Hearing of the State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations - Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Priorities in Iraq

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REP. BETTY MCCOLLUM (D-MN): Thank you, Madame Chair.

Ambassador Crocker, I want to go back on a point that Mr. Obey and Mr. Chandler had talked about earlier, and that's the Sons of Iraq or the "awakening" groups.

On Monday in The New York Times, one of the generals, Iraqi Commander Hashim, for Baghdad, is quoted as saying, quote: "The main thing is that all the arms should be in the hands of the state. We will never allow any armed group to carry arms as an alternative to the state to provide security for the citizens." In other words, they should have control of the arms.

Do you agree with this statement?

AMB. CROCKER: I do agree with that statement.

REP. MCCOLLUM: Well, it's -- I have a question at the end that I -- that I think puts us in a bind for this particular answer.

Have all the individuals in the Sons of Iraq who have been supplied with weapons and are now on the U.S. payroll, have they been vetted for security beyond biometrical data collected?

AMB. CROCKER: Beyond the biometrical data?

REP. MCCOLLUM: Yes.

AMB. CROCKER: That -- getting that data and running against databases is our main security check on them, yes.

REP. MCCOLLUM: But they all haven't been vetted that way, or they all have?

AMB. CROCKER: The -- I don't have that figure in front of me. It was on General Petraeus's slides, but the vast majority, certainly, if not 100 percent.

REP. MCCOLLUM: Were all -- are all the agents of the paramilitary verified to ensure we're not arming child soldiers? Again, I refer to The New York Times article, the opening statement, a "thin teenage boy" walked "up to the patrol of American soldiers walking through Dora, a shrapnel-scarred neighborhood in the capital, and lifted his shirt to show them a mass of red welts" on his back.

And he said, quote, that "he was a member of a local Sunni 'Awakening' group, paid by the American military to patrol the district."

AMB. CROCKER: We certainly are not signing up children for this. I mean, I can't say this particular case --

REP. MCCOLLUM: But there might not be the -- AMB. CROCKER: "Teenage" could by 18 or 19 as well.

REP. MCCOLLUM: Does the U.S. formally train these militiamen before they're armed? Because there's reports that these paramilitaries act more like vigilantes than police in certain areas. Do they receive U.S. training?

AMB. CROCKER: They do receive some training, yes. And they don't operate as independent elements. They operate in full coordination, not only with coalition forces but also with Iraqi security forces.

REP. MCCOLLUM: That -- in fact, that some of the Sons of Iraq who are now receiving U.S. tax dollars were actually members of Sunni insurgent groups that attacked and possibly killed U.S. soldiers, does this -- is this statement correct?

AMB. CROCKER: That may well be the case. You know, reconciliation is not reconciling with your friends, it's reconciling with your adversaries. And if former adversaries are prepared to say, "We want to stop shooting you and shoot at a common enemy instead," we're going to agree to that.

REP. MCCOLLUM: Is it accurate to say that this is not a cohesive, unified force, the Sons of Iraq but rather a configuration of armed tribes, political factions that are at times in competition with one another for power and economic resources?

AMB. CROCKER: They are individuals, sometimes of tribal affiliation, sometimes not, from a particular locality.

REP. MCCOLLUM: They can be in competition with one another?

AMB. CROCKER: They can be, but what brings them forward is their desire to bring security to their own neighborhoods.

REP. MCCOLLUM: General Petraeus is quote as saying, quote, "The Sons of Iraq will stay loyal to the U.S. policy as long as it was in their interest," end of quote.

When the loyal (sic) to the United States or the Iraqi government is no longer in the interest, these thousands of armed paramilitaries, what kind of threat do you think they possess?

And I heard that you speak to the fact about, you know, that the Iraqis need to be given more time to transition to pay for this, but my understanding is currently we're paying $300 per person. What timeline have the Iraqis been given to provide their own security? And should they be disarmed once we stop paying them, if we're the ones who stop the payment?

AMB. CROCKER: Well, again, Congresswoman, it is our intention and also the Iraqi intention that these individuals transition from being paid by the U.S. to being paid by the Iraqis. And as I noted in response to an earlier question, the majority of these individuals will not --

REP. MCCOLLUM: Madame Chair, this is different than a timeline for withdrawal. This is the timeline for the Iraqi government to pay for their own security.

And Ambassador, if you could get back to us with any at least tentative timelines on when we can expect the Iraqis at least to pay for their own security. This is not about our timeline for withdrawal. This is about their timeline -- (inaudible). (Audio break.)

REP. : (Inaudible) -- you are going to continue (upon ?) that strategy, but the pace of progress in terms of reconciliation, in terms of the regional diplomatic effort, that it will take many more years before there is any real demonstrable improvement in the situation.

If that track isn't going to work, what are the alternatives that we can pursue that have been rejected but that we need to consider? And furthermore -- (inaudible).

AMB. CROCKER: My whole focus and effort is on doing everything I can -- (inaudible) -- that the -- (inaudible) -- at the local levels and at the national levels. as a better security climate allows more political and economic activity, my focus is --

REP. : If I could --

AMB. CROCKER: -- directed to making that work.

REP. : If I could interject, in my view the progress has been so halting, the steps towards reconciliation have been so small that if we extrapolate and expect that the pace of that reconciliation will remain the same -- even if we assume it's in a positive direction, it will remain the same -- we're still going to be there for years and years and years. And I don't think that's sustainable.

I also think the only reason we're going back to the pre-surge levels is because our own military can't sustain the pace, much less the facts on the ground.

So what I still would like to hear from you is what are the alternatives? What are the strategies that you're not employing, that have been rejected for whatever reason -- you could tell us why you rejected them -- but what are the alternatives if we're not willing to accept the strategies? Because we're going to be there for several more years; it may get better, it may not. But realistically, we can't expect anything dramatic to improve in the next several years.

AMB. CROCKER: Again, it's -- you know, I am not focused on alternatives. I'm focused on making this current effort succeed.

I have said previously that I believe that moving away from conditions-based redeployment and using just a timeline without respect to conditions puts us at a very high level of risk of seeing this spiral away from us in very serious ways that could allow al Qaeda to re-establish its presence in Iraq as our strategic enemy, that could allow Iran significantly more influence, and could lead to sectarian violence on a scale we have not seen before.

So I think we are on a course of action that is showing not only promise but results. And I think we should continue to drive that forward.

REP. : Madame Chairman, my time is up.

But if the ambassador maybe could respond back to us in writing about the steps that you're taking now, in the event that there is a change of course next year, to mitigate the risk of any escalation of violence, I'd appreciate it.

Thank you, Madame Chair.

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