A Stew Pot of Trouble

A STEW POT OF TROUBLE

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I think we have a bubbling stew pot of trouble brewing in Afghanistan, and we need to take stronger action action requested by President Karzai, by the way-soon, or much of our effort to root out lawlessness in Afghanistan may be undercut.

What am I talking about? Narcotics-particularly about the significant increase in opium production and trafficking in Afghanistan. I am not challenging the significant progress which has been made in the past 2 years. Removing the Taliban and preparing the groundwork for a democratically elected government is no small feat. Working with our allies, we have gathered all of the right ingredients together to build a new Afghanistan that will benefit everyone-particularly the people of Afghanistan. But the outcome is far from certain, and it doesn't seem as if we are paying enough attention to the danger signs.

According to the latest International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, released by the State Department at the beginning of this month, Afghanistan had the potential to produce 2,865 metric tons of opium in 2003. This represents almost two-thirds of the total potential opium production in the world. We know the havoc that drug use creates in a society. We know the corruption that drug trafficking encourages whereever it occurs. Experience has shown us that ignoring drug production and trafficking has only made things worse. These factors alone should be a reason for concern.

We should also be concerned about who is profiting from this resurgence. The difference between what the Afghan farmer is getting and what an eightball of heroin is worth on the streets of Paris is astronomical. And I am certain those reaping this enormous profit are not the same individuals who support the Karzai government, or who are happy to see coalition troops there.

The profits and instability that follow drug production wherever it occurs should be raising alarms for everyone involved. What is most worrisome, however, is we have seen these ingredients thrown together before, in Colombia. We can go down that same road, or we can take action now, before events boil over into chaos.

Earlier this week I spoke on this floor about the connections between drug trafficking and terrorism. The clearest nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism is in Colombia, where there are three major terrorist organizations using drugs to fund their efforts to overthrow the government.

The State Department has designated these three groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, the National Liberation Army, ELN, and the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia, AUC, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. But these terrorist organizations began with more ideological roots, and more localized objectives.

Together, these three terrorist organizations have killed thousands of innocents. Three American civilians are currently being held hostage by the FARC, and have not been allowed any contact with the outside world for over a year.

For nearly 40 years the FARC have been pressing a pro-Marxist ideology. Similarly, the ELN held a more Maoist philosophy, but also strove for the same revolutionary objective. Initially these efforts were supported by donations from both the Soviet Union and Cuba. But that support ended with the fall of the Soviet Union.

While not as old, the AUC began as a series of para-military groups initially funded by the wealthy landlords in Colombia. These groups, initially endorsed by the government, were created because the government was unable to protect these rural landlords from attacks by the guerrillas.

But the end of the cold war did not mean an end to the guerrilla activities in Colombia. Instead, all three of these organizations were able to turn to the narcotics trade for funding. Because of this, their membership and the violence associated with each of these organizations has increased dramatically. It is now estimated that these groups receive a significant portion of their operating revenues from narcotics.

With that move, much of the ideology and even the pretense of being a guerrilla group disappeared as well. At first, they just provided security and other support to the drug lords and were paid for their services. But that was not enough.

Today we know that both the AUC and the FARC fight each other for access to the best smuggling routes into and out of Colombia. They fight the government to protect their drug production and transportation networks. They have also begun reaching out to foreign terrorist organizations as well, using narcotics as currency in exchange for guns and training.

Until recently, these terrorist organizations were able to move freely throughout a significant portion of rural Colombia, forcing the displacement of millions of Colombians as they battled the government and each other over drugs and politics. Only after coming to the conclusion that both drug trafficking and terrorism must be addressed equally has there been progress in restoring the control of Colombia to the legitimate government.

Fast forward to Afghanistan. Like the FARC, there are groups within Afghanistan, primarily operating in the remote areas of the country, who for ideological reasons would like to overthrow the government. The Taliban is perhaps the best known, but there are others as well. Numerous warlords also operate throughout the countryside, some whom have even had the blessing of the government.

The Taliban, like the FARC after the fall of the Soviet Union, need to secure an alternative means of financing their operations if they are to survive. Our success in choking off their traditional funding sources has created this necessity. Opium-like coca for the FARC-is an easy, local, and available opportunity to do exactly that, and will not be a new source of revenue for the Taliban. While the Taliban banned opium production for a period of time when they controlled Afghanistan, they also taxed the trafficking and resulting profits from the sale of stored opium after the ban.

Add to this equation some of the many warlords that control various areas of Afghanistan. Some of these warlords even worked with coalition forces to oust the Taliban. But most have no intention of surrendering any of their power or authority to the central government in Kabul, preferring to fight for their own fiefdoms.
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They have no interest in enforcing edicts from Kabul, or in taking any action that might give the central government additional legitimacy. Profits from opium production and trafficking are a key method for continuing to fund their war clan.

These efforts are not as blatant or as well organized as what we have in Colombia today, but the ingredients are there. It is time we start connecting the dots.

Today, several thousand U.S. and coalition soldiers are hunting down terrorists. These terrorists are receiving physical and financial support from somewhere. Meanwhile, the Karzai government is working furiously to establish the police, judicial, and military systems necessary to ensure that the people of Afghanistan can equitably govern themselves. But they must overcome the chaos created by 20 years of occupation and civil war. The last thing that they need is a well funded rebellion in their backyard.

The Karzai government recognizes the dangers posed by bumper crops of opium. They know the profits being generated by this drug production go not to the Afghani people, but to the few powerful enough to move the opium out of Afghanistan. These drug traffickers flourish in the same kind of lawless environment where terrorists train.

We need to start connecting the dots. We cannot continue to separate terrorism and narco-trafficking. I fear that if the United States narcotics policy in Afghanistan does not catch up to that of the Karzai government, we will be facing the same mess that we are working to clean up in Colombia. We have watched this pot before. We need to begin looking at our options now, before it boils over and we have a real mess.