Hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee's Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development and Related Agencies Subcommittte/Subject: FAA Safety and Modernization Performance

SEN. MURRAY: The subcommittee will come to order.

These are troubling times for our airline passengers and the entire aviation industry. In the last year, we have seen jet fuel prices climb by almost 70 percent. In the last two weeks, three airlines have declared bankruptcy. And two days ago, we learned of a planned mega-merger to create the nation's largest U.S. airline. And more mergers could be announced soon.

With all of this disruption, the millions of passengers who take to the skies in our country each year need to be sure that the agency in charge of enforcing safety is consistent and effective. But instead the FAA has been inconsistent and erratic, and passengers are angry and upset.

I am very concerned. I and the Department of Transportation's inspector general have been sounding the alarm for years about problems in the FAA's flight standards program. Yet we have seen repeated problems. Most recently, we've learned that managers at the FAA allowed Southwest Airlines to violate federal safety regulations, and it punished the safety inspector who tried to bring the violations to light.

Some observers inside the government have tried to blame it all on a few bad apples at one inspection office in Dallas, Texas. But I don't buy it. And I want to know how the FAA will ensure to the flying public that it is meeting its core duty to enforce safety.

For four of the last seven years, this subcommittee has provided more money for safety oversight than the Bush administration or its FAA administrators have requested. It didn't matter if Senator Shelby was chairman, if I was chairman, or if Senator Bond was chairman. We all heard the same concerns raised by the inspector general, the General Accounting Office and others, and we responded. We tried to boost the number of safety inspectors and we increased the quality and amount of training in the thoroughness of their work.

That is why, as I reviewed the inspector general's testimony, I was particularly disturbed by the number of times that the IG's office discovered the very same problems year after year with the FAA's flight standards program. In other words, despite repeated commitments to fix the problems by the FAA, the problems didn't get fixed.

The inspector general will testify that in 2002 and again in 2005, his auditors found an inadequate number of inspections, inappropriate targeting of inspections, and safety-critical inspections that just weren't done.

In 2005, the IG found that 26 percent of the necessary inspections identified by the FAA's own safety targeting system were not done. And half those inspections were considered safety-critical. Those audits prompted the inspector general to recommend that FAA headquarters take a more hands-on supervisory approach to make sure that individual inspection offices were getting the job done.

The FAA, of course, said it was committed to fixing the problem. Well, now it's 2008 and we're finding many of those same problems. One of the most glaring is that the FAA failed to follow its own requirement that every airline be reviewed every five years to ensure it was complying with air worthiness directives.

Those directives are a critical component of aviation safety. At Southwest, the U.S. airline with the most domestic flights, this five- year review has not taken place since 1999 -- nine years ago. And the FAA's management structure either didn't know about it or did nothing about it.

We need an FAA that actually fixes problems as they are found rather than one that rushes into a public relations campaign to assure everyone there isn't a problem. Last year we discussed the FAA's habit of glossing over problems with its capital program. Last year FAA continually boasted that 100 percent of their projects were on time and on budget, even when they were costing hundreds of millions of dollars more than originally advertised.

This year, in the wake of the findings of Southwest Airlines, Acting Administrator Sturgell ordered a complete review of whether airlines were complying with certain air worthiness directives. When I first heard of this plan, I questioned why the agency needed to double-check its work. The taxpayers and this subcommittee paid for full compliance the first time.

Since those initial reviews, the FAA is now boasting a 99 percent compliance rate. But I don't think that figure gives much comfort to the people who thought they were getting 100 percent safety compliance the first time around. And it is not going to be much comfort to the thousands of airline customers who found themselves with canceled flights last week, missing business meetings, weddings, or the opportunity to get home to their kids because of this last-minute review.

Last Wednesday, close to one in every 10 domestic passengers saw their flights canceled, and it may have affected more than half a million passengers. But this wasn't just an inconvenience. This incident raised serious concerns in my mind and many others about the FAA. The FAA had initially give the airlines 18 months to fix the problem with wire bundles in the wheel wells of MD-80s. But after the discoveries at Southwest, the FAA announced that the airlines couldn't wait another day to fix it.

This was very troubling to me. I want to know why, if it wasn't safe enough to fly for one more day, did FAA give the airlines 18 months to fix the problems in the first place? As someone who flies the country twice a week and who represents many constituents who fly, we want to know how you're going to restore passengers' faith in the FAA. Your number one job is to ensure the airlines are safe for the flying public, and that means that safety regulations must be clearly defined and enforced consistently.

FAA inspectors also deserve respect. They are not just your employees. They are stewards of the public safety, and they deserve the support of their superiors. The supervisors in the FAA inspection force are supposed to be agents for safety, not the agents of airlines. They're supposed to support the findings of their own employees and make sure those findings are turned into safe operating practices.

One of the IG's most egregious findings was that both Southwest and Northwest Airlines were actually able to concoct phony complaints against safety inspectors they thought were being too aggressive. The result was the inspectors were taken off the case. That must never be allowed to happen.

The airlines deserve clarity and consistency from the FAA. The taxpayers deserve accountability on the part of senior government officials when those lapses are discovered and left unaddressed. And they deserve better than empty promises that problems have been fixed or will be fixed when they have not.

And finally, this subcommittee deserves answers about why FAA's management still doesn't get it right even though this subcommittee continually adds funding and cites these problems year after year. I hope we will get some answers to those questions this morning.

And with that, I will yield to my ranking member, Senator Bond.

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SEN. MURRAY: Thank you very much.

Mr. Sturgell, the flying public wants to know that there is no question about the safety of the aviation system when they get on a plane. And as a passenger that flies coast-to-coast every weekend, I and all of the taxpayers in this country believe that they already pay for a safe system. I want to know what you are doing to reassure the public that safety is not being compromised by the inconsistent inspection and enforcement activities that we've seen on the part of the FAA.

MR. STURGELL: Well, Madame Chairman, the first thing I would point to is the tremendous safety record and the advances that have been made, especially over the last decade. I think today we have the safest system in the world. But as I said, it is not perfect. Our challenge is to not be complacent about that record and to not rest on that record. It is to make that record better.

The AD review that we are going through now is designed to check and affirm that what we have been doing in this one area has been proven effective. I think a 99 percent compliance rate of the over 2,400 audits we have done now in this area is high. It is the 1 percent that I worry about, and that's my job to worry about it.

But in all the areas, again, I think we've made tremendous advances. We made these advances both as a regulator and overseer, as an agency of enforcement but also as a partner and in collaboration with industry on very important partnership efforts as well. And we're going to continue down this path.

SEN. MURRAY: Well, the grounding of the MD-80s this past weekend inconvenienced about a half a million passengers. Do you think that whole entire mess was the fault of American Airlines?

MR. STURGELL: Madame Chairman, again, I regret and empathize with the disruption that that event caused.

It is my job, though, to worry about the safety of the system and to act on deficiencies we see in the system. That particular wiring AD -- I think it's important for us to understand the context here, which is that we have learned a lot about wiring and the problems with wiring since the Swissair Flight 111 accident from years and years ago. And out of that accident we have developed directives and requirements now to ensure that wire does not chafe, that it does not come in contact with certain other pieces of the airplane, especially in very critical areas where it is close to fuel tanks and close to things like hydraulic lines.

So we went through a notice and comment period on this. We then had an 18-month period where we factor in the risk involved and how much time should we give people to comply with our safety directives. In some cases, our airworthiness directive requirements are much, much shorter. In some cases, they are longer. But it is all about the risk in the system and further improving the system.

SEN. MURRAY: Well, let me ask you about that and the consistency here. You first issued the airworthiness directive affecting this wiring that you're talking about in the MD-80s, and you gave them 18 months to fix the problem. And after the problems at Southwest came to light a few weeks ago, and you conducted some additional audits on all the air carriers, there were questions raised about whether American Airlines had fixed it correctly. The result is that all of these MD-80 aircraft were grounded immediately and as many as a half a million passengers were then inconvenienced.

Now, you're the safety expert, I'm not. But can you explain to us why, if you initially thought it was safe to give the airlines who fly these MD-80s an additional 18 months, all of a sudden with this wiring problem everything had to stop in a day?

MR. STURGELL: Madam Chairman, it is all about accepting a level of risk in the system. And that's what our AD compliance timeframes are based on. There was an 18-month period to comply. When we began the audit -- and the audit was not a crackdown or, you know, getting tough. It was in response to claims that in the light of Southwest and what happened -- and that was a failure on our part as well as Southwest. But in light of that incident, people raised questions about ADs broadly in the system.

So in order to take a snapshot and get an assessment of it, we decided to conduct these audits. And the first time around -- about the middle of March or so -- this particular AD, which had just become effective March 5th -- the end of the 18 months -- was raised as an issue among all the operators of MD-80s -- not just American, but Delta, Alaska and Midwest. And we believe people had taken action, alternative means of compliance were issued and we believe that problem was addressed. And then when we came back several weeks later, we found that at American, it had not been.

SEN. MURRAY: Well, just explain to me what the difference between 18 months and 18 months and two weeks is.

MR. STURGELL: Well, again, the 18 months is based on a level of risk for this particular problem. So any additional time, you are increasing your level of risk. And granted, it is a low-probability in some cases. But in this particular case, it is a high consequence. These are wires that are in the area of the fuel tank and the hydraulic lines.

SEN. MURRAY: Okay.

Well, let's go to the Southwest Airlines and how your agency responded. And we know that there was a record 10.2 million (dollar) civil penalty against Southwest Airlines. That fine was actually announced just days before Chairman Oberstar's planned hearing on Southwest problems and the FAA's cozy relationship with that airline, and it took only a week instead of the usual 60 days for that civil penalty to be forwarded out of your regional council and announced. Should we really believe that that similar timing of that announcement with the record fine and Chairman Oberstar's planned hearing was just a coincidence?

MR. STURGELL: Madam Chairman, that process began back in April when the office manager discovered some discrepancies with the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting form. And I will grant you that from those investigations -- and then we have a process where we go through an enforcement action -- that it took longer than we would have liked.

SEN. MURRAY: You say the timing was just a coincidence.

MR. STURGELL: That is my belief, yes.

SEN. MURRAY: Mr. -- General Scovel, have you found that this fine is consistent with the FAA's previous enforcement?

MR. SCOVEL: The size of the fine, Madam Chairman -- I haven't examined it in detail. I've been informed by my staff, however and in -- through media reports that this is one of the largest, if not the largest civil enforcement penalties assessed by FAA.

SEN. MURRAY: Well, Mr. Sturgell, the reason that I'm bringing this up is we count on your agency to provide us as a flying public the knowledge that what we fly on is a safe airplane. We expect from you to make sure that that's done safely and consistently. It just seems like a weird picture out here where all of a sudden, somebody was talking, there was going to be a hearing, there's a major fine at Southwest and then within days, hundreds upon hundreds of planes are grounded.

What was happening in the last 18 months? Why was this not done consistently? What occurred that all of a sudden there was this -- in the last three weeks -- a huge focus on safety. Shouldn't have that been happening prior to that? That's what the picture looks like to all of us.

MR. STURGELL: Madam Chairman, a couple of points, if I will.

The fine with Southwest is large and it is because of the deliberate nature of the activities involved. And again -- you know, from my perspective, Southwest should not have flown those airplanes once they found that they were over the inspection requirements and, our inspectors should not have permitted them to continue flying knowingly like that.

The -- your second question about 18 months and why now and the consistency -- again, there were concerns raised system-wide. You know, the way for me to assess whether it's a system-wide process is to go out and take a snapshot. So these are inspections we would otherwise be doing in the normal course of business. We have accelerated that requirement into a defined timeframe so that --

SEN. MURRAY: My concern is --

MR. STURGELL: -- we can bring these inspections quickly.

SEN. MURRAY: -- and my time is running out -- is it appears to us the only reason the FAA acted was because this was going to become public. We as the public want to be assured that it is done because it's the right thing to do.

MR. STURGELL: Madam Chairman, it was not because of that. We are trying to do the right thing. We are trying to make this system even safer than it is today.

SEN. MURRAY: Mr. Scovel, do you have any comments?

MR. SCOVEL: FAA's action recently is most assuredly the right thing to do. The rush with which it was brought to bear, however, most recently, gives rise, naturally, to the question of what happened before. Why not this attention before? And I think the record, as illustrated by the Southwest case -- the event occurred in March 2007, initial investigation completed in April, subsequent investigation submitted at the national level in July, a supplement investigation returned to national headquarters in October, I believe, as illustrated by the timeline in our statement -- begs the question, "What national-level review was being conducted once this had been brought to the attention of national authority figures?"

And, apparently, not until November 2007, when enforcement action was initiated against Southwest, and then most recently, when Chairman Oberstar on the House side made public his intent to hold hearings focusing on the Southwest question, was the overall issue of FAA's oversight -- especially of airworthiness directives -- brought to bear and FAA then began to move with dispatch.

SEN. MURRAY: I am way over my time.

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SEN. MURRAY: Just as a quick follow-up, so I understand. So on American Airlines, on the MD-80s, there was a directive administered. They were given 18 months. And during that 18-month time frame, the only thing the FAA did was look at paperwork. There were no physical inspections, correct?

MR. STURGELL: I do not believe there were physical inspections of that particular AD. I am certain there were other types of inspections --

SEN. MURRAY: Maybe the question is better, if there had been physical inspections, checking to see if the work had been done right during that 18-month period, we would not have seen everybody grounded at the same time.

MR. STURGELL: Well, that is an assumption that --

SEN. MURRAY: All right --

MR. STURGELL: If you look at one airplane and it looks good, then all the other airplanes would have that quality of work as well.

SEN. MURRAY: Somebody would have said it's being done wrong.

MR. STURGELL: I'm sorry, Madame Chairman?

SEN. MURRAY: Somebody could have seen that this was being done wrong a year ago instead of all in one weekend, correct, if there was a physical inspection rather than just paperwork.

MR. SCOVEL: If during the 18 months American had done an airplane -- call it "an airplane" during that time, and an FAA inspector had looked at that particular airplane for the work that was done, then that inspector could have seen whether or not the work was being done in conformity with the airworthiness directive or not.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. MURRAY: Thank you.

Mr. Sturgell, a lot of the controversies surrounding the Southwest incident relates to the overly cozy relationship between your FAA inspector in charge and his former FAA colleague that now works at Southwest. The inspector general has recommended that the FAA include in its term of employment a cooling-off period before an inspector can start working in an airline that he or she previously inspected.

Now, the FAA has stated that they're going to adopt this approach to help reduce the risk of conflicts. And it sounds like an appealing solution, but I want to understand what that cooling-off period would look like. And I want to know how you envision that. When is it going to go into effect?

MR. STURGELL: Madame Chairman, we currently have a policy when we hire a person from an airline to be an FAA inspector, we impose a two-year cooling-off period for --

SEN. MURRAY: That's current policy.

MR. STURGELL: That is incoming into the FAA. So we limit that person's interaction with their previous employer for two years. We have not had a policy when an airline hires an inspector to come to work for them. We're going to institute a policy that's going to require the same two-year cooling-off period.

SEN. MURRAY: When does that go into effect?

MR. STURGELL: Well, I believe we have to do this with some kind of comment period. But we're going to expedite it as quickly as we can.

SEN. MURRAY: So it would be a two-year waiting period after they leave the FAA before they can go work for an airline --

MR. STURGELL: Before they can have direct contact back to the FAA, yes.

SEN. MURRAY: To whom specifically would that restriction apply

MR. STURGELL: It would imply, as we've talked about it, at the inspector level, for people that would then be interacting with our inspector work force.

SEN. MURRAY: So supervisors?

MR. STURGELL: Yeah, I mean, offhand, I would say that if a supervisor gets hired and moves to an airline and then interacts with our inspector work force, we're going to require a two-year cooling- off period.

There are already general government regulations that I think have pay levels that require this kind of cooling-off period. Our inspector workforce is generally below those pay levels. So it's my understanding that's why there is not a current policy that applies. But we're going to put one in effect.

SEN. MURRAY: Well, can we expect to see that soon?

MR. STURGELL: As soon as we can get the counsel's office acting on it and get the comment period, if that is required -- (inaudible).

SEN. MURRAY: All right. Now, some people are arguing that if an airline wants to make sure that they hire a person with the best knowledge, that this will preclude them from doing so. Should that be a concern?

MR. STURGELL: Well, hopefully, those kinds of things will be brought out in the comment period. And then we'll have to sit down and discuss the balances here.

SEN. MURRAY: General Scovel, do you want to comment on that?

GEN. SCOVEL: Senator Murray, we think the cooling-off period is good. It ought to apply to supervisors as well as line inspectors.

We think that if it's properly structured, it shouldn't be a problem for an air carrier who wants to hire a former FAA inspector, because the cooling-off period should prohibit direct contacts between that former FAA employee, now working for the carrier, back to FAA.

That's the real essence of the problem is those personal contacts, which we believe contributed to what we have called, for a number of weeks now, this overlay collaborative relationship at Southwest.

SEN. MURRAY: If this is a concern and an issue that should be addressed at the FAA, what about federal railroad inspectors or pipeline inspectors? Should we be looking at the same policy there?

GEN. SCOVEL: Perhaps. I don't want to speculate because, of course, we haven't investigated any cases or instances that would lead us to think that there has been specific problems in those areas.

But the fact that those safety inspectors in other modes within DOT may be susceptible to the same problems we think should give rise to the Department taking a look at that question.

SEN. MURRAY: Okay, I appreciate that.

Mr. Sturgell, many of the issues that were raised by the inspector general today aren't new. General Scovel's testimony includes at least four instances when the FAA has not fully addressed safety concerns that were found years ago in prior audits by the inspector general.

Back in 2002 the IG found the implementation of your new approach for risk-based inspection was inconsistent across the FAA field offices, and he recommended that the FAA strengthen national oversight and accountability for your new approach.

The FAA agreed to comply, but when the IG reviewed your efforts in 2005 he found that inspectors had not completed 26 percent of the planned inspections and that half of those missed inspections were considered high risk.

Again, the IG recommended that FAA strengthen its national oversight and accountability to ensure consistent and timely inspections. Again, FAA agreed to comply, but even today some of those inspections haven't been completed.

When the FAA commits to the IG and to this Subcommittee that it's going to fix particular problems, why don't they get fixed?

MR. STURGELL: Senator Murray, I appreciate those concerns. One of my take-aways over the last week has been to put together all of the various GAO and IG recommendations by our chief financial officer, and then to see where we are in terms of addressing those recommendations, based on our responses. I am --

SEN. MURRAY: But you can see how this is hard for us, year after year after year after year after year after year. You come before our Subcommittee; everything's going to get addressed. And don't want to be back here a year from now looking at the same issues. How do I know that's not going to happen?

MR. STURGELL: Because I'm committing to you to do that kind of review of the IG recommendations. And we will certainly discuss with you, in cases where we don't agree or don't fully comply, the reasons for doing so.

I do want you to know that on the ATOS program, we have now, as of December '07, put every 121 carrier into that program. And we have just recently released an updated version of ATOS which will permit us to do the kind of national overlook that the IG has been requesting.

And we are setting up an office in Flight Standards, AFS 900, that's going to be tasked with conducting those types of national reviews.

SEN. MURRAY: Or -- as you sit here this morning, can you guarantee to us that your agency has conducted a comprehensive audit on every airline that you regulate within those five-year timeframes?

MR. STURGELL: We will be using this office to double-check on where we are in terms of all of the required audits.

SEN. MURRAY: So we --

MR. STURGELL: But Madam Chairman, the five-year audit is part of the program. Inspectors can request an additional year delay, if written justification is required, to delay that program.

At Southwest, we do have a team down there now, an evaluation team.

SEN. MURRAY: It's been nine years. Have they gotten a waiver on that?

MR. STURGELL: That is -- again, I know there were -- from all the testimony and the records, there were issues going on at that office for several years that should have been addressed.

SEN. MURRAY: Nine years.

MR. STURGELL: They should have been addressed.

SEN. MURRAY: Well, General Scovel, let me ask you -- I mean, this is frustrating. We sit here every year. We go through the same questions. We have an FAA director who comes before us and says the same thing.

What do we need? Timelines? And we've had timelines and asked for timelines, and that doesn't happen. What is missing?

GEN. SCOVEL: It is frustrating. In response to our 2002 recommendation for greater national oversight, FAA promised that its newly appointed director of flight standards division would undertake that responsibility. It didn't happen; we felt that we had been burned. When we reviewed ATOS again in 2005, we found the same problem. Greater national oversight, to us, appeared to be the solution.

FAA has communicated back to us with a number of proposed solutions, but frankly, Madam Chairman, we are picky and we have declined to close that particular recommendation with the solutions proposed to us by FAA because we didn't think that they would solve the problem. The recommendation is still open.

With regard to -- the Southwest situation specifically, you were talking about required ATOS inspections at Southwest that are still left undone. The latest information I have is, as you've read in our statement, in March 2007 21 key ATOS inspections had not been done within the required five-year period. Within the last week we've double-checked again. Four of those still remain undone at Southwest.

SEN. MURRAY: Why? Why, Mr. Sturgell?

MR. STURGELL: It is my belief that the air carrier evaluation team that is down there now will be completing those four. It's a comprehensive review and audit that they are doing of Southwest's programs, beginning with airworthiness directives and the maintenance programs.

SEN. MURRAY: Lack of personnel? Lack of funds? Lack of people?

MR. STURGELL: But I will get back to you --

SEN. MURRAY: What's the reason this isn't being done?

MR. STURGELL: Again, Madam Chairman, it's my belief that this team is going to complete those four audits, in addition to the other work that it's doing --

SEN. MURRAY: What about the other airlines, other than Southwest?

MR. STURGELL: We will take a look and see whether there are any programs that are -- require inspections that are outstanding. I am not aware of any at this time.

SEN. MURRAY: And you don't know?

MR. STURGELL: No. I can -- we can take a -- we can talk to our CMO offices and we can put together some information for your about these five-year inspections and get back to you with it.

SEN. MURRAY: Well, how long's that going to take?

MR. STURGELL: I'll know when I get back to the office, and I'll give you a call back. (Inaudible.)

SEN. MURRAY: Well, you can understand why the flying public is frustrated here. Mr. Sturgell, it's your job to make sure that everybody who gets on an airplane knows they're flying a safe flight. I know that's a huge responsibility. There's risk involved in it. But it is frustrating to this Committee that has oversight of the FAA to hear the same answers year after year after year.

And it is frustrating to this Committee to hear that the audits haven't been done, the reports haven't been filed, and we're -- we get an answer from you today, sitting in front of us, that you'll get back to us. Believe me, I've heard it before.

How do I know that this time it's different? That's what I want to know.

MR. STURGELL: Madam Chairman, I -- I'm giving you my word that we're going to address this and have a national oversight capability in as timely a manner as possible. That's the best I can do today.

SEN. MURRAY: General Scovel, do you have any advice to this Committee about how we can get an assurance and -- no, some action on this, other than just pleading at every Committee hearing that we have?

GEN. SCOVEL: If FAA adopts our specific recommendation, and it sounds like they're headed in that direction for this 900 office to oversee ATOS and to incorporate into the program alerts, both -- not only at the local level, but at the regional and national levels, too, when a CMO is in danger of overstepping the tripwire with these required five-year inspections, that would certainly help.

The data is available, Madam Chairman. My audit staff had it within six or seven weeks, regarding the 21 key inspections under ATOS that hadn't been done at Southwest. I would expect that FAA would be able to find that from every CMO in fairly short order.

SEN. MURRAY: Mr. Sturgell?

MR. STURGELL: I am sure we can. I just cannot give you, as we sit here, a definitive time to be able to do that. But when we get back, we will sit down and figure out how quickly we can get that.

SEN. MURRAY: Can you give me a commitment to have that answer back to me within the week?

MR. STURGELL: I think I can do that, yes. (Inaudible.)

SEN. MURRAY: Okay. I would really appreciate it if you could put every effort into that, because it is -- it's a concern to all of us.

I do have a number of questions on inspections, on a number of the runway incursions on (SDX ?) and I will submit those for the record. I would hope that we can get those back. I know some other Committee members do too. We have gone over our time. I know Senator Bond had some additional questions, too, I will submit for the record.

But Mr. Sturgell, sorry to be so hard on you, but believe me, it is frustrating as the chairman of this Committee to have the same conversation year after year, and then to see hundreds and thousands of passengers being delayed, inconvenienced; people questioning the safety of the airlines. And I know there's a good record out there in terms of safety, and I commend you for that.

And I also know there are some great workers at the FAA who go to work every day and really do an excellent job, and they are to be commended. But they need to know the direction, from the top down, that the passengers are who the FAA is -- considers to be their customer, not someone else.

MR. STURGELL: I do appreciate that, and I particularly appreciate the comments about the employees at the FAA, because they do do a great job. Thanks.

SEN. MURRAY: Appreciate that.

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