Address by U.S. Senator Jack Reed: Paul C. Warnke Conference on the Past, Present & Future of Arms Control

In 1946, in a speech to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, President Harry Truman, the only person ever to authorize the use of nuclear weapons, said: "Before us now lies a new era in which the power of atomic energy has been released. That age will either be one of complete devastation or one in which new sources of power will lighten the labors of mankind and increase the standards of living all over the world."

For more than fifty years, the United States has been in the vanguard in ensuring that President Truman's first alternative never becomes a reality. The United States has both urged and acted to "delegitimize" the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Through the early Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Presidential nuclear reduction initiatives, the Strategic Arms Reduction talks, various nuclear weapons testing limitation treaties, and bilateral diplomatic efforts to encourage other states to foreswear nuclear weapons, the United States, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, has worked to reduce the possibility of devastation.

Today, however, the Bush Administration is implementing a departure from this decades-long, bipartisan policy of arms control and risk reduction. President Bush has neither reduced the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenals nor decreased the nation's reliance on nuclear weapons. Instead, he has pushed Congress to adopt measures that may actually lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. These new nuclear weapons policies are being implemented as part of a broader, novel, national security strategy that increasingly relies on preemptive military action to compel states of concern not to pursue weapons of mass destruction.

Moreover, the Bush Administration has not substantially increased efforts to reduce the risks associated with the former Soviet Union's Cold War weapons and materials. On the contrary, the Bush Administration initially cut these programs. Recognizing their importance, Congress restored the funding. But notwithstanding statements of support for these programs, the President has failed in his budget to fund these programs at levels commensurate with their importance.

The Administration is pursuing an agenda which promotes nuclear weapons during a time when the need to delegitimize and stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons related technologies is as important as ever. Revelations about the capabilities of the Iraqi nuclear program prior to the 1991 Gulf War, the North Korean, Iranian, and Libyan nuclear programs, as well as the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 have demonstrated that nuclear weapons remain highly sought after.

In practical terms, however, North Korea and other tough WMD proliferation cases defy quick military solutions. Military pre-emption alone cannot replace a comprehensive and preventive arms control and nonproliferation strategy. Nonproliferation rules and standards of behavior establish the legal, political, and moral basis for organizing U.S. and international pressure to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials to states or terrorist groups. New proliferation dangers and changing threats to our national security, continue to require nonproliferation strategies. These strategies must change as the threats change to remain effective. Changing, strengthening and adapting-not abandoning-preventive diplomacy and arms control should remain at the heart of U.S. national security policy.

Bush Administration

The Bush administration, however, has set a different course. It has clearly shown its distaste for treaties. Administration officials may argue that it did conclude the Moscow Treaty with Russia; unfortunately this treaty is arms control in name only. It does not actually require the elimination of any nuclear weapons, there is no timetable for compliance, no definition of deployment, and it does not provide for additional verification mechanisms. Under the Moscow Treaty, the reductions in deployed nuclear weapons do not have to be achieved until December 31, 2012, and can be fully reversed on January 1, 2013. The Moscow Treaty is not an effective adaptation of arms control.

The trend toward abandoning, not adapting arms control is evident in the Administration's passive neglect of treaties and in its aggressive actions to revitalize the role of nuclear weapons. In December 2001, the Bush Administration completed its Nuclear Posture Review. The NPR supported budget requests to fund the production of hundreds of new plutonium "pits" per year -- a necessary component of a nuclear weapon-to support the design of new weapons, and to shorten the time necessary to plan and conduct a nuclear test. These initiatives strongly suggest that the resumption of nuclear weapons testing is a desired goal-not as the last resort to maintain the existing stockpile, as contemplated under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but to support the development of new, smaller, or otherwise more useable, nuclear weapons.

The NPR also indicates, for the first time, that the United States is prepared to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations that are not aligned with a nuclear power, including the possibility of first use in a preemptive strike. The Bush Nuclear Posture Review combines and thus blurs the traditional distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear offensive strike. Instead of deterring an attack by a nuclear power, the Cold War approach to deterrence, the Bush NPR makes nuclear weapons just one more tool in our tool kit, one more option to exercise.

The President's intentions became clearer in September 2002, when the President issued his National Security Strategy, and in December 2002 when he issued his Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Each document lays out a clear strategy of preemption as an option, regardless of the immediacy of the threat.

These documents, coupled with the Administration's budget requests, set forth the Administration's desire to have a nuclear weapon that could be used in a first strike, pre-emptive fashion against a nonnuclear or a nuclear state.

In the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Administration proposed to begin a three-year effort to design a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator ("RNEP") to use against hard and deeply buried targets. The RNEP would modify an existing large yield nuclear device to penetrate a hard surface, such as rock, survive, and then detonate. The Senate Democrats were able to delay spending money on the RNEP for six months by requiring a report identifying the types of targets that this weapon is designed to hold at risk and the employment policy for the RNEP. Notwithstanding the fact that there is no clear military requirement for an RNEP, the Administration is forging ahead. In its fiscal year 2004 budget request, the Administration proposed a second year of funding for the RNEP.

Also integral to the Administration's strategy of preemption is the desire for new, precision, small nuclear weapons, with yields of less than 5 kilotons. The Administration's first step towards this goal was to propose the repeal of section 31-36 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, which prohibits the Secretary of Energy from conducting any research and development which could lead to the production by the United States of new low yield nuclear weapons, including a precision low-yield warhead.

In 2003 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Ambassador Linton Brooks, acting director of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) did not suggest that the new nuclear weapons work is needed to meet a new military requirement. Instead, he argued that "we are seeking to free ourselves from intellectual prohibitions against exploring a full range of technical options." Pressed further, Brooks provided a more telling explanation of the Administration's motives, saying "I have a bias in favor of something that is the minimum destruction … that means I have a bias in favor of things that might be usable." Despite strong Democratic opposition, the ban was repealed, and $6.0 million was authorized for this research.

Arms Control Accomplishments

Proponents of this new nuclear policy, with its "bias in favor of things that are usable," argue that arms control and nonproliferation have failed, and therefore new nuclear weapons concepts and weapons are needed. They cite a litany of states that have acquired nuclear weapons since the adoption of the NPT in 1968: India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and apparently North Korea.

Arms control and nonproliferation strategies, however, succeeded in ensuring that far fewer states acquired nuclear weapons and established a global norm against the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Forty years ago, when the original nuclear powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China, had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, it was routinely assumed that proliferation would be rapid and irreversible. President Kennedy predicted in the early-1960s that an additional 25 countries might develop nuclear weapons within 10 years. This dire prediction did not come true because of efforts at arms control exemplified by the NPT. Moreover, of the five states that have acquired nuclear weapons since 1968, three (Israel, India and Pakistan) never signed on to the NPT. South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons and joined the regime as a non-possessor state. That leaves the very special case of North Korea, which joined the NPT in 1985, and has been caught on at least two occasions violating its obligations before its announced repudiation of the Treaty.

Critics of the nonproliferation regime frequently fail to acknowledge that Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan ceased their suspected nuclear programs, in part, because of the international norms represented by the NPT. Similarly, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine found themselves in possession of nuclear weapons. All of them voluntarily relinquished their weapons in favor of joining the NPT. Their decision, at the urging of the United States and others, reaffirmed the norm of nonproliferation. At the time, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were, respectively, the third and fourth largest nuclear powers in the world.

Despite its successes, however, the arms control regime is under stress. Today, nonproliferation is being advocated by the United States as "do what I say" not "do what I do." Unfortunately, the United States is more often imitated rather than obeyed. The goals of the Nuclear Posture Review, the National Security Strategy, and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction are reflected in Congressional action authorizing new nuclear weapons research and repealing the ban on low yield nuclear weapons research. Unfortunately these policies and actions will begin to take the United States in a dangerous new direction that marks a major shift in American policy, is inconsistent with our longstanding commitment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to end the nuclear arms race, and makes a mockery of our argument to other countries around the world that they should not develop or test nuclear weapons.

The Bush Administration, through a series of actions taken over the past three years, is quietly moving to change the long-standing bipartisan consensus on nuclear weapons, to make nuclear weapons more usable, and to see them as just another option. Or, as a May 2003 article by Bill Keller in The New York Times Magazine suggests, to make the unthinkable, "thinkable."

Action Agenda

The United States must reverse the course we now seem to be taking. Our nation must pursue comprehensive and practical efforts to deal with the shortcomings and unfinished parts of the global nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons arms control regime in order to adapt to the new threats and new technologies of the post Cold War era. Let us expand and improve arms control, not condemn it.

In the coming years, the President and the Congress should work to build a more comprehensive approach to the evolving problem of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation. These efforts should draw from existing programs and activities, reinforce and expand bilateral and global arms control measures, and be pursued in collaboration with the United States' allies and friends through the United Nations and other bilateral and multilateral mechanisms.

< We must improve international weapons monitoring and inspection capabilities, which would aid U.S. intelligence and can help detect and deter cheaters, encourage compliance, and galvanize support for U.S.-led collective action to deal with violators that pose a threat to international security.

International actions are effective. Evidence of North Korea's illicit nuclear weapons work was discovered in 1992 as a result of that country joining the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and agreeing to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. The dangerous extent of Iran's nuclear program has recently been revealed through a new round of international inspections. Special I-A-E-A inspections in Iraq following the first Gulf War effectively ended that nation's illicit nuclear weapons program by 1998. The IAEA "Additional Protocol," recently submitted to the Senate for consideration, would allow for more extensive inspections and is an important next step to strengthen international capabilities. I commend the Administration for supporting this additional protocol. The Senate will begin considering it with a hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow. I look forward to working with my colleagues to ratify this important protocol.

In place for just over 10 years, the Nunn Lugar initiatives have helped make the United States and the world safer by improving security and dismantling much of the Soviet-era nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons arsenals and infrastructure. More still needs to be done. We can and should accelerate and expand, wherever possible, this vital effort to keep these weapons, materials, and technologies out of the hands of terrorists and criminals. While construction has started on the facility to eliminate the 40,000 metric ton stockpile of Russian chemical weapons, assistance will be needed until this project is finished and all chemical weapons are destroyed. Russia and other former Soviet Union biological weapons research facilities and personnel must be converted into non-defense programs. Russia's sprawling nuclear infrastructure remains vulnerable, with only half of the facilities fully equipped with modern security systems to prevent theft or diversion of weapons and materials. As the ranking member of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, I plan to work with the Administration and my colleagues to increase our current investment of roughly $1.0 billion per year in these programs and eliminate unnecessary Congressional restrictions that threaten the continuation of contracts on important projects.

For years, progress on multilateral negotiations to end the supply of new material for nuclear bombs, through the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, has been stalled. Now, a shift in China's position opens the way for progress. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration has decided to reevaluate its support for such an agreement. Instead, it should take the initiative and move forward to conclude such a treaty. In addition, the Administration should move forward on its idea of creating an inventory of the world's fissile materials and assessing the risk of proliferation. I plan on working with my colleagues on a similar initiative in Congress.

The NPT guarantee of access to "peaceful" nuclear technology and the broad diffusion of that technology has allowed states such as Iran to acquire uranium-enrichment or plutonium-production facilities useful for weapons. Through more robust international export control arrangements, the availability of the most weapons-relevant technologies can be limited without denying access to basic and legitimate nuclear power technology. I do commend the Administration for establishing the Proliferation Security Initiative which will seek to detect and control the export and import of weapons, weapons material, and weapons technology, while respecting international and domestic law.

The Bush Administration's refusal to resume bilateral talks with North Korea in 2001, and its tough talk and hesitancy to resume discussions after North Korea took deplorable and dangerous actions to revive its plutonium production program, have allowed a dangerous situation to fester. The Administration has made some progress towards re-engaging the North Korean regime through six-party talks, but it is not clear whether it has developed an effective or clear negotiating strategy.

The United States in particular must lead by example and not engage in a "do as I say, not as I do" philosophy. Towards this end, the United States should maintain its nuclear test moratorium and reconsider ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, engage Russia in further talks to accelerate strategic nuclear reductions and verifiably dismantle excess nuclear weapons stockpiles, as well as pursue talks that lead to the verifiable dismantlement of the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons remaining in Russia. Today's threats require a strong and nimble conventional military capability and not the development of new or modified types of nuclear weapons designed to be used preemptively.

Conclusion

The consequences of the detonation of a nuclear weapon or other weapons of mass destruction are so devastating that reliance on military means alone to deter or preempt such an event is short sighted. Abandoning serious efforts at arms control will weaken, not strengthen, our efforts to protect the nation and our allies from the development of nuclear weapons by others. Only commitment and leadership to advance a comprehensive arms control regime can provide the security which we seek.