Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee - The Situation in Iraq and Progress by the Government of Iraq in Meeting Benchmarks and Achieving Reconciliation

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SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Petraeus, do you believe that the Mahdi Army, the JAM, will voluntarily disband and disarm at the request of the prime minister?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Sir, some elements of the Mahdi Army could be incorporated into legitimate employment and other legitimate activities. Now, standing down at the direction of the prime minister is something that would undoubtedly result in violence. However, as you may have seen recently, Muqtada al-Sadr has said that he would stand down the force at the request of the marjaiya, of the senior Shi'a clerics in Najaf.

And we're just going to have to see how that plays out in the months ahead.

SEN. REED: But unless he is instructed by the senior Shi'a clergy, he would likely resist that which would lead, in your words, to accelerated violence between -- within the Shi'a community.

GEN. PETRAEUS: It depends again how it's done, Senator. And if you can do this gradually over time with the force in the background that is capable of taking out action and providing alternatives, the key here is actually providing some other means of livelihood, the same problem that, as you know, we had in a number of the different Sunni communities that were in the grip of al Qaeda.

SEN. REED: Well, after the attack in Basra, where the prime minister committed to destroy these elements and then he had to withdraw, I think this is less of an employment problem than an existential problem of the political survival of one or the other. And in those terms, unless there's a voluntary compliance by the Mahdi Army, the alternative for violence seems to be quite significant.

Let's assume that's the case. Will you participate with your military forces in supporting the government?

GEN. PETRAEUS: First of all, there is some voluntary standing in already, Senator. And a number of the Sadr political leaders, in fact, have been engaging and do not want to bring the violence.

I mean, everyone has again looked into the abyss and said, this does not look good; let's step back and let's see if there is some alternative that can be followed.

And so --

SEN. REED: What's the alternative?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, the alternative again is incorporation in the political process and, over time, providing some avenue for these young men to again participate in the economy and so forth. And that has actually worked in a number of neighborhoods, like West Rasheed and a variety of southern communities.

SEN. REED: I think that's the same dilemma. It's been a dilemma now for a year or more with respect to the CLC, the Sons of Iraq, where they are still being paid by us and they are not being assumed, at least 60,000 of them, into the apparatus of the state of Iraq. Is that --

GEN. PETRAEUS: Over -- actually it's well over 20,000 now, Senator, have been --

SEN. REED: 60,000 are still not assumed.

GEN. PETRAEUS: I believe it's over 90,000 actually that are on the rolls right now and that will either be transitioned between 20 and 30 percent to the Iraqi security forces. And the issue there is one often of illiteracy and/or physical disability, but over time. And then the Iraqi government has pledged funds, as I mentioned in my opening statement, to retraining programs, to education programs and to other job employment programs.

SEN. REED: So I can assume you are giving advice, and the ambassador giving advice, to Maliki to go slow, to incorporate the Mahdi Army into the economy and political life of Iraq over many months. Is that the advice you're giving him? Or are you giving him any advice at all?

That seems to be contradict what he tried to do in Basra.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Basra did go much more suddenly than we expected, Senator. There's no two ways about it. And again, you heard, in fact -- the report is a good account. I think it is accurate to say that he thought perhaps it would be a bit more like when he went to Karbala back last year and the sheer presence and so forth would be adequate. And that was clearly not the case in Basra.

Now again, in Basra what has to be done -- and they have just announced, for example -- what is it, a hundred --

STAFF: Hundred million --

GEN. PETRAEUS: -- hundred million dollar program to begin addressing these kinds of issues and, again, to get some alternatives to the young men down there to toting a gun on a street corner.

SEN. REED: Well, it seems to me that Basra illustrated the ultimate conflict between Sadr and Maliki and the elected government. It's a conflict they tried to resolve militarily. They failed because the military forces failed and because people got very nervous about it was spinning out of control. That ultimate conflict is still there. It's the existential conflict with respect to the Shi'a community. And the potential violence, to my mind, is very real, and we'll be engaged somehow, either on the sidelines watching or swept up in it.

Let me switch to the ambassador a moment. Mr. Ambassador, is the Mahdi Army and the JAM the only Shi'a organization that is receiving assistance, cooperation, has significant contacts on a routine basis with the Iranians?

AMB. CROCKER: I don't think so, Senator.

SEN. REED: Who else might be having that kind of contact? If not military training, then a dialogue, money moving back and forth for other reasons?

AMB. CROCKER: Let me -- those are two different aspects and I'll address them separately. There are other militia groups down in Basra, a militia organization called Thar Allah, the Vengeance of God, whose leader, incidentally, is now in detention. They almost certainly get support from Iran, as does something called Iraqi Hezbollah. That does not necessarily imply a connection to Lebanese Hezbollah, but again, an extremist militia. Iran has the -- again the tactic, as we've seen in Lebanon, of supporting a number of different --

SEN. REED: Would that include the ISCI element, the Badr Brigade?

AMB. CROCKER: I'd put that in the second category. Iran has a dialogue with, again --

SEN. REED: Everyone in the Shi'a community.

AMB. CROCKER: -- everyone. That's right. And --

SEN. REED: And it's a mutual dialogue.

AMB. CROCKER: And not just the Shi'a community. What has happened with the Supreme Council and Badr is that they've basically gotten out of the overt militia business. It's now the Badr organization. And many of its elements did integrate with the Iraqi security forces.

SEN. REED: Thank you. My time's -- (inaudible).

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