Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee - Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs

Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

LOCATION: 106 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES: DAVID KAY, FORMER HEAD OF THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP

BODY:
SEN. JOHN CORNYN (R-TX): Thank you.

Dr. Kay, I too want to thank you for your service. I'm deeply concerned lest the politics of the moment overshadow some important facts.

First, would you agree that not only our intelligence agencies, but Democrats, Republicans, President Clinton, President Bush, France, Germany, Britain all believed that Saddam had stockpiles of WMD?

MR. KAY: I think that's true.

SEN. CORNYN: And until your report, after your long work with the Iraqi Survey Group, have you found that anyone-any one of those people or groups that I've identified have in fact learned that it was not true, but nevertheless, tried to manipulate it and present it as fact for some improper purpose?

MR. KAY: No, I know of no manipulation. I know of a lot of skepticism and-because it was such a widely held view, and wanting to know the facts, and I view that as absolutely appropriate.

SEN. CORNYN: So you know of no evidence, no indication that anyone tried to intentionally manipulate the intelligence that we got in order to justify going to war in Iraq?

MR. KAY: I've seen no evidence of that, nor have I seen any evidence after the fact of anyone trying to influence the conclusions that I or others are reaching as part of the survey group.

SEN. CORNYN: Let me just try to nail down a couple other facts. Although it now appears that Saddam, or at least so far appears that Saddam did not have large stockpiles of WMD, he did continue research on chemical and biological and even nuclear weapons, correct?

MR. KAY: Absolutely.

SEN. CORNYN: Would you say then, Dr. Kay, that it was just a matter of time before Saddam would build such stockpiles or have that capability in a way that would threaten not only people in Iraq but people in that neighborhood, and perhaps others?

MR. KAY: I think you will have, when you get the final ISG report, pretty compelling evidence that Saddam had the intention of continuing the pursuit of WMD when the opportunity arose, and that the first start on that, the long pole in the tent, was this restart of the long-range missile program.

SEN. CORNYN: So that given time, these programs would have matured and Saddam would have been able to reconstitute his WMD arsenal?

MR. KAY: I hesitate, Senator, only-I think that's a safe assumption. What I don't know over time, and I'm more and more struck with, is how corrupt and destructive that society had become. But you can't count on when it would fall apart, and it might fall apart in ways that are far more dangerous. So I think that is a safe assumption.

MR. CORNYN: You said something during your opening statement that intrigues me and something that I'm afraid may be overlooked in all of this back and forth, and that has to do with proliferation. You said that there was a risk of a willing seller meeting a willing buyer of such weapons or weapons stockpiles, whether they be large, small or programs, whether it's information that Iraqi scientists might be willing to sell or work in cooperation with rogue organizations or even nations. But do you consider that to have been a real risk in terms of Saddam's activities and these programs, (the risk of ?) proliferation?

MR. KAY: Actually, I consider it a bigger risk than-and that's why I paused on the preceding question. I consider that a bigger risk than the restart of his programs being successful. I think the way the society was going, and the number of willing buyers in the market, that that probably was a risk that, if we did avoid, we barely avoided.

SEN. CORNYN: And indeed that continues to be a concern we have today in the old Soviet Union and other places where --

MR. KAY: Pakistan and other places.

SEN. CORNYN: Pakistan. Other nations where they've had official weapons programs, biological, chemical and nuclear, the risk of proliferation into the hands of terrorists like al Qaeda and others. Is that correct, sir?

MR. KAY: That's correct.

SEN. CORNYN: And indeed the deception that you've talked about, of Saddam's own military and scientists and others who perhaps led him to believe that they were following through on his orders to develop these weapons of mass destruction, would you say that that deception not only convinced perhaps Saddam, to some extent, but indeed that contributed to his intransigence before the world community and defiance of the United Nations, and particularly, finally, of U.N. Resolution 1441?

MR. KAY: I think that probably did. I'm just hesitant because analyzing the mind of someone who would end up in a spider hole like Saddam requires a skill that I suspect I was not equipped for. But yeah, I think that's a reasonable interpretation.

SEN. CORNYN: Thank you very much, Dr. Kay. I appreciate it.

MR. KAY: Yeah.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator, very much.