Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008

EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008 -- (House of Representatives - September 29, 2008)

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Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you.

Like the Iraq war and the PATRIOT Act, this bill is fueled by fear and hinges on haste. So much is missing. There is:

No requirement that Wall Street pay a dime for the damage it caused or the cleanup cost; though a future President can request that Congress do what it declines to do today.

No meaningful limitation on outrageous executive pay; like the war, there is no shared sacrifice; only rewards for the greedy and more burdens for the needy.

No complete bar on American taxpayers having to bail out the Bank of China--and the entire world.

No guarantee taxpayers will not be overcharged for buying toxic debts that no one else wants.

No guarantee taxpayers get a fair share in future profits of those who are bailed out.

Yes, every one of these concerns receives cosmetic attention in this bill. Not even Avon or Mary Kay can compete with the cosmetics in this bill. It's 100 pages--much better indeed--but three pages of what Secretary Paulson would do and 97 pages of what Secretary Paulson could do, plus excuses for approving most of his three pages.

It aspires, but it seldom requires. All of us want to avoid further economic deterioration. Action or inaction today

Congressman LLOYD DOGGETT's assertions about the shortcomings of the legislation are supported by the following citations to the bill:

(1) ``No requirement that Wall Street pay a dime.'' Section 134 (After 5 years, the President need only submit a proposal, which he may or may not support, to Congress, which it may or may not approve, for recouping any shortfall from the financial industry.)

(2) ``No meaningful limitation on outrageous executive pay.'' See Section 111 (Providing limited and vague restrictions on executive compensation and golden parachute payments. Even these very modest provisions apply only during the period of the bailout or as long as the Treasury actually holds the company's debt or equity.)

(3) ``No bar on American taxpayers having to bailout the Bank of China.'' See Section 101(e) (Includes no prohibition on any American institution acquiring troubled assets owned by foreign institutions and reselling them to the Treasury.); Section 3(9) (Subsection (a) defines bailout-qualified ``troubled assets'' as mortgage-related securities created before March 14, 2008, but then subsection (b) then grants essentially unlimited authority for the Treasury Secretary to buy any asset he chooses; neither subsection applies a limitation regarding the date upon which the asset was acquired); see also Section 112 (In certain circumstances, foreign banks holding troubled assets may also sell these assets to the Treasury.)

(4) ``No guarantee that taxpayers will not be overcharged for buying toxic debts.'' See Section 101(e) (expresses concern about unjust enrichment while at the same time granting the Secretary of the Treasury unfettered discretion in purchasing troubled assets.)

(5) ``No guarantee that taxpayers really share in future profits of those bailed out.'' See Section 113(d) (The value of any stock warrants received for troubled assets is at the discretion of the same Treasury Secretary who has made clear he does not want the warrants.)

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