United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act

Floor Speech

UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT ACT -- (Extensions of Remarks - September 29, 2008)

SPEECH OF
HON. ADAM B. SCHIFF
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2008

* Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, my friend and colleague from California, Chairman Berman, has work tirelessly over the last year to make this deal better. He has been a great champion of nonproliferation in this House, and he has led many efforts to prod and question the Bush administration on the negotiations with India--pressing for a deal that would enhance our relationship with the world's largest democracy while protecting the global nonproliferation regime and our interests around world. Unfortunately, the administration resisted many of his efforts, and those of others, and I am forced to oppose the final package.

* I believe that our relationship with India is one of our most important. Our interests are inextricably linked, and our economies draw ever closer. In the past, that relationship has been strained by the issue of nuclear proliferation--India never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and continues to build nuclear weapons. The agreement we vote on today began as a valiant attempt to bring India into the nuclear mainstream, while binding our business communities closer together. Unfortunately, it has ended with an agreement that falls short of either goal: the safeguards are not strong enough, the incentive for other nations to proliferate is too great, and while opening India's nuclear market to the world, it places American companies at a competitive disadvantage compared to French and Russian firms.

* Even worse, the ``deal'' is not really a deal at all. The Indian government and the Administration have been issuing contradictory statements about it for the past year. This is not a problem of each side interpreting the treaty differently--the two sides have apparently signed two different treaties. The next time India has a new government, which could be as early as this winter, it may withdraw from the agreement, and the net result of all of this negotiation will be to allow foreign companies to sell nuclear technology to India. No nonproliferation goals would be accomplished, no new business would be generated for American companies, and no new relationship with India would be achieved.

* So, I have a few questions for the administration, which have not been answered, and I think they're important questions to consider as we vote on this proposal.

* When the administration realized that the Indians would not accept a deal that punished them if they decided to test a nuclear weapon, a requirement of the Hyde Act, why did they continue to negotiate?

* When it became clear that the real winners in this deal were the Russians and other nuclear powers that indiscriminately and irresponsibly sell nuclear technology around the world, why didn't we pull out?

* When the administration realized that this deal might undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a treaty that has succeeded in dramatically limiting the number of nuclear nations, why did they not take steps to strengthen other nonproliferation efforts?

* When it became clear that we couldn't get the assurances we needed to stem proliferation, why didn't we shift gears and produce a deal in renewable energy, information technology, or another area that would bring actual benefits to the American economy without harming our national security?

* Some proponents of the deal have said that it brings India into the nonproliferation mainstream. But in fact, India remains free to test nuclear weapons, has not agreed to abide by the Nonproliferation Treaty, has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and will only allow international inspectors access to a few of their civilian power plants. That is not the mainstream.

* India has become a vital partner in a world that has grown dangerous and unpredictable. But tragically, an agreement in any other field would have brought us more, without seriously weakening our efforts to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and South Asia.

* As a strong supporter of improving our relationship with India, but a firm advocate of nonproliferation, I cannot support this agreement, and I must urge my colleagues to oppose it as well.

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