Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee - The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Are We Building Domestic Defenses That Will Make the Nation Safer?
Statement
SEN. SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME): Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The global nuclear detection architecture, overseen by the DNDO, is a vital component of our nation's defenses against a terrorist nuclear attack. That architecture is an elaborate and expansive structure involving the departments of Defense, State, Energy and Homeland Security.
Its operations encompass work by crews of Coast Guard vessels, Customs and Border Protection cargo screeners at U.S. and foreign seaports and many others all comprising a multilayered defensive screen to detect nuclear materials.
The SAFE Port Act, which I co-authored, enhanced such efforts by requiring that all cargo containers be scanned for radiation at the 22 largest American seaports, covering 98 percent of cargo coming into this country. That law also strengthened the Container Security Initiative which targets inspection of high-risk cargo at foreign ports.
The architecture's multilayered, cross-departmental, international orientation against multiple and shifting threats relies on a system of systems. Assessing the effectiveness of that approach is the purpose of this hearing.
Today's witnesses can give us valuable insights into the challenges that the DNDO confronts and which Congress must consider as we make additional decisions about the structures, resources, operations and authorities of our global nuclear detection architecture. Detecting nuclear materials in transit at seaports, at points of entry before they reach target areas and can be detonated is obviously of the highest priority.
As the recent example of drug smugglers using submersibles to smuggle tons of cocaine demonstrates, however, our enemies seek ways to avoid our efforts. They have many options: using all-terrain vehicles to cross the long stretches of wooded land borders in Maine and Minnesota, for example; piloting small boats into isolated inlets along our coast, or flying small aircraft low into unpopulated areas to land on fields in the Southwest.
Technologies and multilayered defenses can help, but we can never be sure of blocking every path that determined enemies might select to reach targets in our homeland. That sobering conclusion clearly underscores the need to keep our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities at the highest levels of skills and readiness. It also highlights the importance of reducing the chances that nuclear materials can ever be obtained by terrorists.
Our first line of defense must be working with domestic and foreign partners to ensure that nuclear materials are secured and accounted for and to use our best diplomatic efforts to prevent or minimize nuclear proliferation. The more effectively we can pursue those efforts the lighter will be the burden that rests on our global nuclear detection architecture.
Nevertheless, we know that those efforts are imperfect and thus we must make sure that the architecture is as strong and robust as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Mr. Nesbit, I want to follow up with you on the issue of setting priorities. Obviously part of the challenge that we face is allocating limited resources across -- to reduce our vulnerabilities to all types of WMDs. And this is an area where the Defense Science Board has done a lot of work and discuss this topic in terms of prevention, response, mitigation, recovery, as well as detection.
The DSB report from the summer of 2005 proposes a system to prevent nuclear attack that obviously includes more than just relying on detection. The system that you recommended includes enhanced intelligence capabilities and improved counterproliferation regime and greater domestic preparedness. And these are all issues that this committee has been examining and held hearings on.
Give us your advice on how we should allocate resources across those five areas of prevention, response, mitigation, recovery and detection.
MR. NESBIT: In the report we had some detailed numbers on that very issue -- across all the WMD modalities. We thought the number one area needing increased emphasis was on the prevention of acquisition. So in the intelligence area and the diplomatic area, that was far and away, we thought, the most under-resourced in this topic. And second, we thought the consequence management following the event would be the second priority.
We had specific numbers in there of -- that across all the modalities totaled up to $4.1 billion.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Now, looking within DNDO, DNDO reported to Congress that it spent approximately $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2007 for 74 programs included in the global nuclear detection architecture. And of this amount, ($)1.1 billion was allocated to combating international nuclear smuggling and ($)220 million was devoted to border security measures.
I'm going to ask Mr. Shea and Mr. Maurer this question as well, but let me start with you, Mr. Nesbit.
Looking within DNDO on the allocation of funding on fighting nuclear smuggling versus border security measures, do you think that the priorities are right within DNDO?
MR. NESBIT: We recommended that more emphasis be placed on mobile non-overt sensing. So instead of these big large things that sat there every day, you had things that could move around that terrorists would not know where they might be and that if you ship something and it took three weeks to get to the United States you'd have no idea whether you would be detected or not. We thought that was a critical element that ought to be high on their list.
SEN. COLLINS: Actually, the University of Maine is developing a smart sensor that can be placed on a container to monitor, detect any tampering and also detect radiological, biological or chemical contamination or dangerous materials. It's fascinating work, as that is a big challenge.
Mr. Shea, Mr. Maurer, the same question for you. Within DNDO, the allocation of funding for international nuclear smuggling versus border security measures, do we have it right?
Mr. Shea.
MR. SHEA: Thank you for that question, Senator Collins. As I understand DNDO's allocation of program investment to their architecture, these are the programmatic budget numbers for the programs in these other agencies that are aligned to DNDO's baseline architecture. And so to a great extent the budget that is being spent in these layers that DNDO has identified are other agency budgets, especially in the area outside of the United States.
And I think that what the best balance in the architecture is will be an output of further refinement and optimization of the global nuclear detection architecture and will be an identification of priorities from this baseline moving forward. And so I think that that would be something that would come out of DNDO's further analysis of this initial baseline.
SEN. COLLINS: Mr. Maurer, has GAO looked at that aspect of DNDO yet -- the allocation across the various programs?
MR. MAURER: We haven't done a detailed analysis of the various allocations of funds. But I think what I would say is that I think it's difficult to really make an assessment of whether or not they're making the right resource allocation decisions, absent of having some kind of strategic plan that sort of clearly lays out their priorities.
I think one of the things we're calling for today is developing an overarching strategic plan that would really initiate a debate within the administration, hopefully involving the Congress as well about where those resource allocation decisions should be made. Should there be more emphasis on the international programs, or should there be more emphasis on the domestic programs?
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Mr. Gallaway, you mentioned that the Coast Guard boarding teams are equipped with radiation devices, and that obviously is very important. An important layer of the nuclear detection architecture is the role played by first responders -- by state and local police, firefighters and other emergency response personnel.
Our previous hearings have made very clear that they are the ones who are going to be first on the scene if there were a nuclear incident or the explosion of a dirty bomb, and thus, they need access to effective radiation detection equipment to protect themselves and also to provide situational awareness to the public and to the leaders who are making decisions. What steps has DNDO taken to ensure that state and local responders have effective radiation detection equipment available?
MR. GALLAWAY: Senator Collins, right now the DNDO mission has been pretty much exclusively focused on preventative rad/nuc detection, in other words, preventing use of a nuclear weapon. We have not entered into the response and recovery part which I think is what you're asking about.
The department is leading an interagency discussion right now to figure out how the executive branch should deal with response and the different roles and responsibilities. And then within DHS we're going through a discussion to decide who's responsible for the various components.
SEN. COLLINS: Isn't DNDO responsible for testing and evaluation of detection equipment for making the acquisition decisions as far as which equipment should be at the federal level available to the Coast Guard and CBP, for example?
MR. GALLAWAY: Yes, ma'am.
But we're focused on the equipment that would be used to detect a weapon before it's been used.
SEN. COLLINS: But wouldn't that kind of equipment -- the information about standards and testing be very helpful, for example, to the New York Police Department which has a robust effort to detect as well as to respond?
MR. GALLAWAY: I guess I would argue that the detection equipment you need before an event is to actually find -- just find the device or find radiological material, whereas, when you're doing detection after an event, that's for public safety and personal health of the first responders, as you mentioned, and also subsequently the public that might come back into the area, and so, two very different missions.
Sort of the basic detection technology might be similar, but I think it would be employed in very different ways, and also the standards are very different. The standards, for example, in response and recovery, many of the standards have already been set over many years by federal agencies. I would recommend that we would build upon those and come up with maybe some overarching ones now.
SEN. COLLINS: I guess what I would suggest to you is that in -- even when we're talking about detection and not looking at response, that involving state and local first responders is a very important part of the architecture and of our ability to detect --
MR. GALLAWAY: I'm sorry, ma'am, I misunderstood. We engage the state and local folks. For example, the Securing the Cities Initiative in the New York City region, that is -- we've got state involvement, local involvement, as well as federal involvement, and they are working very closely together to develop the detection technology that would be used by all of the local responders -- both police and firefighters -- but again, from a preventative perspective.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gallaway, the Science and Technology Directorate within the Department of Homeland Security has expertise and is responsible for testing and evaluating a wide range of Homeland Security technology that would be used by the department to respond to a wide range of threats. In light of that, does it make sense for DNDO to also have responsibility for testing and evaluation?
MR. GALLAWAY: Yes, I think there's a reason for having two sets of test organizations. As we're developing a new device, we need to do what we call developmental testing, and this is where the program office is making sure that the device is progressing logically as it moves towards a final system. I think that kind of testing should definitely be done by the program office.
On the other hand, the operational testing to assure that the device meets the requirements of the end customer should be done by an independent organization. We are now starting down that road with one of our new detection systems where we are going to the operational test authority within the Science and Technology Directorate -- George Ryan -- and he will be leading the operational testing of our new device.
And so I'm very comfortable with that relationship, where we do the developmental testing and an independent organization does the operational testing.
SEN. COLLINS: The GAO has been quite critical of DNDO's testing of the advanced spectroscopic portal monitor which has been going on since 2005. Last year DHS indicated that it was nearing certification of the system, but then operational and other concerns were raised by Customs and Border Protection and the secretary's certification was delayed until sometime this year.
Doesn't that suggest -- or does that suggest that DNDO does not have a sufficiently well defined and rigorous testing and evaluation program? What went wrong on the ASP testing?
MR. GALLAWAY: Well, the ASP testing that was done last year was done all within DNDO. We learned a tremendous amount during that process. We actually think some of the criticism of the testing that was done was not well founded. With that said, we are in the process right now of going through ASP test series. We've just come out of system qualification testing, which is actually done by the vendors.
As we speak, we have just moved into technical performance testing at the Nevada test site. Very shortly we will do a test readiness review to move into integration testing, which will be done at Pacific Northwest Nationals Labs, which we call integration testing where see that all the parts work together. Assuming everything continues to look good at that point, the systems will be handed to the Customs and Border Protection folks for a field validation where their folks actually run them at ports of entry to assure that they're meeting their needs.
And then finally -- in getting back to the operational test component -- an independent tester from the S&T Directorate will come in and do an operational test to assure that the systems are working to meet the requirements that were laid down.
So I think we've laid down a very vigorous series of testing. We have run this system through probably the most rigorous test -- series of tests that have ever been conducted on a nuclear detection device and we're confident that the systems will be well tested.
SEN. COLLINS: Mr. Mullen, my last question is for you. In response to questions from the chairman, you indicated that you were on loan to the DNDO from Livermore Labs, I think.
MR. MULLEN: Los Alamos.
SEN. COLLINS: Los Alamos, sorry. (Laughter.) I imagine there's competition there, so that was probably a terrible error for me to make.
In any event, that reminded me that DNDO has chosen to be staffed with detailees from multiple federal agencies, including the FBI, the Department of Energy, the Coast Guard, CBP. And on the one hand, I think that's a very appropriate approach that strengthens the interagency connections that allows -- much as the Counterterrorism Center does -- analysts to share information, it helps form a common culture, it encourages information sharing, breaks down those stovepipes. That's on the plus side.
The negative side is that detailees go home, that they go back to their originating agencies and you lose some continuity, some institutional knowledge within the office being staffed by the detailees.
Since you are a detailee, I'm interested in what your assessment is of the strengths and weaknesses. And on balance, is this a good way for us to be staffing DNDO?
MR. MULLEN: I think it's a very good way to be staffing DNDO, provided we do it properly.
Just to give my own perspective on it, in the work that I've done in the architecture directorate, we've benefited tremendously from having detailees from the Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and their contributions have really been indispensable in trying to get our arms around this global nuclear detection architecture. It just wouldn't be possible to do it properly without having that kind of participation -- broad participation and input. So that's the plus side, as you say.
If you had only detailees, then you, as you say, you would be in big trouble when they start to rotate out.
So what you need in practice is a balance. You need a certain number of permanent federal employees that will provide the corporate memory over time. But a continual infusion of detailee expertise is also extremely important. And in the case of somebody like myself, for example, the way we handle that is through succession planning so that at a certain point when it's time for me to go back home, we'll already have groomed and in place people that are ready to step in and carry out the job that I have been doing.
So it can be done. It's a question of striking the right balance and -- but it's really indispensable to have that kind of input.
SEN. COLLINS: I agree that having that input from detailees enriches the entire organization. In fact, I think we need to do more of that throughout the federal government but particularly within the intelligence community.
But you've raised a key issue, which is have we struck the right balance between staffing with detailees versus what you called those core employees. From your observations, have we struck the right balance in staffing DNDO?
MR. MULLEN: I would say yes, both within my own office and more broadly across DNDO. We've put a lot of effort over the last couple of years into recruiting permanent staff that will help us to maintain that balance.
In my office, for example, we were quite shorthanded in 2005, but we now have a cadre of permanent federal staff to balance the detailee staff, and I think it's a good mix now.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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