsibility -- they are not law enforcement officers, for people carrying weapons? How would they be expected to respond, when coming from two jurisdictions which do have their gun -- their own local gun laws, to a jurisdiction which has no gun laws whatsoever --

MR. DELINSKI: We ask our employees --

DEL. NORTON: -- the nation's capital.

MR. DELINSKI: Yes. We ask our employees, particularly those on the buses and in the rail system, to be vigilant in observing suspicious behavior. And we ask that if they do see this type of activity -- a concealed weapon, or otherwise, that they report to us immediately. We do not ask them to intervene or take any type of police action; or be very limited in their contact with any type of suspicious person.

DEL. NORTON: Would such officers, would such, excuse me, personnel -- and, in particular, I'm thinking about personnel who may see people who board the vehicle, such as a bus driver -- would such personnel have to be retrained as well if there were no gun laws in the District of Columbia, and they traveled on vehicles between the District of Columbia and other jurisdictions?

MR. DELINSKI: Currently, there is no training in the law for other employees outside the police department --

DEL. NORTON: Well, how do they know whether to call if there's a concealed weapon, for example?

MR. DELINSKI: We ask them -- through Public Service Announcements, and also public awareness campaigns, internally and externally, to follow those procedures, and not take any type of direct action, and contact us and let us do that.

DEL. NORTON: Mr. Herron, did you have something to add to that?

MR. HERRON: Yes, ma'am. If I may take this opportunity to speak briefly about the --

DEL. NORTON: Please.

MR. HERRON: -- amendment. As you know, I'm the public safety director in Prince George's County. As part of my responsibilities, I direct the police department, and the first department, the department of corrections. Prior to my appointment as public safety director, I was a Maryland State trooper for 27 years, and I proudly served in several jurisdictions throughout the State of Maryland, including Prince George's County.

During my tenure, 13 of my colleagues were killed in the line of duty. Two of these colleagues were personal friends of mine and they were killed at the hands of men, who possessed illegal firearms. I personally was involved in a shooting where a man, who attempted to take my life, possessed a gun unlawfully.

If this legislation passes, Prince George's County -- (inaudible) -- would be in a situation where our crime would increase tremendously. Just recently we announced a drop in crime that had reached an all-low; hadn't been this low in 20 years. And this was because of the work of our men and women of the police department and our citizens.

During this fight to decrease crime, two of our police officers were killed in the line of duty -- Sergeant Richard Findley and Sergeant Gaughan. Sergeant Gaughan was killed at the hands of a criminal who should not have been in possession of a handgun.

In the State of Maryland, we have gun "straw purchases," where people can buy guns legally and then give those guns to somebody who should not possess them. With the enactment of this amendment, in the District of Columbia it will triple the "straw purchases" in the region. And I can tell you, from experience from a local level, that that would cause an increased amount of gun violence in Prince George's County and throughout the National Capital Region.

DEL. NORTON: Mr. Herron, your testimony's important, especially your testimony concerning an increase, and -- as you've been able to report, a recently decrease in gun violence in Prince George's County.

The District had as many as 430-440 homicides in the early '90s, and it's down to something -- a little over 200 now.

We cannot imagine how rapid, or how savage, would be the increase in gun violence if there were no gun laws in the District of Columbia at all. Whatever one thinks of tight gun laws, all one has to imagine is a jurisdiction where there's just none at all, and you were left to your own devices.

Now, let me ask you, Mr. Herron, as a public safety officer, how would the absence of gun laws here in the District of Columbia complicate any evacuation activities? You have your own gun laws. We would have none. You could stockpile assault weapons. You could have any -- you could have gone to Maryland. You could have gone to Virginia. Maybe when you're leaving you want to take your guns with you.

How would the presence of no gun laws, and, therefore, the accumulation of guns here, complicate evacuation and other activities associated with a natural or man-made disaster?

MR. HERRON: I think the absence of gun laws, Madame Chair, would impair our efforts in the National Capital Region to keep our citizens safe. It's important that we have these layers of security, and the interdiction of illegal guns is one of those layers. If we are not able to control, or we are in partnership with a jurisdiction that has no gun laws at all, it would definitely impede or impact not only evacuations but the safety of our citizens in the National Capital Region.

You asked a question about the training of police officers, additional resources. You know, currently the Maryland State Police is responsible for registering handguns and the purchase of handguns. If, in fact, this burden would be put on the State of Maryland, I don't think the State of Maryland has the resources to be able to -- have to register handguns from another jurisdiction.

DEL. NORTON: Would guns be allowed in any of the shelters where you would receive people from other jurisdictions or from your own jurisdiction?

MR. HERRON: No guns would be allowed in any shelters unless you were a law enforcement officer.

DEL. NORTON: Of course -- (inaudible) -- interoperability, it might be hard for people to know that --

MR. HERRON: Yes, ma'am.

DEL. NORTON: -- if any kind of event were to occur now.

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Similarly, with the D.C. Armory, now that we have metal detectors on each of our entrances we'll be able to detect if any weapons would be coming into the building.

DEL. NORTON: I wonder if -- no, that may be under federal law.

Let me ask all four of you about layers. Again, this comes from the testimony that we have received in hearings of the Homeland Security committee, where the mythology (sic) of layer after layer after layer, local level -- certain things happen there, certain things happen at the state, and the cumulative effect, if I may summarize it, is that you are able to provide security in a region as high risk as this.

I'd like to speak about layering, and what would happen if one layer -- namely gun laws in the District of Columbia, the nation's capital, were to disappear.

Let's start with Mr. Herron, and go on down.

MR. HERRON: Madame Chair, I was present when you asked this question previously. I think that, without doubt, that if that layer was removed it would impact homeland security in this region.

It's important to have layers. It's important to have collaboration and cooperation. It's important to know what happens in other's jurisdictions about the sale and the purchase of guns, and things of this nature.

I am very concerned, our county executive is very concerned about this pending amendment and how it's going to impact our citizens in Prince George's County.

DEL. NORTON: Major General Schwartz, you, of course, are perhaps most aware of the military-style weapons. I know that you have served in Iraq. I'd like you to describe the notion of layering, which, I understand, goes on also on the ground when you're in a theater of war.

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Madame, first to clear the record and get it straight, I was not in Iraq, but my troops were in Iraq.

But, on the topic of layering, I think the first thing we have to do is the education of all citizens in this area so that they know the laws, so that they can assist the local authorities with this problem. If all citizens are fully aware of what the laws are, what the issues are --

DEL. NORTON: But, see, I'm not at the citizen level, I'm now asking for officers. I'm trying to find out -- I understand that, you know, the citizen layer has to be aware. I'm assuming that the citizen layer, by the way, is not aware --

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Right.

DEL. NORTON: -- I'm not going to assume what millions of people know, I'm trying to find out about the layering provided by various authorities available to us.

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Yes, ma'am. I think that in the law enforcement arena all layers are extremely important, and we cannot eliminate any one of those layers as there will be a significant gap, and there the security and safety of the entire population will be at risk.

DEL. NORTON: General Schwartz, if there had been no assault weapon ban in the District of Columbia at the time of the inauguration, would that have complicated or affected the National Guard security that you were called upon to provide?

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Yes, ma'am, it would have affected the briefings that our men and women received before going out on their mission, especially in the Mall where there were no screening required for the approximately large -- the large number of folks --

DEL. NORTON: Well, we -- let's make that point clear. There was screening if you happened to be close in, and to have a ticket. But, if there were two million people on the Mall, surely a million-and-a- half were completely unscreened individuals.

Go ahead, sir.

GEN. SCHWARTZ: Yes, ma'am. (As a) matter of fact, they all were unscreened. They would only be screened if they were going into the parade corridor or close to the Capitol. So, it was a concern, and we were very vigilant in making sure -- and, as you heard earlier, we had mechanisms in place to conquer what may happen, and we were very fortunate that nothing happened.

DEL. NORTON: Mr. Delinski -- going on down the line.

MR. DELINSKI: One of the things that we pride ourselves in at WMATA is our very low crime rate. The chances of someone being a victim of a Part 1 crime in the system, meaning someone --

DEL. NORTON: And a Part 1 crime is?

MR. DELINSKI: Part 1 crime -- (inaudible) -- more of the serious crimes -- the rape, robbery, homicides, and so forth, are very low. The chances of being a victim of one of those Part 1 crimes is less that three per every million riders that we have on a regular daily basis, okay.

So, if suddenly there's this influx of weapons, that maybe this bill may bring about, you would certainly expect that we'd see an increase of guns in the Metro rail system, which, you can go down the road, through this process, and say it may equate to a higher level of crime -- which we are trying to protect the very low levels of crime that we have.

Also, we have a very open system at Metro, okay. We do not have security points in place, like airports --

DEL. NORTON: No screening whatsoever to get onto --

MR. DELINSKI: We have approval random bag checks at station entrances, however it's under conditions of higher alert levels or a specific threat against the strategy, okay. So, they're not out there every single day.

We don't have this airport-type screening of everyone who's coming into our system. So, I think, with this amendment's being passed, or if it would be passed, you would certainly expect that our vulnerability would increase as a result.

DEL. NORTON: I must compliment the Metro for apparently receiving endless numbers of new riders. (Laughs.) You've become the most popular ticket in town --

MR. DELINSKI: Yes. (Laughs.)

DEL. NORTON: -- and you've kept a low crime rate. Of course, more people, more risk. And you are finding all kinds of people, including federal officials, who decide they're going to pass up that ride and just get on the Metro and get here.

MR. DELINKSI: That's right.

DEL. NORTON: So, that's increased as well, we know for a fact.

Finally, Chief Nichols.

MR. NICHOLS: Yes, ma'am.

Within our jurisdiction we use a concept that allows us to identify threats the furthest point that we can. Our goal is to detect, deter, respond to a threat, defeat that threat, and then mitigate the results of what that threat brought to our jurisdiction.

Those principles have to interplay well with each other. And, as you know, we're in the middle of this city, so we're not an island. Things that occur just on other side of the street from us, even though it may be legal in that jurisdiction, especially with regard to weapons, doesn't diminish the concern that we have within our jurisdiction about a potential incoming threat. So, it's a very significant issue; it has to interplay with each other; and we do take the layers of security, and the concentric rings of security, very seriously.

DEL. NORTON: The testimony of all four of you has been quite indispensable to this hearing. We're trying to get a sense of the threats to the region. We're trying to understand evacuation. We're trying to understand what happened, of course, at the inauguration. And, with all -- even given the criticism, I want to take this opportunity to commend each and every one of you for a stellar performance.

We didn't expect perfection. We didn't get it. Perhaps we didn't expect the Third Street tunnel, but we should have expected there would be something like that. I don't know how Metro was able to absorb all of these people. It isn't as if you had any idea how many you were supposed to absorb.

I do want to say, for the record, that when it became clear that -- (laughs) -- Metro had done all it could, I asked Mr. (Kato ?) to come see me to do even more, so that the subways would be kept open beyond what he had already agreed to do without additional resources. I want you to know, this is one member -- and I think I have my whole region with me, going to try to get those additional resources for what was a Herculean job Metro did.

There just would have been no inauguration -- let's face it, without Metro. We would've been sitting here by ourselves telling the president, "It's 12:00 now. Metro's broken down, so nobody's come." That's just how indispensable Metro has been. And the reason people felt so safe, despite the crowds, was precisely because of the job each and every one of you did during that time.

I regard it as a unplanned event. Sure, there was planning; and sure, most of the planning worked, but I think it is most valuable because of what you could not possibly have planned for. So, I'm going to take this opportunity -- even given my questioning, to thank all of you for the work you did then, and especially for your testimony concerning a brand new threat that none of you could have contemplated and may be upon us.

Thank you very much.

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