Hearing of the Emerging Threats & Capabilities Subcommittee - FY05 Budget Request for Defense Department Counternarcotics Program
Federal News Service
HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE EMERGING THREATS & CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: FY05 BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT COUNTERNARCOTICS PROGRAM
CHAIRED BY: SEN. PAT ROBERTS (R-KS)
WITNESSES: THOMAS O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT; REAR ADMIRAL BRUCE CLINGAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND; BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN MIXON, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
LOCATION: 222 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
BODY:
SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to join you in welcoming Secretary O'Connell and General Mixon and Admiral Clingan.
And Secretary O'Connell is here with a huge burden, since Secretary Rumsfeld has not yet replaced the principal deputy assistant secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. That individual left the office last year, and the position of deputy assistant secretary of Defense for counternarcotics policy has remained vacant since October 2003. Therefore, Secretary O'Connell is doing yeoman's work without all the assistance he needs. We hope he can communicate again our concern to Secretary Rumsfeld about filling these positions. We know he's going to do a great job since he's a graduate of the University of Rhode Island, but there's no need to have him doing three jobs.
The purpose of our hearing today is to review the Department of Defense request for funding and authority for counternarcotics program in fiscal year 2005. This includes international programs, especially in the Western Hemisphere and Southwest Asia, and military efforts to support the domestic counter-drug work of other federal, state and local agencies.
We are here also to learn about how resources and authorities are currently being used in two of the geographic commands with a critical role to play in reducing illicit drug activities internationally-U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Central Command.
On the domestic side, the department has been providing valuable intelligence, surveillance and other support to the other agencies manning our borders, ports and shores. The National Guard, on top of their other duties, plays a critical role in such drug interdiction efforts.
Outside of the United States, the department provides international support to stop illicit drug production and trafficking. Two areas of particular interest to this committee are Colombia and Afghanistan. In Colombia, some progress appears to have been made. In 2003, the Air Bridge Denial aerial interdiction program in Colombia resumed two years after the tragic shootdown of U.S. missionaries in Peru. We heard yesterday at a full committee hearing from General Hill, commander of SOUTHCOM, that in the last year, the Colombian military has successfully captured or killed several narcoterrorist leaders and is increasing the territory controlled by the central government and denying that territory to the narcoterrorists.
Also in 2003, as the State Department's recently released International Narcotics Control Strategy Report notes the government eradicated illicit crops at a record-setting pace. Unfortunately, the same report points out that Colombia remains a major producing country. Indeed, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, in its January 2004 "Pulse" report on trends in domestic drug abuse found that in 2003, crack and powder cocaine availability remained relatively stable across the United States, and prices remained stable or declined in some cities.
There are, of course, any number of factors to explain this. However, I hope that Secretary O'Connell and General Mixon can address these facts and the challenges of reducing coca cultivation and drug trafficking in Colombia and the Andean region, especially in the context of the department's request for authority to raise the cap on military and civilian personnel from 400 to greater numbers.
In the meantime, we face an urgent and potentially worsening situation in Afghanistan. According to the State Department's recently released International Narcotics Control Strategy Report and the United Nations' latest Global Illicit Drug Trade report, Afghanistan has produced its highest amount of opium since 1999, about three-quarters of the world's illicit opium. Moreover, the United Nations report indicates that poppy cultivation could expand further in 2004. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crimes estimates that the revenue from opium in Afghanistan is about $2.3 billion, equivalent to more than 50 percent of Afghanistan's estimated gross domestic product. The potential impact on security and President Karzai's control of the country is clearly jeopardized by this type of illicit activity.
Indeed, just two days ago, President Karzai told a donors' conference in Berlin, in his words, "drugs in Afghanistan are undermining the very existence of the Afghan state."
The British have had the lead in counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan, but obviously they need help. In recognition of these facts, the 2003 Iraq supplemental included $73 million for counter- drug efforts in Afghanistan.
I look forward to hearing from Secretary O'Connell and General Clingan about the-excuse me-Admiral Clingan about the department's strategy and CENTCOM's plans for employing these counter- drug resources.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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SEN. REED: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
Chairman Roberts has raised the issue of the effect to the operation tempo on activities throughout DOD. And Secretary O'Connell, could you comment on whether this OPTEMPO increase has affected your ability to discharge your counter-drug responsibilities?
MR. O'CONNELL: Thank you for the question, Senator Reed. I agree with General Mixon. Certainly the forces are under strain.
But looking at my responsibility for the oversight of the 48(,000), 49,000 U.S. Special Operations forces, it doesn't appear so at this time. In fact, we've been able to use forces that had been in Colombia previously in other operational areas.
As you know, General Brown and I testified the other day before the Senate Armed Services Committee on posture, and I agree with General Brown that the force is not overextended at this point.
In terms of the specific counternarcotics work done on the Special Operations side, we look primarily to U.S. Southern Command, of course, and the 7th Special Forces Group. I'd just like to point out that the ability of the Colombian military, sir, to follow the advice and guidance of these wonderful Green Berets has made a difference of enormous proportions down there. The Colombian military is now going out into areas which were previously off limits. They're conducting ambushes, long-range reconnaissance, and direct strikes against the FARC. And I think we've all seen that that has had an unbelievable effect on the morale of the people of Colombia.
To move back to one point that Chairman Roberts made in terms of increases on the cap, I would like to point out that because these distances that the 7th Special Forces Group have been able to push the Colombian military out farther-and, Senator Reed, you certainly would recognize this in view of your military service-we're talking now about considerably more terrain to cover. So the helicopter routes are longer, the medical evacuation requirements, the re-arm, refuel, equip, the maintenance requirements go up as you, obviously, have to address more territory. And so that would go to the question of Chairman Roberts.
But to answer your question, sir, the answer at this time is no.
SEN. REED: Let me ask another variation on the question. Are you declining requests for assistance that previously you could-you would entertain? Requests from the Colombians, requests from the Afghani government through CENTCOM?
MR. O'CONNELL: Sir, not to my knowledge. Of course I would defer, of course, to the commandant commanders, General Hill and General Abizaid.
And I will say with respect to General Hill, we meet and talk very often. I mean, he is very much into not only the counternarcotics business, but in terms of stability operations throughout his hemisphere. He's an astute leader. He understands very carefully his responsibilities. And I think he's looking to the future, and he'll apply our military force and training anyplace that it can be beneficial throughout the hemisphere.
SEN. REED: Thank you. And --
GEN. MIXON: I'd like to make a comment on that, sir.
SEN. REED: Yes, sir, go ahead, General Mixon. And, Admiral, if you want.
GEN. MIXON: We have never turned down a request from (sic) support since I have been there, last July. However, the cap has caused us to have to shift support to make sure we did not go over the 400 cap. I'd just like to make that point.
SEN. REED: Thank you, sir.
Admiral?
ADM. CLINGAN: Senator Reed, if I could just add, sir, I think there-at least in the press there has been some misperception that this requested cap increase would be consistent with a deployment order. And that is not the case, and I would hope that that message was delivered by General Hill yesterday.
SEN. REED: Can I raise another question of General Mixon about the caps, since you brought it up? You want to go up to 800. But do you have an estimate of what your sort of average, steady-state deployment in country would be?
GEN. MIXON: Sir, today, as we speak, the numbers that we count against Plan Colombia cap is 332. We had a high about 30 to 45 days ago of 392, and we were making some adjustments.
SEN. REED: Let's assume that the permission is granted. Do you think you'll have close to 800 people on the ground at all times --
GEN. MIXON: I do not.
SEN. REED: What's your estimate?
GEN. MIXON: We did a best-case analysis of this before we went forward. If we were able to provide all of the support that we can envision over the life cycle of Plan Patriota, which is the military campaign plan, and we found it to be at 726.
SEN. REED: All right. Thank you.
Admiral, you have a comment?
ADM. CLINGAN: Sir, in Afghanistan, to my knowledge, we have not denied any request for support specifically from President Karzai nor the minister of interior.
SEN. REED: Thank you very much.
Secretary O'Connell, in October of 2003 Secretary Wolfowitz promulgated a new international counternarcotics policy, which essentially made a link explicitly between counternarcotics and counterterrorism. In his words, department CN and support should be oriented to the greatest extent feasible towards supporting the war on terrorism and department security cooperation guidance. Seems terribly logical to me.
We have given explicit authority in the case of Colombia for the Department of Defense to use counterdrug funds to support Colombian efforts to fight a unified counterdrug-counterterrorism campaign, that's one case. To your knowledge, does the department plan to ask for additional authority to use counterdrug funds for overlapping counterdrug/counterterrorism?
MR. O'CONNELL: Sir, I am not aware of any. The combatant commanders may have specific commands.
But if I could comment on the mechanism that has been provided for generally the Central Transfer Account, which is the way we handle certainly the bulk of these counternarcotics activities --
SEN. REED: And just-and I'd like you to do that in a second, but the Congress has funded this Central Transfer Account counterdrug to fight drugs.
MR. O'CONNELL: Yes, sir.
SEN. REED: And the obvious issue, is this being now used in other ways which we should be at least aware of?
MR. O'CONNELL: Sir, it's my belief that it has not been. As you know, sir, it's extremely difficult to draw that precise line, but in our planning, in the reporting that we do back to the Congress on what we spend this money for, we specifically aim at the counterdrug/counternarcotics areas. The point is, sir, that the Central Transfer Account, the way it is structured-although it's been under increasing pressure do to things like inflation and other aspects such as closing down Roosevelt Roads, which has increased our maritime patrol costs-allows extraordinary flexibility, and I think that the department has been very candid and very honest in how they've handled and allocated those funds.
We, of course, look very carefully at any reprogramming. I'd be happy to go into some of the bloodier specifics, perhaps during our closed session --
SEN. REED: Yeah, sure.
MR. O'CONNELL: -- when we get into contentious issues. But you have provided very flexible authorities, and to the best of my ability-and I think certainly the combatant commanders realize and certainly the secretary-we will focus that on the intended focus of the-the intended aim of the money, sir.
SEN. REED: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I listened to the exchange between Chairman Roberts and the panel with respect to Afghanistan, the drug policy. The initial approach was a British focus on labs and trafficking. We have, with our strategy, have come in with strengthening security along the Afghan- Pakistan border. There's one sort of issue, though, that we haven't spoken about directly, that's eradication. Is that going to play a role? Is that too contentious an issue within the context of the politics and --
MR. O'CONNELL: No, I don't believe so, sir, because obviously eradication has to be part of the strategy. As you know, President Karzai has said he will lead the eradication through his governors and out into the provincial regions. We do not in DOD specifically do eradication per se. There may be some support for eradication in terms of, let's say, provision of security while eradication is taking place. But no, sir; it has to be part of the strategy.
I would ask Admiral Clingan if he had a comment on that.
SEN. REED: Admiral?
ADM. CLINGAN: The secretary has it exactly right. We do not participate in any way, shape or form with regard to eradication. But many of our efforts complement that process, in particular the law enforcement capabilities that we endeavor to enhance, and those intelligence efforts can promote success in the eradication effort.
SEN. REED: Thank you, gentlemen. My time has expired.
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SEN. REED: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And Chairman Warner has raised the issue and expressed all of our outrage about the ghastly attack upon the contractors. It raises some questions, Admiral. First, do we have an idea of how many of these type of security contractors, people who are armed and much different than someone going in to give advice about a project, an engineer? But these are armed individuals whose job is to protect vehicles and properties and engage if they have to. Do we have an idea of how many of these we have in the country?
ADM. CLINGAN: Senator, thank you for the question. We do have an idea; in fact, I would hazard to say that we know specifically how many contract security detachment personnel we have. The precise number is not-I am not aware of, but I can certainly find out and --
SEN. REED: But your notion would be on the order of some thousands of --
ADM. CLINGAN: No, sir. Significantly less.
SEN. REED: Okay.
ADM. CLINGAN: The contract PSD folks are primarily focused on providing security to the Coalition Provisional Authority and some other entities on a smaller scale than that.
SEN. REED: The other issue it raises with the incident, the tragic incident this week, is the coordination between military forces and these security personnel-these civilian security personnel; and also, sir, the standing operating procedures that both sides would follow. And one of the questions that remains unanswered is that, apparently, this situation took several hours. It was an attack and then the crowd built up, et cetera. And at no time, apparently, did American military units respond to try to recover the body or somehow disperse the crowds-or Iraqi security forces. This whole issue of operations I think is important. Can you comment upon that, Admiral?
ADM. CLINGAN: Sir, in this forum I can say that we're continuing to investigate the circumstances surrounding that.
SEN. REED: Thank you very much, Admiral.
Let me raise two other countries.
SEN. ROBERTS: On that point, I had hoped we learned that lesson in Somalia.
SEN. REED: I concur.
Two other countries. Pakistan, according to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report-Pakistan saw a remarkable rebound, unfortunately, in opium production, and it is a transit site for some of the opium leaving Afghanistan.
Secretary O'Connell and Admiral Clingan, can you comment upon the situation in Pakistan, with respect to this increased production and-because it conjures up also the destabilizing effects of drug money getting into the hands of insurgents. Secretary or --
ADM. CLINGAN: Senator, thank you for the question. We are concerned in the United States Central Command in regard to narco- trafficking throughout the AOR, but particularly Southern Asia, which includes Southwest Asia, Pakistan. Part of our plan addresses the bordering countries surrounding Afghanistan, and clearly watching the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is an area that we'll pay attention to in regard to enhancing border controls. That and the "Stans" in the north-those two areas are of considerable interest to us because of the comment that you made.
SEN. REED: Thank you.
And General Mixon, we have forces in Haiti today, and apparently Haiti also is a-at least a transshipment point, if not a production point. Can you comment upon the situation in Haiti with respect to drugs?
GEN. MIXON: Yes sir, I can. First of all, as a transshipment point, we do not have any indicators of production in that area. And I would just comment that, at the present time, we have approximately 3,700 total forces in there, including all the multinational forces in that area.
During the first 30 days of the operations in Haiti, we saw absolutely no flights going into Haiti as we had tracked over the past. However, unfortunately, here in the last week we have identified at least one identified flight going into the area, which indicates to us a resumption of it as a transshipment point. It is our intention, as General Hill's guidance to the Joint Task Force, that we will monitor that in working closely with JIATF South. We will monitor that and we will do everything that we can do to shut it down as a trans-shipment point, given the fact that we are on the ground and present in Haiti. And we will do that in conjunction with the other agencies that are involved.
It's important to note that as a part of the joint Task Force in Haiti, we have formed our naval component around the U.S. Coast Guard.
And as of about three days ago, they have done at least close to a hundred boardings of private and small vessels to ensure that Haiti doesn't operate itself open again as a transshipment point. So we're going take aggressive action in that particular area, because it will destabilize our efforts.
SEN. REED: I guess the question that begs is, we can do that now with 3,000 internationally personnel on the ground and with a Coast Guard flotilla out-what happens or what are we going to do to ensure, when we leave, that it remains-or it's not a transshipment point?
GEN. MIXON: We will continue to do operations that we have done in coordination with DEA. JIATF South-that's one of the areas that they monitor.
SEN. REED: Yeah.
GEN. MIXON: And ideally, as we begin to reform the Haitian national police, we can work with them to make them more effective, because really that's where we need to put our focus.
In the past, that has been part of the problem. And as we saw over the last year, there were strong indicators of Haitian national police involvement in the drug trade.
SEN. REED: Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN./MR. : (Off mike.)
SEN. REED: He's coming right back. I have another question, as a matter of fact. Let me follow up, General Mixon, because the request for the increased personnel in Colombia raises some specific questions.
I think you've all assured us that you will have sufficient support for-in DOD in terms of the individuals you need. So you're not going to be limited in terms of personnel available. That's correct, is it?
GEN. MIXON: There will be a consideration, of course, as we request those additional personnel. But I think we will get their support when we do ask for those people.
SEN. REED: And how do you envision using these increased forces? Will they accompany units in the field? If they do, how far down-how far will they go into the areas of contact?
GEN. MIXON: Yes, sir. They will operate from secure bases. A specific level-the planning and assistance teams that we have operating in Colombia today, which-most of those team members came from within the components of U.S. Southern Command that were not deployed and have not been deployed. In other words, we didn't go out to the broader DOD.
They operate at brigade level, with one exception. We have planning and assistance teams that operates in advice to the Lancero battalion, which is a Ranger battalion equivalent. Even at that level, they stay in the secure bases, providing planning and assistance.
If those headquarters move into an area, it is the responsibility of the mil group commander to ensure that they are moving to a secure base and, through his approval, it is a point in time when the planning and assistance team can move to that base. But they are not allowed to leave the secure base. They are not allowed to go on combat patrols or participate in combat operations.
SEN. REED: Thank you. Part of the dilemma in Colombia has been the sizes of the military for the Colombian military force and their capabilities. Is this request made in recognition of the progress that the Colombians have made in terms of having effective units that can go out and essentially use the skill and the services of these planners?
GEN. MIXON: Sir, that's exactly the point. Their military has grown, and they are doing larger-scale operations where more units are put in the field. And therefore we see it as important to provide them the advice and assistance.
I would tell you, to echo what General Hill said yesterday, the Colombian military and the Colombian government clearly see this as their war to win. And whenever we look at their units and how they're doing operations and the support they may need, we always go to them first and say, "This is what we recommend, where we can help you." Sometimes they say, "Yes, we would like that help." Sometimes they say, "No, give us some time until we are ready to receive that support."
My point is that they aren't-they don't always come to us and rarely do come to us for the types of support we offer. But it's an effort done in conjunction with them and their military operations.
SEN. REED: Can I raise a final point? That is, we discussed the situation in Iraq with contractors, and Secretary O'Connell pointed out that there are contractors in Colombia. I'll raise the same general question: What is the operating procedures to support these contractors, to know where they are in country, to prevent a situation in Colombia that we saw in Iraq?
GEN. MIXON: Yes, sir. They operate under similar rules of engagement.
However, the contractors that work for Department of State, that actually participate in the flying of some of the spray aircraft, some of the intelligence aircraft that support military operations, obviously are flying over hostile territory. And as you know, we have lost two aircraft in the last year, year and a half. One resulted in the capture of three Americans, who are still held hostage by the FARC.
SEN. REED: Thank you. Thank you.