Panel II of a Hearing of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee's National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee - Oversight of Missile Defense (Part Three): Questions for the Missile Defense Agency

Interview

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REP. MCCOLLUM: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Well, I don't even know where to start. But let me thank you for talking about tests, because as a former teacher, I can devise a test to measure what I want to measure. And so I think when you talk about having a successful test, you need to know what the standards were that you were trying to meet with that test.

The computer modeling that people kept -- being referred to, can you gentlemen tell me -- I'm not a computer expert, so if I say something and I'm using wrong terminology, correct me. Do they have their own supercomputer? Do they use cluster computers? Are they just using something kind of souped-up, off the shelf? What are they using to do their testing for their computer modeling? Anyone know?

MR. : Ms. McCollum, they use a variety of different kinds of approaches. Some of it's done on big computers. Some of it, with the amazing capacity of laptops these days, can even be done on a laptop. Whether or not that simulates what would happen in real battle is another matter, but they use a variety of different kinds of computers. And with the kind of resources they have, I don't think access to big computers, supercomputers, is a problem for them.

They also do what are called hardware in-the-loop simulations where they take hardware in the laboratory and run it through small laboratory-scale tests, for example. So those are a couple of ways that they do it.

REP. MCCOLLUM: Okay.

MR. COOPER: May I add a point?

REP. MCCOLLUM: Yes, Mr. Cooper.

MR. COOPER: It's -- the other point is that they do physics- based modeling -- first-principle, physics-based modeling -- just as the DOE laboratories are applying this approach to at least claim that they can do nuclear weapons design without testing.

And so, for example, when General Obering showed you the picture up here of what they anticipated were they to hit the fuel tank on the satellite, and then he showed you the picture of the actual data -- there was a fair amount of detail in the two that compared.

Well, the modeling they did was physics-based modeling. And there is a growing competence in our ability to do that. We fly airplanes today -- I don't know that we've ever gotten to the point where we've actually put one in service without fully testing it, but once upon a time we did lots of testing. Today we don't do as much testing because we believe these models.

REP. MCCOLLUM: Okay.

I -- my time's going to probably run out -- do I have enough time? Go ahead then.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Just two quick points. I was on staff in the 1980s and 1990s when computer simulation started to become an increasingly large part of Department of Defense testing and tried to resist the effort to have computer simulations included as operational testing data for the obvious reason that in a computer simulation, you can program in assumptions that the customer might not be aware of.

So we were very concerned that computer simulations could be manipulated to give data that might not actually be realistic and it would -- as it got down the chain, it'd be more and more difficult to understand what your were actually simulating and what the assumptions were. We lost that battle. So computer simulations are now completely integrated into not just developmental and research testing, but operational testing. I personally find that very disturbing.

Second, I don't even use the word "test" when I discuss what's going on with the ballistic -- anti-ballistic missile programs. You will notice in my testimony I don't use that word. I think these are demonstrations -- that these are highly scripted demonstrations of a certain capability. Do they have value in understanding how far you are to towards achieving your goals? Yes. Are they actual tests of our ability to intercept a target? No, I don't think they are.

REP. MCCOLLUM: If we're going to have another round, I'll wait and do that. But it looks like Mr. Cooper has something he wanted to add, if he'd be kind enough.

Thank you.

Mr. Cooper?

MR. COOPER: I just wanted to add a point of disagreement, I suppose, with my friend Joe here. And that is --

REP. MCCOLLUM: That's good. We had no disagreements --

MR. COOPER: -- he's making a universal statement and that's not entirely an accurate thing, it seems to me. I believe the Navy programs have done quite realistic operational testing in many of their experiments, if you want to use that term, including firing cruise missiles and ballistic missiles at the same time, and as General Obering spoke of, a couple of ballistic missiles at the same time where the crews of operational cruisers are actually the ones that are conducting the test. They don't know when the rocket is going. They know they're going to be on a test range and there's a time window in which it is, but they actually come as close, I believe, as you can come to operational testing as a part of a development activity.

Now to be sure, they're not doing the midcourse countermeasures that you folk are interested in, either, but that's not part of their design at this point.

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REP. MCCOLLUM: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Last week, in the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, General Obering said, and I'll quote him, "Quite frankly, I'd like to see a missile race."

MR. COOPER (?): I'm sorry?

REP. MCCOLLUM: General Obering, in the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee last week, there was discussion about a missile race between the United States and an adversary such as North Korea or Iran. And he said, quote, "Frankly, I'd like to see such a missile race."

I would like to know from you gentlemen if you think that that would be a good thing. And that's kind of a -- that's one question. But I do want to just go back and talk about some of the other things he said today in his testimony that I think goes to that.

He said without a program, such as the missile defense program, the United States weakens its negotiation position in diplomatic talks -- if we don't have a program going. But there's a difference between a program and encouraging or being supportive of a full-blown escalation. And so I'd be interested in hearing what you gentlemen would have to say about that.

And he also went on to say that if we stop funding our program, our enemies will know our vulnerabilities and they will attack us using ICBMs.

So I'd like to get your perspectives on kind of some of the general's comments. And I think, you know, to take his logic a step farther -- and this is me taking it a step farther -- we're currently spending $100 billion each year and we don't have a functioning long- range system. And the general, you know, said everything was on track, on time, which I think we can all agree it -- in my opinion -- it's not.

So if we can spend 10 billion (dollars) and maybe thwart our enemies, then what's to stop us from just saying, okay, we'll say 50 billion (dollars) or we'll spend $500 billion. That'll even make us stronger against our enemies.

So I'd like your reaction on some of the things he said today. And if you're concerned about an escalation with the missile rates.

MR. CIRINCIONE: Let me start.

I think General Obering's statement was the equivalent of "bring it on." You might understand why someone would make a statement like that. I'd like to see a missile race, but I can't believe that in hindsight he doesn't regret those remarks. It's certainly not in the United States national security interests to see a missile race -- even between two countries, let alone the many countries that might join such a race.

Two: That having an anti-missile capability strengthens our negotiating leverage -- that might be true. I don't see any evidence that it has factored into North Korean or Iranian thinking, though. So I don't know how one can prove that statement. The North Koreans have had two failed tests of a medium or intermediate-range missile -- the Taepo Dong series. And they have stimulated, with those two failed tests, billions of dollars in U.S. expenditures. It might be that they think that they have the advantage here; that they are distracting us by -- by their demonstration shots.

The missile facility itself, even if we did continue the deployment of the Alaska system, this system is very vulnerable to asymmetrical responses. It's highly unlikely that a country like North Korea would simply shoot its missile off and wait to see if the U.S. could intercept it.

They would do what any military force does in battle. They would suppress the enemies before you launch your attack. You would go out and knock out the eyes and ears of that system. You might send frogmen to blow up the radar or sink the floating radar. There are a half-a-dozen things one could think of that North Korea would do that have nothing to do with missiles or interceptors that might make this system completely ineffective before they were actually to launch it.

Number three and finally: If the president is allowed to do what he wants to do, and negotiate a deal with North Korea, I think we're going to see the North Korean missile threat disappear -- the same way Ambassador Cooper helped negotiate a reduction in the Soviet missile and then Russian missile threat.

I was just at a briefing last night by Sig Hecker, the former director of Los Alamos, who came back from his fifth trip to North Korea fairly optimistic about our possibilities of containing and eliminating both the nuclear program and the missile program.

If we were able to do that -- and we will know in another year or so -- I don't see what the point of the Alaska deployment is. I think at that point the Congress is going to be faced with the decision of whether to shut it down or not. And I would recommend shutting it down.

MR. COOPER: I'd like to, I think, speak for in support of General Obering's comments about the importance of having serious missile defense program going and influencing the behavior of maybe North Korea and Iran.

If we have a serious program that can frustrate or deal with what they're building -- I mean, it's correct to say that it's a big deal to build long-range ballistic missiles. I mean, that's a point no one is going to dispute.

On the other hand, it only took us four-a-half-years to do that the first time out, you know, 40 years ago. So you don't have a lot of time if you wait until the threat appears to build the defense and that's no mean feat either.

Working hard on missile defenses, the SDI program, I believe, is the reason for that reduction up there in the 1980s. I don't think there's much doubt of that. I saw it first hand across the table from the Russians at the time. That's what got their attention. That's what got them to the negotiations. That's what kept them serious throughout. That's why Reagan walking out of Reykjavik was a turning point. Makromayev (sp), who led the Soviet military, said as much to Vernon Walters at the time.

So the fact that the United States was serious in trying to work this problem -- very difficult problem that we all agree was there -- I think was instrumental in supporting our arms control agenda and worth every penny of the SDI investment. And I believe the same thing would be true today, if it were successful in supporting whatever it is you want to say -- negotiations with North Korea and Iran to hold things back to short-range missiles -- short and medium-range missiles.

I don't think you can imaging, though, that success. I think you have to have real program. I think it has to be directed toward real capability and it has to show progress. And I do agree that it has to involve realistic testing to deter them in doing that, but you don't get it on the cheap. I don't believe you get it on the cheap.

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