ADA Amendments Act of 2008
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 -- (House of Representatives - September 17, 2008)
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Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman.
I thank the distinguished majority leader and the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner). Under their leadership, the House passed the ADA Amendments Act in June by an overwhelming vote of 402-17.
The Senate, under the leadership of Senators HARKIN and HATCH, has taken up our bipartisan call to restore the promise of the ADA and has passed a nearly identical bill, S. 3406.
Like the House bill, S. 3406 overturns Supreme Court decisions that have narrowed the scope of protection under the ADA. These decisions have created a catch-22, in which an individual who is able to lessen the adverse impact of an impairment by use of a mitigating measure like medicine or a hearing aid can be fired from a job or otherwise face discrimination on the basis of that impairment and yet not be considered sufficiently disabled to be protected by the ADA. Congress never intended such an absurd result.
Like the House bill, S. 3406 cures this problem by prohibiting courts from considering ``mitigating measures''--things like medicine, prosthetic devices, hearing aids, or the body's own compensation and ability to adapt--when determining whether an individual is disabled. On this important point, S. 3406 retains the exact same language as H.R. 3195.
S. 3406 also retains the House language on the treatment of episodic conditions, major life activities, claims brought under the ``regarded as'' prong of the definition, regulatory authority, and conforming the definition contained in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act so that entities covered by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act operate under a consistent standard.
While the approach taken in the two bills is somewhat different, congressional intent and the result achieved by both bills is the same.
Both bills make clear that the courts and Federal agencies have set the standard for qualifying as disabled under the ADA too high. Both bills reject court and agency interpretation of the term ``substantially limits'' as ``preventing'' or ``significantly restricting'' the ability to perform a major life activity. Both bills require the courts and Federal agencies to set a less demanding standard by interpreting the term ``substantially limits'' more generously to ensure broad coverage for the wide range of individuals with disabilities.
For that reason, I support and urge all of you to join me in supporting S. 3406. These changes are long overdue. Countless Americans with disabilities have already been deprived of the opportunity to prove that they have been victims of discrimination, that they are qualified for a job, or that a reasonable accommodation would afford them an opportunity to participate fully at work and in community life.
It is our sincere hope that, with less fighting over who is or is not disabled, we will finally be able to focus on the important questions: Is an individual qualified? And might a reasonable accommodation afford that person the same opportunities that his or her neighbors enjoy? Our Nation simply cannot afford to squander the talents and contributions of our people based on antiquated misconceptions about people with disabilities.
I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for passage of S. 3406 and restoring the ADA to its rightful place among this Nation's great civil rights laws.
I thank the gentleman again.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 3406, the ``ADA Amendments Act of 2008.''
I thank the distinguished Majority Leader, the gentleman from Maryland, and the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Under their leadership, the House passed the ADA Amendments Act (H.R. 3195) in June by an overwhelming vote of 402-17.
The Senate, under the leadership of Senators Harkin and Hatch, has taken up our bipartisan call to restore the promise of the ADA and has passed a nearly identical bill, S. 3406.
Like the House bill, S. 3406 overturns Supreme Court decisions that have narrowed the scope of protection under the ADA. These decisions have created a Catch-22, in which an individual who is able to lessen the adverse impact of an impairment by use of a mitigating measure like medicine or a hearing aid can be fired from a job or otherwise face discrimination on the basis of that impairment and yet not be considered sufficiently disabled to be protected by the ADA. Congress never intended such an absurd result.
Like the House bill, S. 3406 cures this problem by prohibiting courts from considering ``mitigating measures''--things like medicine, prosthetic devices, hearings aids, or the body's own compensation and ability to adapt--when determining whether an individual is disabled. On this important point, S. 3406 retains the exact same language as H.R. 3195.
S. 3406 also retains the House language on the treatment of episodic conditions, major life activities, claims brought under the ``regarded as'' prong of the definition, regulatory authority, and conforming the definition contained in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act so that entities covered by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act operate under a consistent standard.
Over the past two Congresses, the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the Committee on the Judiciary has studied these issues extensively, holding multiple hearings and meetings with stakeholders in the disability and business communities. Our colleagues in the House Committee on Education and Labor have done the same. The findings and insights that we presented in the committee reports accompanying H.R. 3195 reflect our understanding and intent regarding the language shared by H.R. 3195 and S. 3406 and should guide courts and Federal agencies when interpreting and applying these aspects of the amended definition of disability.
While the language of the House and Senate bills is identical in most respects, the bills differ in how they address the term ``substantially limits'' in the ADA's definition of disability. But while the approach taken in the bills is different, congressional intent and the result achieved by both bills is the same.
Both bills make clear that the courts and Federal agencies have set the standard for qualifying as disabled under the ADA too high. Both bills reject court and agency interpretation of the term ``substantially limits'' as ``preventing'' or ``significantly restricting'' the ability to perform a major life activity. Both bills require the courts and federal agencies to set a less demanding standard by interpreting the term ``substantially limits'' more generously to ensure broad coverage for the wide range of individuals with disabilities.
In H.R. 3195, we achieved these goals by redefining the term ``substantially limits'' to mean ``materially restricts.'' Thus, to show a ``substantial''--meaning ``material'' rather than ``significant'' limitation--an individual need show only an important or noticeable limit on the ability to perform a major life activity. This is not an onerous burden.
As explained in the Senate statement of managers, they chose an alternate route to achieve the same result. Rather than redefining the term ``substantially limits,'' the Senate left this language intact but, through findings and purposes and a statutory rule of construction, rejected court and agency interpretation of this term as meaning ``prevents'' or ``significantly restricts.'' Like our bill, S. 3406 directs the courts and Federal agencies to set a lower standard that provides broad coverage. As explained in the Senate Statement of Managers, their bill--like ours--ensures that the burden of showing that an impairment limits one's ability to perform common activities is not onerous.
Thus, while the approach taken is different, the intent--and the standard established by both bills--is identical. As such, the guidance provided in House reports regarding application of this less burdensome standard for showing a ``substantial'' limitation remains valid and relevant, with the exception of our use of a ``spectrum'' of severity to describe a relative level of limitation. With regard to the ``spectrum,'' we accept concerns expressed by Senator KENNEDY that this could be construed as keeping the standard inappropriately high, and reject the usefulness of this approach.
Like H.R. 3195, the lower standard demanded by S. 3406 will provide broad coverage, consistent with how courts had approached cases under the Rehabilitation Act prior to enactment of the ADA, where individuals with a wide range of physical and mental impairments such as epilepsy, diabetes, multiple sclerosis and intellectual and developmental disabilities qualified for protection, even where a mitigating measure might lessen the impact of their impairment. In most of these cases, defendants and the courts simply accepted that a plaintiff was a member of the protected class and moved on to the merits of the case. Congress expected and intended the same thing when it passed the ADA in 1990, and we are again attempting to make this crystal clear. As stated in S. 3406, the focus should be on whether discrimination has occurred and ``the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis.''
Under the lower standard for qualifying as disabled, for example, an individual who is disqualified from his or her job of choice because of an impairment should be considered substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Previously, in providing guidance on what the term ``substantially limits'' means with respect to the major life activity of working, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission indicated that ``the inability to perform a single, particular job'' was not a ``substantial'' (i.e.,
``significant'') enough limitation. S. 3406 states that interpreting ``substantial'' to require a ``significant'' limitation sets too high a standard and that we expect the EEOC to redefine this portion of its regulations. Naturally, this change will require reconsideration of the meaning of ``substantial'' limitation in the major life activity of working, as well as other major life activities.
The courts and Federal agencies also will be called upon to interpret our changes to the third, ``regarded as'' prong of the definition. These changes are identical in S. 3406 and H.R. 3195. As we made clear in our committee reports, an individual meets the requirement of being ``regarded as having such an impairment'' if the individual shows that a prohibited action was taken based on an actual or perceived impairment, regardless of whether this impairment limits (or is perceived to limit) performance of a major life activity. Thus, an individual with an actual or perceived impairment who is disqualified from a job, program, or service and who alleges that the disqualification was based on the actual or perceived impairment is a member of the protected class and then entitled to prove that the adverse action violated the ADA.
In clarifying the scope of protection under the third, ``regarded as'' prong of the definition, we also clarified that reasonable accommodation need not be provided for those individuals who qualify for coverage only because they have been ``regarded as'' disabled. We, and the Senate, expressed our confidence that individuals who need accommodations will receive them because, with reduction in the burden of showing a ``substantial limitation,'' those individuals also qualify for coverage under prongs 1 or 2 (where accommodation still is required). Of course, our clarification here does not shield qualification standards, tests, or other selection criteria from challenge by an individual who is disqualified based on
such standard, test, or criteria. As is currently required under the ADA, any standard, test, or other selection criteria that results in disqualification of an individual because of an impairment can be challenged by that individual and must be shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity or necessary for the program or service in question.
The changes made by S. 3406 are long overdue. Countless Americans with disabilities have already been deprived of the opportunity to prove that they have been victims of discrimination, that they are qualified for a job, or that a reasonable accommodation would afford them an opportunity to participate fully at work and in community life.
Like our bill, S. 3406 ensures that individuals like Mary Ann Pimental--a mother and nurse who died from breast cancer a few months after the courts told her that her cancer was too temporary and short-lived to qualify her for protection from job discrimination under the ADA--are covered by the law when they need it. S. 3406 also ensures vital protections for our returning veterans. Thousands of our brave men and women in uniform are returning home with serious injuries, including the loss of limbs, head trauma, and a variety of other life-altering injuries. These veterans have faced great risk and sacrificed much in service of their country and should return home knowing that they are protected from discrimination.
It is our sincere hope that, with less battling over who is or is not disabled, we will finally be able to focus on the important questions--is an individual qualified? And might a reasonable accommodation afford that person the same opportunities that his or her neighbors enjoy? Our Nation simply cannot afford to squander the talents and contributions of our people based on antiquated misconceptions about people with disabilities.
I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for passage of S. 3406 and restoring the ADA to its rightful place among this Nation's great civil rights laws.
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