Hearing of the Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and Coast Guard Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee - Oil Spills

Statement

Date: Dec. 18, 2007
Location: Washington, DC
Issues: Transportation


Hearing of the Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and Coast Guard Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee - Oil Spills from Non-Tank Vessels: Threats, Risks and Vulnerabilities

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SEN. CANTWELL: I want to thank Senators -- Chairman Inouye and Vice Chairman Stevens for their long and hard work and attention to this issue, and to many of my colleagues who were here when the Exxon Valdez situation happened and the passage of the 1990 act. I really think it was groundbreaking legislation that has done a lot to protect our environment and to reduce the risks of maritime oil pollution.

The volume, though, of oil spilled nationwide is sill far too large and spills are still too frequent. We are here today because these events recently in California, I think, demand that we re- examine America's oil pollution prevention and response.

We know that a container ship, the Cosco Busan, collided with the San Francisco Bay Bridge as it was exiting the bay. That collision created a 100-foot gash in the side of the vessel and fuel that was spilled was 58,000 gallons, as my colleague from California just said, of bunker fuel into the bay, and resulted in one of the largest oil spills in San Francisco Bay in the last decade.

The fact that this ship was not an oil tanker transporting oil like the Exxon Valdez is an important one because the cargo ship was built to carry nearly 2 million gallons of oil as fuel. And the true scale of the fuel tank that was ruptured was 1 million gallons.

The incident has brought to light how vulnerable our oceans are to the oil spills from non-tank vessels that carry massive amounts of oil not as cargo but as fuel. I believe this even highlights a need to re-examine the protections of the Oil Pollution Act and whether they are sufficient given today's realities.

Is the current regulation of such non-tank vessels sufficient in the light of the risks that they pose? When non-tank vessels are growing both in size and in number and often carrying volumes of fuel of oil in the millions of gallons, is it really responsible for us to slow-walk the rules that would regulate these vessels?

In a world where the cost of cleanup for a single catastrophic spill would cost several billion dollars, should we really be toying with the solvency of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, the very source of cleanup dollars in an emergency?

And when we have better communication and navigation technology, safer ship designs and more innovative ways to save ships when things go wrong, isn't prevention a better investment than paying for the cleanup in the next catastrophe?

As recent incidents in San Francisco, the Puget Sound and along the Pacific coastline can attest, much more remains to be done to safeguard our waterways and our shorelines.

Like many of my colleagues here, Washington state knows these issues and confronts them every day. Approximately 600 tankers and 3,000 barges move nearly 15 billion gallons of oil through Puget Sound's very fragile ecosystem each year.

But over 6,000 larger non-tank vessels such as cargo ships and freighters transit through those same waters each year as well. And since 1964, vessels have spilled approximately 4.8 million gallons of oil in Washington waters. Of this, 184,000 gallons were spilled after the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

I too will submit the rest of my testimony for the record because I do want to hear the testimony of those witnesses. But I think it's safe to say that now we are 17 years after the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and we're nearly 30 years since my predecessor, Warren Magnuson, Senator Magnuson banned supertankers in Puget Sound.

I hope we can continue to make progress on this vital issue. And that's why we're here today, to here from these panelists who have joined us to bring insight, to examine the risks and threats and the vulnerabilities that we still face, particularly from non-tank vessels.

So I want to thank the panelists on the first panel: Admiral Allen of the U.S. Coast Guard; Ms. Mary Glackin, deputy undersecretary of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and Ms. Susan Fleming, director of physical infrastructure for the GAO.

Welcome. Thank you for being here and for your patience in this hearing this afternoon.

And Admiral Allen, if you could start with your testimony, we're asking each of the witnesses to make a five-minute statement.

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SEN. CANTWELL: Thank you and thank you all for your testimony and the focus on this important issue.

I know many of my colleagues will have questions but I think what I want to do is to start with five-minute rounds and if we want to have a second round on this panel we can. But we do have another panel afterwards, so I want to get to them as time allows and members have interest. So we'll just have to take a reading after that.

But let's start with five-minute rounds if we could, and I'd like to start with how the 1990 act required the preparedness of vessel response plans and each of you mentioned that in your testimony and the effectiveness of the response structure. All vessels that carry oil as cargo -- over 400 gross tons, that carry that fuel -- must have a vessel response plan. And these response plans are to address the potential of discharge from the vessel.

So we -- Congress mandated the Coast Guard to come up -- in the 2004 Maritime Transportation Act -- with what these actual regulations should be, that is the final rule implemented into law. So just a yes or no answer, if you could just tell me whether you think it's important that we get this done. Just a yes or no.

ADM. ALLEN: Yes.

MS. GLACKIN: Yes.

MS. FLEMING: Yes.

SEN. CANTWELL: Okay.

Admiral Allen, will we have these regulations put in place within the next 12 months?

ADM. ALLEN: We are putting together a regulatory work plan right now. As I stated in my opening statement, we did provide guidance to the industry and they have submitted plans to us that we have reviewed and they have been acting under those plans. So we are constructively meeting the intent but the rule is not out there and needs to get out there.

I am prepared to put resources at it. I think we've got a good chance to get it done in the next 12 to 18 months, but there are --

SEN. CANTWELL: I'm asking you for a yes or no commitment of whether we will have that done in the next -- (word inaudible) -- or not -- in the next 12 months. If it takes longer than 12 months, but I think what we're trying to get at is we --

ADM. ALLEN: Oh, you certainly have my commitment, yes, ma'am. Yes, ma'am.

SEN. CANTWELL: I'm asking you more yes or no, do you think it can be done? And are you --

ADM. ALLEN: Any rule can be done in 12 months. As I said earlier, we have 90 rules on the backlog so we can do this in 12 months. It will likely displace something else. Yes, it can be done.

SEN. CANTWELL: Do you think it should be done in the next 12 months, Admiral?

ADM. ALLEN: I would like to collaborate and talk about that because I would like to get the sense from the Congress on the competing priorities of the rules that we've been required to make.

SEN. CANTWELL: I think we're here today because we think it's very important. So, happy to have that collaboration, but I think you'll hear from us that we expect it to be done soon.

Let me ask you about how many non-tank vessels under law haven't submitted a response plan, that haven't done so.

ADM. ALLEN: Well, any non-tank vessel that is calling there is required to have one, so if there is not one that's been prepared, that means they're not calling the United States, ma'am.

SEN. CANTWELL: So you say there is none.

ADM. ALLEN: None that I'm aware.

SEN. CANTWELL: And is the Coast Guard effectively enforcing the response plans?

ADM. ALLEN: Yes. They're received and reviewed and they're given interim authority to operate as non-tank vessels under the circular that we issued in 2005 to conform with the legislation, ma'am.

SEN. CANTWELL: And what kind of uniformity do you think there is in these response plans?

ADM. ALLEN: Well, the guidance that was issued to the industry regarding non-tank vessels was very similar to the tank vessel plans that are already required out there. And we are looking for continuity between the two sets of plans and so they're basically mirrored on the tank vessel plans, ma'am.

SEN. CANTWELL: And so you'd be surprised if -- I mean, I think we're going to hear from my colleague from California and we already heard it alluded to from Senator Snowe this issue of the response time in general. And I think what we're seeing in this particular case is perhaps the lack of uniformity, the lack of oversight.

You might have a broad array of what these response plans have been. But clearly notifying people hours and hours later I don't think is what we had in mind. But let's say, for example, if this particular ship did not have a response plan, what would have happened? What would have transpired?

ADM. ALLEN: The ship would have had to have a response plan as a requirement to enter the port, ma'am. And the plan would've had to have met the requirements of the circular that we issued in 2005. It would have to have been reviewed and accepted by the Coast Guard.

SEN. CANTWELL: Mr. Glackin or Ms. Fleming, do you have any --

MS. FLEMING: No, we -- it's really primarily a Coast Guard role. We do consult on these things as needed.

SEN. CANTWELL: How sufficient do you think the response plans are today?

MS. FLEMING: I'm not in a position to answer that.

SEN. CANTWELL: Okay.

Okay, Senator Snowe. I'm going to turn it over to you.

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SEN. CANTWELL: Thank you.

And I want to thank the panelists for their testimony. I think this will be the first of probably several hearings that we'll end up having on this issue -- perhaps even a field hearing.

Admiral Allen I think should take away that my colleagues are very concerned about those rule makings, whether it's on salvage or response plans or updating the Liability Trust Fund for inflation. All of those things we think are things that we're falling behind on.

So we would prefer the Coast Guard come to us and lead the charge on the changes that we're now going to be proposing as it relates to these non-tank vessels, these cargo containers, because I think that many of my colleagues are expressing here today, in addition to Senator Boxer, issues that we think need to be updated from the 1990 act.

So we look forward to discussing that with you further and for the timeline to respond to these various rule-making authorities.

So with that, I thank the other panelists for being here as well and for your work. And we'll look forward to dialoguing with you about this important issue.

I'd like to call up the second panel now: Dr. Dagmar Etkin, who is the president of Environmental Research Consulting; Mr. Mike Cooper, president of the Washington State Oil Spill Advisory Council; and Mr. Bill Deaver, president and chief operating officer of Totem Ocean Trailer Express.

And if those who are exiting could help us by doing so quickly and quietly, we appreciate it so that we can get on with the second panel.

And I think that we would like to start with you, Dr. Etkin, for being here with us today and for your testimony -- and if witnesses could keep their comments to five minutes or so. Thank you.

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SEN. CANTWELL: Thank you, Mr. Deaver.

And I want to thank all the panelists for -- this second panel seems to be focused a little more on the prevention issue, not that colleagues here didn't want to know a lot where we are on various rule makings on response plans and things of that nature.

But if I could follow on this line of prevention and ask each of you about where you really think we are in the context of I guess you could say a grade, if you will, in the context of prevention. We have prevention, we have preparedness and we have response plans, and I think we all know how expensive the response plans are.

So I'm just trying to get a sense of how much -- Mr. Deaver here is showing a stellar response, I guess I would say. Sounds like maybe the lead of the industry. But I want to hear from Dr. Etkin and Mr. Cooper as well on how much more you think we can be doing on preparedness. If you had to give us a grade today, what would you give us and what else do you think we need to be doing?

MS. ETKIN: A grade on preparedness?

SEN. CANTWELL: Yes.

MS. ETKIN: I'd probably give us a C. I think that because we've had fewer spills, I think there are fewer people who are well trained to respond. Many of the old school response people who were involved in some of the larger spills are retiring now. They tell me that there are many people who are, you know, spill responders who have never actually been to a really big spill, and I think that's a concern.

I think we need to increase our preparedness in terms of the amount of equipment that we have available, and we need to train and position that equipment in a way that we can get out there quickly, because I've shown this many times in trajectory modeling and other studies that the quicker you get out there to respond, the better you are in terms of reducing damages and the spread of the oil. That's certainly an issue.

In terms of prevention, I think we're doing better in the U.S. than elsewhere. I've done some work on the international front and I see that we tend to have a better class of vessels coming into U.S. waters, particularly with regard to the certificate of financial responsibility. Ship owners are afraid to come into U.S. waters because they're afraid of the liability limits, they're afraid of natural resource damages, which is something that does not exist outside the United States.

So there certainly is that, but I think we need to carefully examine those liability limits and see whether they really would cover all of the costs of a spill.

SEN. CANTWELL: Thank you.

Mr. Cooper?

And the reason I'm focusing on this -- and Dr. Etkin, I believe what you said about working together and being positive. What we need to understand is how much more is out there in the area of preparedness, and I want to make sure, since the three of you seem to be doing a lot of work in this particular area, to help us understand where we are and how much better we can do.

MR. COOPER: In Washington state I think, in particular in the preparedness area, we've come a long ways, largely because of some actions that have been taken by the governor and the state legislature over the last two or three years in requiring plans for -- requiring pre-booming and requiring plans for bunkering -- for pre-booming during bunkering and requiring better contingency plans and things like that at the state level.

I think we've got a long ways to go; we can do many more things. There are some people who think that for example, the tug escort requirements in the Straits of Juan de Fuca could be a little bit stricter. There are some who believe, as I mentioned, that we need to push harder on the double-hull issue.

One of the things that I see in Puget Sound in particular and on the outer coast is the increased traffic of barges and tugs carrying fuel, something that we haven't spent a lot of time talking about.

So we're probably in very, very good shape in Washington, but we can always do more. The other thing I think I would note is the agreement that the states signed with the Coast Guard on the memorandum and how we're going to jointly manage the waterways on the prevention and preparedness side.

So I'd say nationally, we're a C. I'd like to believe that in Washington state I think we're a B or a B-plus in many of those areas, but we're not perfect.

SEN. CANTWELL: Thank you.

Mr. Deaver?

MR. DEAVER: I would give us a C-minus. I think that industry can continue to do more. We have a carrier in Evergreen maritime out of the Republic of China that had come up with vessels now that had the vertical fuel tank, similar to what TOTE has put in, which I think is a very positive step, and those ships are calling on the West Coast. So I think that that is a very positive step, but I think that industry can continue to do more.

SEN. CANTWELL: Mr. Deaver, why did TOTE respond so aggressively to the development of vessels that met these prevention techniques that have been so helpful in having you having that stellar record for so many years?

MR. DEAVER: We looked at the vessel assets that we were building and we said that these vessels will be in operation for up to and exceeding 40 years. And we were looking over the horizon as to what the regulations might be or how we would really want to treat the waters that we live and work in. So we voluntarily took the measures because we said it was simply the right thing to do in the environment that we work.

SEN. CANTWELL: So how many other companies have vessels such as TOTE, with tanks in the center of the ship, well protected from possible eruption from collision or other activities?

MR. DEAVER: The only ones that I'm really aware of are the new Evergreen ships that have come out, but I'm not totally aware of that. But the industry, I believe, will begin to migrate to that vertical- type tank in the ships.

SEN. CANTWELL: They will do so on their own, or there's an economic benefit for doing that?

MR. DEAVER: I think that there is a benefit environmentally in being able to say that they have taken the steps to mitigate spills. But economically, I don't know that that could be said at this point.

SEN. CANTWELL: So your company looked at it over a 40-year period and just decided that this was the right thing to do.

MR. DEAVER: It was the right thing to do.

SEN. CANTWELL: Thank you. Thank you.

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SEN. CANTWELL: And thank you, Senator Snowe.

And to follow up on that, Mr. Deaver, and to the other panelists as well, we didn't talk a lot about on the prevention side what were some of the key issues in which we needed to spend more time on and that is in thinking about our prevention efforts. And I don't know if you could comment on in general -- I'm not talking about the specific incident in San Francisco Bay, but human error, communications systems and weather.

And if you could -- Mr. Deaver, you mentioned that you had a three-radar system, and I'm assuming that you use that and probably pretty aggressively in avoiding weather issues and staying out of particular challenging times and particularly challenging areas. But of those issues or any other ones, where do you think we need to be spending more time on prevention?

MR. DEAVER: I think it's really in the management processes generally within the companies. The vessel construction and inputting internal tanks in vessels will take a long period of time. There's been a tremendous number of new-build container ships in the last, let's say, five years that I believe almost all of the tanks are bottom tanks on board those vessels. So I think it's really in the management processes, and I think that clearly, there has to be good language skills on board the vessel at the time that it's transiting U.S. waters.

SEN. CANTWELL: Are you saying that that's a significant problem today, or?

MR. DEAVER: I would ask that question going forward. I don't know. I mean, TOTE is an American-owned company, American-crewed; English obviously is the language. But I think that that is a question when you get into many of the international arrivals into the United States.

SEN. CANTWELL: Mr. Cooper?

MR. COOPER: As Mr. Deaver stated, I think management practices really need to be focused on as part of the human error question. Oftentimes, and one of the things we're finding -- we're doing a root cause analysis right now, and we're discovering that the Coast Guard and the state Department of Ecology's record keeping's not the same, or historically has not been the same; it's better now.

Oftentimes, things get called human error, but when you break down the subsets you find out it's because they didn't have a policy or they didn't have crew training or, you know, they had a management practice that needed to be addressed. So I think the human error, it shows, is clearly the highest root cause of spills. But you need to break that down and talk about all -- where did that human error -- what caused that human being to make a mistake? Were they tired? Were they not trained? Was there a policy that wasn't in place? But I think in particular in Washington --

SEN. CANTWELL: Would you suggest and follow that up with better rule making on that?

MR. COOPER: I think rule making -- if rule making's not in place that addresses those issues, it probably should be.

SEN. CANTWELL: Okay, thank you. I'm sorry, were you going to add something else?

MR. COOPER: Oh, I was just going to very briefly talk about I think in particular in Washington, I think weather is something we need to be paying attention to in the coastal areas, where wind and storms are factors. There's a lot of debate going on right now in the state about whether or not tankers should be offloading their cargo when the weather is too -- even in Bellingham and Port Angeles, when the weather is too bad for them to boom that vessel. There's probably going to be a question about whether or not that's preempted for the state to make that decision, and so I think weather is probably something that should be looked at as well and rule making around, you know, when can you transfer fuel and when can you not transfer fuel? And when is it too rough for those vessels to be transiting in and out, especially in narrow waterways?

SEN. CANTWELL: Thank you.

Dr. Etkin?

MS. ETKIN: Actually, I was involved in the study on currents and pre-positioning of the booms in Washington state and looked at areas where the currents at all times or most times were going to be too high to actually effectively be able to contain the oil, so then, you know, the state needed to then look at that and decide, well, should we say that we can't do any oil transfers in these locations, or do we need to take into account the current and weather conditions at the time?

I think that's an important thing. Certainly, weather is an issue. I mean, fog -- I've been to San Francisco enough to know that fog occurs a lot in San Francisco and this is something that needs to be -- you know, they need to look at ways in which one can navigate in fog, and I don't know, I'm not skilled enough to know myself how one would do that. But certainly that's an issue that should be looked at that seems obvious.

But human error has been shown to be a factor in a lot of spills. I mean, certainly what always comes to my mind is the Julie N spill in the Fore River in Portland, where, you know, the pilot said "hard left -- oh, no, no, no, I mean hard right," and hit the bridge. And, you know, that was quite a mess up there, and that's an obvious example.

But there are certainly a lot of human error factors that come into play and maybe in very small ways. And it's important that we actually look at this and there are people who are actually studying this type of thing. I think more attention needs to be paid to that and then look at well, what is it, is it are the crews tired or not well-trained? And based on what we find are the real root causes, that's where there should be guidelines or regulations put in place.

SEN. CANTWELL: Well, I want to thank the panel very much for your testimony today and your continued work in this area. And I want to thank the vice chair, Senator Snowe, for attending this hearing.

The committee meeting is adjourned. (Sounds gavel.) Thank you.


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