Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Federal News Service

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

LOCATION: 106 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES: DAVID KAY, FORMER HEAD OF THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP

BODY:
SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you.

Dr. Kay, let me also commend you, not only for your service, but for your integrity. We appreciate your being here today.

In your discussion with Tom Brokaw, you were asked about the nature of the threat posed by Iraq. And Mr. Brokaw said, "But an imminent threat to the United States?" And your response was, "Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment."

Now what does that mean? Did that mean that when you're presented with analysis from-in fact, conflicting analysis-that the president can impose a political calculation --

MR. KAY: Senator Reed --

SEN. REED: -- particularly a president that seems to have a very preconceived notion of the threat --

MR. KAY: Senator Reed, it means that any president, when he's presented with intelligence, has got to make a choice about how much risk he's prepared to run for the nation that he leads. It is my belief that regardless of political party, after 9/11, the shadowing effects of that horrible tragedy changed, as a nation, the level of risk that all of us are prepared to run, that we would like to avoid, and-but where you place yourself on that spectrum of how much risk you're going to run is a political responsibility which elected officials have and I certainly don't have.

And so I think, fundamentally, that's why, in a democracy, we elect people like you, and we elect a president-to make those determinations. It's not a fixed point that is ever going to be carved as pi's constant. It is, what's the world look like, and how much risk will I run?

SEN. REED: But also, Doctor, that judgment has to be logically related to the evidence you have before you. And like so many-and I think you, too-there was a supposition that perhaps this Saddam had chemical or biological weapons, less credibility in claims about having nuclear weapons or a nuclear program. And in fact, you know, not just my conclusion but many people concluded similarly that despite that assumption, that there was not an imminent threat to the United States. That wasn't just a political judgment. That was looking at the facts that were presented by the intelligence community, even if they were flawed, and making a judgment based on those facts.

MR. KAY: Senator Reed, I think it's often easy to forget that in the case of Saddam, here's an individual who had invaded two neighboring countries, used chemical weapons against one of those, used them against his own neighbors, and who, by U.N. testimony, had cheated and lied for a decade.

So I mean, as I look back on the evidence, I understand the decision, while honoring the right of any elected leader to choose how much risk he's prepared to run. And that's what I mean by that. I don't think it's something that is a physics constant, that you can just pull out of a table.

SEN. REED: Dr. Kay, you also were quoted-and Senator Kennedy referred to it-"I think if anyone was abused by the intelligence, it was the president of the United States, rather than the other way around." Are you suggesting that the president was misled by the American intelligence community?

MR. KAY: No, sir. What I'm suggesting is that the actual facts on the ground will turn out to be substantially different, at least with regard to large stockpiles, than the estimate before, and that we better understand why that's true.

There are other reasons and other things about Iraq to be concerned with. And certainly, I think Iraq, if you look back at its history of using these weapons, the fact that they remained in violation of 1441, and all of those facts are provable. But with regard to the actual existing weapons, which people keep coming back to because they are the most demonstrable symbol of the threat, reality is very likely going to turn out to be different than the estimates.

SEN. REED: Dr. Kay, you used the term "abused" by the intelligence.

MR. KAY: That's right. I think if-if --

SEN. REED: He was misled?

MR. KAY: If I were your broker and you were investing on my advice, a course I would not advise you to do, and at the end of the day, I said Enron was the greatest company in the world, and you had lost a substantial amount of money on it because it turned out (differently ?), you would think I had abused you.

I think the estimate is going to turn out to be different than reality. That's abuse, as far as I'm concerned.

SEN. REED: Well, part of the intelligence process, as I understand it, is not only the presentation of evidence and analysis by the agencies, but the probing questioning of leaders, decision- makers, particularly when the evidence is not totally reconciled. Do you think that those probing questions were made, particularly since so many people in the administration had preconceived notions about the nature of the threat?

MR. KAY: Senator Reed, I was not party to that. I hope in whatever process a review is going on, that the full record is out there.

I will just say I'm convinced myself, if I had been there, presented what I have seen as the record of the intelligence estimates, I probably would have come to-not probably-I would have come to the same conclusion that the political leaders did.

SEN. REED: Dr. Kay, is North Korea today a gathering serious threat?

MR. KAY: North Korea is an enigma probably with nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. I would probably put it higher up on my scale of gathering threat. I think it's a existing threat.

SEN. REED: And we are approaching North Korea with the same deeply flawed intelligence community that abused the president of the United States?

MR. KAY: I have no knowledge of whether we're approaching it with the same-in a case where the reality will turn out to be different from the estimate, I just don't know. I think that's an appropriate question for you and others to ask.

SEN. REED: Dr. Kay, the U.N. inspectors were readmitted into Iraq for a brief period of time. Had they been allowed to continue their mission, with adequate support, would they have likely reached the same conclusion you have?

MR. KAY: All I can say is that among an extensive body of Iraqi scientists who are talking to us, they have said: The U.N. interviewed us; we did not tell them the truth, we did not show them this equipment, we did not talk about these programs; we couldn't do it as long as Saddam was in power.

I suspect regardless of how long they had stayed, that attitude would have been the same.

SEN. REED: Just one final point, because my time has expired. I do recollect that there were some missiles destroyed because of their either disclosure or discovery by these inspectors, which suggested-you know, another data point we seldom remember that, too, remember that despite --

MR. KAY: Oh, absolutely. That's true.

SEN. REED: So that there was degree of cooperation and degree of success. Perhaps not as conclusive as yours, but that was happening. Is that correct?

MR. KAY: It wasn't cooperation. This was a case of the Samud II missile, which had been even under UNSCOM days a source of dispute with regard to its range. They continued to develop it after the inspectors left in 1998. By the time the U.N. was readmitted and there actually existed Samud IIs, there was no way you could contend that that was shorter than 150 kilometers, and in fact destruction had begun of those missiles, that's correct.

SEN. REED: My time has expired. Thank you, Dr. Kay.