Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee - U.S. Strategy and Operations in Afghanistan and the Way Ahead

Statement

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REP. KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to commend you for holding this hearing. The topics of today's testimony are extraordinarily timely and I've found it very useful.

First I'd like to address the issue of the special envoy, and you've all testified that you would like to have a coordinated special envoy with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I agree wholeheartedly with that recommendation. If we were able to convince this administration, or even if it waits until the next administration, to do that, one question I'd like your expertise on is getting America to do it is one thing, but do you think we could ever get the Pakistani and Afghanistan governments to also work together in a coordinated operation?

MR. INDERFURTH: I do believe that we can do more on that. That relationship has been very difficult to bring together. President Bush actually tried to have President Karzai and President Musharraf to dinner. It was a nice symbolic step but required a lot of follow- up. President Musharraf recently went to Kabul to meet with President Karzai and by all accounts it was the most productive meeting they've had. So I think that there is room there for a U.S. envoy to work with both, recognizing that these are their countries, their problem. But to kick up the level of attention and the interconnectedness between the two countries, both on their political difficulties as well as the military security issues.

So I think that there is an opportunity there and we have plenty of people I think that could be called upon that have the trust of both capitals. I'll give one example: General Tony Zinni. People of that stature and that ability I think could be very helpful in this situation.

REP. GILLIBRAND: Thank you.

Any --

MR. RUBIN: I just want to add, this is not -- as long as Pakistan has existed, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been in conflict with each other. There are very serious political issues between the two countries that cannot be solved at a dinner party. And that is why we -- and to get them to operate together whereas they have tended to define each other as threats for six decades requires a very serious political effort, not just a professional-level coordination effort.

MR. BARNO: I would just add that I think the point that's -- whether we agree with the envoy idea or not -- in realizing how intractable these problems are, the U.S. has got to I think at the military level, at the diplomatic level, perhaps at the economic level look at this as a two-country problem and organize against a two- country problem. We're organized in almost all dimensions on a single-nation basis. All of our embassies are organized that way; much of our military effort's organized that way. So I think somehow we've got to break that down and come up with a two-country solution set for this challenge.

REP. GILLIBRAND: Would you also recommend an inspector general for both countries? Because right now, obviously, we have the inspector general of Iraq, and he and his team have done an excellent job in identifying corruption and fraud and trying to prosecute that on the American contractor side, doing thorough investigations in Iraq.

Would you recommend an inspector general for Afghanistan, number one? And would you recommend that this inspector general do both countries or have separate ones?

MR. INDERFURTH: I would certainly recommend an inspector general for Afghanistan. I think the situation with Pakistan is different. What I do think is required for Pakistan is much greater transparency and accountability for the coalition support funds, the almost $6 billion out of the $10 billion total that we have provided Pakistan since 9/11. Those funds, nobody knows what they've been spent for, and there's no billing and the rest --

REP. GILLIBRAND: Exactly.

MR. INDERFURTH: That requires a lot more attention.

REP. GILLIBRAND: And when I was in Pakistan this summer, that's what the general we met with said. They said if Congress can do anything, you know, we've given these folks $10 billion with no accountability, no oversight. So I raised the question with Secretary Gates, and he's the one who suggested maybe through the inspector general function, because it hadn't occurred to me to use the inspector general in Pakistan, because the role in Iraq is a much more oversight for fraud and corruption and finding misuses of American funds.

And so he suggested that. I just -- I hadn't -- I wanted your thoughts on whether that kind of structure would work, or whether you'd recommend some other kind of oversight where we get a receipt back from Pakistan as to where they spent our money, or some kind of conversation, at least, about how they intend to spend our money.

MR. INDERFURTH: Again, I think the special inspector for Afghanistan would be the right approach. More congressional oversight and making use of our already-existing mechanisms within the Pentagon for Pakistan, I think, would be the best way to proceed.

REP. GILLIBRAND: Thank you.

One follow-up question on the crops issue. Obviously your testimony is that there are some challenges in the way, security being number one. Two, if you do have replacement crops with subsidies and providing the seeds, providing the business plan about how to make this an effective production of a stable economy -- if you do all that, have you considered other ways to support such a structure besides direct subsidies?

One suggestion I'd like to give you as I work on the Agriculture Committee and come from a very rural district, the land grant college system is extremely effective, particularly at Cornell Cooperative Extension program in New York; that's the one I'm familiar with. Would you recommend having some kind of facility where we have infrastructure in place to support agriculture, to help these farmers create their business plans? And obviously you'd need to have security first and you'd have to have roads first and infrastructure. But do you see that as something that we could have a long-term 10- year investment on?

MR. RUBIN: Well, first, the opium economy in Afghanistan is not just a crop; the crop part of it is only 20 to 30 percent of it. It's an industry. And what Afghan rural families need is not just another crop, they need employment and they need incomes, which does not necessarily have to come from another crop. So the arguments that another crop is not as profitable are not really valid; other economic activities are.

Second, of course, we need all of those things, but the main point, I think, is the one that Rick Inderfurth made, which is that neither the United States nor any of the other donors or entities active in Afghanistan has really made agricultural and rural development as much of a priority -- and General Barno mentioned this very prominently as well -- as it needs to be in a country like Afghanistan. Everything you mentioned is potentially part of that program, but with six agricultural experts in the country we won't be able to accomplish that much.

REP. GILLIBRAND: In addition to our National Guard, as the chairman said.

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