Hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform - Blackwater USA; Private Security Contracting in Iraq & Afghanistan
Interview
Hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform - Blackwater USA; Private Security Contracting in Iraq & Afghanistan
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REP. MIKE SIMPSON (R-ID): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I come from Ohio, and Ohio is known frequently as the heartland. And in the heartland, there are a few things that are easy that are not so easy in Washington, D.C. Even in Hollywood, some of these things are easy, and those are the issues of who's on our team and who's on their team.
And today I'm a little saddened by this hearing, because I am absolutely a supporter of congressional oversight and believe this committee has incredible functions that we have to do. Our witness today even talked about being a contractor, the questions that we should be asking of reliability, accountability, cost. A lot of the information we have before us is about dollars, rules of engagement and the like.
But what unfortunately dissolves into our team versus their team, by any account -- by Hollywood's account, by the performance account -- Blackwater is our team. They are our team, working in the trenches and in a war zone. I haven't heard many questions on this committee about the rules of engagement or the limits on the work of al Qaeda or the insurgents.
In fact, I don't recall one hearing in this committee where there has indignation or troubling responses as a result of these senseless and heartless killings of al Qaeda and the insurgents, but I hear today huge concerns over what we must exert as oversight on Blackwater. And I think it crosses the line between our team and their team.
Blackwater has questions to answer, and I believe that -- that they are prepared to do that and today have come forward to do those things. But we should not go to the extent of undermining Blackwater's ability to perform as our team. The Washington Post today in its editorial, in reviewing how this issue has come to light, stated, "Congressional Democrats despise the firm because it symbolizes the private contracting of military missions that many oppose in principle." This is The Washington Post saying that Congressional Democrats are despising this firm because of its engagement in military missions that they oppose. The Washington Post goes on to say, "At the same time, it is foolish" -- that's a pretty strong word for The Washington Post -- "At the same time, it is foolish to propose the elimination of private security firms in Iraq and Afghanistan, at least in the short term." I would hope, as we continue our important functions of oversight, that we don't undermine our team.
Now, Mr. Chairman, you made a comment that I've got to respond to, in your opening statement. It's written in your opening statement, and it says, "As a general rule, children from wealthy and politically connected families no longer serve in the military." Mr. Chairman, that's an attack on our team. I can tell you that Duncan Hunter's -- former chairman of the Armed Services Committee, currently ranking member, whose son served in Iraq, would -- would disagree with you. Joe Wilson, member of the Armed Services Committee whose son served, would disagree with you.
And I can tell you that the -- the DOD, in its report on social representation in the U.S. military services, and the GAO in their September 22nd, 2005, report would disagree with you. According to the DOD report, it says, "Our population representation report shows both a diversity and quality of the total force, men and women of various racial and ethnic groups, of divergent backgrounds from every state in our country serve as active and selective Reserve, enlisted members, and officers of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force and Coast Guard."
A particular note: "The mean cognitive ability and educational levels of these soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen and Coast Guardsmen are above the average of comparatively aged U.S. citizens." The GAO, in their report, similarly confirms that between 1974 and 2000, the force became older and better educated.
So I would hope that the comments by the chairman are not interpreted as -- as what I heard them as, as diminishing the abilities, the backgrounds, of those who serve in our military.
Mr. Prince, my question for you, you are free of some of the limiting acquisition rules that our military is subject to. A general has a different ability to be able to acquire something, as -- as you do corporately. Could you give us some insight as to how our acquisition rules inhibit our military in performing some of things that you do and ways in which we can change those acquisition rules to deliver to them the things that they need?
MR. PRINCE: Thanks for that question. I would say we find that the requirements process for the military constantly looks for the 120 percent solution. And it over-specs the electronic capability -- I mean, there's -- there's an enormous amount of extra stuff and capability put on a vehicle that might not be necessary to just fulfill that job. I mean, if you're going to -- you could almost buy vehicles just -- just planned on for Iraq right now almost off the shelf without having to plan about netcentric??? Warfare and all the other bells and whistles that sometimes the DOD wants to put on things. So we buy to solve the situation at hand.
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