Hearing of the Int. Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights Subcomm. of the House Int. Rel. Committee-Al Qaeda Threat to the U.S. and its Allies

Federal News Service April 1, 2004 Thursday
Copyright 2004 The Federal News Service, Inc.
Federal News Service

April 1, 2004 Thursday

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: AL QAEDA THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES

CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE ELTON GALLEGY (R-CA)

WITNESS: COFER BLACK, STATE DEPARTMENT COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

LOCATION: 2172 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:

REP. GALLEGY: Call the hearing to order.

Today the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights is focusing its oversight responsibility on al Qaeda, which by all accounts remains the number one terrorist threat in the United States and to its people. On March 9th, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director George Tenet underlined this view by warning that al Qaeda terrorists were trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction and planning spectacular attacks against the United States and its allies.

I agree that al Qaeda continues to be a dangerous threat to all of our citizens and to our interests around the world. However, I also believe that al Qaeda has fundamentally reorganized since September the 11th, 2001, and that our counterterrorism strategy needs to reflect the new al Qaeda structure and new al Qaeda strategy. Since they have lost the sanctuary in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has evolved into a much more decentralized organization, relying on either semi-autonomous cells or affiliated groups to carry out its deadly plans. Recent attacks bear out this strategy.

The May 16th, '03 suicide attacks in Casablanca that killed 45 people were carried out by attackers belonging to a local terrorist group who were recruited and trained by al Qaeda. In the November '03 suicide bomb attack in Istanbul that killed 25 people and wounded more than 300, the group that claimed responsibility, Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, is linked to al Qaeda. A few days later, an attack against a bank and British consulate in Istanbul has been tied to another local terrorist group with ties to al Qaeda. Lastly, the preliminary results of the investigation of the Madrid bombings point to the involvement of Moroccan Islamic radicals who are members of the al Salafia -- al -- why can't we have, you know -- Jihadia --

(To staff.) Is that correct? Close?

STAFF: Al Jihadia.

REP. GALLEGY: Al Jihadia -- all organizations affiliated with al Qaeda.

These four attacks were executed by four different terrorist groups. However, each of these four organizations are connected either through recruitment training of Afghanistan or localist help, all tied to al Qaeda. They demonstrate that al Qaeda can inflict major casualties with smaller physical infrastructure and more decentralized operations.

Although we must still guard against a large-scale planned attack by Osama bin Laden or other senior al Qaeda leaders, the United States must respond to the threat posed by al Qaeda-affiliated organizations.

On a related matter, I would like to also explore the extent to which al Qaeda is not only an organization but has also become an ideology. Has it spawned completely independent groups or individuals who are bent on killing Americans or citizens with pro-American countries. And are we doing enough to isolate al Qaeda and discredit the radical ideology of bin Laden as part of a long-term strategy to defeat this terrorist organization?

I would like to now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for the purposes of an opening statement. (To Rep. Sherman) And I just want to check, were you going to yield your time to Mr. Schiff or did you want to take the time?

REP. BRAD SHERMAN (D-CA): Well, what I'd like to do is yield three-quarters of the time to Mr. Schiff and confine my -- I will -- why don't I yield three minutes to the gentleman from Burbank.

REP. GALLEGLY: Very good. The gentleman from Burbank.

REP. SHERMAN: (Off mike.)

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REP. SHERMAN: Thank you. It is said that there's nothing we could have done. The fact is that after the East Africa bombings, after the Cole or upon the inauguration of the new administration, we could have initiated the very policies that we adopted in the fall of 2001, and we would have been justified in doing so. In the fall of 2001, we took action, which so far has prevented al Qaeda -- with, I might add, some good luck on our part -- from carrying out an attack here in the United States.

I want to contrast what we did with Afghanistan for harboring al Qaeda, on the one hand, and our approach toward Iran. Iran harbors at least three major al Qaeda figures. They acknowledge it. They say these folks are in custody. I guess Club Med could be "in custody." They say they'll put them on trial. So far that hasn't happened.

I draw attention to the "big three" of al Qaeda in Iran: bin Laden's son, Saad, who is of course a Saudi citizen; Saif al-Adel, the operative most likely to have masterminded the planning of the May 3rd -- or rather the May '03 Riyadh bombings while -- and he probably did that while he was in Iran.

He is an Egyptian, Ibn Sulaiman (Abu Ghaith ?), a self-styled spokesman for al Qaeda who is a Kuwaiti national. There are others.

Afghanistan harbored al Qaeda; we invaded. Iran harbors al Qaeda; we give the green light to Japan to send Iran $2.8 billion in oil investments. We ignore the Iran-Libyan sanction act or use all of the outs and waivers in it. We try to bring international attention to Iran's nuclear program, but we've used up so much of the world's goodwill by how we've dealt with Iraq. And then finally, we import $150 million of caviar and carpets from Iran, and we do that because even the slightest inconvenience of our business is not something we're willing to do to bring pressure on a nation that is harboring al Qaeda, major figures, including one of bin Laden's sons, and is building nuclear weapons to someday smuggle into American cities.

I yield back.

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REP. BRAD SHERMAN (D-CA): Al Qaeda killed 3,000 of us. They were hoping at that time that they had killed well over 10,000. Timothy McVeigh proved that you don't have to be a rocket scientist to kill 200 Americans. In fact, the very techniques he used could be used right now.

Has al Qaeda not engaged in an attack that would result in a hundred or 200 or 300 American deaths on our soil because they're unable to, they don't even have a Timothy McVeigh capacity, or because they're unwilling to because they've set such a high standard for themselves --

MR. BLACK: Right.

REP. SHERMAN: -- that they don't want to cheapen their brand name by engaging in something less spectacular?

MR. BLACK: Sure. The problem that they have encountered is lack of capability. They have more than enough will and determination. Were they to have the --

REP. SHERMAN: We know know that they have the will and the determination to do another -- you know, if they have the capacity to do another huge attack.

MR. BLACK: Correct.

REP. SHERMAN: Are you saying they lack the capacity to fill a Ryder truck filled with fertilizer and park it in an apartment building in my district? Do they lack that capacity or are they simply unwilling to engage in such banal and unspectacular attacks?

MR. BLACK: I think the decision-making process, the ability to process operational activity is increasingly difficult for them. It is a challenge for them to conduct this type of attack.

REP. SHERMAN: When you say this type of attack, even --

MR. BLACK: I am saying it's not easy. That's what I'm saying.

REP. SHERMAN: Even a Timothy McVeigh, two guys in a Ryder truck and a bunch of fertilizer -- even the sophistication shown by a couple of guys, al Qaeda doesn't have that level of operational capacity in the United States?

MR. BLACK: I would say that under the current very aggressive law enforcement action, the procedures that have been taken as a result of the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security -- what I'm saying, what I'm trying to convey is it's harder than it was before --

REP. SHERMAN: Oh, we know that. I didn't doubt that.

MR. BLACK: Yeah, I know, but I'm just trying to make an operational point here, Congressman. I'm saying, you know, it is -- there are challenges involved to maintain operational security, to accumulate all of this stuff, to have a casing plan of a target that is reflective and something that they can move against. So I am saying if they could do it, they would do it. That's what I'm saying.

REP. SHERMAN: So you're saying if they could kill 150 Americans the way Timothy McVeigh did, they would. The fact that they haven't isn't because they don't want to engage in that level of attack, it is because they can't engage in that level of attack.

I'll move onto another question. This one I just want you to respond for the record.

You told us that if al Qaeda was harbored by a nation that the full power and accountability of the United States would be brought to bear. Bringing in carpets and caviar or acquiescing to a $2.8 billion investments, waiving the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act -- I wonder which of these are the retribution that we've imposed upon Iran for harboring the three al Qaeda well-knowns, not to mention the others. It is absolutely shocking that we continue, for no reason except the taste for caviar, as far as I can figure, to import caviar and carpets from Iran.

Now, if we had -- well, they didn't hit us on September 11th until they got all their ducks in a row. They even killed a major figure in northern Afghanistan and made sure that went well; thus, in their own minds, depriving us of the easiest methodology for getting back at them. We got back at them in Afghanistan anyway, but without the charismatic leader that they assassinated. If we had adopted right after the Cole was hit the same policy that we adopted after September 11th, would al Qaeda have gone forward?

That is to say, if we were threatening the Taliban in November and December of 2000, if we were invading Afghanistan in January or February of 2000, would al Qaeda have gone forward with September 11th, and would they have been able to do so?

MR. BLACK: I don't know, Congressman.

REP. SHERMAN: So it could have saved us; we don't know.

MR. BLACK: I do not -- I can't speculate. I don't know what would or would not have happened under those circumstances.

REP. SHERMAN: Well, this is, I think, the first time the administration has said that there was anything that could have been done a year before September 11th that might have prevented it.

And I believe my time has expired.

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REP. SHERMAN: Yeah. Before Mr. Schiff speaks, I have a unanimous consent request that all members be given up to seven calendar days to furnish statement for the record.

REP. GALLEGLY: Without objection. In fact, everyone that would like to submit a statement for the record should be given that opportunity. And we will, with the unanimous consent, abide by the seven-day rule.

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