Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee's Terrorism, Unconventional Threats Subcommittee - Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism

Interview

Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee's Terrorism, Unconventional Threats Subcommittee - Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism

REP. SMITH: We're gathered today to talk about strategic communications in the global war on terror, which is a critically important part of that effort and one that I think we need to place greater emphasis on, greater focus, and ultimately greater resources as well.

When you look at the battle that we're fighting against al Qaeda and similar ideologies, it is a broad-based ideological battle. And I think that the closest analogy you can draw is to the Cold War and communism. And there were many, many aspects to the Cold War, certainly. Sometimes the Cold War involved military confrontations, in Korea and Vietnam and elsewhere, but it also overlaid the larger issue. It was communism versus capitalist democracy. And we went out and made the case that our system, our ideology, was better. And we made that case comprehensively. And ultimately that had as much to do with our success as anything.

As I've facetiously said, the war on, you know, communism can best be summed up as, you know, we went -- took people from the Soviet Union, said, you know, "Look at your grocery store, look at our grocery store. We win!" Which is a bit of an exaggeration, but that was certainly part of it.

And more importantly, we had a comprehensive strategic plan for how to deliver that and many other messages about what was better about our ideology and what was deficient about the ideology of communism. And slowly but surely, the rest of the world, even in the communist world, agreed. They came across to our way of thinking ideologically. We basically won a marketing campaign. And that had as much to do with our success as anything.

Now we face a similar struggle and an ideological struggle against Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and a very dangerous ideology that they are spreading. And it is my judgment at this point we are not doing as well in that battle as we should be. We clearly have the better ideology. We clearly have more to offer people of all faiths, from all places in the world, with freedom, openness, democracy, opportunity, than what Osama bin Laden has been offering. When the Taliban ran Afghanistan, it was a complete disaster by everybody's estimation. That's what they have on the table, and yet we haven't been able to sort of get up on the other side of that and begin to win that argument, certainly in the Muslim world. You know, you look at various polls and various indicators out there. It is clear that the Muslim world still has way too much sympathy for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda and not enough understanding and appreciation for the west.

But it goes beyond the Muslim world. Even in Europe -- I was in Afghanistan last spring, meeting and talking with various folks about our efforts over there, and that while the leaders of some of the key European countries have bought into what we're doing in Afghanistan, a lot of their citizens have not. And that makes it extraordinarily difficult for our commanders over there.

I will always remember General McNeill talking about the various countries that were involved and then the list of what they would and would not do militarily. Any military commander, I think, would shudder at the notion -- that has, you know, a bunch of troops under his command that are choosing what they will and will not do. And a lot of that has to do with the difference of opinion of how to go about conducting the broader battle. We have got to start winning the battle for ideas, and we have got to do a better job of promoting that.

And I will say there are many issues, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how we can better coordinate that and what we need to do. But the two that strike me and the two I'm most interested in -- one is interagency cooperation. There are many, many people who touch this issue, on all levels. Certainly the State Department is the lead agency. The Defense Department has a lot to do with it. But all across various segments of our government, you know, right down to the captain in Baghdad trying to persuade, you know, a local tribe to be on our side in the battle against al Qaeda and figuring out how to do this, there are many, many different layers.

Are we maximizing those resources? Are we getting the most out of the various pieces that are involved in this and coordinating them in a comprehensive way to make sure that we're getting the most out of what we have?

But second is a matter of resources, and we are not spending very much money on the strategic communications effort. When you look at what we were spending at the height of the Cold War versus what we're spending now, it's a joke. We haven't even really significantly increased our efforts at the State Department, in public diplomacy, in strategic communications, since 9/11. It's pretty close to a flat line.

And I think the world of what our military has done since 9/11. I think the way they have pulled together, coordinated, maximized their resources is a real testimony to how great a military we have. On the other hand, when you look at that, you can look at the Department of Defense budget from 9/11 forward and see it going like this -- (indicating) -- and you can look at the State Department public diplomacy budget and see it going like this -- (indicating) -- and hopefully have a little sympathy for the folks who are trying to do the strategic communications/public diplomacy piece. We need to invest more resources in it if we're going to get the results that we desperately need in this battle.

So I look forward to the testimony, and with that, I want to turn it over to the ranking member on the committee, Mr. Thornberry, for any opening remarks he has.

REP. THORNBERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your opening comments and I agree with them.

I would ask unanimous consent that an editorial from The Washington Post from last Saturday by Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy be made part of the record.

REP. SMITH: Hearing no objection, so ordered.

REP. THORNBERRY: I think this is only the most recent article, with a big stack of studies and articles, that expresses the view that we are not adequately fighting this war of ideas, in part because it's a hard, unnatural thing for our government to do. And I sympathize with each of you in the position that you're in, but I also think it's important for this subcommittee to focus on those issues and try to encourage us to be more successful.

The point of this article is that we operate as if this war of ideas barely exists and have focused our energies on the wrong problem, trying to gain popularity rather than trying to help the struggle within the Muslim faith itself, and it goes on to point out some suggestions on how -- the way we can do that better.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I've been interested in this for some time. I've dug out the Defense Science Board Task Force report from September 2004, part of which I've introduced as an independent bill to try to gain the expertise of the private sector on behalf of this effort. But I'm concerned that we are moving too slowly in really waging this struggle and that this struggle is an absolutely essential part of our national security at this point in time.

So I appreciate this hearing. I appreciate the opportunity to hear from these witnesses and the increased attention that this part of national security is achieving.

I yield back.

REP. SMITH: Thank you, Mac.

Before I introduce the witnesses, just one more quick comment. As you're making your comments, basically we're trying to win a campaign here, a campaign of ideas, and to do that you have to develop a message and deliver that message in the mediums where your audience is going to get their information.

So as I hear your testimony, I'm curious as to, you know, what's our message, how are we delivering it, what do we think are the critical mediums to reach those populations that we are trying to reach.

And with that, I will -- we'll turn it over to our witnesses. I will introduce all three of them. And we'll start with Mr. Duncan MacInnes, who is the principal deputy coordinator of the Bureau of International Information Programs at the Department of State. The Department of State is the lead organization on the ideological piece, on the strategic communications piece of the global war on terror, and the International Information Programs Bureau is the lead piece of the secretary -- of the Department of State's effort. And we also have Captain Hal Pittman, from the United States Navy, who is the acting deputy assistant secretary of Defense for joint communications, and Dr. Michael Doran, deputy assistant secretary of Defense support for public diplomacy, also with the department.

And we'll start with Mr. MacInnes.

MR. MACINNES: Thank you. This mike is on? Yes.

Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats --

REP. SMITH: You might want to pull it a little closer to you. I think it's on, but the system isn't great here.

MR. MACINNES: -- and Unconventional Threats and -- okay -- and Capabilities. Thank you for inviting me here today and thank you for those opening statements, which summarize some of the issues that we do face today.

Combatting ideological support for terrorism poses a variety of daunting new challenges for U.S. public diplomacy. Terrorists have shown themselves to be adept at exploiting the freedom of the Internet to spread their propaganda directly to young Muslims around the world, using effectively video messaging, imaging and text. Our traditional communication tools are designed for mainstream media and have had little impact in this new information battlefield. Our audiences have also been stretched beyond the traditional opinion leaders and elites to the general public, and specifically the youth who are the target of extremist propaganda.

During the Cold War, we fought a traditional enemy in the USSR, and our tools included traditional public diplomacy tools, such as educational programs, rule of law programs, democracy promotion, publications, mainstream media. These strategies remain relevant and powerful still today, but we need to continue to develop new tactics to counter an elusive and decentralized non-state foe who is adept at exploiting the Internet and new technologies and spreading its ideology of violence.

We have come a long way in coordinating our efforts on strategic communications across the interagency. On April 8th, 2006, the president established the interagency Policy Coordinating Committee, PCC, on public diplomacy and strategic communications. As chairperson of the PCC, Undersecretary Karen Hughes leads our international strategic communications efforts within the administration. Over the past year, Undersecretary Hughes has reorganized the PCC to ensure more active interagency coordination and synergies in the struggle with violent extremism. She established the interagency Counterterrorism Communication Center and created sub-PCCs to work on the issues of State-DOD coordination and cooperation, and also set up additional sub-PCC on research and analysis and on branding.

State and DOD now are working closely together on coordinating our efforts. Last week, for example, Dr. Doran, Captain Pittman and I were together discussing strategic communications at the global synchronization conference held by SOCOM in Tampa. The week before that, we met together at the State-DOD sub-PCC on coordination and planning. In that sub-PCC, we are exploring ways to enhance our cooperation and develop shared communication strategies. Already in the works are initiatives on coordinating website activities and content, video production, blogging, and a renewed effort to identify and find ways to empower credible Muslim voices, to develop shared information image data banks, and to strengthen the effectiveness of MIST teams working in our overseas missions.

Overseas in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Europe, our public affairs officers at the embassies work closely with military, public affairs and PsyOps officers. Military Information Support Teams, MISTs, are integrated into the work of an increasing number of U.S. missions overseas.

Let me talk a little bit about the Counterterrorism Communication Center which was set up. Undersecretary Hughes established the Counterterrorism Communication Center last summer to coordinate overall overt U.S. strategic communication messaging in the war of ideas, and to produce and disseminate effective messaging to counter terrorist ideology, especially in the Arab Muslim world but also in Europe and elsewhere. The CTCC, as we call it, is a small but truly interagency organization, with staff currently drawn from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the National Counterterrorism Center and the intelligence community.

Working with State, DOD and other U.S. agencies, it produces strategic communication plans, develops effective narratives and themes to undermine and counter terrorist messaging, and produces specific messages for use by State and DOD communicators. It responds with talking points to breaking news events and works closely with our rapid response unit at the State Department's Public Affairs Office to put out a regular anti-terrorism message. CTCC messaging goes to more than 2,000 key U.S. government communicators, including combatant commands and all U.S. embassies. Those communicators build on the themes and information in those messages, customizing them for bulk audiences, in order to achieve the greatest impact.

Our efforts focus on undermining and putting extremists on the defensive by exposing how terrorists recruit and exploit young people, destroy religious sites and mosques, murder women, children and men and innocent victims, such as in the tragic events last week that resulted in the deaths of 59 schoolboys, 5 teachers, police officers and other innocent adults in an effort to target members of the Afghan parliament, 6 of whom were murdered.

We have also set up a digital outreach team. It was launched one year ago as a pilot initiative to counter ideological support for terrorism on the Internet. It employs Arabic speakers to post entries into influential Arabic blogs, challenging misrepresentations and providing accurate information about U.S. policy, our society and our motives overseas. Our bloggers speak the language and idiom of the region, and know the culture references, and are often able to converse informally and frankly, rather than adopt the more formal persona of a U.S. government spokesperson.

This is a major departure from our previous way of conducting public diplomacy. It requires both creativity and a new set of skills. We are currently in the process of expanding the original team of 3 up to 10, including an Urdu speaker and 2 Persian linguists. We are also exploring how we can use other cybertechnologies, such as cell phones, Second Life, in our war against the terrorists.

Our Bureau of International Information Programs is also fully engaged in expanding public diplomacy and countering terrorist's extremist ideologies through the Internet. Our English-language web site and six foreign-language sites, including both Arabic and Persian, are being transformed to use more videos, more blogging, podcasts, webchats that are designed to reach younger audiences. Our Arabic website attracts more than 200,000 visitors per month, with the top users coming from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf and Morocco.

The decline in favorable overseas public opinion towards the United States has resulted in an increased skepticism about the motives that drive our policies.

On the practical side, this has led to a distrust that undermines the effectiveness of our messages against extremists. We are addressing this issue by working with our embassies overseas and with the American Muslim community here in the States to reinforce credible anti-extremist voices. For example, we have sent out dozens of American Muslims to predominantly Muslim countries to engage in discussions with their counterparts. These citizen dialogue programs directly counter al Qaeda's negative propaganda message that the U.S. is at war with Islam. The CTCC collects and disseminates anti- terrorist statements and editorials and cartoons made by Muslims from around the world in order to amplify their voices in the fight against extremism. We are in the process of finding new ways to empower credible Muslim voices in the Muslim world because this is a key issue we have to work on.

The strongest messages are sent, however, not through words but through deeds, what Karen Hughes calls the diplomacy of deeds. She talks about the importance of waging peace by showing the United States as a positive force for good in the world, in stark contrast with the destructive ideologies espoused by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

Americans are generous, committed to helping others, and we have the largest number of people working in voluntary organizations. We have worked closely with DOD to promote understanding among foreign publics of our humanitarian efforts. These cooperative efforts have included telling the dramatic story of our emergency relief for tsunami and earthquake victims in Indonesia and Pakistan.

Another initiative of Karen Hughes is the Pilot Country program, which provides funding for special projects in key countries with predominantly Muslim or sizable Muslim populations. Funded through the 2007 emergency supplemental for the war of ideas, the Pilot Country project seeks to find ways to counter ideological support for terrorism through innovative projects that are identified by the ambassador and senior embassy staff members. The focus of these projects is to reach often young people who are vulnerable to radicalization and help them develop the skills and confidence they need to resist recruitment and becoming committed extremists.

Mr. Chairman, I have given you and the members an overview of our current and new initiatives to counter extremist ideologies. I've also highlighted the very positive trends towards great -- greater interagency cooperation between the Department of State and Defense. This struggle against the evils of terrorism will take many years, and we still have a great deal more to do to meet the challenges of violent extremism. We believe that we have made major strides in adapting to the new and sometimes daunting media environment of the 21st centuries.

But these initiatives, however, do not stand in isolation. Public diplomacy and strategic communications must continue to deploy all instruments at our disposal and must rely on the best and most up- to-date research data. We need to expand our use of the Internet and other new media while continuing to support effective and more targeted educational exchanges, democracy programs, youth initiatives, et cetera.

More importantly, we must continue to work harder to integrate our overall U.S. government efforts, embrace new communication technologies and enlist the support of our allies overseas. We must continue to work towards a proactive position instead of one that is only reactive. The battle for the hearts and minds is one that will only succeed if we embrace innovation and use our nation's great communication talents and creativity to the best effect.

Thank you, sir.

REP. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. MacInnes.

Captain Pittman?

MR. PITTMAN: Chairman Smith, Congressman Thornberry and distinguished members of the subcommittee, good morning. First I'd like to thank the subcommittee members for all you've done to support our military and our men and women in uniform. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today about the Department of Defense's efforts in strategic communication.

As a military officer and a professional communicator by trade, I have served in multiple joint assignments and I have observed first- hand where many of the communication challenges we face today are against a cunning adversary that does not have to tell the truth. While the U.S. military conducts a largely kinetic campaign complemented with communication efforts against violent extremists, our adversaries conduct an information campaign punctuated by kinetic exclamation points -- suicide bombings, spectacular attacks and the like -- to highlight their cause.

In a long war, where the real battle is a battle of ideas, America's enemies place a premium on telling their story regardless of the truth. How we engage in this sphere is important. I believe in the need to maintain the credibility of our military and also in the need for transparency. At the same time, we must collaborate and synchronize our actions, words and images within both the department and the interagency to maintain that credibility.

Above all, strategic communication is a process, and the process of communication integration will require a long-term commitment and sustained effort by the department in support of the U.S. government.

Today I will focus somewhat on process and try to briefly describe for the subcommittee some of the efforts to date that the Department of Defense has undertaken in this regard; specifically, the Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic Communication and Execution Road Map, the Strategic Communication Integration Group, or SCIG, process, which is the departments's strategic communication planning effort, support the State Department in the interagency, and education efforts focusing on helping strategic communication thinking occur naturally in every action.

In September of 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Strategic Communication Execution Road Map. Mr. England cited three primary objectives in this document. First, to institutionalize the DOD process by which the principles of strategic communication are incorporated in the development of policy formulation, planning and execution.

Second, to define the roles, responsibilities and relationships and develop doctrine for strategic communication and its primary communication supporting capabilities. And those primary supporting capabilities include public affairs aspects of information operations, principally (PsyOp ?), visual information, DOD activities of military diplomacy, and defense support to public diplomacy.

And third, to properly resource military departments and combatant commands to organize, train and equip DOD's primary communication supporting capabilities.

One of the most significant successes of the road map to date is the establishment of both an integrating process and creation of a Strategic Communication Integration Group, or SCIG. The SCIG secretariat coordinates and synchronizes communication plans and concepts within the department. And a SCIG Executive Committee, or EXCOM, provides oversight and guidance. And I'm the director of the Strategic Communication Integration Group Secretariat.

The DOD has also significantly increased communication collaboration with the interagency. My office participates in working groups and has joined Undersecretary Hughes' Policy Coordinating Committee and sub-PCCs on a variety of topics and issues, including research, new media engagement and content sharing, as Mr. MacInnes has indicated. We attend a collaboration group with DOD, State and USAID, and a weekly fusion cell meeting as well. DOD had direct input into the National Strategy on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication through the SCIG process and has provided military manpower and expertise to the interagency Counterterrorism Communication Center which was recently established and just mentioned.

The Defense Department has also conducted multiple strategic communication, education and training initiatives over the past two years to help institutionalize strategic communication as a process. Strategic communication and public affairs blocks of instructions are being incorporated in the joint professional military education, working closely with the war colleges.

Advanced and expeditionary joint public affairs training courses are being developed as an SC road map task, and they'll be taught at the Defense Information School at Fort Meade.

Simultaneously DOD and State Department are exploring ways to leverage training resources. Interagency participants attended the first ever DOD strategic communication interagency worldwide seminar in July 2007. And a State Department public diplomacy officer just attended the DOD strategic communication workshop, which was held a couple of weeks ago in Monterey, California, at the Naval Postgraduate School.

In summary, we've come a long way in the past four years, particularly in the past two years, since the DASD for Joint Communication was established. But the department has a ways to go yet in realizing our long-term goal of institutionalizing strategic communication across the department. We certainly appreciate your support of our efforts and the interest that you have shown by conducting this hearing, and look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, sir.

REP. SMITH: Thank you.

Dr. Doran.

MR. DORAN: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for inviting me to speak on the issue of countering ideological support for terrorism. My written testimony provides more detail about this concept, but I would like to devote a few minutes in my oral remarks to highlight a few key aspects of it.

The war we are fighting today is an information way, a global conflict of perception. Terrorist attacks, even ones of the magnitude of 9/11, are not designed to cripple the United States but rather to generate the perception of American weakness and vulnerability among key audiences across the globe. The spectacle of the attack is as important to the terrorists, sometimes more important, than the destructive effect itself. At their essence, terrorist attacks against America are tools in a contest for power and authority within Muslim societies. Our goal is to purposely join and influence a political process, an ongoing multi-sided conversation that is proceeding independently of the United States.

The recent success enjoyed by General David Petraeus and his Iraqi allies is dramatically demonstrating to us the primacy of inter- Muslim politics in counterinsurgency and in countering ideological support for terrorism. The general has taught us that coordinating our statements and actions is an important component to influencing the internal Iraqi debate over legitimate political authority in that country.

But countering ideological support for terrorism is not primarily about creating brand America. It should not be reduced solely to executing public diplomacy campaigns whose objective is to burnish the image of America. Those are laudable efforts, and we fully support -- support and encourage them. But they are not the essence of what countering ideological support for terrorism is all about.

The key question is how do we join and influence this intra- Muslim conversation in order to undermine the intellectual and perceptual underpinnings of terrorism.

Terrorists actively foster the perception that the global Islamic community is under a severe threat. To counter this perception, we must inject critical doubt among key populations about the terrorists' vision of hate and fear.

For their vision to have any credibility, terrorist groups seek to foster a sense of doom, a sense that midnight is fast approaching. To manufacture this threat, al-Qaeda and others argue that the United States and our allies are somehow placing the global Islamic community in peril.

To counter this, we must chip away at the bleak picture of helplessness and vulnerability that supports it. Our enemies foster a culture of blame to foment anger, hatred and a sense of victimization. They offer their violence as the only solution to the challenges of today.

To be successful, we must focus on the self perceptions of key audiences rather than perceptions of America. It's core message must outline -- our core message must outline an alternative future that is more attractive than the bleak future offered by the terrorists.

This positive narrative must contain more than just anti- terrorist rhetoric. It should include elements that will positively impact the future lives of Muslims everywhere.

To promote this object we cannot simply focus on getting our message out . Success requires taking actions that make the alternative narrative real. Thus key components of a successful strategy include civil affairs, security, education reform and economic opportunity.

In Iraq's al Anbar province we are beginning to see the process of combating ideological support for terrorism done correctly. Just a few short months ago public commentary in this country widely suggested that al-Qaeda was firmly ensconced in Iraq. In fact we now know that al-Qaeda is not as welcomed in Iraq as outside commentators claimed, especially after the Anbar Salvation Council emerged in late 2006 to oppose al-Qaeda's violent extremism and attacks on civilians.

This trend appears to be accelerating, since just last week Major General Joseph Fil, commander of U.S. forces in Baghdad, told the media that al-Qaeda in Iraq has been cleared out of the Iraqi capital, and that Iraqi families are returning to their homes.

By countering ideological support for terrorism, we seek to appeal to the self interest of local communities whose values and aspirations find no expression in al-Qaeda's worldview.

Although it claims to speak on behalf of all Muslims, we should not be taken in by al-Qaeda's propaganda, or endorse its inflated sense of its own ideological appeal. Our countering ideological support for terrorism approach seeks to force al-Qaeda to live as an actor in our alternative pro-future narrative.

The reality is that governments and citizens today are fighting against al-Qaeda. I'm not declaring universal success, but to paraphrase the famous quote from Winston Churchill, in Iraq what we are seeing is not the end; it's not the beginning of the end; but it is perhaps the end of the beginning.

With that I conclude my oral remarks. My written testimony will be submitted as part of the record. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

REP. SMITH: Thank you all for your testimony.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

MR. MACINNES: When you say "Islamist," they hear -- they don't make -- they hear "Muslim," you know. And as one of my friends said once, "You don't start a conversation by sticking -- poking a stick in your person's eye you're going to try to talk to." And that's -- when you say "Islamo-fascism," it's equivalent, it's a verbal equivalent of poking a stick in somebody's eye. And they do not -- and that -- bin Laden has been very good at taking or words and turning them to his advantage by saying, "See, they're actually at war with Islam."

REP. GILLIBRAND: Correct.

MR. MACINNES: And we fall into the trap of, you know, of having to answer that question. And like, "Have you stopped -- (inaudible) -- ?" You can't answer it, well -- yes, no.

REP. SMITH: Mr. MacInnes, if I could interrupt, because I want to draw a point on this. So I think what you're saying basically is, the word "Islam," "Muslim," should be no part of how we describe al- Qaeda, and who we're fighting against.

MR. MACINNES: You can --

REP. SMITH: And that's something we've struggled against, the "Islamo-fascist" comment, "Islamist," no matter how you put it -- and I've been through this over the years, figuring out how to put it because, you know, you think, well, logically, they have a certain religious bent -- but I think the ultimate answer, and what Ms. Gillibrand is pointing out, is there's no way you can put "Islam" in there.

And has that -- is that a decision that our strategic communications folks have made -- let's call them, you know, al-Qaeda, call them "Qutbists," which is one, you know, a person that they followed -- find something else to call them that does not give them any piece of the Islam label. Is that a decision you've made?

MR. MACINNES: That is something we've looked for -- we try -- we basically call them terrorists, murderers, what they are. But when you want to talk about them as Muslims, you're better off using a positive Muslim voice saying that. Because if we talk about Islam, we're not credible in terms of "you're not a Muslim."

So what we actually have done -- and Dr. Doran talked about it earlier, is we're looking at getting, and collecting those positive statements made by leading Muslims against terrorism. And they can say, you know, they can use the word "Islam" and talk about Islam, and they are very convincing.

And we are finding that they actually -- that there is, there's a lot more of that going now than was previously. I mean, there are editorials; there are great cartoons that poke fun at terrorism. I think that Muslims are concerned very much about their religion being hijacked, but as Dr. Doran said, they're not a society that tends to have a lot of public debate on issues.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REP. SMITH: The gentlelady's time has expired.

REP. GILLIBRAND: Mr. Chairman --

REP. SMITH: I'll give a little bit more, because I took some of it there.

But I just -- a couple of questions. One, in terms of how our audience in this war of ideas gets their information. You know, what's the best medium for reaching them? And there's a whole bunch of different mediums out there, depending on who your audience is and where they get their information. I just -- from my own campaign experience -- you know, when I was first running, you know, for Congress -- you know, there's a lot of different ways to reach the people in my district -- the ones who are going to vote. Radio, mail -- but just sort of walking around and having grown up there, I knew that sort of television, if you will, was the killer rap. That's -- you know, if I had a limited amount of money and I did, it should all go there because that's where they're going to get the bulk of their information. That was, you know, 12 years ago, so things may have changed.

But in the audience out there of sort of the disaffected Muslim world, the ones who are -- you know, we're trying to persuade, what -- have you discovered sort of what the best source of information -- where do they get their information? When they develop an opinion, where is it coming from? And then what have we done to try to get into that medium in the most effective way possible?

MR. PITTMAN: That's a very good question and one we grapple with all the time.

First of all, what -- what's happened in the modern -- the 21st century is audiences have segmented a lot. For instance --

REP. SMITH: It's a lot more difficult --

(Cross talk)

MR. PITTMAN: -- I watch television a lot -- news. My son, who's in high school, never watches television but he gets a lot of information off the Internet.

REP. SMITH: Right. And there's hundreds of channels now --

(Cross talk.)

MR. PITTMAN: So with -- for the general public in the Muslim world, television is the most powerful media, without question. For the youth audiences in much of the Muslim world that is well-connected to the Internet, it's the Internet, without -- okay. So we need to do both. But what happens is there's a relationship between the Internet and television. You know, if bin Laden puts a video on the Internet and if it gets picked up by TV, the TV runs something, the segment gets put into YouTube. So it's really the -- so we need to do both.

REP. SMITH: And if I may make the observation based on a pervious hearing we had on this subject, we need to do a lot more on the Internet. I -- and I think you guys get it. I think the people at the top leadership now understand that. We have not -- and this sort of follows up a little bit on Ms. Gillibrand's question -- we have not put the resources into it. I mean, once I discovered the television was the thing, I stopped doing everything and every nickel I could -- you know, I put into that. I don't sense that we've seen -- we've done the same with the Internet. We're vaguely aware of it. We don't have enough people involved and we need to do more, dramatically more. And we would like to be helpful here on this committee and in Congress in doing that.

Is that a fair assessment?

MR. PITTMAN: I think that's a fair assessment. I think we've -- that we identified that we are weak there and we need to move into it.

One of the things, to answer Mr. Levin's earlier question, was on recruitment -- one of the things we're looking at for Internet is do we need to actually have it done within the government? Is that the most effective way to be doing it? We need to do some of it, but we also have been working with, like, the University of Southern California School of Diplomacy on -- there are ways that we can get people outside the government to be doing it because they'll be more effective. They can be freer. They can say, "I don't like this policy." But -- you know -- which we can't -- we have to be -- we're in a -- somewhat of a straitjacket, okay? So we would like seek out ways that we can get nongovernmental organizations involved in using the Internet against extremist terrorism in ways that amplify because the Internet is best done often as a decentralized --

REP. SMITH: I just have one more question, and then we're going to have to wrap up. We're under a new regime now. We're actually doing votes in 15 minutes instead of a half-hour, so I have to let members go to get over there in time.

And that is, who's really in charge of the operation? Because we've heard a lot of different organizations. I sort of get the sense that the CTCC coordinates, but on the other hand we have the position that Karen Hughes is currently occupying -- leaving; I assume someone will be taking that post. You know, if we were to say, "Okay, who's the person in charge of strategic communications within the whole government -- I mean, State is the central -- but is it the CTCC? Is it Karen Hughes' shop? Is it you? I mean, who really is sort of in charge of the overall operation?

MR. MCINNES: Karen Hughes.

MR. PITTMAN: Karen Hughes is -- we -- I have to do a proviso there on overt strategic communications. She -- we don't have authorities on the intel side --

REP. SMITH: Sure.

MR. PITTMAN: -- but then there are things that need and have to be done on that side.

REP. SMITH: Yeah. Understood.

It's really the -- I mean, the -- covert piece -- I mean, there's a lot of different things going on. I think it's more the overt piece that we are interested in. So it -- so it falls from Karen Hughes down -- (audio break) -- CTCC then coordinates. So does -- (audio break) -- CTC -- C, sorry -- then report directly to Karen Hughes on a fairly regular basis so that --

MR. PITTMAN: Yes, very much so.

But again, the CTCC is interagency. The deputy director is -- (audio break) -- the officer of -- (audio break) -- and we -- it is interagency in its nature and makeup.

REP. SMITH: From -- (audio break) -- CTCC standpoint, they then report up --

MR. PITTMAN: Yes.

REP. SMITH: -- and they go from there.

That's all I have -- (audio break).

Mac, do you want to add anything to wrap it up.

REP. THORNBERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just -- had a few questions in the limited we have.

I just mentioned in response to the point you were asking about -- my understanding is that for a substantial segment of the Muslim population, short-wave radio is still a big deal. And yet too many places -- I -- there's some issue of funding where we are no longer funding some initiatives of the government that we have funded in the past. And so while I agree with you completely on the Internet, we -- different strategies, different mechanisms seem to make sense in different places.

I want to get briefly back to Mr. Saxton because I think he very eloquently laid out the hear of this issue, and not everybody had a chance to respond. I'm looking back at that Defense Science Board report I mentioned before and it talked about building on an in-depth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human behavior, which, it does seem to me, is the heart of the matter. He laid out the contrast between Lebanon and some of the recent successes in Anbar.

Dr. Doran, on a scale of one to ten how would you rate our in- depth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human behavior as are applied to our strategic communication strategies?

MR. DORAN: I'd give us a five or a six. It differs from -- in different areas. I think we can do a lot better on that but I would put the emphasis on, as I said before, the need for a huge cultural shift. It isn't because people aren't trying but we -- the institutions and the processes that we have set up are really geared for another era and another threat.

REP. THORNBERRY: Yeah, and I guess that's -- let me ask you --

REP. SMITH: I apologize. I have to run actually. I'll let you wrap up the meeting if that's okay -- finish your questions. But I have to get to my office before I get to the floor. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

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