Preventing Nuclear Hazards in America

NEWS FROM ED MARKEY

United States Congress Massachusetts Seventh District

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Israel Klein or Michal Freedhoff (202) 225-2836

March 24, 2004

Statement of Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-MA)

Preventing Nuclear Hazards in America

A Congressional Briefing on the 25th Anniversary of the Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown

Thank you very much for inviting me to speak to you today.

Back in the 1950's, when I was a boy, Americans were told that "Our Friend the Atom" was going to
produce nuclear energy that was too cheap to meter. The wave of nuclear boosterism that followed,
however, led to complacency about safety, and safety nearly led us to disaster. Twenty-five years ago, the
Three Mile Island accident represented a wake-up call to the nuclear industry and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and to most Americans. You will be hearing later this morning from representatives of the
Three Mile Island community who continue to be victimized by the health and environmental impacts of the
radiation they were exposed to.

In the accident's immediate aftermath, the Kearney Commission made a number of reform proposals, and
Congress held investigative hearings. In response, the NRC implemented some long-needed safety reforms.
Unfortunately, over the years they have weakened some of those reforms at the behest of the nuclear
industry. Today of course, we have more than accidental meltdowns to worry about. We now have the
threat of nuclear terrorism.

September 11, 2001 should also have been a wake up call to the nuclear industry and the NRC about the
need to take this threat seriously. Unfortunately, the inadequate steps the NRC has taken to improve security
since 9/11 were developed behind closed doors with the nuclear industry, without an opportunity for state
and local officials, emergency responders, or the affected public to submit comments or participate. Twentyfive
years since Three Mile Island and two and a half years since the worst terrorist attack in the U.S., the
NRC and the industry continue to shortchange safety and security at nuclear reactors. Consider the
following facts:

· The NRC still has not conducted a permanent rulemaking to upgrade security at nuclear reactors to
address the terrorist threat we now know we face, even though Al Qaeda has made it clear that it views
nuclear reactors as attractive terrorist targets.

· The NRC has been barring or impeding stakeholders, outside interest groups and independent experts
from providing input in its safety and security proceedings, while allowing the nuclear industry and its
lobbyists unfettered access.

· In the public relations materials the NRC developed for the 25th Anniversary of the TMI accident, the
Commission actually cites improved fire safety regulations at the top of its list of post-Three Mile Island
reforms. What is remarkable about this claim is that it appears that after discovering that many nuclear
reactor operators were out of compliance with the fire regulations, the Commission has decided to gut
these regulations rather than insist that industry actually comply with them. Instead of requiring noncombustible
materials or physical separation of the electrical systems that would be used to shut down a
reactor in the event of a fire, the NRC is proposing to allow the industry to assign reactor personnel the
duty of rushing directly to the shut-down equipment located throughout the reactor complex to shut down
the reactors manually. This could potentially take place in areas impacted by smoke, fire and radiation
and possibly under attack by terrorists. If these personnel fail to reach the shut-down equipment, the
result could be catastrophic - a melt-down like TMI, or even worse.

· On January 25, 2003 the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio - which was already shut down because boric acid
had eaten through the containment vessel - was infected with the Slammer worm virus, which shut down
two of its computer systems for over four hours. The NRC only sent notices of this cyber-vulnerability a
few days after I sent a letter requesting information about the problem. The Commission needs to get
serious about the threat of hacking and cyber-terrorism at nuclear plants, so that keystrokes can't lead to
meltdowns.

It should not take another catastrophic accident to get the NRC to stop being an industry lapdog and start
being the public safety watchdog it is supposed to be. I applaud all of you for your efforts in ensuring that
the public remains aware and the NRC remains accountable for the safety and security of the nuclear power
industry. I look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues in the months and years ahead.