Hearing of the Airland Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee - The Army's New Doctrine (Field Manual 3-0, Operations) in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for FY2009 and the Future Years Defense Program

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SEN. JOHN CORNYN (R-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's good to see you.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: You too.

SEN. CORNYN: Thank you for scheduling this hearing.

General Caldwell, thank you for being here, and I look forward to your testimony and your answers to questions that the committee propounds.

Of course, today the subcommittee will receive testimony on the new Field Manual for Operations, and this edition of the field manual represents the first major update since 2001 and was crafted from the Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And that's what I would like to focus some of my questions on, the appropriateness of the Army as opposed to other in the military, as opposed to other institutions of the federal government, how those will be coordinated in order to leverage and maximize resources.

You know, my impression is, post-Katrina, there was some discussion about giving the uniformed military services additional roles in natural disaster relief, because frankly I think most people view the military as the most competent institution in the federal government. But the problem is that with that competence and professionalism, it can clearly be stretched too thin and overloaded and perhaps given missions that are inappropriate or divert it from its main mission. So I'd like to talk a little bit about some of that.

Recognizing the Army's long commitment to the development of military doctrine, this can be traced back to the Continental Army in Valley Forge in the winter of 1777 and 1778. I'm reminded of the connection between the release of this most recent -- of the most recent counterinsurgency field manuals, just in terms of talking about what the impact of these manuals can have, the impact of that counterinsurgency field manual and the revised strategy we've had in Iraq, which has, from my perspective, turned things around in a way that's very positive. And I'm not the only one that feels that way, obviously.

In 2006, the Army and Marine Corps released a new field manual on counterinsurgency operations. It had been 20 years since the Army had published a formal field manual devoted to that subject. And, of course, General Petraeus oversaw the preparation of that field manual.

In 2007, just a month after the release of that field manual, President Bush announced a new strategy in Iraq, and that new strategy has been sometimes referred to, of course, as the surge strategy, but closely parallels the doctrine advocated in that new counterinsurgency field manual.

Now, a year later, the subsequent improvements in security in Iraq have been notable, and I believe demonstrate the extant connection between doctrine, strategy and change.

General Caldwell, today's discussion of the Army's new field manual on operations, I'd like to ask you a little bit about how -- in what respects you consider this to be revolutionary and whether that revolutionary change is in fact something that the Army can do, given the fact it's -- of our international commitments and the fact that, as Senator Lieberman said, end strength concerns remain and stresses on the military, given its current mission.

And what changes that you would foresee in the institutional Army and the organization of the Army's combat formations, the requirements for future systems being fielded to force -- to the force, the roles and missions of the Army Reserve and the National Guard, and the mobility requirements of the Army and the training of young officers and non-commissioned officers.

I'm particularly interested in whether a career path for a military officer conducting stability operations is something that would be considered a plus or a minus, and how we deal with that very practical concern.

In addition, I'd like to ask you a little bit about how this field manual can be harmonized with joint doctrine and how it has been received by our allies, coalition partners, and other agencies and departments in the federal government with whom the Army and the military need to work, to bring all aspects of U.S. power to the table.

It's our Army soldiers, of course, who will execute this doctrine and learn the new lessons that it requires and thus, General Caldwell, we're going to ask you a little bit about the kind of feedback that you received from soldiers.

There's no doubt that our nation will require a more agile, responsive campaign quality and expeditionary Army to meet the challenges of persistent conflict and change that will characterize the strategic environment well into the 21st century. I'm confident that this field manual is an important contribution to the Army's successfully meeting the high demand for Army forces and capabilities.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for -- again, for calling this important hearing, and I look forward to the testimony.

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SEN. CORNYN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Caldwell, this significant development of this Field Manual to incorporate into Army doctrine this requirement of stability and civil support in a much more formal sort of way, do you see any conflict between the traditional warfighting function of the Army, and providing enhanced responsibilities for these kind of operations? Or do you believe it's inherent in that warfighting capability?

GEN. CALDWELL: Sir, I believe it's inherent. And it's something we'll be doing for the next 10 or 15 years. You know, we've spent a lot of time looking at the -- (inaudible) -- that is part of this Manual development. And one thing we do say is that they will continue to be -- these type of operations for the next 10 or 15 years.

You know, we've spent a lot of time looking at the threat out in the future and examining that as part of this manual development.

And one thing we do say is that there will continue to be these type of operations for the next 10 or 15 years.

SEN. CORNYN: After 9/11 we heard a lot about stovepipes in the intelligence community. And of course, in the military we've been working a long time to build a joint capability between the various branches of the military. But I'm wondering whether it's time to look at removing some of the stovepipes in terms of all U.S. government powers through greater interagency cooperation to perhaps engage in a more meaningful way, from my perspective, the State Department and other U.S. government agencies in these stability and civil affairs operations.

Would you comment on that?

GEN. CODY: Sir, I have three objectives out in my command. One is leader development, obviously, and the second is the interagency. And I am aptly passionate and could not agree with you more.

If you just take our educational process -- where we have to start it. If you go out to the Command and General Staff College, our mid-grade level leaders at 10 years we're bringing out there and educating. I have 1,100 -- I'm the commandant of the college out there. I have 1,100 majors. A hundred of them are from other nations. I have 82 different nations represented to give me the international flavor so that we can have that kind of cultural dialogue and exchange between us. I have 200 from the other services -- from the Navy, the Air Force and the Marines.

I'm down now to about 800 Army officers. I have three from the interagency. Two of them are from the diplomatic security corps and one is from the Defense Intelligence Agency.

I literally have, for the last eight months, have put a team together to try to somehow get the interagency to participate and be a part of the educational process, because if we don't train and educate together, we're going to be challenged when we go into the type of situations we see in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

Sir, just having come out of Iraq, I can tell you the members of the U.S. government that are there -- other than the military -- are incredible heroes, putting forth 110 percent effort. They are absolutely committed and dedicated and they're working every day with us. But they just aren't resourced and funded to be able to do what's necessary there -- nor, in this case, to provide like students who can come out to the Command General Staff College and spend 10 months in an educational process with all those other students out there to enrich the training environment, so that we educate and train ourselves as we will find ourselves operating in future environments in the world that our nation may commit us to.

SEN. CORNYN: Well, you mentioned funding. And of course, the key to -- a key to the stability operations that you outline are the provincial reconstruction teams and their efforts to rebuild key infrastructure. And a large portion of the PRT funding -- the economic support fund -- was in the fiscal year GWOT supplemental funding request.

In December, Congress appropriated only $15 million out of the $797 million requested to fund the provincial reconstruction teams. In your opinion, how does this impact the PRT's ability to provide stability operations?

GEN. CODY: Sir, it obviously starts much earlier, because the other branches of the government are challenges to find the people to put into the PRTs, because they aren't resourced with that kind of expeditionary capability.

Given though, that the members that we do find there -- the PRTs are essential if we're going to eventually transition and provide greater stability and quality of life for the Iraqi people or the Afghan people.

Captain Kuhlmann (sp) can share a personal example of how here he is at the Baiji oil refinery where you think you would find every element of the U.S. government from -- engaged up there. And he has one person that he's able to find from the PRT that's nearby who's coming and working with him and helping to provide some kind of connectivity back into the whole of government. And that's it.

Had it not been for that PRT -- had it not been for that one department person outside the U.S. military -- he would have had no outside engagement with them through his first six or seven months there in trying to figure out how do we help the government of Iraq get the Baiji oil refinery -- it's major one refinery in the country -- more operational and functioning better.

SEN. CORNYN: I was interested to see in chapter seven of the field manual that's about information superiority -- and particularly information -- operations information. Operations divides into five Army information tasks with particular emphasis on information engagement.

Could you explain a little bit what you see is the role -- the proper role of the military when it comes to information superiority?

GEN. CODY: Sir, in the 21st century, as we all know, the information medium has exploded. And the messages and ways people can transmit information has quadrupled. So the question is: Are we as a military going to understand and embrace this information medium and establish the procedures, the methods, the means by which we can in fact use it to educate and inform others and help work and understand that the perceptions of the people -- because we're working among the people -- in fact becomes reality?

And therefore, your actions on the ground -- that of the American soldier -- he or she and what he or she does on a daily basis has a tremendous impact. But then there's also the other medium of conveying a message through the Internet, through radio, through TV, through newspapers that are out there and we need to understand better and take advantage of.

We haven't fully embraced and taken a hold of that medium yet. We need to. It's critical to the 21st century. Some people call it soft power. In the Combined Arms Center we prefer to call it smart power. It's taking these non-lethal elements, like information, and figuring how do we take and use that in the 21st century where in fact, force-on-force is not necessarily the means by which you're going to achieve an objective. But rather, informing and educating the people and making them understand what's going on will in fact, many times, change their behaviors and their attitudes much more quickly than anything else will.

And so this information medium is absolutely paramount. It's a major change in this manual. Of the four -- you know, if you were to say: What are the four major things? One of them, of course, is elevating stability operations equal to and as important as offense and defense. Another one is this information domain.

And I had the opportunity yesterday to talk to every public affairs officer in the United States Army, at a worldwide public affairs conference, and share with them and talk to them about this information domain, because it is so critical. And they're a key element of helping us get at that. They're not alone in this effort, but they're an aspect of it, because we do have to figure out how we're going to better inform and educate others about what the objectives are of our U.S. government.

SEN. CORNYN: Well, I'm glad to see the emphasis on that and the emphasis on that issue, because frankly, I think the enemy we are confronting is a master of using information tactics to advance their cause.

And I remember being with a group -- a bipartisan group of members of this committee in Kirkuk in August of 2003 with General Odierno and General Petraeus at the time, and listening to a briefing of the good work that was being done there, and just marveling that that information just never seemed to get out.

And obviously, in terms of the public support for the mission of the military, I think it's important for the public to know what the military's doing and not just leave it to the halls of Congress for people to spin and sort of characterize it for whatever their motives might be, but actually to get good, solid information.

So I'm glad to see that the field manual does view that as an important part of the function of the military to make sure that information -- accurate information -- does get out in a way that enhances our ability to do the job.

Mr. Chairman, I'll turn it back to you for right now.

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SEN. CORNYN: Just a few more questions, General. You know, there's some criticism that, going into Iraq, we sort of were looking for a replication of what happened in Afghanistan and we found something entirely different due to the failure of intelligence to let us anticipate what we, in fact, encountered. I don't mean from a military standpoint. I mean in terms of the disintegration of civil society, the insurgency and the like.

Are you concerned at all that this field manual, responding as it does to the current need for increased stability in civil affairs operations, is a response to what we've experienced in Iraq, that may or may not be present -- a need that may or may not be present in future conflicts?

GEN. CALDWELL: That's a great question. We've had a lot of discussion on that. The lessons we have learned over the last really seven years now from both Afghanistan and Iraq have been taken and used in helping formulate this manual. But it's much more than that. It's also -- as the chairman asked, what assumptions do we make in trying to look to what we're going to (perceive ?) that we could face in the future and having that as a major building block too? But very much so, we are influenced by and wanted to ensure we didn't lose the lessons learned from the last six or seven years.

SEN. CORNYN: My notes tell me here that more than 90 percent of civil affairs troops are Reservists currently. Could you confirm that or not? And do you expect the regular Army, as it adopts a larger role in the stability in the civil affairs operations -- now that it's been doctrinally elevated to a core Army mission, is that going to change the need to have more of that capability in the regular Army?

GEN. CALDWELL: Sir, I'd have to come back to you on the exact percentage. I don't believe it's 90 percent anymore. But I would not -- I really want to come back to you if I could on that and give you a definitive answer. I'd like to be correct.

But what I can tell you, sir, is we only had one active-duty civil affairs battalion when 9/11 occurred. We're going to have six of them here shortly. It's an acknowledgement to how critical that asset is. And that will be six in the active-duty force. There will be still some in the Reserves, but that's going to be six in the active-duty force, because we also recognize that we probably have -- that we did put too much of it into the Reserve component.

Again, but it's because we had not set stability operations as equal and as important as offensive and defensive operations. We have now, and in doing so, therefore, must have more civil affairs in the active force.

SEN. CORNYN: As this becomes a core Army mission of stability and civil affairs operations, I read one article suggesting that some military officers may not see this as particularly an advantageous career path leading to promotion. Are you concerned about that?

GEN. CALDWELL: Sir, I am. And I can tell you one thing that we have just done in the Army too. We have taken and put all our leader development under the Training and Doctrinal commander. In fact, today General Wallace is chairing the first of the quarterly leader development reviews so that we can look specifically at leader development issues. They were very much dispersed across the Army in different areas. We now, just in the last six months, have pulled them all together.

We have a team out of Fort Leavenworth that's working this for him, and we're having our first quarterly review today, which literally will include everybody from the Army, from Army G-3, the G- 1, our personnel people, our Training and Doctrine, our Forces Command. They're all coming and meeting, with General Wallace chairing the session.

As we work through and then not only prioritize these leader development things, but then put the resources against it, which is the part that has also been missing, and so that he has been given the authority to move resources within the Army so that we ensure -- we say, "This is our number one critical thing" -- that, in fact, it'll be resourced so that it occurs, which would then follow on with things like board instructions that give instructions for promotions and acknowledgement of how important those kind of skills are.

SEN. CORNYN: We all know that the current conflicts in which our nation is engaged have put a lot of stress on the Army with repetitive deployments. And, of course, one way we're responding to that is by growing the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps. Does this change in the Army Field Manual call for any changes, in your opinion, with regard to the numbers of new members of the Army and the Marine Corps that we're going to need?

GEN. CALDWELL: Not directly, sir. I mean, if we're trying to figure out end strength, I think perhaps what we do is we look at what do we think are the mission requirements and then what are the forces to accomplish those missions.

SEN. CORNYN: I guess my -- to clarify my question, maybe, since we're talking about more than offensive and defensive operations, more than just being the most lethal force on the planet, but expanding the role, it would seem to me you're going to need more people if your role is going to be expanded.

Now, maybe you'll tell me you're doing it anyway now, and really it's just sort of recognizing reality. But I would be interested if you do believe -- and you can certainly take it under advisement and come back to us -- if you think that there's any need to increase the numbers of growing our end strength in the Army or Marine Corps as a result of this new core requirement of the field manual.

GEN. CALDWELL: Sir, what I can say, the current growth that's been approved, the 72,000, of which 65,000 or so was active duty, you know, that's where, in fact, we're doing the civil affairs growth and some of these others. You know, as we say, this doctrine is evolutionary in nature, because there has been the acknowledgement that these kind of things have been required. But it's revolutionary in that we codified it in writing. And so that's the revolutionary aspect of this.

And so in the growth that the Congress did approve already for the United States Army, a lot of that has already started to occur and has been looked at.

I will tell you there are still ongoing reviews, again, because we also do that out of Fort Leavenworth for the Army, in the overall force structure. We are not finished with it. There are still dialogues and discussions. And we will go back here in about two more weeks with another major series of events that will lead up to about the 1st of July when we'll go back to the department and make a recommendation on some further changes within our force structure.

SEN. CORNYN: I appreciate your candor in responding to Senator Lieberman's question about whether you can rely on other agencies of the federal government to perform this function or whether the uniform military is going to do it. Because frankly, there's not going to be a lot of help from elsewhere. I would be interested if you have recommendations. I believe your staff and mine have talked a little bit about what over and above the Army field manual and elevation of this (ability ?) and Civil Affairs operations to a core part of the Army doctrine, what other ideas you might have about how we could engage the full spectrum of the federal government to assist.

I mean, I think you've acknowledged the reality. And I happen to agree with you under present circumstances, but I don't think we ought to give up. And if there are things that we could do that would supplement or enhance this capability of the Army in providing these operations by funding or training or some other reorganization of U.S. government power, I would appreciate the benefit of your thoughts and ideas on that.

GEN. CALDWELL: All right, sir. We'll come back to you on that, sir. And you are right, sir. Our staffs are engaged, and I appreciate that dialogues that's been going on.

SEN. CORNYN: Thank you very much.

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