Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee - Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners

Date: May 7, 2004
Location: Washington, DC


Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: MISTREATMENT OF IRAQI PRISONERS

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD; GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; LES BROWNLEE, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE U.S. ARMY; GENERAL PETER SCHOOMAKER, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY; LIEUTENANT GENERAL LANCE SMITH, DEPUTY COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND

LOCATION: 106 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:
SEN. REED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by stating the obvious: for the next 50 years in the Islamic world and many other parts of the world, the image of the United States will be that of an American dragging a prostrate, naked Iraqi across the floor on a leash. This is unfair to the honor and the courage of our soldiers, but unfortunately I think it's become a fact. This is disastrous.

Mr. Secretary, let me follow up on your proposed commission. As I understand your comments, this commission or this group of people will not have the authority to call witnesses, to obtain material independent of your investigation. They will simply review what you are doing?

SEC. RUMSFELD: We will be happy to give you a copy of the draft charge to the individuals. They will have, I can assure you, the absolute full cooperation of the Department of Defense.

SEN. REED: Will they have the opportunity to call individuals to testify?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Indeed. I wouldn't use the word "testify," but certainly they can call individuals.

SEN. REED: Mr. Secretary, the Taguba report indicated the principal focus of Major General Miller's team was on the strategic interrogation of detainees and internees in Iraq. Among its conclusion in the executive summary were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures in place to effect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq. The executive summary also stated that detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation-an enabler for interrogation.

Major General Miller was involved at the Guantanamo DOD operation in another theater. He was sent to Iraq. I don't think major generals of the United States Army make up policies about strategic interrogation of detainees unless they've coordinated and communicated to the higher headquarters. Did you ever see, approve or encourage this policy of enabling for interrogation? Did Secretary Cambone ever see, approve or encourage this policy at either facility?

SEC. RUMSFELD: I don't recall that that policy came to me for approval. I think that what we knew from the beginning, since September 11th, is that we had three issues with respect to people that were detained.

One issue was to get them off the street so they can't kill again more innocent men, women and children, and keep them off. A second was the question of criminal prosecution for wrongdoing. And the third was to interrogate and see if additional information could be found that could prevent future terrorist acts against our country or our forces or our friends and allies.

So all of those things have been part since the beginning. They're different functions, as you point out.

SEN. REED: Is that Secretary Cambone's view too? Did he either see, approve or encourage-he's behind you. Can he respond?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Sure he can respond.

STEPHEN CAMBONE (undersecretary of Defense for intelligence): Sir, the original --

SEN. WARNER: Would you identify yourself for the record, please?

MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. My name is Steve Cambone. I'm the undersecretary for intelligence, Senator.

The original effort by Major General was done with respect to Guantanamo and had to do with in fact whether or not we had the proper arrangements in the facilities in order to be able to gain the kind of intelligence we were looking from those prisoners in Guantanamo.

We had, then, in Iraq a large body of people who had been captured on the battlefield that we had to gain intelligence from for force protection purposes. And he was asked to go over, at my encouragement, to take a look at the situation as it existed there. And he made his recommendations. His recommendations were that.

SEN. REED: Were the recommendations made to you, Mr. Secretary? Did you approve them?

MR. CAMBONE: To me directly? No. They were made to the command.

SEN. REED: But you were aware of the recommendations --

MR. CAMBONE: I was aware of those recommendations.

SEN. REED: -- about enabling interrogation?

MR. CAMBONE: Excuse me, sir?

SEN. REED: You were aware of those recommendations?

MR. CAMBONE: I was aware that he went over, made the recommendation that we get a better coordination between those who were being held and those who were being interrogated.

SEN. REED: Mr. Secretary, were you aware that a specific recommendation was to use military police to enable in the interrogation process?

MR. CAMBONE: In that precise language, no. But I knew that we were trying to get to the point where we were assuring that when they were in the general population, those that were under confinement were not undermining the interrogation process that was taking place.

SEN. REED: So this was Major General Miller's own policy?

MR. CAMBONE: No, sir, it was not a policy, it was a recommendation that he made to the command.

SEN. REED: And so General Sanchez adopted this policy, making it a policy of the United States Army and the Department of Defense, without consultation with you in any specific detail?

MR. CAMBONE: Sir, I don't think that's a proper rendering of it.

SEN. REED: Well, I don't know what the proper rendering is, but that seems to be the core of this issue. Were you encouraging a policy that had military police officers enabling interrogations, which created the situation where these --

MR. CAMBONE: No, sir.

GEN. MYERS: No.

SEC. RUMSFELD: May I comment? I think that that is-it is probably best put this way. They're different responsibilities-detaining and interrogating-however, they do need to be looked at together. They found in Guantanamo that how they are detained in terms of the rhythm of their lives can affect the interrogation process. And so the linkage between the two is desirable, if in fact you're concerned about finding more information that can prevent additional terrorist acts, or in the case of Iraq the killing of our forces in Iraq. So it's important that there be a linkage, a relationship.

That is not-it-the way it can be put is that it has a bad connotation, and goodness knows that's not desirable or a policy that General Miller would have recommended. On the other hand, it --

SEN. REED: Well, the policy seems to be de-linked --

SEN. WARNER: Senator, I have to ask if you would require the witnesses to provide further responses for the record.

SEN. REED: Mr. Chairman, I will certainly ask for additional responses.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator.

SEN. REED: Thank you.

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