Bush Foreign Policy: Real Threats but Ideological Responses

It is fitting that we are here today at the Pell Center to discuss the international challenges that we must address at the beginning of the 21st century.

No one did more to help guide this nation through the daunting challenges of the Cold War than Claiborne Pell.
His vision, his powerful insights and his wise counsel informed our national debate for four decades. He understood, as few individuals do, the huge economic, cultural and historical forces that daily collide to create the frequent and frightening headlines that we read. But, more than that he understood the human emotions, sometimes noble, too often petty, that drive events.

Senator Pell understood also the strength of this nation. This strength transcends our military and economic prowess. It rests fundamentally on our values, a respect for the individual and a belief that the conditions of language and culture and sectarian practice that divide us are not as powerful as the common humanity that unites us. These walls of division are best surmounted not by brute force but by shared knowledge gained through extensive dialog.

Senator Pell counseled us to be strong as a nation. He knew that the perception of weakness could invite our adversaries to misjudge our capabilities and our intentions. Senator Pell was not a wistful internationalist. He was a pragmatic internationalist who recognized that in a dangerous world we must always be ready to protect ourselves.

But, he also counseled us to be patient and wise in the use of our military and economic power. He understood that military force engenders enormous costs both explicit and consequential. He also understood that military operations, even the most successful, generally just buy us time; time to address the elemental causes that prompt threats to our nation and time to engage in that dialog and shared experience that is the best guarantee for our peace and freedom.

Today, we appreciate even more such a wise, decent and practical voice. Here at the Pell Center, his presence and his inspiration give us the opportunity and the obligation to carry on.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the People's Republic of China from an ideological adversary to a commercial partner, the Cold War ended. Almost fifty years of taut confrontation between two nuclear-armed super powers and painful and deadly episodes of conventional conflicts like Korea and Vietnam came to an end.

A new Post Cold War world emerged without clear outlines or priorities. Some tasks seemed obvious; the rehabilitation and reform of the former Soviet empire, efforts to make economic development more widespread throughout the globe, increased attention to end the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and periodic attention to crises that griped fragile nations and caused regional instability. But, for a moment, it seemed that existential threats to the United States had faded. It also seemed, for a moment, that America's power and prominence could exempt it from the messy tasks of engagement throughout the world. President Bush's campaign rhetoric attacking "nation-building" was a symptom of this feeling.

The Cold War had been won through deterrence sometimes encompassing the limited application of force to thwart, or attempt to thwart, the ambitions of Soviet proxies. A strategy for the Post Cold War had not yet fully materialized when, with savage and shocking force, September 11th struck. Now, we are engaged in a War on Terror. Once again, we are preoccupied with existential threats to our homeland. Once again, we understand that our involvement in the world is not optional and it is not always on our terms.

The greatest threat that confronts the United States today is the intersection of two phenomenon; international terrorists and nuclear weapons. If these lines cross, then we are in grave peril. Our national strategy must be focused on this most serious case. Such a focus calls for the preemption of terrorists and the elimination or reduction of nuclear weapons and material, especially in the hands of countries that do not scrupulously adhere to the provisions of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

The Bush Administration has responded to this decisive threat more with ideological hope than strategic vision.
Robust efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons and materials are undercut by the Administration's own preoccupation with the development of new nuclear weapons and innate distrust of international systems to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Moreover, funding for the elimination of existing stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear material and other weapons of mass destruction under the Nunn-Lugar program is still insufficient to the task.

On Saturday, the New York Times reported that highly enriched uranium discovered in Iran could be traced back to Russia. It appears that thieves stole it from poorly protected facilities in Russia or other parts of the former Soviet Union and sold it on the black market.

And, when it comes to terrorists, the Administration's initial attack on Al Qaeda and its host, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, was quickly transformed into the ideological pursuit of Saddam Hussein.

The Administration's immediate response to September 11th was to seek out and destroy the terrorist apparatus that stuck us: a prudent and eminently sound course of action. Our attack in Afghanistan was aimed at the heart of Al Qaeda and the rogue regime that provided it sanctuary. We understood, very painfully, that we could not grant these terrorists a safe harbor. We had to act, and we had to be prepared to act preemptively to destroy Al Qaeda. The threat was clear and, in the context of international terrorists like Al Qaeda, the doctrine of preemption was not only compelling, but also inescapable.

Operation Enduring Freedom, the demolition of the Taliban regime and the disruption of the Al Qaeda infrastructure, represented a shrewd use of military power to focus directly on an existential threat. Al Qaeda could not be deterred and toleration would simply invite further attack.

Ironically, having begun the destruction of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, the Administration quickly shifted its attention from the complete destruction of the Al Qaeda network to Iraq. Only in the past few weeks has the Bush Administration begun to realize that Afghanistan is far from secure. They are redoubling their military and political efforts to ensure that Afghanistan does not slide back into a failed state.

But, regardless of the situation in Afghanistan and, indeed, anywhere else, the Bush Administration has never lost its fixation with Sadaam and his Bathist regime. Some in this audience may recall that, in January of 1998, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Wolfowitz and other prominent neo-conservatives wrote to President Clinton urging him to use military force to remove Saddam. That was several years before September 11th.

And with the publication of the first glimpses inside the Bush Administration, the preoccupation with Iraq becomes more obvious.

Former Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O'Neil, recounts that at the first meeting of the National Security Council on January 30, 2001 the discussion quickly vaulted over nagging issues of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and landed squarely on Iraq. In an apparently scripted exchange, Rice and Cheney and Tenet not only led the discussion but also concluded with an examination of grainy photos purporting to show what the CIA thought was a plant producing chemical or biological materials for weapons manufacture.

According to O'Neil, "ten days in, and it was about Iraq."

Many months later, the Administration's rationale for a preemptive and virtually unilateral operation against Iraq rested on
a faithful devotion to their preconceived notions and a strained reading of available intelligence.

The Administration did not use intelligence to help make a difficult decision. It used intelligence to sell a preconceived notion. The long-term, fixed view of the Administration held that deterrence and international inspectors were inherently incapable of containing Saddam. Only the elimination of the regime could suffice. Moreover, regime change could have the added benefit of precipitating a transformation of the entire region.

In planning for post-hostilities, the Administration most clearly let its hopes triumph over history. They bet that Iraqi gratitude, together with a government of exiles, would provide for a cheap and easy exit strategy. They ignored a history of antagonism among the Sunni, the Shia and the Kurds. They spoke of a rapidly emerging democracy and market economy in Iraq, a country whose civic life and social institutions had been suppressed for many, many years. They insinuated exiles of dubious reputations, like Chalabi, who do not command the respect of the Iraqi people. The Administration entrusted post-hostility planning to the Department of Defense not for their expertise, but for their ideological correctness.

The Administration has committed the Nation to operations in Iraq. And, we cannot fail. But, we need to recognize that these ideological preoccupations have real costs. We are spending $4 Billion a month to continue our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. And these costs do not include the heartbreaking loss of American service men and women. In addition, these preoccupations have significant opportunity costs. Our engagement in Iraq has limited our strategic flexibility and narrowed our strategic focus.

As we become more and more consumed with the military situation and political machinations within Iraq, we are paying insufficient attention to a place that is more likely than Iraq to produce that dreaded intersection of "nukes" and terrorists; North Korea. We know the North Koreans have nuclear material and the ability to make much more if they have not already done so. Although there does not appear to be any direct links between North Korea and Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations, the North Koreans have a disturbing history of weapons proliferation. Inept at economic development, they have become too adept at trading dangerous weapons to stay afloat or as a means to underscore their demands for international aid.

A few days ago, we concluded another round of international talks with the North Koreans without any apparent breakthrough. As encouraging as these discussions may seem, success, meaning the complete and verifiable elimination of nuclear material and nuclear weapons held by North Korea, can come, in my view, only with more resolute and determined leadership by the President. To date, Iraq seems to have monopolized the effective attention the President and his inner circle pay to pressing international problems. Failure to resolve the situation in North Korea through diplomacy will result in an intolerable situation that could prompt the consideration of military action. A military option is not appealing, and it may be extraordinarily difficult to carry out with the current open-ended and demanding commitment to Iraq.

Compounding all these strategic difficulties is the Administration's failure to candidly and promptly acknowledge the huge costs that are necessary to pursue our international objectives. The recently submitted Presidential Budget does not include any funds for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The President is attempting to rely on previous supplemental appropriations until the election. Recently, the chiefs of the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force admitted that they would run out of funds on October 1st. More recently, reports have surfaced that the Services my indeed run out of funds sooner than that. They are now "robbing Peter to pay Paul" as they scavenge other accounts to fund operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is not only poor budget policy with regard to our military forces, but if we cannot even honestly budget for military operations how can we marshal the will and the dollars to reinforce military success with the resources for economic development that will address the root causes of the animosity that we are confronting. Of course, perhaps, we are the victims in this regard of the final ideological obsession; tax cuts will also win the War on Terror.

The challenges before us require a strategic vision grounded on attention to the compelling threats that we face not the ideological impulses that stir our hearts. These challenges can best be faced with other nations, not alone. These challenges require huge resources and a long-term commitment, not budgetary gimmicks for the short-run.

Until the Administration acts on these basic principles, our response to real threats will be hobbled by ideology rather than focused by experience.