Press Conference with Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) and Senator Ted Kaufman (D-DE)

Press Conference

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI) AND SENATOR TED KAUFMAN (D-DE)

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

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SEN. REED: (In progress) -- with Vice President Biden. And his own intelligence and insights and intellectual curiosity added immensely to this trip. And we were both immensely aided by the work of Liz King (sp) and Hailey Sofa (sp), who are the staff assistants that joined up.

We departed on April 13th and returned yesterday. And this was my 13th trip to Iraq, seventh to Afghanistan and fifth to Pakistan. During this trip, Senator Kaufman and I were able to meet several of our military leaders, including Generals Odierno, Jacoby and Helmick in Iraq and General McKiernan in Afghanistan. We met with our diplomatic personnel in each country, and we had the opportunity of meeting local leaders like the ministers (sic) of defense and ministers -- minister of interior in Iraq, the prime minister of Pakistan. And in Afghanistan we met with President Karzai, the defense minister and the minister of the interior.

Most particularly, we had the opportunity to visit American forces in the field. We traveled to Kirkuk in Iraq and met with military personnel there. We traveled to the frontier areas of Pakistan to observe American and British personnel training the Pakistan frontier corps. And we traveled to Kandahar and Helmand in Afghanistan to visit American and British forces. As always, we were superbly impressed with the skill and sacrifice of our military forces and their civilian counterparts and the tremendous support that their families give them here in the United States to do their very important job.

During our travels, several common themes emerged. We recognize that each country represents a unique political and tactical challenge and each country has to be understood in a regional context. But there are common themes reflected in each country. The first is, inadequate governmental capacity undermines the ability of these governments -- Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan -- to provide basic services to their population. Without these capabilities, populations are vulnerable to intimidation and dependent in many cases on insurgent forces for their basic services. This is particularly true with respect to police forces.

We found in every country our military leaders, our diplomats were pointing to the deficiencies in the local police as a key factor inhibiting their government and our government's ability to truly assist the individuals and the countries and to prevail against the insurgents. We also saw, in each of these areas, ethnic and tribal politics complicating the creation of a strong national vision. And these ethnic and sectarian tensions create opportunities that are exploited by insurgents.

Now, let me turn just to a few comments on particular countries. In Iraq, the Status of Forces Agreement, signed by President Bush, has set the overall timelines. That issue of deadlines and drop-dead dates is over. And the president -- President Obama's announced policy has given specific direction to our efforts, and we met with strong support for the president's policy directions in Iraq and Afghanistan. These efforts -- in Iraq, particularly -- have also reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and their responsibilities, and that has produced a positive effect.

We are shifting from combat missions to the missions of training, counterterrorism and force projection, and these missions are under way.

Under the topic of training, we have to not only train military forces but we also have to organize and provide resources for governance. Because, again, this is one of the consistent shortcomings we observe in every country.

Indeed we ourselves have to organize our government to be more effective supporters of governance activities in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

With respect to Iraq, we have to work to properly equip their forces. Our efforts should emphasize building a force capable of assuming increased responsibilities from the United States, a force capable of being sustained by the Iraqis over several years, and one that balances our assistance, which has already been considerable, with Iraqi acquisition of complementary systems.

One of the dangers is that they simply go into the market, buy a piece of equipment without sustaining capabilities at the cheapest price and end up with a hodgepodge of equipment that won't work for them and won't work for their long-term security.

We also have to acknowledge, when it comes to Iraq, and particularly in the message of -- the mission of force protection, that General Odierno's needs to draw down -- the platforms, the specialized troops -- are in many cases the same resources that General McKiernan needs to build up in Afghanistan. There are very difficult decisions that General Petraeus must make in terms of allocating resources. Some examples of these are engineer route- clearing units, to provide mobility in both places; UAVs, et cetera.

We are going to look very hard at the budget and the policy of the Defense Department to ensure that we have enough of these assets, which are the critical enablers between both countries.

Let me make a few comments about Pakistan. Pakistan poses potentially the greatest threat in the region. Growing instability, together with the nuclear arsenal, make it a serious threat, a most serious threat. And it still remains the safe haven of al Qaeda, with transnational and international terrorist aspirations. There is a real question of whether the government of Pakistan has the political will and the army of Pakistan has the capability to successfully confront a growing insurgency.

Moreover, as we have noticed throughout the region, limited government capacity makes it difficult to provide services to the population either to preempt insurgent activity or to build regions after military forces have secured the territory. The abandonment of the Swat area in the last several days is troubling.

Prior to this development, the government of Pakistan tried to justify their agreements with insurgents by claiming that the territory was tribal and had long been an area of self-rule. But at least since the 1960s the Swat area has been a part of Pakistan proper. This concession represents a serious development and reflects both the growing strength of the Pakistani Taliban and the inability of the Pakistani army to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations.

With respect to Afghanistan, more must be done to develop a unified effort -- unified among our military, between our military and civilian agencies, and between Afghan forces and our forces and NATO forces.

We also have to integrate and unify our efforts with respect to counternarcotics and counterterrorism. This unity of effort is one of the major priorities that has to be undertaken. It's very difficult to have classic sort of unity of command, given you have an indigenous national army, an international NATO force and American forces on the ground. But at a minimum, the diplomats, the generals on all sides have to work day in and day out to unify the effort.

We've got to get the key enablers into Afghanistan. I mentioned the tension between the needs of General Odierno and the needs of General McKiernan. We have to go ahead and provide these enablers.

The Afghan security forces must be increased. That includes their army and their police. And in the long run, this is probably the only sustainable strategy. If we can -- and I hope we will -- build a successful Afghan security force, then our ability to leave in a timely fashion is that much more enhanced.

And I think we need an explicit contract with President Karzai and his successor. As you know, elections will be later this year. There will be a new president or at least the -- President Karzai will be reelected.

We need to have that government understand that they have to do certain things: for example, match our increase in Regional Command- South, Helmand, Kandahar, with an increase of Afghani forces; match our efforts to disrupt the drug trade by their efforts; emphasize anti-corruption activities throughout the government; build more transparency into the government; build more predictability and more meritocracy into their appointments of governors of provinces, of leaders in departments in Kabul.

This should be an understanding that is reached very explicitly with the government of Afghanistan. And I think it should be enforced not only by our mutual self-interest, but I think the donor community should be also involved and interested in terms of these steps that must be taken by the government of Afghanistan.

And then finally, with respect to operations there, I do think we have to continue to develop lines of communication that are not so dependent on Pakistan. One sense that you have there is that there is a -- in some cases -- unwillingness to fully cooperate, because of the sense that we depend on them, that we can't leave because it would not be in our interests. And I think part of -- particularly with respect to Pakistan, part of getting away from that is making it quite clear that we have independent ways to support our forces in Afghanistan.

Those are a few comments particularly about the countries. Now let me recognize my friend and colleague and traveling companion, Senator Ted Kaufman, to --

SEN. KAUFMAN: Thank you. First, I want to say, I cannot express what a privilege and honor it was to travel with Senator Reed. As he said, I mean, these numbers kind of roll off your -- 13 trips to Iraq; seven trips to Afghanistan; five trips to Pakistan.

There is no one more knowledgeable about the region, and I benefited from his extensive insight and experience. Honestly, I can't remember the last time I learned so much from someone in such a short period of time.

It was also -- was a great honor, obviously, to visit with our courageous men and women in uniform. And that's -- that rolls off the tongue too, but it is really remarkable when you're over there to see what these people are living with and the kind of dangers they deal with every day.

What was great is this is my first trip. So I arrived in Baghdad and what's there but a C-17 from Dover Air Force Base to make me feel at home. That was great. And then we have a unit -- Delaware has a unit, the 261st Signal Brigade, which is right outside of Baghdad, so I got a chance to go by and see them.

We met with literally hundreds of soldiers. One of the things that Senator Reed does, which is really great and is a very important part of our thing -- our trip, was to meet with the soldiers and the Air Force and the sailors. I mean, they really do appreciate this. And it's a great honor for me to be able to do that.

But in addition, it's our civilian employees over there, which are becoming more and more important in the fight -- the chance to meet with them. And I'm just -- some of them: the State Department, obviously, everywhere; USAID; Drug Enforcement Agency; and all kinds of other experts dealing with unique challenges with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

Let me just make a couple overall points. It -- this is -- clearly we are at a pivot point in the region. We've got the withdrawal in Iraq, which seems to be going well. We've got the increased military and civilian resources being deployed under President Obama's plan in Afghanistan. And we've got true growing instability in Pakistan.

One of the first things that I was happy to see, I read a lot about before I left and talked -- was this is not just a military problem. If we're going to fight insurgencies, we need to use nonmilitary units in addition.

It's absolutely essential that under the proposal which they call "shape, clear, hold, and build," that the shape and clear of the military -- and we've got the best military in the world by far -- that they have to go in and do the first two, the shape and clear. But more and more we're depending on the local police, which we have to train, as Senator Reed said. We need a lot more police over there in -- everywhere. They got to hold. And then the real challenge here is getting the political people in to do the build.

Economic conditions -- corruption and narcotics are fueling the insurgency. This is not just about religion or about anything like that. This is economic. Overwhelming -- in all three countries, the leaders there said, what's the number-one problem in the country? It sounded like we were back here. Jobs, jobs, jobs. So we have to deal with this economic -- they're not -- the vast majority of these -- the bad guys and the insurgents are -- it's not -- it's about economic factors, not about ideology.

Perceptions of corruption in the government -- this is the second big thing. If we're going to have governance, people cannot have the perception that there's corruption in the government. It's led to popular disenchantment and a weakened central government in all three countries, but especially in Afghanistan. That's why I strongly support expanded nonmilitary assistance in all three countries focused on development.

Good news is, after being there, talking to the military leadership but also the civilians, we can peel off the Taliban. Now, this is -- I watched a TV show when I got back: There is an incredible misunderstanding about what that means, when we peel off folks from the Taliban.

We still -- some people still treat the Taliban like it's a nation- state. This is not a nation-state; this is an insurgency. This is a bottom-up organization. We will never negotiate with Mullah Omar and the Taliban.

Ten percent of the Taliban, talking to them would be a total waste of time. But there is 90 percent who are -- what they usually say is the black-gray-white. The black is the real hard insurgency; it's maybe 10 percent. The white are the people that were in it kind of for insurgency, but it may be because of something that happened to them and they're upset. And then the gray -- I mean, the gray is that. And then the white -- the white is many people who've just been on a job. You know, economic conditions, there are no jobs, so they pick up a rifle and they go to war. We can peel those people off. We did it -- they did it very successfully in Iraq, and we can do the same thing in Afghanistan.

And then finally, everyone agrees on this new counterinsurgency program that we need all the different efforts, the counterinsurgency emphasis in all three states. In Iraq -- really positive impression is that progress has been made. This has allowed -- the military has allowed the political process to move forward. We need, as Senator Reed said, and I basically agree with everything that he said -- not basically, I agree with everything he said. The military and police is essential to the success.

We've got a number of political questions left, which is always -- we knew it was going to be a problem; that the surge would help us get the military on the ground. First off, we've got to deal with -- the biggest one is Kurdish-Arab relations, which is pretty rocky now that the common enemy is gone. Two, the sectarian relations between the Sunni and the Shi'a. And finally, how are we going to deal with the detainees, thousands of the detainees, we have in the country, before we leave?

Pakistan is in serious danger. I went over there, like Senator Reed, I think, concerned about the will of the Pakistanis, would they in fact -- why wouldn't they move their troops down from India to confront the Taliban in the FATA regions and along the border with Afghanistan? After the Swat Valley decision, where the Pakistani military went in there and took their best shot, the Taliban lasted, and they felt like they had to sign an agreement with them, it just makes me worry now that this is not just a will problem; this is a capability problem, just as Senator Reed said in his remarks. This is one of the key things that came out. And clearly, in Pakistan -- talk about the right place at the right time, the Kerry-Lugar Bill is just absolutely essential in order to deliver as a framework. The only thing I'm worried about is whether there's enough money.

And finally, in Afghanistan overall -- military, Afghans, civilians -- everyone is really pleased with President Obama's plan. They're not sure it's the end-all and the do-all, but they really think it's -- it's the right plan.

But the one thing we met everywhere we went in Afghanistan -- and as Senator Reed said, we were in Kabul but then we went out in helicopters into Kandahar and Helmand, where most of the bad guys are -- governance is key. We're losing these folks. It's not -- they've had the Taliban. They know what the Taliban is. We don't have to convince them the Taliban's bad. But what we have to do is convince them that we're going to be there, we're going to make it right, and that this new -- the government is going to work well. If they don't have confidence in this new -- in the new government, then this well all could be for naught. And obviously, the one key thing for governance is corruption, as Senator Reed said.

So -- but people feel good about where we're going in Pakistan. As I said, this was -- this was a wonderful trip, an education of the region, and there is no one I could have traveled with that would be anywhere near as good as Senator Reed.

So we're open for any questions.

Q Senator, do you support attaching strings to the Kerry- Lugar Bill?

SEN. REED: I think we should have certain conditions on support which would, I think, be in the mutual interest of ourselves and the government of Pakistan, because, as Senator Kaufman said, when we met with military leaders, when we met with the prime minister, they made the point that if they don't have that capacity to build after a military operation, then the military operation will fail and you'll see something similar to what took place in Swat.

So I have the -- I have a sense that there are mutual areas where they would agree with us that that money should be focused. And we would -- I think should be explicit in where the focus should be.

I think it would be unfortunate if we simply reinforced the present tactical disposition of their troops, the present training of their troops, every -- the status quo is not working for Pakistan, and we want to, I think, be a force not only to aid them materially, but together we focus their efforts so they're much more effective against these insurgent groups.

SEN. KAUFMAN: And the other thing is -- I think I was surprised, based on what I read before I went there -- this Swat Valley has been a wake-up call for them, too. I don't think we're going to be in much of a position where we have to demand certain things. I think the Pakistani government now is ready to do some of the things that we've been suggesting to -- our military and our State Department people have been suggesting for a long, long time.

SEN. REED: It was -- I think Ted's point is very well taken. We had a briefing from the 11th Corps commander in Peshawar, and we were with our counsel there -- our remarkably brave and extraordinarily gifted Foreign Service officer, a woman. And we left the meeting and said, you know, that's the first time I've ever seen in one of their briefings an explicit statement that they will not, in any way, negotiate with these insurgent groups. So they're getting the message. And I think, as Ted pointed out, Swat was a wake-up call.

Now the question is getting the message and operationalizing on the ground are two different things. And it's going to require not only support, like Kerry-Lugar, but also working together to make sure that that -- those resources are targeted to where they could be helpful.

Q Senator Reed?

SEN. REED: Yeah.

Q When we were in Iraq a couple of years ago, you told me that the problem with Iraq is that every time you turn a corner, there's another corner. Do you get the -- two questions. Do you get the impression that they're turning another corner and it may not be a corner -- going in a direction that's going back to the bad old days?

Second question is what both of you have described seems to me to be nation-building. Is that what you -- what you think is necessary, at least for Afghanistan and Iraq and maybe Pakistan as well?

SEN. REED: That's absolutely the case. This is nation-building -- a much-derided term which now has become a reality. We -- the Bush administration, with unanimous support, went into Afghanistan. And that, I think we understood, would require not just a military operation but helping them develop their institutional capacity. They went into Iraq, against my judgment, but that, too, inevitably would have entailed nation-building. And that's what's going on right now.

And in a way, in a situation where we don't have any military forces and we're not engaged, thank goodness -- Pakistan -- they recognize themselves that they have to begin to increase their governmental capacity.

So nation-building, yes. That's what's going on out there.

Respective to Iraq, I do believe -- and this is not just with Iraq but every place -- when you turn a corner, there's another corner. The corners out there now are more political than military and tactical. And Ted put his finger right on top of the biggest one: the tensions between the Arab(s) and the Kurds. There also is the ongoing reconciliation between Sunni and Shi'a. The Ministry of Interior has agreed to hire 20 percent of the Sons of Iraq, and they've also agreed, in concept, to hire the other 80 percent into other ministries and pay for it themselves. If that takes place, then I think you'll see that situation beginning to resolve, always with the possibility of tension.

There's another point we have to stress with respect to Iraq and the new corner. The new corner is the declining oil market. Their budgets a year ago showed oil at somewhere from 85 to a hundred dollars a barrel. That buys a lot of good will in the country, a lot of support out of different factions. Now, at $40 a barrel, they really have to recalibrate their military sales. Can they support this?

Part of this is also tied to come after them with an adequate hydrocarbon law. That's another one of the corners ahead. Will they finally come to a agreed-upon division of the resources of Iraq so that each community feels they've gotten a fair shake?

So yeah, there are still corners, but I guess the good news is that they're not as violent, potentially. as what we've seen in the last year or two.

Ted?

SEN. KAUFMAN: I'd just like to say, in terms of nation-building, we only get to nation-building after we've got the military in there to kind of secure the ground. So -- but look -- and this is pretty clear -- nobody's going to take the United States on militarily, in conventional forces, in our lifetime. And we are so -- the most powerful military nation in the history of the world.

So our basic battle -- and we're learning how to fight it, and we did a good job in Iraq -- is, how do you deal with these insurgencies? And I think when you look at the counterinsurgencies, we're laying out a plan here to how to do it, and it starts with the military, and then you have to get in what has been called nation-building.

SEN. REED: Can I just say one other point that Ted (has ?) raised? You know, we are sort of being forced into these nation- building operations because of military operations that we decided to conduct. It would be nice -- and maybe this is a very lofty ideal -- if we could be so proactively engaged diplomatically, in terms of economic developments throughout the world, that we didn't have to have a military engagement, that we could actually start building capacity in some of these places around the globe ahead of time.

If you look to the situation in Somalia -- ungoverned space, very little institutional capacity, a breeding ground for international pirates. You know, it would be nice had we been able to, in concert not just with the United States alone but with the world community, go to some of those places and provide the capacity before we have to conduct military operations.

SEN. KAUFMAN: Let me just say one -- let me say one other thing. And that is, no matter what military person we talked to, whether it was Special Forces, toughest of the tough, or our generals, every one of them said that this is part of the deal; that what we have to do is, we have to make the preventive, the diplomatic -- we need more -- they're the ones saying we need more State Department people, we need more AID people, we need more agricultural people, we need more of all these things to do our job as the military.

Now, remember, the military has got to do their job first. But then they know that the next step is this. And they are the biggest. Is that fair to say? They are the biggest.

I mean, you meet really, really experienced, everything from young, tough Special Forces, military, right through to the gray- haired, senior three-and-four-star generals. They all know that this is the way that we have to go, if we're going to be successful.

Yes.

Q Senator Reed, can you be a little more explicit about what conditions, you think, should be on continued U.S. support, continued U.S. aid to Pakistan? What do you think is the most important sort of conditions that should be on that aid?

SEN. REED: I think they have to engage in a very serious counterinsurgency training program. They're doing that. We had a remarkably good visit up to a training facility, north of Peshawar, where British and American military personnel are training the frontier corps.

And by the way, the frontier corps commander, General Tariq, is a very determined, tough-minded, professional soldier who's, you know, engaged in the fight, clear about his will. His will is that he's going to use his forces to prevail against these insurgents.

But that type of training, the build phase we've been talking about continuously; the advisers, civilian advisers, they can go in and help them stabilize the situation.

For example, there was a successful operation in Bajaur, which is one of the areas of the FATA, where the frontier corps went in and fought a pretty tough fight. But they displaced several hundred thousand people. And one of the issues that the Pakistanis had was, how do we get these people back into Bajaur? How do we protect them? How do we build up police?

So if I had to tick off a few things, one is, you know, the institutional capacity of the military, to conduct counter-guerrilla operations, counterinsurgent operations; the development of effective police, which is a problem throughout the region but particularly in Pakistan; the ability to support economic development; some type of even temporary assistance, again working with the international community, for displaced persons, so that they can get back to their homes and they can be protected and stabilized.

So that's where the resources should go. If it goes simply to provide more conventional firepower for the Iraqi army, that's not going to help them. And it's not going to help us.

SEN. KAUFMAN: Just one thing I'd say is, you know, there's nothing like the prospect of a hanging to concentrate the mind. I think so far, in all the Kerry-Lugar discussions, there's been a reluctant Pakistani government that we've kind of had to force through, you know, putting strings on and things like that.

I really and I'm not -- this is not optimism, this is pessimism. I really think that the prospect of what's going on over there now; we're going to have a lot less difficult time having to tie these things. Because I think they're really going to want to do the very things that Senator Reed was talking about.

SEN. REED: I'm going to take John first.

Q Senator Reed, you've said that when Ambassador Hill is ambassador, he's going to have to go right to work pretty hard on -- (inaudible) -- that you've been talking about, in particular on the status of Kirkuk.

Can you flesh out that idea at all, talk about some of the variables and some of the elements of potential deals among these people?

SEN. REED: Well, we went up to Kirkuk and we met with American military personnel, but we also met with the local leaders -- the provincial governor, the head of their provincial assembly. And since there's been no new elections in Kirkuk, these are the incumbents from the very beginning. In fact, I was reminded I met the governor with Senator Clinton about in 2003, so he's been there for a while.

It's divided into basically three ethnic groups: Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen. And the Kurds have a position that this whole area is theirs -- a very large swath of territory. The Turkomen and the Arabs feel, no, that they have legitimate rights to be there. So there's a dispute about a census, of, you know, when it should be taken, what dates, et cetera.

But underlying all of this is oil, because the area has significant oil deposits. And so I think -- and, you know, you're right. I think one of the first jobs that Ambassador Hill must undertake -- together with the United Nations, who has been extremely helpful to us when it comes to Kirkuk -- they have to get up there and work simultaneously the issue of the territory and political representation, but also the hydrocarbon law.

My sense is that you can't resolve one without the other. And the resolution might come at a higher level than the Kirkuk, you know, provincial council. It might be with the KRG, the Kurdish government in Erbil, talking directly with our ambassador, the United Nations and also Prime Minister Maliki.

But it is a sensitive fault line. There are significant Kurdish military forces -- Peshmerga; they have their own intelligence agency; they have Kurdish police. They are all over the -- the security of the line within -- close to the city of Kirkuk. One of the interesting things we found out is that the Iraqi national police has no presence in Kurdistan. They have their own police. So the Iraqi national police sort of stops at the border of Kurdistan. But that's just one example of the -- this fault line, which is significant.

I think eventually it will be resolved, but it's going to take a lot of effort, and the resolution has to touch upon oil as much as referendums and population censuses and things like that.

Ted?

SEN. KAUFMAN: Just one thing. I totally agree with what Senator Reed said. The one thing to remember is that this is the area where Saddam -- he knew this was coming, so he displaced a whole bunch of the Kurds and moved Arabs in. So it isn't just like they want the oil, they want the land. They can say, look, we were here; we should have this land, and it belongs to us. And there is a provision in the constitution for a referendum that both the Sunnis and the Shi'a -- one thing the Sunnis -- nothing like the Kurds to get the Sunni and Shi'a to agree. They basically agree, you know, they don't want to have a referendum right now.

So this is a disputed area where Saddam moved people out. The Kurds think they should be able to go back to where they were pre- Saddam; and therefore, they would have the oil. By the way, 4 percent of the world's oil is in that area.

SEN. REED: Yes, ma'am?

Q Senator Reed and Senator Kaufman, the weapons -- the problem of weapons made in China, fell into the hand of Taliban insurgency groups, has not been brought up for a while.

And I just wonder, during your visit this time, have you heard much complaints on this? And secondly, I would like to know your position on Chinese government sending peacekeeping troops over the area or using their influence to help stabilize that (region ?).

SEN. REED: Yeah. We did not hear any specific reference to Chinese weapons in Afghanistan and that area. That might be because there's -- everyone seems to have their own AK-47. (Laughter.)

SEN. KAUFMAN (?): Yeah. Right.

SEN. REED: So it's a place where there's no shortage of small arms.

The -- what is encouraging, and I think I must give credit to the president and the secretary of State -- is the designation of Ambassador Holbrooke as a special envoy. He's really captured for the first time the interrelationships of many of these problems between Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and China. China has a border with Afghanistan.

Ambassador Holbrooke is reaching out to all the regional parties. He had a brief interaction with the Iranian foreign minister in the Hague. He has been to New Delhi numerous times; will go again. He's been in Afghanistan. He has been in China.

And the focus is how, collectively, the regional powers can work to stabilize the situation of -- and how -- an example of why it's so critically important: The Iraqi -- the Pakistani forces are all along their southern border. There's very few exceptions. That's because the Indian forces are massed along THEIR border. Now, if there can be some sort of step back -- away, that could open up the possibility of moving more Pakistani forces into contested areas. That would be very helpful, moving police up. But that's going to require some very delicate negotiations between the government of India, the government of Pakistan. I know Ambassador Holbrooke is working in that line.

The other thing that's encouraging, particularly when it comes to the intervention or the participation of the Chinese, is that Ambassador Eikenberry is a fluent Mandarin speaker and a former Defense attache in Beijing. So you're going to have someone who speaks the language and knows many -- many, many high-ranking Chinese officials, both military and civilian. And I think he too will be trying to engage China in these efforts.

Q Senator Reed, you fought -- I have two questions for you. You fought for years with Senator Levin to get a -- to establish a goal for withdrawal. Is that something that should be considered for Afghanistan? And then I just have a separate question.

SEN. REED: I think what we want to establish in Afghanistan are, you know, conditions and a -- if you will, a glide path so that we can turn over responsibility in a reasonable time period and fashion to the government of Afghanistan.

There's, I think, a significant difference, strategically, between the situation in Iraq and the situation in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we have a situation where we were attacked by elements that were located in that country. And there is a real possibility that if we were to withdraw prematurely, those elements would reestablish themselves there.

In addition to that, bin Laden et al have just moved south a bit, in Pakistan.

And so the stability of Pakistan, particularly with their nuclear weapons, is a very, very significant issue.

So I think we have to maintain a longer view, not that we can successfully maintain a presence there indefinitely. History suggests that's not the case. But the notion -- one of the things that works, in some respects, conceptually against us is the notion that we're going to leave.

What that does is, it makes the Pakistanis, for example, sort of less willing to crack down on their intelligence services, less willing to be tougher with the Afghan Taliban at least. Because they'll say, well, we'll need these people.

So I think we have to be able to create a posture that we can sustain. And it can't be, you know, 10 brigades on the ground indefinitely. But that's why increasing the size of the Afghan army, their police, building their capacity, dealing with corruption, and it's a problem. But there's been some, on my many trips here, some encouragement.

The minister of the interior now, Atmar, is a very talented individual who seems absolutely committed to, you know, vetting police, eliminating corruption. They've created a special narcotics court, mostly for small fish at the moment. But at least they're taking steps.

So I think there are two different strategic rationale. And the rationale there is, our presence, I think, is necessary. And hopefully it's non-military as quickly as possible.

(Cross talk.)

SEN. KAUFMAN: Yeah. Let me just say this, that this really is a very different situation. Because remember, they still remember the fact that we left after the Russian war. That's number one.

Number two, when you look at the survey -- (inaudible) -- the people do not like the Taliban, as I said earlier. But if they're going to get the Taliban eventually, they're going to make a different kind of deal on how they work this thing.

Do you see what I mean? So sustainability for us, in Afghanistan, is absolutely essential. We're going to stay until we win. And I think if in fact, we're here a year from now or two years from now, it will be a different story.

But starting this new operation, we have to convince the Afghan people that we're there to win and they're not just going to put off the time until they eventually get the Taliban.

SEN. REED: The only other thing I would add is that we also have to make it clear to them that the only people who can win are themselves. I mean, you know, we cannot garrison and secure a country.

We have to help them build internal security forces, governmental capacity. And ultimately it's the will of the Afghan people that will prevail. And that's why we talk so much about governments and how kinetics is important. But it's police. It's governance, it's building. It's all those things.

Q Related to detainees captured, on that battlefield, I mean, is it your opinion? And I know you're on the Judiciary Committee. (Inaudible.) Is it your opinion that Bush administration officials -- these aggressive interrogation tactics that have been called torture by some -- is it your opinion that these officials should be held accountable, some officials in the Bush administration, perhaps the lawyers at OLC who built the framework, upon which the interrogation policy was built?

SEN. REED: I think the -- I think these policies did a tremendous disservice, not only to our country but to the men and women in uniform. And I am particularly distressed by what went on. And I don't think they should be given -- there should be a sort of carte blanche sort of reprieve for those who designed the policies, who supervised the policies. The individual -- and the president's made it clear -- the individual agents in the field relying upon this guidance, I think, is a separate issue.

But I think certainly the issue should be reviewed and discussed and clarified. And, you know, maybe there's an opportunity for some sort of mitigating circumstances we're not aware of, but I -- at this point, I don't think that a carte blanche dismissal in terms of those who were the architects -- that's quite different than those that were -- thought they were acting under the color of law.

SEN. KAUFMAN: And one thing is that, you know, this is a town that worships precedent. The thing that worries me about it is that somebody -- if we don't something about this, don't make it clear what's going on, 20 years from now somebody can provide an OLC memo that says it's okay to do this or okay to do that.

So it's a little bit like when we did the church assassination committee hearings, we had to actually have a big public show so everybody knows you can't go around assassinating people. And I think we need something in the Congress that sends a clear message that if you ever bring this up in the future, that what went on here was wrong, was against the law and is not a good precedent, what's going forward.

SEN. REED: We're going to take one more question.

Q A related question about precedent going forward: The supplemental's coming up. There's money there to close Guantanamo Bay. And today Republicans are going off, saying there's just no place to put it. And other than John Murtha, no one's stepping forward to say, hey, put them here.

What's your latest thinking, both of you, on how best to go about or whether or not to close Guantanamo and what to do with them all? There's 240 some-odd down there waiting to be housed somewhere.

SEN. REED: The president has already made a decision it's going to be closed. And so the question is your second one, is where do they go. I must confess I don't have any list of the top five locations on hand, but there's no doubt in my mind that we should and we will close Guantanamo. We'll have to work through it. It's going to be contentious, where do they go.

Q Give us a hint. Can you envision a scenario wherein there is a safe housing for those 240?

SEN. KAUFMAN: Well, we have some very, very -- we convicted terrorists involved with the first bombing of the World Trade Center and they were incarcerated in the United States. We've incarcerated people who we've picked up who were rather sinister figures. And they're in our system.

So I think that can be done and it will be done. The decision's been made; it'll be closed.

Q You're ruling out Rhode Island and Delaware, I take it?

SEN. KAUFMAN: No, the -- you know, I can't think of a more -- first off, we're going to close Guantanamo. There's no doubt about that. I can't think of a more difficult problem, how to work our way through it. But we're going to do it. There aren't going to be 240 left at the end.

I mean, we have to look at these things like the Uighurs, the 17 Uighurs down there. That's a totally different situation. They -- nobody accuses them of anything.

The only problem is, we can't send them back to China, because they'll -- the Chinese will kill them.

This is a person-by-person deal on these 240, and I can guarantee you, when we get down to the end, it won't be like 240. Will there be some left when we get down to the end? Yes, there will. And what we do with them -- it's going to be one heck of a problem.

But there's no doubt this administration, the president, with both of our support, is doing the right thing in closing down Guantanamo, which is probably the single best thing for a recruiting officer for the al Qaeda that we have on the face of the Earth.

Q Does Bagram aggravate that situation, since you -- you referred to earlier the fact that we have to also do something with the detainees that are at Bagram, correct?

SEN. KAUFMAN: Yeah. Well, that --

SEN. REED: These are at Bucca.

SEN. KAUFMAN: Bucca --

SEN. REED: I think at Bucca, in Iraq.

SEN. KAUFMAN: We're talking about Iraq, not --

SEN. REED: We have an agreement with the Iraqi government to begin to release our detainees to their custody, because they're sovereign, and you are actually pulling out. And the question there is their capacity to vet them. And then we have to ensure, when we turn them over to the Iraqis, that we're turning over into humane conditions. So that's, you know, another issue of training correction officers. Part of the microdetails in Iraq is our, I think, authority to train or funds to train correction officers expires within several months. So we have to look at that.

But the issue, I think, Ted, was about Iraq.

SEN. KAUFMAN: Yeah. I mean, that's a thorny -- that is a thorny problem, and I can list it as one of the problems we have. Compared to Guantanamo, well, it's not comparable (to ?) Guantanamo.

SEN. REED: Final question.

Q Final question. Coming back to the question about detainees, both of you have talked about the need for the U.S. military to stay in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to help stabilize the situation. Vice President Cheney suggested last evening that this perhaps is putting the U.S. at risk and, I would infer by that, by putting U.S. forces who are trying to deal with these insurgent factors in those countries at risk. Is his assessment on the mark or not?

SEN. REED: I didn't hear any military officer come to us saying that they're at risk because of -- well, what's the allegation?

Q The release of the memos and the vice president suggesting that's now chilling our methods and procedures -- the insurgents will know how to work around them.

SEN. REED: Well, if the insurgents read our SERE manuals, they would have had an idea of what the Cheney-Bush administration was ordering to be done to people. So I think that's a -- not a credible comment.

And the other evidence, frankly, is that's not an issue that ever came up with our military commanders. Let me tell you what did come up -- we could ask General Odierno -- under the SOFA, which the Bush- Cheney administration negotiated, we have to have a warrant to detain an Iraqi, and we have to turn that Iraqi over within 24 hours. And we have to now treat them, every one, with -- under the Geneva Convention in terms of our operation. And General Odierno said that's all going very well. No complaint. In fact, in a way, it's better. It's a better operation than it was before.

So you know, defending the indefensible by arguing the irrational is something that the vice president does quite well -- Vice President Cheney.

SEN. KAUFMAN: I can't top that. (Soft laughter.)

Q Thank you, sir.

Q Thank you.

END.

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