Joint Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee- The Proposed U.S. Security Commitment to Iraq

Statement

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REP. ROSA DELAURO (D-CT): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to just say thank you to Chairman Delahunt and Chairman Ackerman for holding this hearing, and particularly to Mr. Delahunt for inviting me to participate.

I also want to say thank you to my colleagues who day in and day out sit on this committee and for allowing me to participate.

Our relationship with Iraq is undoubtedly one of the most critical issues facing our country today. With approximately 170,000 troops fighting in Iraq and the recent decrease in violence, much of the discussion concerning Iraq has turned to whether the troop surge is working. I welcome the reduction in violence, and I applaud General Petraeus and our troops. They make us proud.

And I say to my colleague, Mr. Pence, this is not about the surge. This is about whether or not Congress should have a role. If our troops are to be present in Iraq to 2012, to 2018, that in fact is a long-term arrangement. As a matter of fact, the State Department in Circular 175 does call for consultation with the Congress in cases like these. I have long questioned our long-term strategy in Iraq. What is it? And how long do we plan on waiting for substantive Iraqi reconciliation?

In June, Defense Secretary Gates said that we would have a, quote, "long and enduring presence in Iraq." And he said that we would be borrowing from the Korean model and a security relationship that we have with Japan. He compared our relationship to the one that we do have with Korea and Japan, two nations with which we have treaties. In November, the administration finally revealed its strategy when President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki agreed to a declaration of principles for a long-term U.S. relationship to be finalized by July 31st, 2008 -- just in the next several months.

I am concerned about the security assurances that our nation plans on providing Iraq according to this declaration. Among other things, the declaration proclaims the party's intention to negotiate a security arrangement, and I quote, "to support the Iraqi government in training, equipping and arming the Iraqi security forces so they can provide security and stability to all Iraqis, support the Iraqi government in contributing to the international fight against terrorism by confronting terrorists such as al Qaeda, its affiliates, other terrorist groups as well as other outlaw groups such as criminal remnants of the former regime and to provide security assurances to the Iraqi government to deter any external aggression and to ensure the integrity of Iraq's territory." Sweeping commentary!

The declaration appears, in many ways, to adopt the Maliki government's definition of both external and internal threats, and that concerns me. What are these undefined threats? Will we be obliged to preemptively strike Sunni fighters beyond Iraq's borders or even strike homegrown armed factions Maliki's own government deems to be a threat? After the principles were signed, as has been said already many times this morning, Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan Lieutenant General Douglas Lute said he does not anticipate, and I quote, "the status of the formal treaty which would then bring us to formal negotiations or formal inputs from the Congress," end quote.

Because the administration apparently believes Congress should not be involved in the negotiation of this agreement, I recently introduced the Iraq Strategic Agreement Review Act. The bill makes clear that the administration must consult with Congress and expresses a sense that any long-term security, economic and political agreement with Iraq must come in the form of a treaty following approval from the Senate.

We have been in Iraq for nearly five years. I understand that mapping out a future relationship with that country is vital to our national interest in the region. A core majority of Americans still believe we should bring our troops home as soon as possible, and this Congress has been elected, in large part, out of dissatisfaction with this war. Congress has a central role to play in formulating any long-term relationship with Iraq. This president simply should not be permitted to unilaterally tie the hands of his successor.

I look forward to hearing the witnesses today, getting their expert opinions on this type of agreement. I thank Mr. Delahunt and Mr. Ackerman for inviting me to this hearing and I thank the witnesses in advance for sharing their views. As I must be at a press conference shortly, I don't know if I'll be able to hear Mr. Katzman's testimony, but let me just pose this question and then I will leave my questions with Mr. Delahunt for the other witnesses.

And I'll say to Mr. Katzman, in your testimony you talked about an August, 2007 communique signed by the top five political leaders -- Shi'ites, Kurds and Sunnis -- as a springboard for this proposed agreement. Later in your testimony, you go through probable support, or lack thereof, for such an agreement in the Parliament. I count at least 100 seats against. So is it quite possible that the Iraqi Parliament would not be able to muster the seats to approve any treaty or agreement?

I anticipate that their Parliament is going through much the same considerations as we are today. What do you think the prospects are of the al-Maliki government ignoring the Parliament, moving forward this agreement without approval? What would the ramifications of that be among the various sects in Iraq and on the Iraqi street?

I thank the chair and -- for his indulgence in allowing me to speak before this hearing today. And I thank my colleagues.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Source