Hearing of the House Committee on Appropriations' State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee - Assessing an Effective Diplomatic Program in Iraq

Interview

Hearing of the House Committee on Appropriations' State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee - Assessing an Effective Diplomatic Program in Iraq

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REP. BETTY MCCOLLUM (D-MN): Thank you, Madame Chair. I want to thank you both and for your staff -- your staff work in extraordinary conditions -- for your commitment and the commitment of your organizations to provide Congress with the analysis we need in order to perform our oversight duties, duties which have really just gotten underway since January of this year.

While the SIGIR report cites examples of increment, I'm deeply dissatisfied with the overall assessment that -- that you were forced to give, especially with the lack of accountability in U.S. operations.

For instance on page 33 of your report it -- it indicates that three of the top 10 most expensive reconstruction contracts don't even list a contractor. I want to repeat that again, that three of the top 10 most expensive construction contracts don't even list a contractor.

In fact line 373 items don't even include a contractor, totaling more than $3 billion in contracts -- 376 line items don't include a contractor; $3 billion in contracts.

So Mr. Bowen, I have a couple of questions for you. Do we know the scope of work that these contracts were to be performing that we paid for? Do we know the outcome of the work? Do we know who was even supervising the work? I mean we just talked about the Dimecorp, the $1.2 billion contract which we still don't know what we got for the money but at least we knew who the contractor was.

The SIGIR report also discusses the Iraqi corruption, calling the corruption the second insurgency. U.S. accountability plus Iraqi corruption is never going to equal long term success in Iraq. The president is asking for nearly $200 billion in additional funding.

So my questions to you gentlemen are, to what extent will the additional funds help address, one, U.S. accountability in its operations; two, Iraqi corruption.

And then finally, how can these funds be most effectively targeted to address these fundamental problems. In other words how do we stop the second insurgency?

MR. BOWEN: Thank you, Ms. McCollum.

As to your first question, you were referring to our list of Iraq security forces fund contractors. One of the things I've tried to do in section two is capture, from each of the largest funds, who the top contractors are, so we can understand where the money is going.

And -- and with respect to the Iraq security forces fund, which is now the largest amount of money in play if you will, 14 billion (dollars) appropriated, another 5 billion (dollars) in the pipeline; 10 billion (dollars) obligated; seven billion (dollars) spent. I had -- I have -- as I point out in the report -- real challenges in trying to find out from the multinational security transition command Iraq, from the Corps of Engineers, and others, who those top 10 were.

And -- and as I sent out data calls and sifted through the material, we found that we weren't able to get complete data. And I highlight that in this report, and I hope that next quarter we're going to get more complete data on -- on how the Iraq security forces fund is being spent.

With respect to the specifics about those three contractors you refer, I'll have to get back to you and see if we can provide scopes of work about what those contracts were about.

On the anti-corruption issue, as I mentioned in my opening statement, it remains a concern, and I think it became a more aggravated situation over the last quarter with the departure of the Commissioner of Public Integrity, because of threats to his attempts to carry out his mission. Personally, I got to know him pretty well. I saw him each of the last 14 trips I've made over there. And he -- he told me this last trip that the houses on either side of him in the Green Zone even had been -- had been attacked and destroyed. And so he was -- he was under care, and we also assisted with his chief investigator, who is a witness in a case as well, that -- (inaudible) -- to get out of the country.

So the point being, as we say in this report, that -- that the security threats to those who are trying to enforce the laws in Iraq are significant, and impeding the efforts of the Iraq government itself to roll back the tide of corruption.

REP. MCCOLLUM: And do you agree with the Iraqi gentleman's conclusion that Mr. Maliki has given immunity from prosecution from anyone in the Iraqi government who would be found guilty of corruption. He has been very outspoken on that.

MR. BOWEN: And order was issued in March from the prime minister's office that provided immunity to any minister or former minister from prosecution for corruption. The other problematic component within Iraqi law is Article 136(b) of their criminal code which permits any minister to provide the same kind of immunity to any ministry employee.

May I comment on corruption issues? I think one of the challenges that we constantly face when we do reviews in Iraq is that the U.S. government wants to try to help in some fashion. We've spent over $300 million to try to build the budgeting and procurement and contracting skills in the Iraqi ministry. But the question always remains, are we effectively helping to build the capabilities of corrupt ministries?

And you see that in the Ministry of the Interior in which, when you visit the Ministry of Interior, every floor is divided between the two predominant Shi'ia militias, the Mahdi Army and the Badr Corps. Now there's always a struggle of trying to want to do something to be productive, but the question is, are you enabling individuals that are ultimately corrupt.

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