Federal News Service
HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: DEADLINE FOR BIOMETRIC PASSPORTS
CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE JAMES SENSENBRENNER (R-WI)
WITNESSES: SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN POWELL; AND SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY TOM RIDGE
LOCATION: 2141 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
BODY:
REP. SENSENBRENNER: The committee will be in order. Mr. Conyers and I will give opening statements. Secretary Powell is caught in traffic somewhere between the White House and here, but with Secretary Ridge's permission, we decided to get going.
Mr. Conyers and I will make opening statements. Without objection, other members' opening statements will be included in the record. And both secretaries will testify for about 10 minutes, and then we will have questions under the five-minute rule. I will repeat this after the testimony is concluded, but both secretaries have to leave at noon. I am keeping track of who appears in what order, and people will be recognized alternatively on each side under the five- minute rule, and when we get to noon, wherever we are, we will thank you very much -- (chuckles) -- we hope we thank you very much for saying what you're going to say, and everybody can be on their way.
Today we meet to discuss the October 2004 deadline for countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program to certify that they can issue machine-readable passports that are tamper resistant and incorporate biometric identifiers. The Visa Waiver Program allows travelers from certain designated countries to come to the United States as temporary visitors without having to obtain a non-immigrant visa. There are currently 27 countries participating, and in fiscal year 2002, 13 million foreign visitors entered the United States under the program.
Since its creation in 1986, the program has greatly facilitated travel to the United States from foreign countries-program countries. Through reciprocal arrangements, the program also benefits American international travelers. The Visa Waiver Program was established on the premise that nationals of participating countries pose little security risk or threat of overstaying their period of admittance. This premise may have been true in years past, but it's questionable today.
For example, in February of this year, thousands of blank French passports were stolen from a delivery truck, the third such theft in less than a year. Spain is a Visa Waiver Program country, and it appears that most of the terrorists who carried out the Madrid bombings were Spanish citizens or legal immigrants entitled to passports, which they could have used to travel to the United States under the visa waiver program.
In part to address threats like this, I authored the Enhanced Visa Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002. The act requires that by no later than October 26, 2004, governments of Visa Waiver Program countries must certify that they have programs to issue to their nationals machine-readable passports that are tamper resistant and that incorporate biometric identifiers that comply with the biometric identifier standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
-BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT-
REP. SENSENBRENNER: The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lofgren.
REP. ZOE LOFGREN (D-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And you know, I have found this to be an interesting hearing because, as I've listened, it's become clear to me that while we do need to play a role internationally in setting of standards, the most important thing for us as Americans and as the Congress is to make sure we know who's coming in here, and actually our US-VISIT system does that pretty well. And so, whether or not the request to extend the biometric requirement for passports goes forward, we actually have that protection for us, for US-VISIT individuals.
And I guess one of the questions we might want to ask is whether we extend that US-VISIT model to any non-immigrant visitor who does not have a machine-readable passport. That might actually solve the security issue that we have before us on the international standard, and I think it's something that we ought seriously to consider.
With that, I think that we need to think about how we utilize the data that we obtain and whether we're really getting maximum value out of it. Before I was in Congress and before I was elected to any office, I taught immigration law and I practiced immigration law. And with all due respect, I think the consular officers abroad I think are decent people and hard-working people, I certainly-but they don't have a lot of information. And having someone go in to apply for a visa does not give me a high level of confidence they're going to pick out the bad guy from the good guy because they don't have databases, they don't have information.
I think the ability to identify someone at entry is really in some ways a higher level of competence than what we're going to get with a visit to a consular officer, because you cannot commit identity fraud after you've once been admitted. You can be John Doe the first time, if you're John Smith, you're John Doe forever.
The question is, how do we connect the dots. And that really gets to the database issue where we have substantial need to put resources. And, Secretary Ridge, I was upstairs with Mr. Liscouski. We do not have a merged data list in terms of what our CIA and others have in terms of risk. It's not available to your officers at the airport, it's not available to the State Department visa officers. And furthermore, we don't have any ability to input and connect the identity of entrants to the most significant database, which is the Immigration Service. As you know, they are still creating paper files, they are creating microfiche, they have legacy systems. And so you may know the biometric, you may know who's coming in, but you've got no way to connect that person to their history in the Immigration Service.
So my question to you is, when is that going to change? When are we going to score on that effort to get the databases merged from a security-international security point of view, and then also get the Immigration Service database in line? When's that going to happen?
SEC. RIDGE: First of all, I think at the heart of the president's initiative in the creation of the Terrorist Screening Center is to compile-we have the databases and all the relevant agencies have access to them, but it's very labor intensive. And the ultimate goal, which will be completed, I think, by the end of the summer, is to merge them technologically.
REP. LOFGREN: So that's the end of the summer?
SEC. RIDGE: Yes. I think obviously in the next couple of months, so that not only will we as departments have access to them, but then it's our job to put the technology connect to the borders and to the airports to give them access to that information as well.
REP. LOFGREN: Okay. What about the Immigration Service? You know, I've been here in Congress now for nine years, and for nine years I have asked this question of-you know, obviously a bipartisan question-the Immigration Service is still not technologically efficient. We are paying a price for that.
SEC. RIDGE: We're paying a huge price.
REP. LOFGREN: When are we going to get there?
SEC. RIDGE: Well, first of all, under the leadership of the director of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Eduardo Aguirre, we have begun the process of investing more heavily in technology, to the extent that about 35 or 40 percent of the applications that really, really bog down these-it's a very labor-intensive process-we are putting online --
REP. LOFGREN: Well, but the problem is, you know, the biometrics are more reliable than the names. And your I-94 ought to be filed by your fingerprints and your iris scan, not by your name.
SEC. RIDGE: Correct.
REP. LOFGREN: We're not there, and when are going to be there?
SEC. RIDGE: Well, we've had the department for about a year. Unfortunately, in the previous eight years, when you were in Congress, maybe you never got the answer you wanted --
REP. LOFGREN: And I'm still not.
SEC. RIDGE: Well, you got part of an answer. We're putting about 35 to 40 percent of the applications online. We know that it is absolutely, undisputably technologically deficient, and we know that we have to make significant investments over the next couple of years in bringing it into the 20 -- maybe to the latter 20th century, let alone the 21st century.
REP. SENSENBRENNER: The time of the gentleman (sic) has expired.