Providing for Consideration of H.R. 928, Improving Government Accountability Act

Floor Speech

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 928, IMPROVING GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT -- (House of Representatives - October 03, 2007)

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Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this modified closed rule that waives important portions of the Congressional Budget Act.

Last night in the Rules Committee, we learned that this special rule finds yet another way for the majority to break regular order. By waiving section 306 of the Congressional Budget Act, this rule undermines the integrity of the budgeting process by allowing legislation within the Budget Committee's jurisdiction to be considered by the House without the Budget Committee's review.

My friend from Pasco, Washington, DOC HASTINGS, asked the acting chairman of the committee, Mr. McGovern, if the rule being considered does indeed waive this budget rule that protects taxpayers and Members of this House of Representatives. The answer came back simple and clear: Yes, the rule waives this commonsense provision.

I wish that I could say that I am surprised by the Democrat leadership's decision to find yet another way to toss House rules and procedures out the window. Unfortunately, this is precisely what has come to be known as, and to expect from, the new broken promise Democrat majority.

Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us has the noble goal of strengthening and clarifying the authority, tenure, resources, oversight and independence of the Inspectors General in the various Federal Departments and agencies.

Many of the issues addressed by the legislation today enjoy bipartisan support and are of great importance to me and a huge number of my colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle. The bill establishes a council to identify, review and plan to promote efficiency and address waste, fraud and abuse. It provides for greater integrity by establishing a new committee to investigate allegations of wrongdoing and to report on their efforts to the executive branch and to Congress.

It requires reports to Congress on the cooperation of all Federal agencies with the General Accountability Office and requires that semiannual inspection and evaluation reports, in addition to audit reports, be submitted to Congress.

Despite all of the noble goals of this legislation, I do regret that this bill was not crafted in closer coordination with the administration to resolve some of the outstanding issues that prevent it from being signed into law.

Like me, the administration has publicly stated its strong support for the work of Inspectors General and their overall mission to improve agency performance and to eliminate waste, fraud and abuse. However, the administration strongly objects to some of the provisions included in this legislation that are likely unconstitutional.

The end-run contained in this legislation around article II of the Constitution, which our Founding Fathers provided to the executive branch to ensure that all of our Nation laws are faithfully executed, guarantees that this bill will not only be vetoed by the President but would also be overturned by the Supreme Court if this bill were ever passed by the House and the Senate.

Also, by requiring Inspectors General to circumvent the long-standing and constitutionally based budgeting process that currently exists, without even including the House Budget Committee in the decisionmaking process, is a thinly veiled political stunt intended to draw a veto threat from the President and to create a false disagreement over this bill when it is clear that both Republicans and Democrats support reducing waste, fraud and abuse at each of our Federal agencies.

Mr. Speaker, I insert in the Record a copy of the administration's statement of policy regarding their position on this legislation.

Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget,

Washington, DC, October 1, 2007.

Statement of Administration Policy

H.R. 928--TO AMEND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978 TO ENHANCE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, TO CREATE A COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

The Administration appreciates the work of inspectors general (IGs) and their mission to improve agency performance and eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse. IGs play an important role in Executive Branch efforts to measure and achieve success in program performance. Each agency's Office of Inspector General (OIG) fills a vital role in these efforts by reviewing operations and making recommendations for improvements and corrective actions. By providing objective information to promote strong management, decision-making, and accountability, OIGs contribute to the success of each agency and the Federal government as a whole. The Administration strongly supports efforts to ensure that IGs have: the skills and training they need to perform their duties; fair pay; findings and recommendations that are transparent to the public; and access to necessary legal advice.

H.R. 928, the ``Improving Government Accountability Act,'' would further some of these objectives. However, the Administration strongly objects to provisions that are inconsistent with these goals, and with broader policy considerations and constitutional requirements. If H.R. 928 were presented to the President in its current form, the President's senior advisors would recommend that he veto the bill.

H.R. 928 would permit the President to remove IGs only for cause. The Administration strongly objects to this intrusion on the President's removal authority and his ability to hold IGs accountable for their performance. The responsibility to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed''--which Article II vests solely in the President--includes the responsibility to supervise and guide how IGs and other executive branch officers investigate and respond to allegations of wrongdoing within the executive branch. IGs already have the independence necessary to perform their investigative functions with respect to individual agencies, because agency heads generally may not supervise IGs' conduct of investigations. H.R. 928's attempt to extend this current independence to include independence from supervision by the President does not enhance the function of IGs and raises grave constitutional concerns.

The Administration also strongly opposes provisions that would authorize IGs to circumvent the President's longstanding, and constitutionally based, control over executive branch budget requests by allowing IGs to submit their budget requests directly to Congress and by requiring the President to include each IG's request as a separate line item in the President's annual budget request. Since its inception, the current executive branch coordination process has worked well for both the President and the Congress. The process is deliberative and results in an agency and government-wide coordinated submission that accounts for long-range planning and priorities.

IGs have been a part of this process since their creation in 1978, and there is no evidence that the current process results in budgets that fail to enable appropriate IG performance.

The Administration also objects to provisions that would establish within the Executive Branch a freestanding, independent Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. A similar council already exists under Executive Orders. Statutory codification of such a council would impede the President's ability to react swiftly and effectively to problems with IGs or with the Council itself. Furthermore, the council provisions in H.R. 928 raise constitutional questions because they restrict the President's authority to nominate individuals to serve on the Council and contain ambiguous definitions of offices and their respective roles and responsibilities. Finally, it is critical that disclosure protections regarding the Witness Security Program apply to the Department of Justice's Inspector General's internal investigative procedures and release of information, since the release of specific information related to the program could endanger the program's means and methods, personnel, and the continued safety of the program's protected witnesses.

Mr. Speaker, I oppose the majority's unwillingness to work with the administration in a bipartisan way to create a bill that all Members of this body can support and that would also pass constitutional muster. I also oppose the Democrat leadership's willingness to once again subvert regular order for political purposes and to prevent my colleague from The Woodlands in Texas, Congressman KEVIN BRADY, from having an opportunity to offer his amendment to provide additional review of the work product of our Federal agencies.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. SUTTON. Mr. Speaker, I would inquire of the gentleman from Texas if he has any remaining speakers.

Mr. SESSIONS. I appreciate the gentlewoman engaging me at this time. Mr. Speaker, I would inform my colleague that I do not have any additional speakers.

Ms. SUTTON. Okay. I'm the last speaker for my side, so I will reserve my time until the gentleman has closed for his side and yielded back his time.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Ohio and enjoy working with her.

Mr. Speaker, I will be asking Members to oppose the previous question so that I may amend the rule to allow for consideration of H. Res. 479, a resolution that I like to call the Earmark Accountability Rule.

During last year's campaign and again at the beginning of this Congress, promises were made to the American people and to the new minority about the Democrats' supposedly new and improved earmark rules. As the year has worn on, however, I have noticed that while the Democrats' rules changes may sound good as a cynical sound bite for the evening news, they haven't actually accomplished much since the majority has repeatedly turned the other way when it comes to their own actual enforcement.

We continue to see nondisclosed earmarks appearing in all sorts of bills, and even the House Parliamentarian has determined that the hastily drafted and passed Democrat earmark rule ``does not comprehensively apply to all legislative propositions at all stages of the legislative process.''

I will insert this letter from the House Parliamentarian, JOHN SULLIVAN, to the Rules Committee chairman, LOUISE SLAUGHTER, into the Record at this point.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARIAN,

Washington, DC, October 2, 2007.
Hon. LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
Committee on Rules, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRWOMAN SLAUGHTER: Thank you for your letter of October 2, 2007, asking for an elucidation of our advice on how best to word a special rule. As you also know, we have advised the committee that language waiving all points of order ``except those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI'' should not be adopted as boilerplate for all special rules, notwithstanding that the committee may be resolved not to recommend that the House waive the earmark-disclosure requirements of clause 9.

In rule XXI, clause 9(a) establishes a point of order against undisclosed earmarks in certain measures and clause 9(b) establishes a point of order against a special rule that waives the application of clause 9(a). As illuminated in the rulings of September 25 and 27, 2007, clause 9(a) of rule XXI does not comprehensively apply to all legislative propositions at all stages of the legislative process.

Clause 9(a) addresses the disclosure of earmarks in a bill or joint resolution, in a conference report on a bill or joint resolution, or in a so-called ``manager's amendment'' to a bill or joint resolution. Other forms of amendment--whether they be floor amendments during initial House consideration or later amendments between the Houses--are not covered. (One might surmise that those who developed the rule felt that proposals to amend are naturally subject to immediate peer review, though they harbored reservations about the so-called ``manager's amendment,'' i.e., one offered at the outset of consideration for amendment by a member of a committee of initial referral under the terms of a special rule.)

The question of order on September 25 involved a special rule providing for a motion to dispose of an amendment between the Houses. As such, clause 9(a) was inapposite. It had no application to the motion in the first instance. Accordingly, Speaker pro tempore Holden held that the special rule had no tendency to waive any application of clause 9(a). The question of order on September 27 involved a special rule providing (in pertinent part) that an amendment be considered as adopted. Speaker pro tempore Blumenauer employed the same rationale to hold that, because clause 9(a) had no application to the amendment in the first instance, the special rule had no tendency to waive any application of clause 9(a).

The same would be true in the more common case of a committee amendment in the nature of a substitute made in order as original text for the purpose of further amendment. Clause 9(a) of rule XXI is inapposite to such an amendment.

In none of these scenarios would a ruling by a presiding officer hold that earmarks are or are not included in a particular measure or proposition. Under clause 9(b) of rule XXI, the threshold question for the Chair--the cognizability of a point of order--turns on whether the earmark-disclosure requirements of clause 9(a) of rule XXI apply to the object of the special rule in the first place. Embedded in the question whether a special rule waives the application of clause 9(a) is the question whether clause 9(a) has any application.

In these cases to which clause 9 of rule XXI has no application in the first instance, stating a waiver of all points of order except those arising under that rule--when none can so arise--would be, at best, gratuitous. Its negative implication would be that such a point of order might lie. That would be as confusing as a waiver of all points of order against provisions of an authorization bill except those that can only arise in the case of a general appropriation bill (e.g., clause 2 of role XXI). Both in this area and as a general principle, we try hard not to use language that yields a misleading implication.

I appreciate your consideration and trust that this response is to be shared among all members of the committee. Our office will share it with all inquiring parties.

Sincerely,

John V. Sullivan,
Parliamentarian.

Mr. Speaker, even the nonpartisan House Parliamentarian acknowledges what Republicans have been saying since January: that the so-called Democrat earmark rule has more holes than a bowl of Cheerios and that earmark abuse by the broken promise Democrat majority continues to run rampant.

This rules change would simply allow the House to debate openly and honestly about the validity and accuracy of earmarks contained in all bills, not just appropriations bills.

If we defeat the previous question, we then can address that problem today and restore this Congress' nonexistent credibility when it comes to the enforcement of its own rules.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the amendment and extraneous material appear in the Congressional Record just prior to the vote on the previous question.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

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