Hearing of the Int. Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Human Rights Subcomm. of the House Int. Rel. Committee-Al Qaeda Threat to the U.S. and its Allies
Federal News Service April 1, 2004 Thursday
Copyright 2004 The Federal News Service, Inc.
Federal News Service
April 1, 2004 Thursday
HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: AL QAEDA THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES
CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE ELTON GALLEGY (R-CA)
WITNESS: COFER BLACK, STATE DEPARTMENT COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
LOCATION: 2172 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
BODY:
REP. GALLEGY: Call the hearing to order.
Today the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights is focusing its oversight responsibility on al Qaeda, which by all accounts remains the number one terrorist threat in the United States and to its people. On March 9th, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director George Tenet underlined this view by warning that al Qaeda terrorists were trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction and planning spectacular attacks against the United States and its allies.
I agree that al Qaeda continues to be a dangerous threat to all of our citizens and to our interests around the world. However, I also believe that al Qaeda has fundamentally reorganized since September the 11th, 2001, and that our counterterrorism strategy needs to reflect the new al Qaeda structure and new al Qaeda strategy. Since they have lost the sanctuary in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has evolved into a much more decentralized organization, relying on either semi-autonomous cells or affiliated groups to carry out its deadly plans. Recent attacks bear out this strategy.
The May 16th, '03 suicide attacks in Casablanca that killed 45 people were carried out by attackers belonging to a local terrorist group who were recruited and trained by al Qaeda. In the November '03 suicide bomb attack in Istanbul that killed 25 people and wounded more than 300, the group that claimed responsibility, Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, is linked to al Qaeda. A few days later, an attack against a bank and British consulate in Istanbul has been tied to another local terrorist group with ties to al Qaeda. Lastly, the preliminary results of the investigation of the Madrid bombings point to the involvement of Moroccan Islamic radicals who are members of the al Salafia-al-why can't we have, you know-Jihadia --
(To staff.) Is that correct? Close?
STAFF: Al Jihadia.
REP. GALLEGY: Al Jihadia-all organizations affiliated with al Qaeda.
These four attacks were executed by four different terrorist groups. However, each of these four organizations are connected either through recruitment training of Afghanistan or localist help, all tied to al Qaeda. They demonstrate that al Qaeda can inflict major casualties with smaller physical infrastructure and more decentralized operations.
Although we must still guard against a large-scale planned attack by Osama bin Laden or other senior al Qaeda leaders, the United States must respond to the threat posed by al Qaeda-affiliated organizations.
On a related matter, I would like to also explore the extent to which al Qaeda is not only an organization but has also become an ideology. Has it spawned completely independent groups or individuals who are bent on killing Americans or citizens with pro-American countries. And are we doing enough to isolate al Qaeda and discredit the radical ideology of bin Laden as part of a long-term strategy to defeat this terrorist organization?
I would like to now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for the purposes of an opening statement. (To Rep. Sherman) And I just want to check, were you going to yield your time to Mr. Schiff or did you want to take the time?
REP. BRAD SHERMAN (D-CA): Well, what I'd like to do is yield three-quarters of the time to Mr. Schiff and confine my-I will-why don't I yield three minutes to the gentleman from Burbank.
REP. GALLEGLY: Very good. The gentleman from Burbank.
REP. SHERMAN: (Off mike.)
REP. GALLEGLY: Very good. Mr. Schiff.
REP. ADAM SCHIFF (D-CA): Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, and Ranking Member Sherman, I want to thank you for your generously loaning me some of your time.
For millions of Americans, last week's hearings of the 9/11 commission were an opportunity to revisit the horror of September 11th. Now, two and a half years after the attacks, we're able to look back at 9/11 and the months that preceded it and ask ourselves what, if anything, we could have done to prevent that calamity that morning. This is properly a job for the 10 commissioners and I trust that their report will be comprehensive and fair, but also unsparing. The murder of 2,996 demands nothing less. Nevertheless, I'd like to offer some thoughts on the conduct of the government in the years leading up to 9/11, for it is a cautionary tale that should guide all of us in thinking about the war on terrorism. I reject those on either side of the aisle who have sought to exploit the attacks for political gain. But that does not mean that we can shrink from fulfilling our duty to exercise oversight of the conduct of the executive branch.
The commission and the joint congressional intelligence panel that investigated the terrorist attacks in 2002 have focused on a multitude of systemic and bureaucratic failures that crippled our ability to piece together the disparate bits of information that the intelligence and law enforcement communities were receiving in the spring and summer of 2001. However, I believe that the root of the problem was a combination of an inability or refusal to imagine that attacks such as those that occurred on September 11th were possible. It was a world view that did not view non-state actors as urgent threats to our national security. The testimony before the 9/11 commission, the report of the joint intelligence panel and numerous media accounts have painted a fairly clear picture of some of our policies towards al Qaeda.
And I think that at the sum of these, we know that in the summer and spring of 2001, American intelligence was picking up an incredibly high volume of information that suggested al Qaeda was planning a major attack against the United States. However, the danger posed by al Qaeda did not fit the threat paradigm that framed our view of the world. Our failure to stop 9/11, if such a thing was even possible, was not a result of bad intelligence or ill will by officials of one administration or those of another. It was, I think, a failure to imagine that such a thing was even possible.
The need to imagine that, trying to separate ourselves from the world view that guides our response to threats and information about possible threats, is especially important now. The al Qaeda of today is different from the al Qaeda of 2001. Like a virus, al Qaeda has evolved and adapted to the U.S.-led war against it. Already defused, it has become less an organization than a banner. Whereas 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, the majority of those arrested in the wake of the Madrid train station attacks were Moroccans. Two days ago, British security services arrested eight suspected terrorists and seized half a ton of ammunition-of-excuse me-ammonium nitrate fertilizer. Those arrested were Islamic extremists, but all had been born and raised in Britain. British officials said that the eight had no known connection to the al Qaeda hierarchy, but can there be any doubt that they were inspired by Osama bin Laden?
President Bush has said that the struggle against al Qaeda will be a long one. I agree with him. I also agree with Richard Clarke, who said that al Qaeda has come to resemble a mythic hydra; where one head is lopped off, two more emerge from the bloody neck. We may have made remarkable inroads in destroying the al Qaeda of 2001, but my question for Ambassador Black is this: Are we making progress against the al Qaeda of 2004?
Again, I thank the chair and ranking member for indulgence, and I look forward to hearing from our witness.
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REP. GALLEGLY: Mr. Schiff.
REP. SHERMAN: Yeah. Before Mr. Schiff speaks, I have a unanimous consent request that all members be given up to seven calendar days to furnish statement for the record.
REP. GALLEGLY: Without objection. In fact, everyone that would like to submit a statement for the record should be given that opportunity. And we will, with the unanimous consent, abide by the seven-day rule.
Mr. Schiff.
REP. SCHIFF: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, I wanted to get your reaction to a quote attributed to an American official closely connected with counterterrorism. This was in a piece by Fareed Zakaria recently where he quotes this official as saying that "states have been getting out of the terror business since the late 1980s. We have kept many governments on the list of state sponsors for political reasons. The reality is that the terror we face is mostly unconnected with states."
Is that an accurate statement? Not necessarily that they're on the list for political reasons, which is obviously a very pejorative connotation, but is the dominant threat we face right now not that of state-sponsored terrorism but rather local groups loosely affiliated, if at all, but bonded by this common murderous ideology?
MR. BLACK: Yes, sir, I think you're absolutely right. I think the trend is towards localized groups.
I would say that the list of the state sponsors of terrorism is one that's very important to us. We look at it very closely. I would take exception with it's there for political reasons. I do counterterrorism, and they're on it for specific reasons of counterterrorism. It's hard to get on this list. It's also hard to get off, and there's a reason for it. We always look at ways, when people meet our requirements-the country, as an example, that's made-that is making good progress is Sudan. You know, they're doing-going through the checklist. They're-they've done a lot of good work. There are some areas that we're very concerned about still, such as --
REP. SCHIFF: Ambassador, I --
MR. BLACK: Please.
REP. SCHIFF: I don't need to defend that particular point --
MR. BLACK: Yeah.
REP. SCHIFF: -- which is the least interesting, from my point of view. Apr 01, 2004 12:10 ET .EOF
MR. BLACK: Right.
REP. SCHIFF: But you do concur with the view that the predominant threat right now is not from states and their sponsorship, but rather from these loosely affiliated local organizations?
MR. BLACK: I think the trend is in that direction. They're both dangerous. A state sponsor can utilize these groups to its own advantage --
REP. SCHIFF: Well, I'd imagine that they --
MR. BLACK: -- and there are associations. Take-Iran and Hezbollah would be one example. But the trend is towards localized groups that are less connected.
REP. SCHIFF: Well, and the-you know, the state sponsorship may be critical in terms of the really potent terrorist weapons, like a nuclear device or radioactive device, et cetera. But if then the predominant threat today is these local groups that share this global ideology-the Bush doctrine is very general; it's more like a goal than an operational strategy.
Tell me, if you would, your view of what this ideology is that links these disparate groups of people? Because unless we have a clear understanding of the ideology, and we fight the ideology as well as those who carry the ideology, we're not going to be successful. It's obviously more than simple anti-Americanism because they're blowing up Saudis and Indonesians and fellow Muslims. It goes beyond those that have been working as allies in the war on terrorism. What is the essence of this ideology, and what is our strategy for going after it?
MR. BLACK: The essence of the ideology, I think, is to overturn the trend of current events, to impose one's own vision of Islam and how society should be organized upon others. If you look as an example, I think it's very instructive to look at the al Qaeda organization, where even before 9/11 you had examples-I say examples of maps of the world where they planned to have the whole planet go-their favorite color is green-have it all go green.
The objectives are comprehensive. A part of this strategy to impose their will on others is the acceptance this will be a long struggle, it will take a long time. And to a certain extent, al Qaeda's objective was to get this process in motion, to enlist others to their aid. There have been some aspects of our modern life that have facilitated this process: television, the Internet, our forms of communication used to co-opt localized groups into the objective of overturning the establishment to set up a brand of Islam that is extremely conservative and is based on-that is achieved by the use of terrorism.
REP. SCHIFF: What is our strategy to combat that ideology? And given how unpopular we are around the world right now, doesn't that pose a real problem for us in the-essentially the propaganda war that's going on? How can we be successful when much of the world has such a violent animosity towards the United States right now?
MR. BLACK: This strategy is based upon empowering the international community. Build a coalition of nations first of all to conduct those law enforcement, intelligence and legal activities that protect innocent people from attack.
REP. SCHIFF: Can you --
MR. BLACK: And then the next-and then to go beyond that, if you're looking at the underlying causes, you do have a lot of work to do there to get out a message. And even in the State Department we have a new assistant secretary, Margaret Tutwiler, who is looking at the public diplomacy aspects.
These are areas that we're looking at and need to do a better job at to get our message out.
REP. SCHIFF: Thank you, Ambassador.
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