Hearing of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconvential Threats an Capabilities of Those of the House and Armed Services Committee

HEARING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
CHAIRED BY: REP. ADAM SMITH (D-WA)
WITNESSES: ROBERT MARTINAGE, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT; ROGER CARSTENS, NON-RESIDENT FELLOW, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

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REP. SMITH: Welcome, we'll go ahead and get started with our hearing. We're going to get interrupted. It seems to happen frequently. I want --

REP. : (Inaudible)

(Laughter)

REP. SMITH: I think it's personal, that's the way I would guess. But we will get started and probably have our witnesses have the opportunity to at least give their testimony and then we'll take the votes and come back.

It shouldn't be that long, should be I think three suspension votes, which takes about 20 minutes longer than it should. But we'll take about 45 minutes probably and we'll have that break and we'll come back and try to do that. And hopefully we'll be able to drop some more members. I think the weather yesterday disrupted some schedules.

But we appreciate our witnesses being with us here today. We have Robert Martinage who is senior fellow for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Mr. Roger Carstens, who is a non-resident fellow at the Center for a New American Security. And we've asked them here to give us their perspectives on where the special operations command is apt, where it needs to go, what it does well, what it can do better, something that is of particular interest to this subcommittee.

We are very, very focused on what the Special Operations Command is doing. They are growing, as we know, as the demands on their talents have grown. We are trying to grow the force. So one of our big concerns is how can we do that process and do it in a way that makes sure that we maintain the quality because, you know, you don't find SOF people just walking around the streets.

There is a special set of talents. We want to make sure that we maintain that very, very high level of quality. And then also they have been the lead organization in the counterterrorism effort throughout the world. But this subcommittee has had the opportunity to travel Philippines, Iraq, Afghanistan, a whole bunch of different places where SOCOM forces are taking lead the combating violent extremism in a variety of ways, certainly, with kinetic action, identifying high value targets and disrupting terrorist networks, but also with non-kinetic actions, indirect action that focuses on classic counterinsurgency, of training local communities to fight off insurgencies before they can take root, and providing for those local communities in a way that discourages counterinsurgency -- sorry, that discourages insurgencies.

So I think there is a lot to learn from what SOCOM is up to, and we are, you know, just amazed at what they are doing throughout the world in making a difference and being highly successful in many, many places, some of which are in the news and some of which aren't. But their talents I think have really been a major, major factor in our successes thus far against the violent extremist networks like al Qaeda that challenge us.

And with that, Mr. Miller has not joined us yet, ranking member is on his way, but I will yield to Mr. Shuster for whatever opening comments he may have.

REP. BILL SHUSTER (R-PA): In light of the fact that they just called a vote, I'm going to be extremely brief so we can get their statements in before break.

REP. SMITH: Right, yeah, go ahead.

REP. SHUSTER: And just echo much of what Mr. Smith said. It's so important that we do this right and we hear from other folks that are knowledgeable on this subject and learn from them. And also I would like to ask unanimous consent that Mr. Miller has a statement for the record that be submitted in its entirety. And with that I yield back.

REP. SMITH: Great, thanks. And I think we'll try to tell you, Mr. Martinage, if we could keep it in a 5 to 10 minute round. We'll hear your opening statement and then we'll break and come back. You're on.

MR. MARTINAGE: Great. Well, first of, I want to thank you and the committee for the opportunity to appear here today to share my thoughts on the challenges and opportunities facing U.S. Special Operations Forces. I just like to emphasize a few points that I have raised in my written statement, which I guess is part of the record, and you know, allow time for follow on discussion.

I think everyone here is aware SOF have really figured prominently in U.S. military operations since 2001 and have become central to the implementation of U.S. national defense strategy. Reflecting that reality, the operation's tempo currently being sustained by SOF, is the highest in its history.

Looking ahead, the future security environment we believe will likely be characterized by three trends. One, the continuation and intensification of violent Islamic radicalism, the potential rise of China or other authoritarian states as more aggressive political and military competitors, and the increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Of course, SOCOM will need to be shaped, sized, and postured for all three of these challenges, but this afternoon I really want to focus on the continuation of war against violent Islamic extremism and irregular warfare more broadly. And if you want to talk about those other two topics, I would be happy to do so.

So I've organized my thoughts into three conceptual bends. First, what are some of the institutional or policy changes within Special Operations Command or SOCOM. Second, what are some high priority investments for SOCOM subordinate commands, and third, what are some steps that the general purpose forces, the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps might take to contribute to the regular warfare mission or enable SOF.

So using that to set the stage, I'll start from the stop -- I mean, from the top. I would like to suggest two potential institutional changes for SOCOM. The first is consideration should be given to the establishment of a joint regular warfare command.

I mean, although that's a contentious idea, I mean, I think a strong argument can be made that the indirect warfare part of SOCOM's portfolio, meaning unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, and psychological operations are under-represented bureaucratically.

As a reflection of that, over the past 2 decades, SOCOM has never had a special force -- has never been commanded by a Special Forces officer, and conversely, every SOCOM commander has climbed the direct- action ladder and most have held at least one senior-level command in Joint Special Operations Command or JSOC.

So in addition to centralizing the management of a regular warfare related doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and career path, a joint regular warfare command would also be better able to compete for resources and advocate indirect warfare strategies within SOCOM and the border DOD. And that this type of organization would also serve as a needed counter-balance to JSOC within SOCOM and could also be a proponent for special operations approaches to irregular warfare within the conventional joint force, which as you know is dominated by general purpose forces.

There would be an opportunity really to give SOF a louder voice in debates about a regular warfare strategy. The second, SOCOM wide change, I think, merits some consideration are options for forging a closer two-way relationship with the CIA.

At its core, the war against Islamic terrorist groups is intelligence and special operations-intensive war. Making full use of special authorities to wage its indirect, clandestine, and covert war is essential. This should entail not only integrating CIA capabilities with those of both black and white SOF, but regularly leveraging the CIA's Title 50, foreign-intelligence authorities, for SOF operations through the flexible and routine detailing of SOF personnel to the agency. Ideally, personnel should not only be able to move back and forth from CIA stations and SOF ground units, but also to compete for selected mid and senior level leadership positions in either organization.

I now would like to shift quickly to some high priority investments for SOCOM subordinate commands. I would like to quickly make six points. First, consideration should be given to changing the regional orientation of the five active Special Forces groups. The present configuration is really a legacy of the Cold War and is poorly aligned with current and emerging strategic challenges.

For example, responsibility for Africa, a key region in the war against violent Islamic radicalism is divided among three Special Forces groups. Conversely, the Fifth Special Forces Group not only has responsibility for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, which arguably is a pretty big area of responsibility currently, but also Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. So really this regional orientation needs to be re-looked at, and I have some thoughts about that.

Second, serious consideration should be given to expanding special operations rotary-wing aviation capability, special operations helicopters. The 2006 QDR did a lot of important very good things in terms of preparing SOF for the future including most notably a one- third expansion of SOF ground forces.

The problem, however, was there was no proportional increase in the fixed and rotary-wing aviation required to support those ground forces. And this shortfall really is something that needs to be addressed as soon as possible.

In Iraq and Afghanistan conventional Army aviation units are relied upon to provide lift support for about two-thirds of SOF ground units. In Afghanistan, nearly 50 percent of the lift request to support Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan or just SOTF-A are routinely unmet. So simply put, more SOCOM controlled helicopters are needed to move and support a busy and expanding SOF ground force.

I suggest in the paper the creation of at least two additional special operations helicopter battalions hopefully over the next 5 years, given the altitude, challenges in Afghanistan, the need to operate at high altitude with relatively heavy payloads. The top priority should really be standing up a new MH-47 Chinook battalion to support White SOF.

To accomplish this in a timely manner, it's going to be necessary to redouble ongoing efforts to recruit, assess, and train helicopter crews. That really is the pacing factor in terms of this. And more specifically, additional funding will be needed to increase the number of instructors and expand the limited training infrastructure currently available to the Special Operations Aviation Training Company in Fort Campbell, Kentucky. (Inaudible) -- should be explored for having the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps contribute to the special operations aviation lift requirement.

Third point is for the same reasons I discussed a minute ago. It's also necessary to recapitalize and expand the fixed-wing aviation fleet under AFSOC. This should entail both additional C-130 variants as well as smaller aircraft like the C-27J Spartan and singular dual engine aircraft and some numbers similar to the U-28As.

Fourth, given the importance of winning over the hearts and minds of local populations in a future security environment likely to be characterized by persistent regular warfare, serious consideration should to be given to further expanding active-duty civil affairs and PSYOPS force structure.

Fifth, Air Force Special Operations Command clearly needs additional unmanned combat air system or UCAS capacity to provide persistent airborne reconnaissance and strike coverage globally. While SOCOM is in the process of expanding AFSOC's fleet so that it can provide 10 combat air patrols with a mix of Predator and Reaper systems, it still falls far short of the 30 orbits that SOCOM says it's a state requirement just for the CENTCOM AOR.

Now, of course, the conventional Air Force should also provide some of that capacity for persistent surveillance and strike coverage. The question is what is the appropriate balance, but I think, clearly, additional organic capacity within Air Force Special Operations Command is needed.

Sixth and finally, Air Force Special Operations Command's combat aviation advisor, aviation FID, Foreign Internal Defense capacity needs to be further expanded. At the direction of the 2006 QDR the sixth special operations squadron, where this capability resides in SOCOM, is doubling its capacity from 110 to 230 authorized advisors.

That expansion is still insufficient. And to close that gap between available capacity and demand, SOCOM should consider creating an irregular warfare wing that would have two core missions; providing specialized airpower necessary to support U.S. led irregular warfare operations globally and training and enabling partner nations to develop, sustain, and employ airpower in combating internal threats.

Now, I'd just like to briefly wrap up with a few comments about how the general purpose forces might better support the irregular warfare mission and enable SOF. Basically, the Army and the Marine Corps must develop the capabilities and capacities needed to train and advise foreign security forces in multiple widely dispersed countries simultaneously.

What do this mean? To the Army, it means a significant shift away from heavy or a future combat system to combat teams, toward infantry or security cooperation BCTs, and preferably much smaller security force assistance or other specialized regular warfare units. A similar shift needs to occur in the Marine Corps.

It also would be helpful if the Army took steps to better support SOF ground forces, especially with respect to rotary-wing aviation and logistics support, currently to structure the brigade combat team and supporting brigades like the Combat Aviation Brigades sufficiently -- significantly constrains their ability to support or enable SOF.

The Navy really needs to take on the steady state maritime foreign internal defense and security force assistance mission. I can share some details with you later on if you're interested in what that might entail.

REP. SMITH: Okay.

MR. MARTINAGE: And the Air Force --

REP. SMITH: I think we'll probably have to wrap up on your Air Force point because we're getting close to time. The members need to run over and vote. And so --

MR. MARTINAGE: Okay. The Air Force really -- just like the sixth SOF needs additional capacity, the regular Air Force should stand up and dedicate it to irregular warfare and aviation advisor squadrons and that have a number of implications for the Air Force, but it would be good to have that capacity both in the regular Air Force and in AFSOC. And with that I wrap.

REP. SMITH: Well, we will look to -- you've raised a lot of issues, most of which I think we all want to talk about further. So we will sprint over to vote hopefully quickly. The best estimation based on previous experience is that we will be back at 4:30. So we'll try to get back sooner than that, but for planning purposes that's the most likely outcome. We will be back.

(Recess.)

(Sounds gavel)

REP. SMITH: I think we'll go ahead and dive back in. Goal is still to be done by no later than 5:30. So we'll hear from Mr. Carstens and then open it up for questions.

MR. CARSTENS: Chairman Smith and distinguished members of the committee, I'm honored to appear before you today and I thank you for your invitation to discuss the challenges and opportunities that will face U.S. Special Operations Forces.

As a 20-year veteran of Ranger Battalions and Special Forces units, I was given the opportunity to conduct a year-long study to catalogue how SOF has changed since 9/11 and where SOF should go in the future. My study took me to Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa as well as 13 military locations ranging from the National Training Center in California to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. My findings and recommendations emanate from those visits and I look forward to sharing them with you today.

With the chairman's approval, I'd like to submit for the record, a more comprehensive view of my findings.

REP. SMITH: Without objection.

MR. CARSTENS: And I'll summarize it verbally. Special Operations Forces have spearheaded the War on Terror from the very first days of the campaign in Afghanistan to the current battlefields of Iraq. Some of their missions and successes are well known, others such as the quiet battle being waged against Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, less so.

But one thing seems certain; the demand for SOF in the near and long term is likely to increase. As conventional forces depart Iraq, SOF is projected to stay. As AFRICOM grows, so will SOF participation in Africa. And as pressure on the defense budget grows, policymakers will increasingly look to SOF as an efficient and effective return on investment.

To that end, senior leaders must be aware of the issues that face SOF and of the choices that they will have to make to best position this capable force for the future. This study has identified some of those key issues and has derived a set of findings as a result and I will go through them quickly.

Number one, SOF must right-size growth to support QDR 2006 increases. The 2006 QDR dictated substantial growth in personnel and equipment for SOCOM. These increases, however, have not been right- sized to meet the current and future demands of SOF. As a result, the 2010 QDR needs to focus heavily on right-sizing growth to support 2006 gains as well as growing SOF across the spectrum to meet emerging missions.

Number two, SOF must strike a balance between the indirect and the direct approaches. Conventional wisdom holds that the special operations community has not struck an effective or an appropriate balance between the direct and indirect approaches. While the case for imbalance may be overstated, the need to address this issue is not.

Number three, SOF and General Purpose, GPF, Forces, must seek a division of labor. As SOF responsibilities grow, policymakers and military leaders will need to determine where GPF can take on SOF roles and where SOF has a comparative advantage. SOCOM and GPF must find the right balance.

Number four, SOCOM must evaluate roles and missions to address duplication and better balance resources. Seven years into the Global War on Terror, SOCOM tactical units are heavily engaged in direct and indirect actions around the world. However, there is still some confusion as to who should be doing what.

Number five, SOF must conduct acquisition at the speed of war. SOF has traditionally been the lead in rapidly taking equipment and putting it into the hands of its operators. A lack of acquisition executives at SOCOM with special operations experience, combined with a risk-adverse approach to bringing in new soldier systems on board have dramatically slowed the procurement process. SOCOM needs to reverse this trend and bring back the days of SOF primacy in the arena of combat development and acquisition.

Six, DOD must ensure enabler and logistics support to SOF remaining in Iraq as the conventional force withdraws. It is clear that the conventional military forces that are now in Iraq will draw down in the near future. It is likely that SOF will not be drawing down.

SOF, however, does not have the logistics architecture to support such prolonged deployments. Basing, messing, fuel, motor pools, medical facilities, ammunition resupply, and base security, to name a few areas of concern, reside within the conventional force. Civilian and military leaders alike will have to make value judgments as to what the conventional military leaves behind.

Number seven, SOCOM must receive more authority to manage and recruit personnel. The 2006 QDR was generous to SOCOM, adding over 13,000 people to its rolls. The services however, retained a strong voice in the management of these special operators. SOCOM should have more of a say in how they are managed. And that may require revising Title 10.

Recommendations that follow from these findings, there are five. Number one, encourage SOCOM to reevaluate component roles and missions. In a time of decreasing budgets, the demise of the wartime supplemental, and confusion in the field as to who should be doing what, it is necessary for SOCOM to reevaluate the missions it expects its components to execute.

Two, increased interagency participation in special operations. In the early days of the fight against -- in Afghanistan, Army Special Forces and CIA officers use their unique talents and congressional authorities to great effect. Such efforts in bringing these two elements together and as well as other members of the interagency will allow for the meldings of Titles 10, 22, and 50 during the conduct of operations.

Three, dramatically increase SOF to meet future demands. SOCOM must match the missions that they expect SOF to conduct with the forces and enablers that are required. SOF will have an increased role in future that will likely include a persistent presence, persistent engagement, and shaping operations.

Such steps as dramatically increasing the size of the Special Operations Aviation Regiment, formalizing the creation of a Special Operations Aviation Training Battalion, adding another Ranger Battalion, increasing MARSOC personnel authorization, bolstering civil affairs, and growing more in-house enablers, like, Unmanned Aerial Systems and intelligence analysts are prudent choices for the Defense Department to make in this environment.

Number four, establish a permanent position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a special operations flag officer. All of the services currently have elements organized under SOCOM. While SOCOM sits as a combatant command, it is not adequately represented at the JCS level in the Pentagon where uniformed services conduct strategy planning and resourcing decisions.

There have been discussions in past of creating a completely separate service of SOF to address this shortfall in representation. While this has some appeal to address the current and future military challenges, it is not appealing in an environment of constrained resources.

The services have significant organization, support, and logistics tails, which SOF would have to recreate at significant cost in terms of both resources and time. A more timely effect could be achieved by having a SOF representative sit on the JCS as an equal partner.

Lastly, restructure the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities to report directly to the Secretary of Defense. The ASD SO/LIC and IC is currently organized under the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

At a time when ASD SOLIC/IC is functioning as the Secretary of Defense's primary advisor on SOF in countering extremists, this is ineffective. This advice and oversight extends across all the services and the agencies of the department. As such, ASD SO/LIC and IC should be elevated to a level where oversight and coordination can more effectively include all aspects of the department.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I will conclude by thanking you for giving me the opportunity to come and share my thoughts with you. I hope that you found this testimony useful. I will be happy to answer your questions.

REP. SMITH: Thank you very much. We will begin the questions and we're going to stick to the 5-minute rule. Typically in subcommittee level we do have time to get around for a second round. But I find it moves more efficiently for all members if we do stick to the 5-minute rule for everybody including me.

So the first question I have really for both of you. There is a lot of items here, and I very much agree with where are you going on this, particularly, the idea of elevating SOCOM in a variety of different places. They have such a vastly more important role now than they did you know, seven, eight years ago. Getting them, you know, greater status on the joint chiefs, increasing their acquisition ability, increasing their, you know, cooperation, I think all of that is very good.

And as you also list through the areas where they could use more resources, I can't disagree with any of them. I'm also mindful of the fact that there is simply no way, particularly in going through Mr. Martinage's list, they're not going to get all of that.

And I guess the question I would have what's the most important? What are the one or two things in that list? I mean you mentioned, you know, more fixed wing, more helicopters, more personnel in general, more UAVs, a bunch of different issues. I think I'm not sure if you had a chance to talk about that in your actual remarks, but in your statement you talk about on the Navy side, more sealed delivery systems, more for the Boat (ph) teams.

There is a lot of more in here. So I've already asked the question. But what -- you know, if you said, okay, here is the two things. If you gave this to SOCOM, this is what would really make them -- you know, give them the greater operational capacity to the maximum extent, most bang for the buck, if you will.

MR. MARTINAGE: Number one for me would be the rotary-wing aviation piece. I think increasing the capacity of the 160th SOAR is probably job one. Beyond that, I'm really torn. I have five that I was going to suggest. But I think probably, number two --

REP. SMITH: That's thing about being in a think tank of --

MR. MARTINAGE: Yeah, I know.

REP. SMITH: I'll give five suggestions, you guys figure it out.

MR. MARTINAGE: But they are all kinds of --

REP. SMITH: No, I understand, I understand.

MR. MARTINAGE: I'll tell you what the second one is. I think I will go with probably the combat aviation advisors, the 6th Special Operations Squadron, which is because I see a big demand for that down the road. That's really running very close though with the PSYOPS in civil affairs capacity. I snuck three in on you but --

REP. SMITH: That's okay.

MR. MARTINAGE: Okay.

REP. SMITH: And the same question, Mr. Carstens, actually from your perspective.

MR. CARSTENS: Sure, I have to agree with Bob. I think we need to get dedicated SOF Air. That can be done in numerous ways. But one way would -- should be increase the size of the Special Operations Aviation Regiment and formalize the creation of a Special Operations Aviation Training Battalion to better prepare their crews and their aviators because right now they are taking everything out of HUD (ph).

The second thing would not really cost much. At least it wouldn't have hidden costs, but I really think we need to take a look at Title 10 again and take a look at trying to give the SOCOM commander more control over personnel. And that, we can go into great depth on that but I'll just throw one as an example.

If a Navy intel analyst swings by a SEAL unit, goes to Iraq, gets numerous combat deployments under his belt, becomes an expert after 2 or 3 years of man hunting and dealing with special operations, what he might find is that on his next assignment he is going out to sea, to serve, you know, a ship-borne duty and he may never rotate back to special operations community.

We need to somehow fix that either closing the loop or giving them a skill identifier, which gives the Navy a chance and also the Army and the Air Force and the Marine special operations a chance to get some of these people back. That's one example. There are many. But we need to get more personnel control back to admirals.

REP. SMITH: Okay.

MR. MARTINAGE: Can I throw in one more thing on this?

REP. SMITH: Sure.

MR. MARTINAGE: And that's, two of the other areas I would've suggested are the fixed-wing aviation and then the UCAS or Unmanned Combat Air Systems. But really then the question is what is the appropriate balance between SOCOM and in this case AFSOC and the big Air Force. So if the Air Force steps up to provide more of that capacity, it's a less urgent demand for AFSOC. If they don't, then that rises, you know, increases the priority of those things.

REP. SMITH: Right, and that is a major concern of the committee is on the air wing side because the Air Force has so many demands on them right now, so many programs. They are a little bit behind in terms of the acquisition needs, certainly, with airlift, with the C- 17, and those of us who are from the northwest are familiar with the tanker issue that we fear that because of the dependency that SOCOM and AFSCOM, in particular, have on the big Air Force, the Air Force doing all this stuff what's left over, not enough. And I think that's a big problem. I have a couple of other question areas. But I will suspend those until later and I yield back the balance of my time and call Mr. Shuster.

REP. SHUSTER: Thank you. You are starting to sound like an appropriator, just one more thing, one more thing.

(Laughter)

MR. : Can't help it.

REP. SHUSTER: My question is concerning the personnel. And I think that a lot of people on the committee have expressed concern as we start to increase the force number, that we don't degrade the quality.

MR. : Right.

REP. SHUSTER: I spent time with Coronado last year and General Kiernan was getting, he told us, a lot of pressure, form his bosses in the Navy to make sure the washout rate was reduced. And he was very concerned about that. As well as folks in the Army I've talked to, they are concerned about decreasing their criteria and letting people through that aren't combat ready. And I have seen -- read some information that schools seem to be turning out people on shorter timelines and just wondered what your thoughts were on that picture of more people while making sure the quality is there.

MR. MARTINAGE: Certainly that's a clear priority. You know, that's what makes SOF special is the training of the personnel. As you know, the goal right now is to send out five new SF battalions by 2013. Two have been created, I believe, and three to go.

And the big challenges right now, as you suggested, is the limited size of the recruiting pool, the high proportion of washouts, as you mentioned, and sort of, retention, competition from the private sector, as well as, you know, family pressures.

You know, I think, SOCOM has taken pretty good steps to try to address the challenge of improving, I mean, increasing capacity without reducing quality through the 18X or 18-Xray program that has worked out pretty well. We can argue about the training pipeline, and whether the expansion of that from like 400 to 700 is actually had an effect on quality people. We have vastly varying views on that. And retention bonuses for senior operatives have also been important.

I think going ahead, the question is, if this is really important, and I think it is to maintain, to achieve the SF battalion growth that's been directed, what else might be done. And I think, one thing is retention incentives for mid-career personnel, extending some operator benefits like education reimbursement to their families, for you -- this is kind of getting in the weeds, but section 517 of the U.S. Code, Title 10 restricts the number of E-8s and E-9s in each service.

That has already been waived for JSOC. That same thing could be waived for SOF across the board which would take -- which would prevent some very seasoned operators from being pushed out the door because of that. And then lastly, it's possible to open up the Q- course to other folks by making it easier for Marines, Navy or Air Force guys to transfer into the Army to go into the Q-course. But it's a challenge, I mean, I think its important to get the growth but as you suggest, its important keep quality up, but I think those types of steps would be helpful.

REP. SHUSTER: Colonel?

MR. CARSTENS: Sir, what is painful is that -- you are all searching for the same guy. You all want that intelligent athlete that's comfortable in the chaotic and ambiguous environment, so whether it's MARSOC or the SEALs or the Green Berets, you are all looking for that same guy. And right now they are too experienced. The Army Special Force's School is actually doing quite well.

I talked to a pretty mean grizzled SF battalion commander and I said, tell me about the 18-Xray program and I expected having -- I used to run the Q-course -- I expected him to tell me it was an abysmal failure. Instead, this guy looked me right in the eye and said, "They are the best soldiers I've ever had, they are ten times better than you and I were in our youth."

And he gave me a few vignettes to show me how good these young kids are. So I think the SF course is doing quite well. The SEAL course is a little more challenging. No matter what they do it seems they still get the same failure rate. You know it's a very tough course, very demanding and they are having -- even if they get more people going into the course, they are still getting the same numbers coming out.

And the Navy is working hard. I had a chance to visit Coronado they are working -- trying hard to try to break that. To try to get more guys through the pipeline.

REP. SMITH: I think it's a -- sorry to interrupt you --

MR. : Please.

REP. SMITH: It's the whole water thing.

(Laughter.)

So that adds a layer to it. It just isn't there. And I talked to people about it, and they said that's what, you know, that's what makes it very difficult. I mean because all those skills you said are hard to find. And then you throw into it, you know, by the way, you know, you got to hangout in, you know, freezing cold water for few, you know, for a few hours, several times a day and it is like -- and you know, how you get around that I don't know. But you're right, I'm sorry, go ahead.

MR. CARSTENS: No, that had an effect on me. I thought it'd be much easier to be a Green Beret than a SEALer.

MR. : I am sure Dave Silverman (ph) is in the back of the audience around --

MR. : He is busy on that.

MR. CARSTENS: Yes, he is a tough little guy. But I'm -- there are a few things that we need to take a look at. And one is recruiting from different backgrounds. I know that SOCOM, right now, is trying to look at perhaps recruiting from legal aliens. And that has a benefit for a few different reasons. It increases our pool and would you want to have a guy who is a legal alien in the United States who came from the Sudan, who speaks local dialects, who can get through our program, he is culturally aware, and can go and do the missions and become a full-fledged member of the special operations community, there is a thought.

Another thought is making sure that we target the right high school and collegiate areas. For some reason, some of or recruiting programs are not quite hitting that college athlete who is bored of going to college, or that high school wrestler who wants another challenge and doesn't necessarily want to go into higher education. Got to do a little better job of targeted recruiting, and maybe opening up the aperture of who we are recruiting from.

And lastly, get the pipeline problems of just increasing the capacity of the schools. I know the Q-course we didn't want to have non-Green Berets in the course because you want to have UCMJ authority over your students, maybe it's time to go into the contracting world and give up that UCMJ authority just to make sure we have the right number of instructors to keep the pipeline functioning properly.

REP. SHUSTER: Thank you.

REP. SMITH: Thanks.

REP. SHUSTER: We're going to have another round --

REP. SMITH: Yes, certainly.

Mr. McIntyre?

REP. MIKE MCINTYRE (D-NC): Thank you very much. Thank you gentlemen, for joining us, thank you Mr. Chairman for conducting this today.

Two quick questions to Lieutenant Colonel Carstens, with Fort Bragg and Lejeune being on either end of my district, I've read with quite admiration for the work that you've done. And wanted to ask you, you mention on page 3 of your testimony that DOD must ensure, enabler and logistic support for SOF remaining in Iraq, as well as, as conventional force is withdrawn.

But yet you did not list that as one of your top two priorities. And I'm concerned since we know the President was at Camp Lejeune when we were there with him just this past Friday, that day is coming now. We do have a certain date, after all of the debate and discussions.

And so how critical is this to us to get them logistic support because this is on the horizon now. And I want to know if you think well, they can make it a couple of years or they can only make it six months, or they can make it four or five years, but how urgent do you think this is on the logistics support question?

MR. CARSTENS: Sir, I think it's incredibly important. I don't think they can make it a few days. When the conventional military leaves, when a conventional say, infantry unit takes off, it's going to take with it a lot of the enablers and a lot of the support that would have afforded Special Forces an operating base.

So if you go to either Iraq or Afghanistan, Balad, Djibouti, Bagram, if there are Green Berets and SEALs sitting in a CJSOTF, if the conventional force leaves they suddenly take with them their aviation support, their basing support, the people who run the dining facility, the contractors. And it's going to be much harder.

Something as simple as putting fuel in vehicles, be they a rotary-wing, or be they Humvees and GMVs, they are going to have a critical problem.

And the one thing I can say is, no matter where I went, if I went to anywhere in the United States, or if I went to Coronado to talk to the SEALs or Lejeune to talk to the Marines, I would ask that question that we all love to ask, "What keeps you awake at night?" And every single officer and NCO I talked to said, "We're stressed out, that if we fold up in Iraq, we are not going to have logistic support to keep operations up and going."

So while it did not make my list of the top two, I know that it would probably make the top one of about everyone in the special operations community right now.

REP. MCINTYRE: Okay. All right, great. And then that's the urgency that I wanted to hear in terms of what we need to focus on right away --

REP. SMITH: I will give you a little more time; I want to follow up on that. Is, you know, the 30 to 50,000 that the president talked about, is that the right number? Does that calm some of those concerns, or is there still a concern that there is going to be too much pulled out?

MR. CARSTENS: You know the -- sir, that's a great question. Some of the guys I talked to down at the Fort Bragg area, and I didn't poll the Navy SEAL community on this sadly, but they feel that the number seems a little more right. And yet the question is again what's left behind.

Bob and I had a chance to go down to SOCOM just the past week and what they are worried about, even with big numbers being thrown about, with troops staying in Iraq, are you going to be able to breakdown the conventional military unit to leave behind what SOF needs.

Good example, rotary-wing aviation assets. When an infantry BCT -- that's probably a bad example -- when an infantry BCT rotates back to the United States, it pretty much has to take everything with it because if it doesn't it becomes combat ineffective. And on the report manning requirements that filter up through the highest levels of the Pentagon that's not a good thing.

So trying to convince a BCT to leave behind an enabler is going to be hard to do. Now, what SOCOM would like to do, in working with the GPF, it gets into the regular warfare directive. What can you do to help us? Can you disaggregate the BCT and just leave us something? Can you disaggregate a core and leave behind the aviation or the mess hall facilities.

If the GPF can work with SOCOM under the rubric of a regular warfare, and breakdown the BCT to an extent -- disaggregate its capabilities, we'll have a fighting chance to answer that question in the affirmative, that it can be done.

REP. SMITH: Sorry Mc.

REP. MCINTYRE: Thank you. No, that's a perfect follow up. And my point exactly, is there a particular ratio generally you can say like, for every special operator you need, is it one-to-one, or one to one-and-a-half, or one-to-two in terms of logistic support typically.

MR. CARSTENS: My answer would be I'm not sure. I wish I could say, I was a little smarter on that -- probably not the brightest light bulb in this room sadly. I think, it comes down to more like packages though if --

REP. MCINTYRE: Yeah.

MR. CARSTENS: -- whether the ratio might not be right, but SOF wants to make sure as when someone leaves to have X number of intel analysts, X number of SIGINT people to make radio communication right, and X number of dedicated rotary-wing air, and probably another list. So it might not be the ratio; it might be whatever package that they show up with -- (cross talk) -- support.

REP. MCINTYRE: All right, okay. Yeah, that's logical and one last quick question in the few seconds I have left. Where do you see the strongest resistance to elevating SOF to a Joint Chiefs of Staff level? Is it certain personalities or is it a certain branch of the services, or is it just a tradition that that has not occurred. Can you identify where you think the resistance to that idea would come from?

MR. CARSTENS: Sure, I think it hasn't been floated around much and I believe that -- the actual chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service representatives would probably have some heartburn with that. But I guess my thought is, why shouldn't TRANSCOM be there, why shouldn't STRATCOM be there, why shouldn't SOCOM.

Right now the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has service representatives that basically argue for what they want. As the Army four-star, I'm not really worried about the joint force, I'm worried about the U.S. Army. We need to break that down and take these cross pollinating entities like SOCOM, STRATCOM, and TRANSCOM and give them a voice on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because right now they have none.

REP. MCINTYRE: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SMITH: It's a -- excellent idea.

Mr. Rooney?

REP. TOM ROONEY (R-FL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have kind of a comment first, and then a question just because I missed, you know, the part of the presentation I'm interested in hearing. You talked about the UCMJ and you talked about Special Operation Forces sort of having their own flag as part of the Joint Chiefs possibly some day.

One of the concerns that sort of just popped in my head when you said that, and then you brought up the idea of independent contractors, like you know, Blackwater or whatever over there. You know, and I don't know how, you know, what the logistics of this, but its just something that concerns me as a former judge advocate in the Army, is that the line between independent Special Operation Forces with its own member of the Joint Chiefs, not subject to the Army or Navy, or whatever, and how they are, sort of, perceived by this sort of changing international community with regard to the --.

Bottom-line, if one of our guys gets in trouble, we got to make sure that they are subject to the UCMJ and not some other, you know, jurisdiction that we can't control because they are sort of out there on their own. As of now, you know, if the guy is special -- Green Beret, you know, he is part of the Army, obviously. So there is not a question there, but that's just something that popped into my head when you were discussing that.

And just want to make sure that we are very careful when we -- if that actually comes to fruition that, that there is a clear distinction between those guys, and guys that are independent contractors.

But my question is with regard to something that I didn't get to hear you talk about, and that was the resurrection potentially of the OSS, and how that could actually play out in this day and age?

MR. MARTINAGE: Either of us?

REP. ROONEY: Yeah, sure.

MR. MARTINAGE: You know the OSS had a lot -- components within it. There is research and analysis which now has really been the intelligence community writ large, of which there is, you know, a number of different entities. Secret intelligence and activities which is now -- observed mostly by SOF and JSOC in particular, and divided with the CIA and their Special Activities Division, and the counterespionage role that OSS had is now through the FBI. So what does that mean? I think, what that means is to create a new OSS would really require potentially blowing up the entire national security bureaucracy and starting over to some degree because there is --

REP. ROONEY: So you are thinking that might be a little difficult?

(Laughter.)

MR. MARTINAGE: I think that might be a little difficult, and I'm not sure if the disruption would really be worth it. Especially because individual elements like CIA's Special Activities Division and Special Operations Group, and black SOF are very effective. Now that's not to say that there isn't room for improvement.

And that's why I would stress, I think, three things, but sort of a middle course between, you know, keeping everything the same and blowing everything up. And then that middle I would say one increased institutionalized cooperation between the CIA and SOCOM including hybrid career paths that people can go back and forth between the two.

Two, a regional Interagency Task Force that bring together the CIA, SOCOM, DOD, and other relevant agencies to solve a common problem. We've done that already in some areas of the world and they've been terrifically effective.

Third, expanded SOCOM authorities, perhaps closer to Title 50 that gets into very contentious grounds, but if we can't make some of those other things work, that might be the direction where things need to go. That would be my response to that.

MR. CARSTENS: Sir, quickly, that would be a dream of mine; I would love to serve in that unit. If I could go back in a time machine to be with the OSS and do all sorts of feats of daring do -- well you know what I am saying anyway --

(Laughter.)

Well, I don't think, in this area of constrained resources that may be possible. I think that will be a -- just a bridge too far. So I would recommend a few things. Number one, JSOC has actually done a pretty good job of taking the interagency and bringing it into the military realm. We need to take that capability that we've learned from the last 7 years and might break that down to the CJSOTF level for white side Special Forces and SEALs.

There is no reason that CJSOTF shouldn't have people from the State Department, Department of the Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency all working together in say, Bagram or Balad.

Secondly, migrate Special Forces over to the CIA. And I'm not talking about just 1Ds (ph) and 2Cs (ph). Why not take a Special Forces company just plop them down to Virginia and say, when you -- when you go to that company you are spending a three-year long tour working for the agency.

And what would -- that would do is that would give ground branch a resident capability in Foreign Internal Defense, which is not a bad thing. Thirdly, Joint Interagency ODAs, let's have a go at the other direction. Let's take people from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of the Treasury, Department of State, and if they meet the right criteria let them serve on a 12-man ODA.

Maybe it becomes a 14-man ODA, but how wonderful would that be, to be in a foreign country and have all the authorities right there. You want Title 50, well you have John right over there. You want Title 22, you got Al, right over here. But bring the interagency down to a 12-man ODA, bring it to the Central Intelligence Agency, and by all means put it in the CJSOTF.

Lastly, if we can't win by creating an OSS that also argues for taking that four-star officer and putting him on the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and making ASD SO/LIC a direct report of the SecDef. Because really the overarching issue is making sure that SOF has a bigger voice, and making sure that the interagency is brought into the fold.

So we can do it at all sorts of levels from the 12-man ODA and this line of continuity that goes right up to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

REP. ROONEY: Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

REP. SMITH: Appreciate it.

Mr. Langevin.

REP. JAMES R. LANGEVIN (D-RI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today. In your -- Mr. Carstens, in your testimony, I think you mentioned that it's likely, and this may have been covered, so if it did -- I came in late -- so if it was covered you can let me know. But from my own edification I'd like to know that your testimony says it's likely that with draw down of conventional forces in Iraq, the Special Operations Forces will see even greater demand. And what do you believe their primary mission should be; training and support or combat operations.

And the second part is you noted that in the early days in Afghanistan they were a model for interagency cooperation among SOF community and the intelligence community. And I was wondering if you could expand on this and offer your assessment as to what other interagency missions, special -- Special Operations Forces could be involved with, especially your comments, you just made in the prior question. But are there any lessons learned -- to be learned from this success that could be applied to other interagency missions. And if you could -- it's kind of a follow on to the previous discussion.

MR. CARSTENS: Yes, sir. Sir, to answer your first question, do they train or do they go on combat? And the great answer is both. The thing that people do right now is called combat FID, and that's Foreign Internal Defense, but you work with your host nation element, you train them, you take them through tactics, techniques, and procedures, and then you actually get on the helicopter and go out and fight with them.

Now, we don't do that everywhere. We don't do that in the Philippines and we don't do that in the Colombia, that's more like direct FID. You train -- the -- members of the Philippino army or the special ops and then you stay in the base camp and they actually leave to conduct the combat operation.

But in Iraq, I think, it would be appropriate to keep conducting combat level FID. Right there you get into the great question of what does the GPF do and what does SOF do.

It probably would be preferable that when it comes to basic rifle marksmanship, and basic soldiering, that may be General Purpose Forces conducts that level of training for Iraqi forces, be they police, military, or such. But when it gets into the creation of high-end finishing forces, I think, SOF has a role in conducting that. Second, and by the way, I hope I answered that question, sir.

REP. LANGEVIN: That's fine.

MR. CARSTENS: Okay. And they could be very busy doing that by the way. I had a chance to serve with the Iraqi National Counter Terror Force when I was in Iraq. And I think that's a model for how you can take a unit and just keep elevating, and elevating it to make it a high-end finishing force.

Secondly, on the interagency side, if Special Forces were to work with the Central Intelligence Agency, I think that would give them a better training capability in conducting foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare at either the class -- the classified level to where if the CIA has a mission in country X, if it brings along an ODA, a resident capability in Foreign Internal Defense, they might actually have a more powerful entity down range trying to complete that mission in working with the State Department.

And there are places in Africa where it's hard for a military unit to go to a village and build a well, to build positive relationships with a village because we don't have the proper authorities. And you've probably been here for all the battles between 1208 funding, 1207 funding, and 1206 funding.

If you are working with the State Department you certainly have a positive melding of authorities. That well does get dug because you are working with people with -- with Title 22 authorities, and Title 22 Monday -- money, excuse me. Now, I hope I answered that question too, sir, does that --

REP. LANGEVIN: And can either of you expand on the issue of -- perhaps do we need clearer ties between Special Operations Forces and our intelligence -- and we can look at that, is there -- now is there sufficient coordination right now, can that be a greater force multiplier?

MR. CARSTENS: I think we've made great strides. In fact there is someone in audience who actually did that in Afghanistan. He was there during the early days and I will have the chance introduce him to you afterwards, but the point being I think we've made incredible strides in taking the special operations community and melding it together with the intelligence agencies.

There is more work to be done and I would say, based on the people I've talked to that people are seeking that closer cooperation. So I think what, we are trending in the right direction, we still have ways to go.

REP. ROGERS: What about a -- you know in -- probably in the not- too-distant future, I'm hoping even before 2011, when there is more of a draw down of U.S. Forces, we are still going to have to have I'm sure a presence in the area to make sure that we don't have to go back there in five years.

And I would expect that Special Operations Forces would be playing a very effective role of being stationed outside of Iraq and going in and out when necessary to back up Iraqi security forces. Can you maybe expand on that vision and how will they be limited, and how will they function the same way if they are not, per se, in country?

MR. CARSTENS: In talking -- I've brought that up when I was in Iraq. And that was actually -- every time I brought that up to a Special Forces officer they would kind of push that to the side because it just didn't -- to them it didn't make sense.

That they -- their argument was, why would I want to be outside the country, when I can be inside the country eating the same food with my Iraqi counterparts, training with them, living with them, spending my time with them, building positive relations, training them, and then fighting together in combat FID.

Right now all Special Forces units that are conducting missions in Iraq or Afghanistan are partnered with a like unit, an Iraqi or an Afghan unit, and I think that's kind of where everyone wants to keep that.

When you talk to folks they don't necessarily want to be outside the theater of operations, flying in unilaterally to conduct a mission. They would rather make sure that they are with their partners and that they are fighting that way.

REP. LANGEVIN: Okay. Thank you. I have a couple of more questions but I know Mr. Shuster has some as well. So I'll yield to Mr. Shuster for five minutes.

REP. SHUSTER: Thank you very much.

Mine -- back to the personnel situation, and we started talking about a little bit on the recruitment piece of it. I know that when we were in Coronado the admiral had set up a -- he brought in a college coach -- I remember a college football coach. He had this whole group of people who were trying to figure out how to better recruit SEALs.

How does that work -- have you -- is that something you've looked at, and what's going on, on the Army side in that? You've mentioned, I think, a little bit of that recruitment. Are they looking at different ways and --

MR. CARSTENS: I think when I was in Coronado, and it was -- gosh, probably about eight or nine months ago, they were still struggling through that. And they had done a few interesting things I thought they were trying to target these audiences as you just mentioned. And, I think, they had also hired a contracting firm to try to conduct some pre-mission or rather pre BUD training to make sure that when a prospective candidate went into that environment they had a more of a fighting chance to succeed.

And what was confounding them is they still had the same failure rate. They are increasing the numbers, they are recruiting, they believe, the right guy. They are providing them with some training that would make them physically and mentally harder with -- before they go into the training environment and yet the failure rate is the same.

And there is still -- it is at least -- they may have made some different gains in the last eight to nine months, but when I was there they were still struggling through that and it was frustrating to them. They want more numbers and that gets into whole of their conversation, more numbers are going to allow them to fill the requirements they have at the higher levels of say, 03, 04, and 05. The trick is getting people into the pipeline and then out.

On the Army side, they have had great success with the 18 Xray program, and the Army is also doing that -- a training environment to allow a prospective candidate to show up at the start of the Special Forces Qualification Course having already received some land (ph) navigations, some military or -- a physical training and such.

So we're trying to give everyone a chance to just show up to be as best as they possibly can because at the end of the day its not about how physically fit you are, we're working on someone's ability to thrive in an ambiguous environment. It's more mental than physical, but the physical portion at many times is what we use to test the mental.

REP. SHUSTER: Well, what about diversity? Are we trying to go into different people, different backgrounds, and have they talked about that and what kind of success rate are they having with people from culturally different backgrounds and that goes into the next question about talking about foreign nationals?

What are the thoughts of recruiting foreign nationals to come into our Special Forces and be able to operate in those parts in the world that we'll never be able to, as Americans, be able to fully understand or appreciate the --

MR. CARSTENS: I appreciate that question.

I can't tell you from the Q-course side and the BUD side. I don't know the answer to that. I can tell you that SOCOM has put -- SOCOM writ large and SOCOM in Tampa has put a major effort in to try to work through that with the Pentagon. They've been talking to OSD PNR (ph), they've been talking to the Department of the Navy, and Army, and Air Force and such. They have kind of spread out a broad attack to find out what they need to do that would legally allow them to recruit legal aliens.

They've even wrestled with the idea of perhaps coming to you at one point and asking for another Lodge act. These are --

REP. SMITH: The regular forces, there are legal aliens in the regular forces, are there not, or am I wrong about that?

MR. CARSTENS: Sir, they -- you can join the Army, but what SOCOM wants to do is fast track people. You know, if they want to recruit into that population as opposed to having someone just join the Army, they want to focus that spotlight on that.

REP. SMITH: I see, they want to be able to focus their recruitment, not just take them if they come. Okay, I understand that.

MR. CARSTENS: Yes, sir. And I also wanted -- but I can tell you they want to -- they're pushing the edges. Right now, they are talking about legal aliens; they've considered maybe, as I said, another Lodge act.

SOCOM is actively trying to seek to really answer your question, how do we get into a diversified recruitment? How do we find that guy from Botswana? How do we find that guy who just left Syria? How do we bring the men to our culture and train them and then have them become full-fledged SEALs and Green Berets and MARSOC employees.

MR. MARTINAGE: One of the constraints has been the ability or inability of those people to get a security clearance. And the secretary of Defense, I think, recently made some changes to make it possible for some of those naturalized citizens to get expedited security clearance for this exact reason.

The only thing I'd throw in to the mix on this topic is that well, increasing recruitment and expanding the training pipeline are essential. If that just continues, without any improvement on the backend, the maturity of your force is going to go down, it is going to be diluted over time as more and more of these young folks come into the teams.

So that's why retention is really, really important because you need to keep the retention to balance the overall experience level and maturity of these units. So you can't focus just on the recruitment end.

REP. SHUSTER: And I know that we talked to some SEALs and -- not enough spots, and those -- comes down to, I think, well, the question we ask after we talk to folks that wanted to stay in and wanted to serve longer, is this a matter of money. We only funded so many slots, but it seems to me that it's not wise from our side to not keep these guys in that want to continue to be active and serve.

MR. MARTINAGE: I agree sir.

REP. SHUSTER: Thank you, thank you both very much.

REP. SMITH: And we continue to work on that issue with the personnel committee, something we should definitely, definitely take a look at. I've just a couple of more questions. One quick follow-up on that.

In terms of where the SEALs are at with their numbers, how big is the problem in terms of them meeting whatever the expanded requirements are for them in the next five to six years? I'm trying to get an idea of how short the current process is going to leave them in terms of being able to meet the numbers they want.

MR. CARSTENS: Sir, I wish I could give you a good percentage, I can't. I can say that -- I think they're going to have to -- they're challenged. They're challenged in trying to get again people to graduate in the right amount. They are getting about a 130 to 150 graduates every year.

They would love to elevate that, but they just cannot seem to break into the 200, 250 realm no matter what they're doing. I know they're working on it. I -- they are smart guys, I am sure they will figure it out here, you know, any day now.

But another problem, I will just throw out there though is even if they increase the capacity of the school, and let's say where they suddenly start generating 200 to 250 people. Where they are currently, they're going to have to -- they are going to have problems putting people in slots.

There are only so many SEAL platoons and if you suddenly push 250 through you're going to almost be double slotting people in basic SEAL platoons. And yet you've got, you have to do your time in a SEAL platoon --

REP. SMITH: Before you can --

MR. CARSTENS: Before you can rise. So it's almost you want them to create more SEALs and it's almost like you have to create more force structure to create more SEAL platoons to get to the right force structure you want, as you progress through the rank structure through time.

REP. SMITH: I want to follow up on the irregular warfare piece of this, and you'd suggested setting up an irregular warfare command. And I think that speaks to the larger issue of how we sort of get the SOF to cooperate and work more closely with the broader force on the demands that are now so disproportionately placed on SOCOM because a lot of the type of stuff we're talking about counterinsurgency, certainly the indirect action piece, but also the direct action piece, you know, that SOCOM has done so much of is really sort of the future face of the war we're going to be fighting and where we're going to be fighting it.

And one of the ways to sort of get past some of number problems would be to leverage the larger military into that.

And certainly having an irregular warfare command, having a focus on that, having a cooperation, I've heard some other people suggest, just as you had suggested on the -- the ODA is bringing in CIA and Treasury to sort of get that cooperation that you do the same thing with the regular military.

That you start, you know, slotting some of those people out into the force with an ODA or with a SEAL team or with the CJSOTF in different places. I just want you to play out for us a little bit how you envision that happening and also specifically I know the OSD has looked at on how to expand and place more importance on irregular warfare.

We put some language in our bill last year to try to push them in that direction. How is that effort going and where does it need to go to get the level of focus on IW (ph) forcewide, that you think we need?

MR. MARTINAGE: When I was -- the joint irregular warfare command as I envision it, would be under SOCOM. And it was really intended to be sort of the indirect approach counterpart to JSOC and to the direct action.

And the reason for that, sir, is really, there are a combination of things. One is to centralize the -- sort of the material development, the organization, the training, the caring and feeding, the career paths of folks who are in that sort of career specialty.

Because there is some concerns certainly within the Special Forces community that they -- the indirect warfare approach folks don't get the same opportunities, the same training opportunities as the DA folks do.

The second reason to consider doing it is to create a more powerful advocate for the special operations approach to irregular warfare within the broader joint force. So, you know, you go out there either within SOCOM or within DOD trying to push the case for the special operation's answer to this irregular warfare challenge.

It'll be nice to have some more senior folks in that position. I'm not sure if Roger wants to talk about the idea of trying to integrate conventional forces into that that -- to me it gets into some really sticky areas between SOCOM and the other commands.

REP. SMITH: Just quickly on that, how open do you think OSD is to the idea you just described?

MR. MARTINAGE: I'm not sure. OSD, I think, might be reasonably open to the idea. I think the question more is, is SOCOM. I think, SOCOM and the Center for Special Operations in particular, would be very opposed to this idea.

And so there we are, but you know, as I said earlier, you know, its not a coincidence that there has really never been a special forces officer commanding SOCOM, and that all of the SOCOM commanders have come from the direct action community.

And the question is, as you said, if the world we're looking at over time is really more of this persistent irregular warfare where the indirect and clandestine approach is really central, should we do something to build up those guys.

REP. SMITH: I want to drill down this -- I am overtime, but I'm in charge so I'm going to cheat.

I will get to Mr. Langevin just a second. There has been a far -- first of all, I don't know that you can draw such a, you know, a neat line and say that there has never been an indirect action, you know, person be on charge of SOCOM.

Certainly, they've all had that experience, but I think that aside a lot of these folks have done a lot of different things.

MR. MARTINAGE: Right.

REP. SMITH: So I'd be leery of drawing such a bright line distinction. I doubt, you know, outside of, you know, certainly the Rangers, you know, most people who served, certainly in the last four or five years in SOCOM have had occasion to do both in one place or another.

So I think it blends over a little bit and also in talking with the admirals and in talking with General Brown before him and a lot of different folks, you know, there seems to be a lot more emphasis on the indirect action right now within SOCOM.

You know for the importance of this piece, just in, you know, of traveling around and talking with people about it that's my perception. You know, my perception could be wrong but do you -- don't you see SOCOM sort of moving at least a little bit in that direction on their own now?

MR. MARTINAGE: Sure, and just going back to your previous point, I wouldn't make the distinction between direct and indirect so much as between special forces and non-special forces or something from other career path through the direct action community, but anyway that's sort of a minor issue.

REP. SMITH: Okay.

MR. MARTINAGE: But I think yes, I think SOCOM recognizes, and I think they're putting more resources into that area, but I still think you have this perennial, institutional tension between sort of the two sides.

And as was mentioned earlier, you know, okay what explains for instance the fact that white SOF in Afghanistan don't get the list they require 50 percent of the time and the special mission units get whatever they want. And that to me is a real question --

REP. SMITH: I don't question the validity of your overall point, yeah.

MR. MARTINAGE: I mean, I think they're moving in the direction, I just think there is probably more that could be done to balance it.

REP. SMITH: Certainly.

Jim, do you have any more.

REP. LANGEVIN: (Off mike).

REP. SMITH: Bill, this is unfair at the moment, but if you want to say anything else.

REP. SHUSTER: No.

REP. SMITH: One other issue area as far as the theater special operations commanders are concerned, how do you see their role in all of these issues we've raised in terms of interagency, in terms of working with the intelligence side, in terms of working with the broader military.

Do you think that that's effective right now, and how would you -- what makes sense in terms of enhancing and making those things work better focusing on the TSOCs?

MR. MARTINAGE: That's a great question. I've a couple of quick comments. One is I think there is a question about what is the TSOC's role. Is it really supporting the Global Combatant Commander or is it being the instrument through which SOCOM coordinates and synchronizes global operations.

REP. SMITH: It's kind of both.

MR. MARTINAGE: In theory, and I think right now what comes, it's more about supporting the Global Combatant Commander. And the sense I certainly got when we were at SOCOM is, SOCOM is much more interested in how can we help you GCCs, and the TSOCs are a part of that.

And some have suggested that, you know, SOCOM should use the TSOCs as a more powerful instrument for coordinating and synchronizing global activities and for getting these special operations approach attention within the regional combatant commands.

And as part of that, you know, certainly the TSOCs could serve in an interagency taskforce at the regional level within each of the global combatant commands, but I think the question is again coming back to would it be appropriate to give the TSOCs a louder voice in the global combatant commands.

Because you know we face this regular warfare dominant world, where special operations are really central and intensive. And so in making the points with the very much GPF dominated staffs, would it be helpful to say to increase the rank structure or the staffs of the TSOCs.

So for instance in a place like CENTCOM which is, you know, clearly a major area for this irregular warfare indirect and clandestine fight against terrorist groups, should that TSOC commander be a three star. Just to give again, a stronger voice to the special operations community.

REP. SMITH: Mr. Rogers.

MR. CARSTENS: My sense is that the TSOC has a lot of unused potential. If you were to go down to Djibouti, and ask the CJSOTF there or SOCs, however you want to refer to it, a rather small element.

If you were to ask them about the role the TSOC right there -- SOCF (ph), they would say that they'd like them to step up a little more. Right now, they feel that they are part of CTJF, the conventional military's special staff with regards to special operations.

They don't feel that the TSOCs taking an appropriately aggressive role in providing them support and giving them a voice. So in Djibouti they'd say we'd like the TSOC to step up to the plate a little more.

And I think in Afghanistan they felt the same way. They felt that there is such a convoluted approval process for fires and for increasing troops, and I will especially go to fires.

They would like the TSOC to have a stronger more aggressive role in providing them top cover and for giving them a voice. Iraq, I really didn't probably delve into that as much as I needed to, but I will say from two of the three places I visited overseas, they would like the TSOC to step up to the plate and give them more of a voice.

REP. SMITH: Well, thank you. It's all the questions I have. I really, you know, I think the issues you've raised here have been very important. And one of our main focuses on this committee is to try to expand the number of people who are paying attention to this and to try to get, you know, certainly Congress, but also OSD to really focus on this.

There are a lot of issues clearly surrounding our military right now, but as you go forward, as you look at the most important battles that we're going to fight, they are against insurgencies.

Insurgencies attach primarily to the violent extremist ideology that al Qaeda and others are promulgating and its Africa, its Southeast Asia, its Iraq, Afghanistan, and a bunch of other places.

And the lead on this, in my view, in the decades ahead is going to be much more an irregular warfare piece, which is what SOCOM is uniquely qualified to do and has been doing an outstanding job.

But how is not just the military, but how is our entire government apparatus including the intelligences pieces and the State Department piece, how is it structured to fight that counterinsurgency fight.

And right now, I think too much is focused on more Cold War era issues. And I understand, you know, if that's sort of where you came of age and, you know, where the skill sets are, or where the weapons systems are that there is this natural tendency to try to say, no, but this is perfect for the new fight too. We will just pump it around here and make it fit.

But we really, if we are going to effectively fight this, we need to make some shifts. And I think you guys have some great suggestions here and it's the intention of this committee to push the envelope on that in our authorizing bill.

To push for some of these changes you've talked about, which ones we think are well most likely to be successful on with the full committee and with the full House.

But we definitely want to see some of these changes and, you know, I just think you've given us some outstanding ideas and we want to keep up the dialog and continue to work with you as we go about trying to push and implement some of these ideas into the administration and into OSD.

So thank you for your excellent work and we look forward to working with you. And we will also probably submit some questions for the record that we will then get written responses from you as more ideas occur to us after this.

So thank you very much for your work and your testimony and we are adjourned.

END.

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