Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee - Transition to Sovereignty in Iraq

Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY IN IRAQ

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PAUL WOLFOWITZ; DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE RICHARD ARMITAGE; JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CHAIRMAN GENERAL RICHARD MYERS

LOCATION: 106 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:
SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Secretary Wolfowitz, in your recent discussions with Prime Minister Allawi, did you discuss his proposal for martial law?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: We didn't discuss it specifically, no, Senator.

SEN. REED: It would seem that that would be an item of intense interest, since he's announced his intentions. In fact, reports today in the press suggest that plans are being undertaken for types of increased national security provisions, or some other euphemism. And you did not discuss it at all with him?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: We didn't discuss it specifically, unless my memory's failing me here. But we-let me be clear. He-we talked a lot about the need for close consultation on a range of sensitive military issues, including our offensive operations, and a declaration of martial law by him would clearly be such a policy consideration that would require consultation with the mechanisms that Ambassador Negroponte will be running when he's there.

But let me be clear, because I said this earlier. He's not talking about, as I understand it, declaring martial law on a national level. He talked about special measures in specific areas where there are problems, measures like curfews, which we already have the authority to impose. And I think it's giving Iraqi security forces in those areas the kind of authority that coalition forces have already. It's obviously something that will be subject of the coordination with the Iraqi government.

SEN. REED: Do you have a position whether martial law, limited as you described, would be necessary at this time, based upon your extensive experience and personal travels?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: It would depend on the location and the circumstances in the location, and what is meant by martial law, Senator.

SEN. REED: Well, I would presume curfews; checkpoints; eliminating free assembly; eliminating political opponents who might be contrary to the --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Well, that's not martial law, and that's out of bounds, the thing you just mentioned. What I believe, and I think I'm going on press reports here, was mentioned were curfews, limitations on assembly and searching houses. And those happen to be all things that our troops do as appropriate in specific locations. We're dealing with an extremely dangerous security situation. You realize that. And the enemy is taking extreme measures to destabilize civil order, and such measures as curfews and searching houses and establishing checkpoints are measures that have to be taken, and particularly the areas we're doing it ourselves already.

SEN. REED: Well, one of the issues that was raised in this whole discussion of martial law is the capacity of the Iraqi security forces to do it themselves. I noticed that they are not ready yet for employment, and it would invariably, I think, draw in United States forces, either in a supporting role or even in a primary role. Is that your conclusion too?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: We retain control over our forces. They retain control over theirs. The purpose of consulting is where we may undertake actions that affect them, or vice versa. We've been doing this for a long time in Afghanistan with President Karzai. He at times wants to do things which might be perfectly within his prerogative to do, but we will tell him, if you can do it with your own forces and your own capability, you're entitled to do that, but we're under no obligation to enforce something that you simply decide you want to.

SEN. REED: I --

MR. WOLFOWITZ: The same thing would happen in Iraq. They-if Prime Minister Allawi decides that it is appropriate to have martial law in some area, and we think not, it's going to be up to him with his own forces to be able to enforce that.

SEN. REED: Well, Mr. Secretary, listen to all of you gentlemen this morning, I'm confused about the strategy. The strategy seems to be, let the Iraqis do it; that we have put an Iraqi face on this. And yet they don't have the capability to do it alone. The suggestion that they can carve out pieces of the country, put their security forces in, even if we disapprove, I think is not reflective of the situation on the ground.

And what you're describing is also perhaps a potential for strategic paralysis, where they want to do something; we don't want to do something. And I think the poster for that is of course Fallujah. Mr. Secretary, you were here several weeks ago reading an impassioned letter for a young Marine that said this is the next Belleau Wood. We're going to finish it today. Of course, a few days later, we turned it over to someone who looked remarkably like Saddam Hussein as the general to control it. And you're indicated today that's still a situation that's out of control. And it just doesn't seem to be a strategy that's going to work.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Senator Reed, I think the strategy is clear, which is to-not to change things overnight, because you can't change situations like this overnight, but to build their capacity over time and as rapidly as possible.

And the important thing-Secretary Armitage referred to it a few minutes ago-we have incredibly courageous Iraqi leaders who are determined to succeed here, who have indicated in all manner of ways that they are committed to a free Iraq, a democratic Iraq, but also understand the nature of the enemy that they're confronting. And their own lives are on the line in doing this.

It's the nature of coalition warfare, and this is a coalition between the multinational force and the Iraqis, that you have to come to some compromises about at least some coordination of policy, and I think we are in agreement that the Fallujah situation needs to be changed. But we weren't-we didn't change our approach to Fallujah because the Iraqis vetoed what we might do; we changed our approach to Fallujah because, after consulting with the Iraqis, it was concluded that the effects of continuing with large-scale military operations in Fallujah would be significantly negative in the rest of the country; that it was better to go with this compromise to see what it would-results it would produce and then proceed from there.

MR. ARMITAGE: Senator Reed, if I may, the context of the Fallujah decision is important to us. We were trying to stand up and assist the efforts of Lakhdar Brahimi to get an interim government, and this was-the Fallujah activity and the heavy military involvement by the United States, it was very much interfering with our ability to put together what I think all hands would agree is a pretty impressive interim government of Iraq's, sir.

SEN. REED: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.