Hearing of the House of Homeland Security Committee - Homeland Security Policymaking: HSC at a Crossroads and Presidential Study Directive 1

HEARING OF THE HOUSE HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: HOMELAND SECURITY POLICYMAKING: HSC AT A CROSSROADS AND PRESIDENTIAL STUDY DIRECTIVE 1
CHAIRED BY: REP. BENNIE G. THOMPSON (D-MS)
WITNESSES: KENNETH WAINSTEIN, FORMER HOMELAND SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT; FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, FORMER HOMELAND SECURITY AND COUNTER TERRORISM ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT; PHILIP PALIN, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC PREPAREDNESS; TOM FRAZIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS ASSOCIATION; BRUCE HOFFMAN, PROFESSOR, CENTER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Copyright ©2009 by Federal News Service, Inc., Ste. 500, 1000 Vermont Ave, Washington, DC 20005 USA. Federal News Service is a private firm not affiliated with the federal government. No portion of this transcript may be copied, sold or retransmitted without the written authority of Federal News Service, Inc. Copyright is not claimed as to any part of the original work prepared by a United States government officer or employee as a part of that person's official duties. For information on subscribing to the FNS Internet Service at www.fednews.com, please email Carina Nyberg at cnyberg@fednews.com or call 1-202-216-2706.

REP. THOMPSON: The committee is meeting today to consider what the future of homeland security policymaking in the White House should look like and whether or not the existing National Security Council and Homeland Security Council's structures should be reconsidered.

The Homeland Security Council was stood up in 2001 in the wake of September 11th attacks to enhance our nation's ability to deter, detect, prevent and respond to terrorism. Later that year, when Congress authorized the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the decision was made to also codify into law the Homeland Security Council.

The language of Title 9 sets forth the composition and mission of the council. The Homeland Security Council is responsible for providing advice to the president on homeland security policies based on assessments of our nation's risks. It is also charged with overseeing, reviewing and making recommendations to the president on federal homeland security policies.

In its short history, the Homeland Security Council -- by most accounts -- has been an important driver of preparedness and response activities throughout the nation. With the change in administration, the timing is right for asking key questions about whether how -- ask key questions about whether how we've been doing homeland security policymaking over the past eight years is still the right way to go.

The president is to be commended for issuing Presidential Directive 1, which establishes a study team to examine how to improve security policymaking at the White House. As the study team is hard at work developing its recommendations, I thought it would benefit the committee for us to hear from people who know, all too well, about the challenges of the current homeland security policymaking apparatus.

I thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for being here to participate in one of our favorite Washington pastimes, the game of speculation.

For my part, I've been giving some thought to the potential outcomes of the study -- which should emerge in late April -- and see it going one of three ways. Number one, they could propose dissolving the Homeland Security Council into the National Security Council. Number two, they could propose retaining a two-council system that is more integrated, or number three, they could propose eliminating both councils in favor of creating a new council to handle full continuum of security issues, everything from nonproliferation to emergency response.

There are strong cases to be made for better integration of homeland security and national security policies. Whether a structural merger of the two White House councils is the best way to achieve better integration remains to be seen. However, this committee, given our oversight responsibility, has a vested interest in making certain that whatever comes out of the White House review actually enhances homeland security.

Findings should be able to pass a basic three-part test. Number one, first, will the findings enhance the nation's security? Second, will the Department of Homeland Security's effectiveness be bolstered? And third, will the findings enhance the voice of state, local and tribal authorities, our nation's first preventers, in the White House?

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on this important issue.

I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an opening statement.

REP. PETER KING (R-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for scheduling this hearing because it really is on a topic which I think many of us probably have opinions, but not fully formed opinions. I think it is important that we determine what the best direction for the president to go in and the country to go in.

I also want to welcome our witnesses this morning, especially thank Mr. Wainstein and Ms. Townsend for their service to our country.

And I want to assure Ms. Townsend that I'm looking after the welfare of her mother who is a constituent of mine, and you said she was thinking of moving. Tell her at least stick around till the next election. It could be close. I don't want to lose any -- (inaudible) -- votes.

REP. THOMPSON: It doesn't matter where in New York she is for the next election, right?

REP. KING: That's right. (Laughter.)

Mr. Chairman, as I said, I do not have a fully formed opinion on this. My inclination right now -- my belief is though that we should not be separating out the Homeland Security Council from the National Security Council. And having said that, I don't think there's any guaranteed system which ensures success or one which would bring about failure.

I believe even if there were a merger and the president had a strong working relationship with the homeland security adviser and that adviser could go to the president in times of emergency -- if they had direct access -- it would work. And a lot does depend on the personalities involved. A lot does depend on the extent of the relationship. It would depend on other people at the council, including the head of the NSC.

My concern, though, is putting in place a system which would work even if all of the actors, all the characters, are not doing their job perfectly. Have a system in place where if things do go wrong the system itself would better provide for success.

And I just have a number of concerns about what would happen if there were a merger and there were not this excellent relationship between the president and the homeland security adviser. For instance, my concern is -- and this is true of the Congress and of the country -- that each day we go beyond September 11th the issue of homeland security recesses into people's minds.

They forget the significance of it -- or, not forget, but they put it away and it doesn't have that cutting-edge importance that I believe it should have at all time. That's just human nature. And we are going to be having ongoing conflicts, whether it's Iraq, Afghanistan, or wherever. That's just a reality of the world we live in where we're going to have ongoing foreign crises and a human nature for more attention to be focused on them.

Also, within the administration itself, I think -- any administration -- people tend to go where the power is, or the influence is, or what the hot button topic of the day is. And I just see that could more and more be foreign policy as opposed to homeland security. And I know they're overlapping. I know there's interrelationship between the two -- obviously.

But on the other hand, there are also real distinctions between the two. And so, again, I would have the concern that those distinctions wouldn't be -- could run the risk of not being fully appreciated and realized as we go forward.

Also, I say this -- and I know that Ms. Harman probably disagrees with me on this, but I think the administration does make a mistake by not using the term terrorism. And I think so long as that is not used, it also can create a -- among people, say, looking for positions or looking for jobs or looking for positions of influence in the administration, that homeland security would not have that sense of importance that it obviously had after September 11th and the years after that.

So I -- because of that, my inclination right now is to think that the two should be kept separate. Having said that, I have no doubt that President Obama and John Brennan, or whatever, will have an excellent relationship, will get the job done, and will do what has to be done. But I'm thinking more of the institutional protections we need and I don't think that will be fully addressed -- and my concern is will not be fully addressed if this separation occurred.

And with that, I look forward to the hearing and I yield back the balance of my time.

REP. THOMPSON: Other members of the committee are reminded that under the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record.

Again, I welcome our witnesses to today's hearing.

Mr. Wainstein was appointed -- our first witness -- was appointed to President George -- by President George W. Bush as assistant for homeland security and counterterrorism. He's previously served in leadership positions at the FBI and the first assistant attorney general for national security at the U.S. Department of Justice.

Ms. Townsend served as assistant to President George Bush for homeland security and counterterrorism from 2004 to 2008. As of sometime this week, she is now with Baker Botts LLP as a partner.

Congratulations. Nothing like a real job, right? (Laughs.) Congratulations, as I said.

And prior to her service at the White House, she served in the U.S. attorney's office in Manhattan and as the assistant commandant for intelligence of the U.S. Coast Guard.

Mr. Palin -- welcome -- is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Strategic Preparedness and has authored major papers in the area of emergency preparedness.

Mr. Frazier is executive director of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, which represents the police chief of the 56 largest police agencies in the United States and Canada.

Welcome, also, Mr. Frazier.

Mr. Hoffman is currently a professor at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is a thought leader and a recognized scholar in counterterrorism and national security affairs.

Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be inserted in the record. And I recognize each witness to summarize he (sic) or her statements for five minutes, beginning with Mr. Wainstein.

MR. WAINSTEIN: Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I want to thank the committee for holding this hearing and for its invaluable work over the years to build the homeland security infrastructure that protects our nation and our people.

I applaud President Obama's decision to undertake a review of the structure of the Homeland Security Council at this time. I also completely agree with his statement that, quote, "Homeland security is indistinguishable from national security."

If there is one lesson that we learned from the attacks of September 11th, it was that the distinctions between international security and domestic security have lost much of their meaning.

While it is true that homeland security is part and parcel of national security, it does not necessarily follow that there has to be a single, unified coordinating mechanism for both. Conversely, the fact that homeland security is a priority doesn't necessarily mean that the White House has to devote an interagency council to that mission.

Whenever we undertake to organize or to reorganize government operations, there's a natural tension between the interest in having all relevant operations in a unitary structure and the countervailing interest in separating those operations to ensure that each has its own identity and the resources, support and high-level attention that often come with that separate identity.

I have seen this same issue play out in different contexts at other points in my career. When I served at the FBI, for example, the 9/11 commission and others engaged in a lengthy debate over whether the bureau's intelligence function should remain consolidated with its law enforcement function or be separated out and assigned to a new agency.

Similarly, several years back there was a debate between -- debate whether Department of Justice intelligence attorneys and national security prosecutors should remain in separate divisions or be consolidated into a single new division, an issue that Congress resolved by creating the National Security Division that I had the honor to lead.

Each of these debates highlighted the trade-offs at play when deciding whether to separate or consolidate government functions. The organizational issue before the committee today highlights the same trade-offs.

In deciding whether to keep or to change the current structure, it's useful to review the accomplishments that the current structure has achieved. These include, first and foremost, the fact that the very existence of the HSC sent a clear message that homeland security was and remains a high priority.

Second, the Homeland Security Council coordinated and oversaw the growth in myriad homeland security functions that were underdeveloped, nascent or simply nonexistent prior to 9/11.

Third, the stand-up of the HSC allowed the White House to assemble a staff with expertise in homeland security fields like port security, pandemic planning and disaster response, some of which understandably did not figure prominently in White House staffing prior to that time.

Also the HSC played an important role in fostering the growth and maturation of the newly established Department of Homeland Security by helping DHS work through difficult interdisciplinary issues with other agencies and departments and keeping its issues and concerns on the president's agenda.

And lastly, the existence of the HSC relieved the national security adviser of the responsibility of overseeing the homeland security buildup.

I cite these benefits not to suggest that they will accrue only if we retain the current structure but, rather, to ensure that these benefits are considered and taken into account when deciding how to reconfigure that structure.

My experience as homeland security adviser left me firmly convinced that the White House must exercise a strong coordinated role among the varied players that share in that mission. I therefore believe that any new policy coordinating structure should meet the following prerequisites.

First, the person serving the function of the homeland security adviser, no matter what his or her title, should be vested with the requisite authority and stature to coordinate and broker agreements among Cabinet officers and departments.

Second, the homeland security adviser should have sufficient access to the president.

Third, the interagency process devoted to homeland security issues, no matter whether conducted under the HSC or under a combined entity, should have the same status and authority as that devoted to national security issues. Also, those who work within the homeland -- within the new structure will need to work cooperatively and collegially in those areas of shared and overlapping responsibilities that necessarily arise between the homeland and national security portfolios.

And finally, the White House should make sure to devote the resources necessary to build and maintain a homeland security staff with the requisite expertise and size to handle the vast portfolio of the homeland security mission.

Any organizational model that follows these operating principles has the potential both to maintain the priority of homeland security and to build upon and improve the performance of the HSC under the current structure.

I thank the committee for soliciting my views on this important subject, and I applaud you for holding this hearing. Your concern about this subject is a strong reminder that homeland security is and must remain a front-burner issue and helps to ensure that the homeland security coordinating structure of the future will be strong, effective and recognized by all as a critically important piece of our national security apparatus.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member King, and I look forward to answering your questions.

REP. THOMPSON: Thank you very much for your testimony.

I now recognize Ms. Townsend to summarize her statement for five minutes.

MS. TOWNSEND: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to thank you for the opportunity. It's a particular privilege for me to appear before this committee, Mr. Chairman, because Congressman King is my hometown congressman and I have had the privilege of working with not only you, sir, but a --

REP. THOMPSON: I won't hold that against you, by the way.

MS. TOWNSEND: -- (laughs) -- a number of members on the committee, including Congresswoman Harman, Congressman Carney. So it's a real privilege for me to be here today.

There is no more solemn responsibility that the president bears than to protect the American people, and during my four and a half years at the White House I came to believe that, for this reason, organization -- should it be dictated by effectiveness.

How best to maximize effectiveness will inevitably change over time as we as a country continue to weaken al Qaeda and other enemies and as the Department of Homeland Security gains strength. You will not be surprised, based on your experience with me, therefore, that my view of this issue is a pragmatic one. This is not one that I think lends itself to sort of an easy assessment of an organizational chart.

And I'd like to just suggest to you a framework in which you might consider this issue. I think it really comes down to three fundamental criteria of any organization.

First, there has to be a single person who is both responsible and accountable to the president, who monitors threat information and who has the authority to marshal all instruments of national power -- military, intelligence, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic and public diplomacy -- to defeat the threat.

The individual cannot wait until threats arrive on our shores but must have the responsibility and means to identify those threats where they originate and to ensure a coordinated response to them. The president's homeland security adviser must not be constrained by geographic boundaries that our enemies do not respect.

Second, the homeland security adviser must have direct and immediate access to the president. Ultimately, if terrorists successfully were to strike the United States, it is the president, and not his staff, who will be held -- rightly held accountable by the American people for the failure. The homeland security adviser must be able to get to the president quickly without the clearance from his or her colleagues on the White House staff.

Unfortunately, there will be times when American lives are at stake and the president will need to be advised and operational decisions taken and communicated to the relevant Cabinet secretary in real time. These sorts of crises do not lend themselves to normal bureaucratic process.

Third, the homeland security issues faced by our government are diverse and many. They range from preparedness and response to natural disasters to pandemic planning and biological and nuclear threats. These issues are often distinct from the more traditional foreign policy issues faced by the National Security Council and require experienced staff with significant expertise. The staff must understand state and local emergency management policy issues and concerns. And in that regard, during my time I had the privilege to work with Mr. Frazier and a number of other state and local officials.

The White House must be organized not simply to facilitate the homeland security policy process but also to anticipate and respond to state and local political leaders in times of crisis. The homeland security adviser requires adequate staffing to deal with both counterterrorism and homeland security issues.

Mr. Chairman, I do believe we remain a nation at war with a very determined enemy. We have troops deployed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but the national security adviser has many important responsibilities in addition to those two theaters. For example, he must contend with the Middle East peace process, counter proliferation around the world in places like Iran and North Korea. I worry that increasing the span of control of the national security adviser could dilute the homeland security mission and make it just one more item on an already overburdened list.

That said, I wish to be clear. We should judge any reorganization by the substance and criteria that I have suggested above. We must be careful not to assume that a merger means the president cares less about homeland security. And we must resist, as I have said, this easy organizational chart test and look to the substance of how responsibilities are allocated and how we are being protected.

Again, I would suggest that the committee look at three fundamental questions. One, is there one person responsible and accountable to the president who looks around the world at threats and advises the president? Second, does this one person have direct and immediate access to the president? And third, does this person have adequate staff to fulfill his or her responsibilities, both at a national level to state and local leaders.

These are the questions that we should be asking and the criteria against which we should judge this effort.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member King, I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I look forward to answering your questions.

REP. THOMPSON: Thank you very much for your testimony.

I now recognize Mr. Palin to summarize his statement for five minutes.

MR. PALIN: Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, members of the committee, as I have reviewed the plethora of reports and recommendations on how we might reorganize Homeland Security Council. And as I've listened carefully to the rumors emerging from the PSD-1 interview process, I have become concerned that well-intended parties are trying to remove politics from homeland security. This would be a serious mistake. I hope we can minimized partisanship in homeland security. But in my judgment, we need more, not less, politics in homeland security. And the Homeland Security Council is uniquely positioned to play a crucial role in domestic political organization for homeland security.

The Homeland Security Council is a political creature. It is the legitimate child of the executive and the legislature. Both mother and father wanted it.

The executive has been inclined, I think, to treat the HSC as its sole creation. But Congress was wise enough to enshrine HSC in Title 9 of the Homeland Security Act. There is joint custody. This joint custody gives the HSC its legitimacy and provides the foundation for its potential coming of age as a profoundly important political player.

I suggest three especially important roles for Homeland Security Council: first, supporting the president's role in prevention, mitigation, response and recovery to catastrophic threats of every sort -- intentional, accidental and natural; second, supporting the president's role in working with the governors and the homeland security leadership of the states in framing and executing a shared strategy of prevention, mitigation, response and recovery; and third, fulfilling the risk assessment role of the Homeland Security Council as set out in Title 9.

The Congress, perhaps someone on this committee, bestowed on your child a crucial responsibility. Section 904 of the title states that the first function of the HSC is to assess the objectives, commitments and risks to the United States in the interest of homeland security. This is precisely right.

Assessing our comparative risk is the essential foundation of homeland security. Assessing risk is a profoundly political process.

Risk assessment can and must draw on technical resources, but choosing which risk is most risky is a political choice, by which I mean, it is a choice that can only be made by people of different perspectives who come together to reason with one another. It is especially important that the federal government reason together with the states on preparedness, prevention, mitigation, response, recovery and other activities that will seem exotic to specialists in the national security sphere.

Practically, the states have the local resources to prevent, mitigate, respond and recover. Constitutionally, the states are where the Founders meant for such power and authority principally to reside.

This nuanced engagement in domestic politics strikes me as ill- matched to the strengths of the National Security Council. The NSC behaves as it ought, to support the president's role as commander in chief. The role of the president and his administration in working with the states is an entirely different matter.

The federal and state governments need to reason together. The Department of Homeland Security cannot do this alone. As a former governor, Secretary Napolitano can do it better than most. Judith (sic/Juliette) Kayyem, the new assistant secretary for intergovernmental programs, will contribute a great deal. But the department -- to do its work effectively -- must have an ongoing and meaningful dialogue going on between the White House and the governors' mansions on shared homeland security policy and strategy.

As you know so well, politics is about building coalitions and motivating support for tough choices. When the choices are too tough for enthusiasm, politics cultivates self-interested compliance through a process of shared choosing. In homeland security we must make tough choices. The president's homeland security adviser and his or her HSC staff should be -- and are needed to be -- the president's trusted agents in crafting the political compact with the states to make those tough choices.

I look forward to answering your questions.

REP. THOMPSON: Thank you very much for your testimony.

I now recognize Mr. Frazier to summarize his statement for five minutes.

MR. FRAZIER: Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the potential merger of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council.

My name is Tom Frazier. I'm the executive director of the major city police chiefs association. MCC is the association of chiefs of the 56 largest municipal police departments in the United States. We are the chief executive officers of departments located in metropolitan areas of more than a half a million and employ more than 1,000 law enforcement officers. Collectively, these departments are first responders to over 50 million residents in our country.

On February 23rd of this year President Obama issued Presidential Directive 1 on organizing homeland security and counterterrorism. The assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism was instructed to lead an interagency review of ways to reform the organization. The directive requires this review to be completed within 60 days.

Before discussing our specific views on the potential merger of the NSC and the HSC, I'd like to set the stage a bit by articulating our perspective of these two organizations and how we, as local first responders, fit into the respective missions.

First, the NSC: Established by the National Defense Act in 1947, the NSC was originally defined as an organization dealing in military and diplomatic issues beyond the U.S. borders. The NSC was, and is, staffed by personnel from DOD, the State Department and subject-matter experts with an intelligence community background.

NSPD-1, signed by President George Bush on February 13, 2001, reiterated this NSC focus by stating national security includes the defense of the United States of America, protection of our constitutional system of government, and the advancement of U.S. interests around the globe. National security also depends on America's opportunity to prosper in the world economy.

This external focus fulfills a vital national need but has no components with backgrounds or experience in dealing with the vastly different needs and constitutional responsibilities of state governments and their tribal and local partners. Public safety leadership has only recently had their domestic viewpoint represented in this forum.

Now the HSC: Established by HSPD-1, its mission was defined as ensuring coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies and promoting the effective development and implementation of all homeland security policies.

We see the missions of these two bodies as being fundamentally different. These differences become clear when you look at the backgrounds of the principal decision makers. National security decision makers are primarily federal and accustomed to working at a high level of federal engagement. Homeland security decision makers include federal but equally and perhaps more importantly are state, tribal, local and private sector partners.

While the NSC deals with issues that rarely involve state, tribal, local and private sector entities, the HSC must deal with the interests and the constitutional responsibilities of state governments of these partners on nearly every issue.

Now let's consider jurisdictions, a fundamental concept of law enforcement. The NSC deals with military and diplomatic issues beyond the jurisdictions of state, tribal and local governments.

The HSC, however, deals in an entirely different environment where states have constitutionally defined responsibilities over domestic incidents that the federal government may not share.

Response to disasters belongs with the jurisdiction in which it occurs. The homeland security continuum of prevent, protect, respond, recover is one in which the federal role is to help plan, coordinate and support effective programs which build a collective national capacity for implementation of the activities mentioned earlier.

Our recent experience with the new federal entities, specifically the National Counterterrorism Center and its state and local analytic cell, or ITACG, is also instructive. A presidential adviser whose sole responsibility was homeland security was critically important to our nation's internal ability to identify domestic security threats. As our newly combined efforts come to maturity, policy and funding issues that would be lost in an international effort will still receive the focus and importance that is required.

When viewed from these perspectives, it is clear to us that state and local -- at the state and local level of government that our role in the NSC is minimal. Our partners in the emergency management and fire professions agree. It is equally clear that our collective roles in the HSC are fundamental.

We do not advocate preservation of the status quo. There are clearly areas where the HSC can be significantly improved, which may be a good topic for a follow-on hearing. But we see a merger of the HSC and the NSC as a bad idea -- one sure to muddle both missions while a newly created DHS absorbs change and settles down.

There are many opportunities to streamline, to improve communication, and to meet jointly. Let's pursue these first, while also working to improve the budget, staffing, and subject-matter expertise within the HSC itself.

On behalf of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, I want to thank you for allowing MCC to submit its comments on the important work that you do. We look forward to have continued interaction with the committee on strategies to address this and future issues. And I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

REP. THOMPSON: Thank you very much for your testimony.

I now recognize Professor Hoffman to summarize his statement for five minutes.

MR. HOFFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member King, for the opportunity to testify before the committee on this important issue.

"Mom, I'm in Somalia. Don't worry about me. I'm okay," was how 17-year-old Burhan Hassan's worried mother discovered where her son had gone weeks after he and five other Somali-American youths disappeared from their homes in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.

According to Abdisalem Adam, a teacher and community leader, up to now, no one knows who recruited them, but they obviously did not wake up one morning and decide to go to Somalia. Suspicions have focused on a largely unknown radical Somali organization called Al- Shabaab. Interestingly, the most credible terrorist threat that had surrounded Barack Obama's inauguration as the 44th president of the United States had come not from al Qaeda or its leader, Osama bin Laden, or his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, but from these youths and Al- Shabaab.

Although the threat never materialized, it nonetheless shed important light on the albeit obscure terrorist group that in fact presents U.S. authorities with the most serious evidence to date of a homegrown terrorist recruitment problem right here in the American heartland. More worrisome still is the fact that the first time authorities reportedly learned of this potential threat was when the families of the three boys came forward with information about their departure.

Recently, new evidence has come to light which suggests that the six Somali-Americans were only part of a larger contingent of U.S. citizens lured to Somalia. As many as 30 persons are believed to have left the United States to train in terrorism and guerrilla warfare in that violence-plagued East African country.

Indications that recruitment of U.S. nationals to train in Somalia was not a problem restricted to the Minneapolis-St. Paul area have also surfaced. These developments raise anew serious concerns about America's homeland security and the threat of new terrorist attacks.

Protecting and securing the United States from terrorism, it has long been argued, ultimately depends on state, local and tribal law enforcement officers who are both the first and last lines of homeland defense. Their familiarity with the communities which they patrol enables these officers to observe and detect criminal activity that may indicate a terrorist plot and thus stall its commission.

Hence, effectively countering terrorism is more than a technical issue involving top-down federal guidance, direction and intelligence dissemination. Rather, it requires that state, local and tribal agencies have the requisite training, education, knowledge and up-to- date intelligence to identify and respond effectively and appropriately to these threats.

Given that my expertise is on terrorists and their behavior, and not on the U.S. government and its bureaucratic national security structure, I cannot provide a definitive answer in respect to the current proposal to fold the HSC into the NSC. What does though seem clear is that this proposed consolidation will only work provided that state, local and tribal law enforcement have a strong, forceful and credible representative and advocate on the NSC governing all matters pertaining to homeland security. That is, not only terrorism but disaster preparedness and response, infrastructure protection, border security, immigration, incident management, and health and medical planning and response.

The United States has, of course, come a long way since the establishment of the HSC and the DHS in terms of both the capacity and capability to defend our nation against terrorist attack. But as the Somali case and the surprising international reach of a hitherto obscure and local terrorist movement demonstrates, we are faced with a continuing terrorist threat from al Qaeda and associated movements that is at once as operationally durable as it is evolutionary and elusive in character.

Accordingly, in so dynamic a threat environment, our responses and preparations need to be equally as evolutionary, flexible and robust.

President Obama's first presidential study directive embraces this notion in its call for a comprehensive interagency review of our national and homeland security architecture. Although the logic behind this statement is indisputable, it must a priori acknowledge that homeland security encompasses concepts and missions that do not necessarily fit comfortably with traditionally defined national security priorities and concerns.

Further, the president and Congress will need to be convinced that state, local and tribal homeland security authorities will have a forceful champion in any reorganization of the HSC who could effectively serve as their advocate, explaining their needs and expectations and ensuring federal responsiveness. These needs will invariably be different from traditional national security concerns, because states and localities, not federal agencies, will often be in the lead in many homeland security missions.

In sum, the cop on the street may likely be the key player in disrupting and preventing a terrorist incident. Police officers not only need to know what to look for, but what they are looking for may be a small piece of a larger puzzle that may reveal broader links with terrorists either in this country or abroad. Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

REP. THOMPSON: Thank you very much. We will have a series of votes.

I will try to get through my questions and yours, Peter, if that's good. And it will take about 60 minutes to do that and then we'll come back.

We appreciate the divergence of testimony of the witnesses this morning and -- (laughs) -- we got exactly what we were looking for. And I guess to the five of you, if you could, for me, if the president ultimately decided to dissolve the Homeland Security Council, and if legislations require it going forward, what can you tell us as to how we can best ensure state and local and tribal partners will be integrated into the policymaking apparatus?

I'll start with you, Mr. Wainstein.

MR. WAINSTEIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that there have been a number of studies done and proposals -- I think Mr. Palin referenced them -- and one component of many of these proposals has been to have either a series of liaisons within the new entity that are liaisons to state, local and tribal, or an advisory committee or both. And there have been some look-backs to the HSAC advisory committee that was instituted seven years ago and how that fared and what it was -- the extent to which it was effective or not sufficiently effective in keeping state, local and tribals linked up.

And my sense is, in talking to the folks who are doing the study for President Obama, is that they are looking at a number of different mechanisms like that and are very focused on the concern of keeping a tight connection with state and local and tribal. So their proposal might well have some feature like that, which I guess could then become a piece of any resulting legislation that comes out of Congress.

MS. TOWNSEND: Mr. Chairman, my concern about liaisons and advisory committees is that they tend not to be -- have daily input, sort of be part of the DNA of the new organization sufficient and bring sufficient muscle to it. One of the things that I had tried to do -- it was very difficult at the time, but I think needs to be looked at -- is actually integrating state and local officials into the council, whatever the structure is, is actually having them serve. So there's a daily voice and a daily reminder.

One of the most beneficial things in my background was the fact that I had been a local prosecutor before I entered the federal government, and my understanding was based on my own experience. And so bringing people like that -- I worked with Ray -- Commissioner Kelly of the NYPD to have an officer assigned so that I had somebody constantly looking at every issue and bringing that perspective to it, and I think that's important.

And it's not sufficient for -- just to be in the department. The department does have an intergovernmental liaison. You need somebody at the political level at the White House who's engaging with political leaders at the state and local level, including chiefs of police and elected officials.

REP. THOMPSON: Mr. Palin.

MR. PALIN: I heard the question to relate to statutory adjustments that might be made, and I don't think this committee will like my answer, because I think if in fact the HSC is done away with and the Congress agrees that that is in the White House self-interest, I think the best way to take care of the assurances that -- and the important assurances that you've asked about, Mr. Chairman -- is for the National Security Act to be amended.

REP. THOMPSON: Well, we didn't ask for agreement by witnesses, so you won't hurt our feelings. (Laughter.) Thank you very much.

Mr. Frazier?

MR. FRAZIER: Mr. Chairman, as the ITACG brings a state and local perspective to National Counterterrorism Center and a valuable perspective, the traditional intelligence collection world does not see things through the same lens that an experienced state and local investigator or executive does.

And I use that example to say that inside the NSC it would be necessary to have a -- and I agree with Ms. Townsend -- a full-time component that can represent that point of view. Our perpetual difficulty with the Department of Homeland Security is that there are so few law and fire practitioners in the decision-making machinery that things occur that when you have to put them into practice on the ground they just don't make sense.

And the only way to, in my view, prevent those kinds of mistakes from occurring is to have someone at a level to provide input before decisions are made.

REP. THOMPSON: Thank you.

Professor Hoffman.

MR. HOFFMAN: Well, it's the benefits of going last; I agree completely with Ms. Townsend and Mr. Frazier. I think the stakeholders in homeland security issues are very different than for those in stereotypical national security issues and there has to be that strong representation present in the White House as well as at the DHS.

REP. THOMPSON: Thank you. The gentleman from New York for five minutes.

REP. KING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to ask Mr. Wainstein and Ms. Townsend, based on their real-life experience in the White House -- and I'll exclude this administration for now -- but every administration up until now has strong personalities, often with competing interests, with the best of the intentions, but turf battles become a reality.

And based on your experience, if the homeland security adviser does not have that independent status, what are the chances with a dominant personality, like, say, the head of the NSC who does not share your concerns on homeland security, and it could be very well intentioned -- could that freeze you out or minimize the importance of the homeland security adviser?

MS. TOWNSEND: Congressman King, you're absolutely right. I mean, I enjoyed an extraordinary relationship both with Secretary Rice when she was the national security adviser, and you'll remember Steve Hadley was a deputy, an equal of mine, before he was promoted and then he and I were both equals as assistants to the president. And so I didn't have that problem.

I will tell you my concern about the merger is if -- that's why I said one of my fundamental criteria is direct access to the president -- if what the reorganization and a merger means is that the homeland security has to report through the national security adviser, yeah, you do have the opportunity for that person, if there's a conflict or if there's a personality problem between the two, to be frozen out of the process to influence directly the president. I have a lot of confidence in both Jim Jones and John Brennan, so I don't imagine that even in this administration -- but you do worry.

The second point to that, I would say, is rank actually, as you are well aware, in this town really matters. And so if you want the individual who's got responsibility for the homeland security matters to be able to resolve either a conflict between Cabinet members or a conflict between federal policy and state and locals -- and by the way, the ITACG is the perfect example.

Here is a case where Congresswoman Harman called me, was very exercised about having, ensuring that we had local representation at the NCTC. And we were able to resolve that, but that was a conflict between -- at the federal level over policy that required the homeland security adviser to actually sit down with the Cabinet secretary and break through it to make sure we got that done.

And so you need somebody with the rank and the access to be able to actually break through all that and get the Cabinet secretary or Cabinet secretaries to answer the phone call and resolve it.

REP. KING: Mr. Wainstein?

MR. WAINSTEIN: Yes, Congressman King, I appreciate the question. Like Fran, I had the pleasure of working with Steve Hadley, who was wonderful. If anything, he bent over backwards to include me and include HSC and to make sure that our issues got the highest level of attention. And my sense is that the folks in those positions now share that approach.

But it is a real concern, and there are a number of different ways of addressing it or making sure that the subordination of homeland security issues doesn't come to pass in the future. And Fran, I think, has touched on many of them, but I can't underemphasize how important it is that the homeland security adviser and his or her people are fully represented in National Security Council meetings. If this ends up being in the National Security Council, the homeland security adviser needs to be there in those meetings and, very importantly, needs to have a set schedule of meetings with the president in the Oval Office. The national security adviser, just because of the pace and the nature of the job, is going to spend a lot of time with the president.

The homeland security adviser won't necessarily spend as much time but needs to have those designated times he or she is in the Oval Office; that make sure there is an opportunity to get those issues on the president's plate and make sure that the profile of those issues stays high. So that's why, as I said in my introductory remarks, it's important to put a structure in place that ensures high-level attention.

REP. KING: And I want to make it clear, my experience with the Bush administration -- I'm sure it's going to be the Obama administration, too -- I don't necessarily foresee a homeland security problem, but human nature being what it is, I do know from dealing with the Clinton administration and the Bush administration that there certainly were some of those conflicts in foreign policy as to who was in and who was out and who was excluded.

And human nature being what it is, there's no reason why that couldn't also apply to homeland security, and that's the concern I have. My time is running out. I just would add also that by its nature, foreign policy is in the news. I mean, people know what's going on in Afghanistan, know what's going on in Iraq. Homeland security, as you well know, could be off the front pages for weeks, months, years at a time, as we saw between 1993 and 2001, but then it happens.

And again, to keep people focused on it -- and even best- intentioned people -- that's why I'm leaning toward keeping that separate position so that people's attention won't be lost.

And with that, I yield back, and I thank you.

REP. THOMPSON: Thank you very much.

As I indicated, we have a series of votes under way right now that should take about an hour. So the committee will stand in recess for about one hour, or as soon as the last vote is taken. (Sounds gavel.)

(Recess.)

REP. THOMPSON: (Sounds gavel.) We'd like to -- (audio break) -- recessed hearing, and I apologize to our witnesses, but when we set hearings, as you know, they don't necessarily correspond with votes on the floor, and so you've now had firsthand experience of the conflict.

Mr. Townsend, I understand you have a previous commitment that you can't break and I do understand that, but I think Ms. Harman, who's our next member to ask questions, wanted to make a comment in addition to ask questions.

The gentlelady from California for five minutes.

REP. JANE HARMAN (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to our panel for your patience. Welcome to our world. And my special welcome to two of the panelists who have been co-conspirators for many years, one of whom is Fran Townsend. I thought your service in the White House was exemplary and you were always available to counsel on a bipartisan basis or a nonpartisan basis about what we ought to do to protect the homeland, and I miss you. I want you to know that. And you are a reason why I think there needs to be someone exactly like you in the White House, whether that person works for the National Security Council or not, someone with that level of expertise and that level of availability. Otherwise, I worry about -- (laughs) -- I worry about the future.

And to you, Bruce Hoffman, you have again been a really invaluable counselor and continue to be on how to get some of our legislation right, how to navigate the shoals out there which are sometimes difficult. Some of you tuned into yesterday's hearing and you got the frontal view of that. But all of us up here think that the terrorists aren't going to check our party registration before they blow us up.

And to Peter King, who is not here right now, I do actively use the word terrorism. I served on the National Council on Terrorism in 1999 and 2000, then chaired by L. Paul Bremer. One of the other members was Juliette Kayyem, whom I think will be -- is an excellent pick for the state and local position at the Homeland Security Department. I'm very glad she's going there.

And I do worry, just as Bruce does, about what's happening to kids in Minneapolis or pick another place and when are we going to learn about that on the front end, before it's too late?

So I freely use the word. I, on the other hand, however, think we have overplayed the fear card and what we should do is prepare, not scare, the public in America about the real terror threats we face. So that's the end of that little speech.

Let me put some of my thoughts out about this and invite comments from anybody.

Number one, I agree with the testimony that the organization should be dictated by effectiveness. I'm not sure how the boxes should line up. I am sure that we need a Fran Townsend equivalent in the White House and, boy, has she proved that power comes in small sizes.

So I have great regard and affection for the national security adviser, Jim Jones. I know he's working hard at realigning his authorities because it is true that in the past the National Security Council has operated mostly by using detailees and it's had a tiny budget. And it may not be the most effective -- it is not the most effective organization.

But we can't let it eat the homeland security function in a way that puts homeland as number 46 on a list of 45 priorities. That would be dreadful. That would compromise our security. More Americans are at risk from terror attacks here than anywhere else in the world and so we have to keep the focus and expertise here.

Let me just probe with you, having said all that -- and one more thing. I am disappointed at least by reports of two actions that Janet Napolitano may be taking. One is she has not followed a friendly suggestion from here to name someone with a law enforcement background as the new head of intelligence and analysis. We think -- or I think -- that that would send the right message about reorganizing that function. Number two, there is a homeland advisory committee that has existed and functioned well for some years headed by Bill Webster, whom I think has impeccable credentials, which I gather is either going to be replaced or retired. I think that's a mistake, too. I think very able people in both parties serve on that council.

So in my 47 seconds I would just invite reactions to what I have said and any suggestions about the specific qualifications of the person in the White House regardless of what organization box that person's in, the person who is charged with focusing on homeland security matters for the president.

MS. TOWNSEND: Congresswoman Harman, thank you very much for your very generous remarks. It was a great privilege to me to be able to work on a nonpartisan basis, and I had the -- frankly, I had the freedom to do that because of the authority vested in me by the president. And so it really was -- I think we got a lot of good things done that way.

I will say that I think it's hard to come up with what the perfect list is of qualifications because whoever it is will come with their own experience and then they'll build their staff around them in some ways based on what their experience is not, because you want good smart people around you that cover you where you're weak.

And so of course you want someone -- look, as I mentioned earlier, I thought it was a great asset to me to have worked at a local level.

There aren't a lot of people, as has been pointed out by my other panel members, in senior levels of the federal government who've had local experience. But, boy, it served me very well in terms of understanding the issues, particularly implementation at the field level.

I will also tell you I was fortunate to have had a legal background. I'd encourage Ken to make an observation about that. My law enforcement and legal background and time in the Justice Department was tremendously useful.

All of the interagency experience that you bring to it is very important because you're trying to resolve what essentially amount to either policy disputes or turf battles, and so I think all of those things in some measure or another -- and your intelligence background -- are all incredibly important.

I share your view about the Homeland Security Advisory Committee. I think we've got to be careful about how much we expect of it because it's not, as you know, a daily body, daily involved. But I think that the secretary in particular needs that sort of advice and outside counsel and on a nonpartisan basis. As you pointed out, there are people from both parties who serve incredibly well, put in a lot of time there, and I think it would be a mistake to do without it.

I will -- let me -- one observation on organization that hasn't really been discussed but I think, based on conversations I've had with John Brennan and the team doing the review, is just worth noting. One of the ways, if you were going to merge the two councils, you might consider, is to have a deputy who traditionally looks regionally and by country -- that is the principal deputy job Steve Hadley occupied it before he was the national security adviser -- and to have a second deputy who looks at issues functionally -- counterterrorism, homeland security  and has more of the functional issues -- counterproliferation -- that I had when I was at the White House.

It's a way, if you were going to merge them, you could have two deputies of equal rank  that is, assistant to the president  so that they would have the gravitas to be able to call necessary meetings, Cabinet members, and have direct access to the president. So there's a model by which you could do this I think and have the access and have the rank if you chose to do it that way, and I think that's one of the things they're considering.

And that's why I came back to what I said about look, let's not worry about boxes; let's worry about effectiveness. And I do think in fairness to the team that's doing the review that that's their mind- set. They want to come up with the right answer and the question is just how to get there.

REP. THOMPSON: Thank you very much. The gentlelady's time has expired.

The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee, for five minutes.

REP. SHEILA JACKSON-LEE (D-TX): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think this is an important discussion and, as well, hopefully at the end of the 60 days of the study that the president has authorized that we will have the right answer. And I think that is certainly a challenge.

Ms. Townsend, I am interested in your theory about making sure that any merger still keeps direct access to the president, and I'm hoping in the 60 days we will glean from that that that will occur. I'm not yet committed to a merger. I think that collaboration is truly key, but there is a directive from the White House and likely we may have that.

Help me. What would be, if a merger to take place -- and you've said it in your testimony -- but just if you can succinctly say two factors that need to be in place for a successful merger, would one be access to the president, direct access?

MS. TOWNSEND: Yes, ma'am. And the reason for that is, as was my experience, you'll have a threat and it will be breaking very quickly. And the president will need to prioritize actions and it really, ma'am, does not lend itself to having first to find the national security adviser then to find the chief of staff, then to get to the president.

And so in -- gratefully, these things don't come up all that often. But when they come up, it needs to be an absolutely crystal clear -- because there's a process by which you get to the president if he's in the residence or you make a phone call. There are people whose job it is to check whether or not you have direct access and there's a list. And unless you have direct access you've got to get a by your leave permission from somebody else to get through.

I didn't have to use it often, but it was incredibly important when I had to use it.

REP. JACKSON-LEE: I'm going to weave in and out of terrorism and disaster, so obviously I looked at your tenure, and you were quite well known 2004 to 2007. Help me understand the disconnect in the notification regarding Hurricane Katrina. You were there, direct access to the president. What went wrong?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, in fact, for one thing there was a whole myriad of factors that contributed to that. But at the time of the incident, while the Homeland Security Council was supporting and getting information from the Department of Homeland Security, it was in fact the Domestic Policy Council that had been tagged with responsibility for briefing in the White House. And in fact at the time the domestic policy adviser, Claude Allen, was the person who went into the briefing room and briefed the press initially, we were supporting him.

So I can't tell you exactly how that worked.

REP. JACKSON-LEE: So your name was homeland security but it did not -- it didn't connect to the Domestic Council because that was left to them. It didn't connect that you were homeland security, which is securing in the wake of terrorism but also FEMA is under homeland security. But you were distinguished from what the responsibilities of the Domestic Council, which would have addressed the question of a tragedy or a natural disaster in the United States. Is that what you're saying?

MS. TOWNSEND: Well, we had -- we did interact with DHS; we did interact with FEMA. But there were lots of equities going on in the midst of that crisis. One person had to be designated. At the time the chief of staff had designated the Domestic Policy Council, so there was a single place to feed things in. It was in the early going of that, the Domestic Policy Council.

REP. JACKSON-LEE: Okay. So then I see a fracture right there, which is seemingly that was a conspicuously wrong place to put it because I think security equates to urgency.

MS. TOWNSEND: Yes, ma'am.

REP. JACKSON-LEE: And not a study, not a review, not a quiet report -- and I'm not suggesting that maybe that was the style of Mr. Allen, but the point is that was obviously a fractured response and we needed urgent response. So I'm not sure the president's review's going to include that as well.

Let me just ask quickly -- all of you all will comment -- say something is occurring in Pakistan which -- it has occurred. Tell me how you would see that being reported as it relates to homeland security.

If all the persons can answer, please. I'll yield. That's my last question. Thank you. Go ahead.

MS. TOWNSEND: In my time there if it was a threat emanating that involved the United -- first of all, the first thing that would have happened was Steve Hadley and I would have discussed how are we going to integrate the information and how are we going to brief the president.

We typically briefed him together because we had both foreign policy implications to that. If there was an incident in Pakistan, it would have impacted Afghanistan, it would have DOD implications. Steve would be pulling that together, the national security adviser. I'd be looking at how that threat related outside the region, outside of Pakistan, whether it was the U.K., and that we were talking to intelligence services around the world, we had the appropriate domestic law enforcement response, and DHS.

And so I would be bringing that piece, Steve Hadley would be bringing the military and foreign policy piece, and then we would be responsible for integrating that into a single comprehensive brief for the president.

MR. WAINSTEIN: Just to add to that, Congresswoman, keep in mind that structurally the directorate for combating terrorism over at the White House co-reported to both the national security Adviser and the homeland security Adviser.

So anything having to do with terrorism would co-report and that information would get sent to me and to Hadley or to Fran and to Hadley because obviously there are homeland dimensions as well as international military intelligence dimensions to any terrorist -- (inaudible) -- throughout the world.

MR. PALIN: Congresswoman, the Massoud threat that came about is I think a good example of where clearly there's an international dimension that the National Security Council would be focusing on, but there is also a domestic dimension that the Homeland Security Council should be focused on in a strategic way rather than an operational or tactical manner.

The department should certainly be pulsing the whole system operationally and tactically on the kind of reports that need to go out, but the kind of threat that we have from Massoud or others, the homeland security adviser, Homeland Security Council should be looking at that from a policy strategy point of view and using that as frankly an opportunity to advance the conversation with state and locals about the implications of that kind of event strategically for the state and locals.

MR. FRAZIER: (Off mike.) I'm sorry.

If the information -- take the London train bombings, for example. As early as we knew about those and we were fortunate that a number of the largest of our city chiefs were in one place at one time -- once they became aware -- and this is in the middle of the night and the largest cities with the subway systems had an immediate decision to make about deployment and countermeasures -- those things would happen in real time down through that intelligence channel.

MR. HOFFMAN: Well, it obviously has to be seamless I think because as the Mumbai attacked showed, I think it's just as easy to get on a boat in Karachi and sail to the Port of Angeles or the Port of Baltimore or any other port in the United States as it is to sail to Mumbai.

REP. JACKSON-LEE: Let me just conclude and yield back.

I think what I'm gleaning from the testimony is quick response, direct response, disseminating information should be our key and particularly disseminating intelligence should be our key.

And Ms. Townsend, I clearly think there was a breach on Katrina. I think that was the wrong determination, to put it on a domestic side, because whenever you are in dishevel and upheaval, it is as much vulnerable to Hurricane Katrina as it might be to attacks on our oil processes in the Gulf. It might be the time to come and do so. So I think it's homeland security. And I understand the chiefs were saying that you all happen -- the idea is to have a structure that gets information to you as quickly as possible if it has a relevance to your -- security of your area.

MR. FRAZIER: Yes, ma'am. That's correct.

REP. JACKSON-LEE: Mr. Chair, I yield back.

And I think we do have some work before us in terms of ensuring that this system works and works well.

I yield back.

REP. CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY (D-PA): Thank you.

Ms. Townsend, I know you -- I will dismiss you in a moment, but I do have a quick question and this is for -- actually, you can answer first and then, you know, take your leave. Thank you.

You know, you and I have worked together for quite awhile. What would you do differently now?

MS. TOWNSEND: I think -- I actually think that there needs to be -- I would change the personnel structure to more closely match the NSC, where it's -- if they have -- they're titled separately; it doesn't all have under the same White House rules. It gives them greater flexibility in terms of who they recruit, how they get detailees. And so, if I was going to change it, I'd actually change it to more closely mirror the NSC system.

I'd give it more resources. I think, you know, Ken and I were talking during the break. I don't think I ever got it to one-quarter the size at its largest of the NSC, and that's a problem. The kinds of input and expertise I needed was very different. I needed a lot of technical expertise. I had doctors on my staff to help me think through bio issues and the pandemic planning issues. And so I just decided I had a greater need for real technical expertise on my staff and I didn't have enough. And so it was a combination. I need more and I need real particular expertise.

And you need the flexibility to get that and then do an issue and send people back, and I didn't have the sort of personnel and budget flexibility that I found they really did have more of on the national security side.

REP. CARNEY: Did you share that with the president's review team or did you talk to the president's review team?

MS. TOWNSEND: I did.

REP. CARNEY: Okay, good.

MS. TOWNSEND: I was interviewed and they asked me to share my observations and I was very candid.

REP. CARNEY: Excellent. Thank you.

We appreciate your testimony today. Thanks so much. It's good to see you again.

Gentlemen, please jump in here, first on, you know, what we ought to do differently than the last administration, and do you agree with Ms. Townsend's assessment that we need to make it larger?

And by the way, did all of you talk to the president's review team?

Good. Very good. Great.

Mr. Wainstein?

MR. WAINSTEIN: Okay. Thank you, sir. I'll go ahead and start.

I will essentially repeat what Fran said in terms of personnel and resources. And, you know, that's the mantra you hear from every good bureaucratic -- we need more resources. But I did get a feeling that there were -- I always felt like there were matters of great importance that I really wanted to have someone dig into more deeply, have somewhat more expertise on them so that we could push them forward, and we just didn't have the personnel. And it's not as though we -- I asked for more personnel and got rebuffed. It's just that that's sort of the way it was designed initially.

I think this is a good opportunity to sit back -- step back a minute and think maybe it should be designed differently. Maybe the personnel authorization should be done differently so we could expand it more easily.

But I think it's important to keep in mind where we are in sort of the homeland security mission, which is we're still building in a way that we're not necessarily building on the national security side. And all these efforts, whether it's from pandemic planning to continuity planning to port security, this stuff is not going to be sort of front burner, but it's going to be a constant need and we need people who are not -- you can't just throw in to deal with an issue as it bubbles up but who are constantly minding that issue and then checking back in and saying here's where we are on port security and the like.

So I'm with Fran. And I've passed this on to the folks who are doing the review at the White House that yes, we definitely -- maybe we don't need the same numbers as the National Security Council currently has, but we do need more people with greater expertise in more areas.

REP. CARNEY: Great. Thank you.

Mr. Palin?

MR. PALIN: Certainly more, but I would differ potentially from my two colleagues in this way. It's no longer a startup. A lot of the work that you see prior to now was a major effort to simply get the beast started, and I think you can especially see that in the way the HSPDs were often taken on by the Homeland Security Council. Very important work, very detailed work, work that in, at least my judgment, should have been done probably by the department but couldn't be done by the department, so the Homeland Security Council was doing it.

I think as we move forward, having more people that are focused on the homeland security mission, that have background in the full continuum of risks -- counterterrorism and natural hazards -- but also developing a discipline that the Homeland Security Council staff is focused on strategy, policy, and operational tactical management issues are the domain of the department's.

REP. CARNEY: Thank you.

Mr. Frazier?

MR. FRAZIER: I think two things; one is representation from state and local practitioners. Running a big-city law enforcement agency or fire, medical service is a profession in and of itself. It brings a different perspective than an intelligence community professional or a military professional, and I don't think that the perspective has been present in the decision-making levels of those areas that, frankly, who you're going to have to deal with in a domestic situation. This is not overseas stuff.

And flexibility -- these issues come and go so quickly, budget flexibility to bring subject-matter experts in is important.

REP. CARNEY: To bring them in rather than have them on staff?

MR. FRAZIER: You know, there are so many possibilities that I think you need to have a core but there are always going to be things that are going to take a specialist and I think you need the ability to bring them when you need them.

REP. CARNEY: Thank you.

Professor Hoffman?

MR. HOFFMAN: Much of what we've heard from my fellow panelists, at least in my recollection, was part of the vision in the HSC when it was first established. I think that's one of the problems is that it's been an unrealized vision.

And in fact, if it had been as large, as robust, if it had had the state and local representation that was originally planned, we wouldn't be having this discussion actually. It would be far more difficult to fold it into the NSC. The fact that it's been something of a Cinderella is exactly the problem. So it either has to be plussed up and strengthened or a new organization is found that still gives it all of these capabilities within the NSC rubric.

REP. CARNEY: Thank you. My time is over-expired.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Maryland (sic), Mr. Cleaver, for five minutes.

REP. EMMANUEL CLEAVER (D-MO): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is kind of a general question to all of you. In my real life I'm a Methodist minister and I've been through two church mergers. The only thing that could be worse would be -- I don't know what could be worse. And so I do have some experience in mergers, where emotions run high.

And my great fear when we talk about these departments merging is that there will always be a department with a dominant culture. And, you know, and so people will go in with war on their mind because the dominant culture, consciously or unconsciously, will try to impose that culture on the other. And the chances are homeland security will be the weaker culture just by virtue of its short existence.

Am I analyzing this incorrectly? Is the church a poor analogy?

MR. WAINSTEIN: I'll take that one on initially, sir.

You're right. Anytime there's a merger, the same thing, you know, whether it's a church or with government components, it can be difficult. And actually my introductory remarks talked about a couple I've been involved in and there are -- it's tough. You've got the human factor you've got to deal with. I think in this case that's going to be mitigated by several things, for one thing, at least, the possibility of friction at the front end.

One thing is, you know, they're starting with a clean slate. This is a new administration. They're walking in there with primarily new people, at least in the homeland security area; obviously a new homeland security adviser and the like. So it's not as though you're going to have to merge two long-standing bodies together with their own cultures, et cetera. That's one thing.

Secondly, the president has made it clear he's firmly behind this effort to do this review and that makes a big difference. People might have concerns about it, but the president is the one who's dictated it and ordered it and that makes a huge difference.

REP. CLEAVER: Kind of like a bishop in a church.

MR. WAINSTEIN: Yes.

REP. CLEAVER: Yes.

MR. WAINSTEIN: Yes, I think so. And, you know, so you know that it's coming from on high.

And I think the last thing to mention is the process of this review that they're doing right now. I'm confident that at the end of the day whoever disagrees with the recommendation and the president's decision will at least not be able to challenge the validity of the process because the folks I've been working with over there are being very inclusive, are talking to everybody from all perspectives, all sort of interest groups who might have an interest in this. So at the end of the day, no one's going to be able to say hey, you know, we got -- our interest in this got short shrift because they all will have had some input in the process and that went a long way to ensuring its credibility.

REP. CLEAVER: Mr. Palin?

MR. PALIN: If it was just the merger of two churches, I would agree with everything that was just said. I think a better analogy is the merger of a United Methodist seminary with a Free Methodist seminary.

REP. CLEAVER: It won't work.

MR. PALIN: Yes, sir.

And the reason for those that might not be aware of Wesleyan theology is that the theory, the concepts, the practice of national security are very well developed. Those dogmas and doctrines have a robustness that we do not yet have in homeland security. And there needs to be a period of time to allow that new discipline to develop, and I'm afraid that giving over the care of homeland security to the big brother, national security, will stifle that potential.

REP. CLEAVER: You hit on something, Mr. Wainstein.

What happens to the national continuity coordinator, which has been also presidentially mandated? What happens there? Who does the coordination?

MR. WAINSTEIN: That's one of the myriad functions of the Homeland Security Council, the homeland security adviser that will then have to be sort of allocated if that person and that council gets merged with the NSC.

I don't know. I assume it would be the homeland security adviser or whatever that person's title is; the person who has the homeland security responsibilities in this new entity would retain that, because that's very much a homeland security --

REP. CLEAVER: Yeah. But of all the federal agencies, do you think that we can chance inside squabbling that could impede the efficiency of homeland security or national security?

I mean, of the -- you know, if it were, you know, HUD and Commerce, we could probably, you know, work it out. Nobody's going to get hurt, you know. But we're talking about national security and homeland security.

And if there's any chance that the infighting, which I know for a fact exists even without a merger in the federal government, is it worth the risk?

REP. AL GREEN (D-TX): We will hear the answer after which my friend's time will have expired.

MR. WAINSTEIN: Sir, I think that's a very good point, a very good question.

My point is sort of, aside from looking at the substantive question as to whether homeland security should be separate from national security, in terms of the prospect of friction, I think there is that prospect. For the reasons I've cited, I think that prospect is somewhat diminished here. And I think advocates of merger would say that is more than -- the concern about that is more than counterbalanced by the infighting that already exists because of the fact that you have two separate councils operating in the same space.

I actually don't believe that that infighting is all that great. I never saw it; I never felt it. But obviously whenever you have two different groups or two different sets of people working in the same area there's a possibility of lack of coordination. So advocates would say even if there might be some growing pains after the initial merger, they're not going to be so much that it outweighs the benefit of getting rid of this, you know, the jockeying and the rivalry between the two different councils.

REP. CLEAVER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. GREEN: Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

I believe I'm next, but I will yield to Mr. Massa. Mr. Massa, you're recognized for five minutes.

REP. ERIC J.J. MASSA (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you distinguished panel members. I'm a freshman member of Congress and so I come at this with some level of having to do evening preparation and study these questions before us.

And as I was doing this last night, it occurred to me that first I applaud the administration for conducting this review. It seems very timely and it seems very appropriate. I believe, however, that I have arrived at a conclusion that it would be counterproductive to the missions of both councils to merge in a way that would not understand their distinct identities.

I believe that there's some fundamental conflicts about ensuring homeland security under civilian authority and national security that directs a much more robust involvement of the uniformed military services et al, things like Posse Comitatus, etcetera, that goes back to the very nature of why we have a separate United States Coast Guard with its origins in the Revenue Cutters.

So, Professor Hoffman, I would like if I could, understanding your background, to hear your thoughts on that if I might.

MR. HOFFMAN: Well, I think, I mean, you've hit the nail on the head as you're talking about two different cultures and two different orientations and missions but also, in many respects, two different sets of stakeholders as well.

And the national security structure, which has been overwhelmingly outward looking, that hasn't had to deal with many of the domestic issues even when there has been overlap with terrorism, it's still, I think, there's a very different orientation.

So I think that what that suggests is that -- well, firstly, I have trouble using the word merger, but maybe I'm alone in that. And it doesn't seem like a merger to me. Merger to me implies something of parity.

REP. MASSA: Could it be a hostile takeover?

MR. HOFFMAN: Well, absorption or folding in, I think, was the diplomatic phrase that I used.

But I think you've identified one of the key concerns which underlies all of this is the fundamental one of civil liberties and about government that is able to keep us safe and secure while still being mindful of the fundamental rights and freedoms that the United States citizens enjoy.

And I think, you know, I don't have an answer to your question about how we facilitate it, but I think your concern, though, is well founded because you're talking about an agency that hasn't had to pay attention to these things to the extent of some of the challenges we see with the Department of Homeland Security, for example, and even some of the challenges we see with fusion centers, who have to deal not just with the mechanics of intelligence sharing but not least with successfully doing all that without being seen.

No one has the intention I think to violate civil liberties; it's often the perception and that perception can undo a lot of good work.

REP. MASSA: Thank you, Professor.

I'd like one last specific question and a quick follow-up, Mr. Chairman, if I might?

I sit on the Maritime Security Subcommittee of this full body and there are many, many issues before us. But as we talk about hostile takeovers and mergers and acquisitions in this environment, it occurs to me that perhaps now is the time to ask a question about the closer coordination between the United States naval service and the United States Coast Guard, which has always been very separate, but even today, if we're going to review at the top-most levels, should we be discussing the correct placement for the maritime security forces as a body?

And Mr. Palin, I would like to hear from you on that.

And I'm sorry to toss a hand grenade at you. I know --

MR. PALIN: I would be inclined to see a continuation of the sea services from the Coast Guard for many of the same principal reasons that I think the Homeland Security Council should remain largely separate from the National Security Council.

There is an amazing Coast Guard culture. Inside the government it's a command and control culture; it's a military culture. But they have developed an ability to work with state and locals that is much more similar to the way that cops on the beat behave than any naval officer I've ever had the privilege of working with.

The sea services, both the Marines and the naval services, have a very important outward-looking role to play. I think the Coast Guard, while they are sometimes tempted, you know, they'd like to go overseas a little bit more for their own reasons, but their real mission is here at home in our home waters, even in Fargo last week.

And we want to preserve, protect and advance that very special culture that we have in the Coast Guard and not lose it inside the much bigger, broader, powerful naval services.

REP. MASSA: Well, thank you for that.

And I tend to agree with you having spent 24 years in the Navy and having developed an incredible respect for the Coast Guard, who frankly often did much more than I was able to do on one-tenth the budget. So they have certainly earned the admiration of all my fellow naval officers.

And I appreciate your insight into that and actually concur with you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

REP. THOMPSON: Thank you very much.

I don't think you'll find any disagreement with your statement. We've found personally, during Katrina and some other emergencies, how the Coast Guard really serves this country and its citizens well.

Let me thank the witnesses for their testimony and their patience in staying around while the votes were being taken. Let me assure you you were invited because of your contribution. You were not invited because you all sing off the same page. And we got exactly what we were looking for in your testimony, and it will ultimately, we think, go toward some solution to exactly what we will do based on that testimony.

Again, I do thank you for the witnesses' -- I'll yield to the gentleman.

REP. : I'm okay.

REP. THOMPSON: You all right?

REP. : I'm good.

REP. THOMPSON: I mean, we've got a little time. Okay.

We're getting out tonight so everybody's -- (laughter) -- feeling good.

Again, I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions.

The members of the committee may have additional questions for you and we will ask you to respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.

Hearing no further business, the committee stands adjourned. (Sounds gavel.)

END.

Source