Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subject: Report on the Findings of the Iraqi Security Force Independent Assessment Commission
Statement
HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCE INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION
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SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, not only for your work on this commission but for your lifetime service to the nation in many different capacities.
General Jones, General Joulwan, you probably know as much about the force structure of the Army and the Marine Corps as anyone. And my understanding is that, given our present force structure, unless we take draconian steps to decrease deployment times overseas, that by next April the surge, the additional 30,000 troops, approximately, will end. Is that a fair -- is that your understanding?
GEN. JONES: My understanding is that there will be a point when the surge will end, yes, sir.
SEN. REED: And roughly next spring is the --
GEN. JONES: I think it's forecast for that. I don't know exactly.
SEN. REED: So in one sense, really, reducing forces is not an option; it's a reality. The question, I think, is when is that date. Is it March? Is it April? Is it June? Is it May? Which raises, I think, one or more fundamental questions here.
The increase in forces would justify a mission of population control. Those forces go away next year sometime. So what are the missions that a smaller force can not only support but would be more central to our interests in Iraq? General Jones, General Joulwan, do you have any thoughts?
GEN. JONES: Well, we'd suggest that, assuming the continuing rate of progress in the Iraqi army and a renewed effort with regard to the police forces, which would result in being able to handle the internal threats to the country, and hopefully -- we should hit this drum again -- some evidence of national reconciliation that diminishes sectarian violence, then the rate of progress can be enhanced.
But having said that, with regard to what's going on right now, the rate of progress in the Iraqi army seems to be improving to the point that we can consider not only alternate missions but alternate force structures to take on some of the things that are not being done very well, and that is the territorial defense, the border defense, the critical infrastructures of the country upon which the government relies on for its popularity -- electricity, water, all kinds of services.
And so we think that, assuming a steady rate of progress, that the coalition over time could be retasked towards that mission. And that would mean new numbers and new capabilities, hopefully fewer.
GEN. JOULWAN: Can I just add --
SEN. REED: General Joulwan. Yes, sir.
GEN. JOULWAN: -- can I just add, Senator, that implicit in your question was somehow we may have timed our early '08 to the issue of will the troop deployments, because of stretched thin or not -- at least from my standpoint, that was not our intent. We based that on what we saw in development in our professional judgment.
And I think I want to make that clear, that I think it's important here that we see tactical success. How we build the strategy now to build on that success is key. And we think, going to a strategic shift of some sort, we can see possible, possible, reductions next year.
SEN. REED: Well, you know, this is where you sit is what you're seeing, basically. And I understand, your mission was to evaluate the Iraqi security force, independent of any other factor. But at the same time -- and I think we're all aware of this -- there are huge strains on the land forces, Army and Marine Corps, and that everything I have heard from people that I respect and admire, and who are being quite forthright, are indicating by next spring, unless you increase the deployment time to 18 months, call up Reserve and National Guard units at a much more accelerated rate, that this surge will end. I mean, essentially that's what General Petraeus told me in Baghdad about a month ago.
So I think we have to be realistic about what happens. Regardless of the progress of your folks on the ground, are troops coming down? What are the missions?
But let me ask you in a different way something I think is critical. And this is not central to your mission, but you were there; you've got a sense of it, I think, and you've got great expertise. The real question here, I think, is when those troops come down -- May, April, June -- how reversible are the tactical successes that we see today on the ground? Where is the force that's going to come in and replace them?
Where is the political coherence and the political infrastructure that will sort of build on these gains? How long will it take -- we've seen this repeatedly -- as our forces are drawn down necessarily by the force structure constraints, will it take for the insurgents to begin to back-fill, to begin to express theirselves (sic)?
GEN. JONES: Well, the rate of progress that's forecast for the Iraqi army is to grow to 13 divisions in 2008 from the 10 that they have now. So, you know, assuming they're able to do that -- and we see no reason to believe that they can't -- manpower is available. Volunteers are standing in line to join. The training bases are established. The schools are up and operating. The equipment is in the pipeline.
They should be able to grow to 13 divisions. And that's three more than they have now. And they'll be tested and they'll be taking over more and more of that internal security. Under that scenario, that ultimate reduction of our forces is commensurate with the increase in theirs.
And that's what the challenge --
REP. REED: So you don't --
GEN. JONES: -- we'll have to face.
REP. REED: -- anticipate at least a temporary period of time in which our force is drawn down, the Iraqi forces that you looked at closely are getting up to a level of expertise, but a gap in which once again, the insurgents can exploit a decrease in our forces and the inability of the Iraqi security forces. You don't even suspect that at all?
GEN. JOULWAN: I think you always have to anticipate different options but if we see the continued improvement that we've seen on the ground during our visits, if we can speed up the foreign military sales of the equipment, they have, what, 2 (billion dollars) or 3 billion (dollars) in the bank in New York ready to buy things that plugged up. That's our problem, not their problem.
REP. REED: I agree.
GEN. JOULWAN: So we have to, if we give them the means, there may be substantial improvement by next spring in the Iraqi security forces, particularly the army and we ought to say how can we facilitate that and -- sale of the political side of it, but how can we facilitate that and that's incumbent upon a lot of folks here in Washington. But I think there's opportunity here. And I think we ought to try to see if we can capitalize on it.
REP. REED: Well, my time's expired. I think, you know, as you've pointed out, the resources are growing, there are resources we have to provide, particularly this foreign military sales issues, is to me a disaster -- we've known about it for a year, we can't get equipment to them, and they pay for it. But the real question which resonates throughout your report and throughout your testimony today is does the Iraqi people have the will to do these things? And frankly, after four years -- and I would poll you individually but my time's expired -- that's a highly debatable point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
GEN. JONES: Senator, if I could respond to that though because I think that's an important thing.
One of the things that the commission did is we actually took a pole of the multinational force commanders, all eight commanders, and we asked General Patraeus to do this for us, and it's a poll that is unsigned, but we asked some interesting questions and I'd like to share some of the responses. These are the most senior commanders on the ground, eight representing the coalition.
The assessment of the progress has been made by the Iraqi security forces towards attaining the capabilities required to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq. The choices were excellent, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory.
Within the MOD, six responded satisfactory, and only two unsatisfactory. Within the progress with regard to attaining the capabilities required to deny international terrorists safe havens, seven satisfactory, one unsatisfactory.
Assessing what progress had been made by Iraqi security forces towards attaining capabilities required to bring greater security to the providence in your area of operations, seven satisfactory, zero unsatisfactory, one not applicable for some reason.
Assessment of the progress that's been made by Iraqi security forces towards ending sectarian violence and achieving national reconciliation -- this is again army, the army only -- six satisfactory, two unsatisfactory.
Ethnic composition of sectarian and its impact on performance, two moderate, five negligibly.
Capabilities required to significantly enhance independent direct combat operations against al Qaeda and other forces hostile to the government of Iraq. Choice, 12 to 18 months, 18 to 36 (months) or more than 36 (months). Three said 12 to 18 months, four said 18 to 36 (months) and one said more than 36 (months).
And, finally, the assessment of the progress that has been made by ISF towards creating the administrative, financial training and other institutions needed to sustain the force, satisfactory four, unsatisfactory, three.
So to give you a flavor, the response to these questions is very important by the people, by the commanders who are actually running the multinational forces on a day-to-day basis working with the Iraqis, the trend lines are favorable. And I think this is a meaningful finding.
REP. REED: Well thank you.
GEN. JONES: Thank you for the opportunity to say that.
REP. REED: My time's expired, but again, gentlemen, thank you for your service and your comments. Thank you.
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