Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee - A DHS Status Report
SEN. SUSAN M. COLLINS (R-ME): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the United States government launched the largest reorganization in its history to strengthen coordination among the 22 agencies with responsibilities for protecting our nation. We established the Department of Homeland Security.
More than four years have now passed since DHS opened for business on March 1st, 2003. As Senator Lieberman noted this afternoon, our nation is safer than prior to 9/11/01. But nevertheless, the threats continue to evolve and intensify. Violent extremists, both foreign and homegrown, remain determined to attack Americans. Natural disasters continue to challenge our communities' ability to prepare, respond and rebuild.
Meanwhile, global commerce, travel and new drug-resistant microbes raise the risk of pandemic disease.
DHS officials and staff have worked hard to enhance our security. I think it's important that we take note of that. We have been spared a new terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 2001 and the people of DHS deserve a measure of credit for that. We all know, however, that the department has also encountered difficulties and setbacks in performing its vital mission.
Today we will attempt to assess the department's performance fairly and accurately, noting its successes, its failures and its incompletes.
When Senator Lieberman and I first asked the GAO last year to perform a status check on DHS's first four years, we knew that we were asking for a major assessment. And certainly the 320 pages in this new GAO report are certainly proof of that.
I also expected that DHS would receive a mixed report card and it has. Reviewing the grades fairly, however, does require a word of context. As the GAO notes, quote: "Successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take five to seven years to achieve," end quote.
Applying the GAO's measure of performance expectations to 14 key DHS mission areas yielded indications of moderate or substantial progress in six areas, including key concerns like aviation security and maritime security. Four other areas were judged to show modest progress.
That DHS should be a work in progress after only four years should surprise no one. But it is nevertheless disturbing to see limited progress in four areas as critical as human capital management, information technology management, science and technology and, most of all, emergency preparedness and response.
The limited progress grade in emergency preparedness and response particularly concerns me. The GAO does document some progress, such as grant programs to improve interoperable communications for first responders, a very high priority for the chairman and for me.
And I would also think that it's important to note that there are some positive developments resulting from last year's FEMA reform legislation that are not reflected in GAO's analysis. For example, FEMA now has regional centers with defense coordinating officers and multi-agency strike teams multiplying its readiness to deliver rapid and effective systems. FEMA also has improved its capability to pre- position vital supplies and to track their deployment. I've seen these improvements firsthand in the regional exercise in New England and they are encouraging. And they are not fully reflected in this report.
But nevertheless, I'm very concerned that GAO found only limited progress in establishing an all-hazards national response plan in developing national all-hazards preparedness goals and coordinating the implementation of a national incident management system. These are troubling incompletes. No amount of investment and technology and an aid to first responders can compensate for the lack of well- developed and well-understood goals and procedures for coordinated response. We simply must have better results in this area.
Now, I am proud that the highest score GAO awarded was in an area that this committee has worked very hard on and that is maritime security. We held a number of hearings. We authored landmark port security legislation that was signed into law last year. And in this area, the GAO has found that DHS has achieved more than 75 percent of performance expectations.
Another topic that has occupied a great deal of the time of this committee is acquisition management. This committee has uncovered appalling instances of waste and fraud in the response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita and in contracting in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
In light of those investigations, it's troubling that GAO found that DHS still lacks clear department-wide acquisition policies and suffers from acquisition staff shortages. This is an area where the department must redouble its efforts, because faulty acquisition not only wastes scarce taxpayers' dollars but it can also literally cost lives if vital supplies are lacking or they cannot be moved swiftly to aid victims of natural disasters or terrorist attacks.
Nearly six years after September 11th, 2001, four years after its creation and two years after Hurricane Katrina, the department must pick up the pace of its progress. GAO's report should serve as a useful road map in this effort. With so much at stake and with so many areas where progress is still required, America cannot settle for a mixed report card.
I welcome our witnesses today and I look forward to a productive discussion. Thank you.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schneider, I want to focus on the four areas where the GAO really gave the department unsatisfactory ratings -- in other words, found only limited progress, the lowest rating. They are emergency preparedness and response, science and technology, human capital management and information technology management on the chart.
Now, I indicated in my opening statement that I think GAO actually graded the department too low on the emergency preparedness and response area, and that that one deserves at least somewhat higher ratings, so let's go to the other three.
Tell me whether or not you agree specifically with the ratings of only limited progress for those three areas: science and technology, human capital management and information technology.
MR. SCHNEIDER: In science and technology, I strongly disagree, and the basis for that is the strategic plan that I referred to in my opening oral statement, and the reason for that is that I have looked at that strategic plan. One of the things that the department was criticized for significantly about two years ago was the lack of a good S&T strategic plan. I would say that we did not have a good plan, we did not have a good structure, we did not have a good process for making science and technology investments as one of the secretary's priorities, which is why he went outside, hired a new undersecretary, they brought in a lot of people, changed the processes around.
I worked very closely with the undersecretary for science and technology -- actually a retired admiral from the Navy who used to work with me, and you might say he actually worked for me. And so what we've done is we actually have instituted a segment of the very basic processes that were used in DOD and the Navy for science and technology investments, which is why we've spent a lot of time making sure that that science and technology plan that we sent to the Hill was in fact what we consider to be an outstanding plan.
If you take a look at the number of the performance expectations that drive from that S&T plan, there are several, so I would say that we strongly disagree with that one.
SEN. COLLINS: If I could just interrupt, that's Admiral Cohen who was brought in, and I too think he's made a real difference in that area. I think it was very weak until he was brought in, but I think he's making a real difference.
MR. SCHNEIDER: We are -- this is not, you know, most plans are living plans, if they're good plans. This is a living plan. We changed the number of mission areas that we invest in, we increased it based on the changing threat. There's handshake agreements between the operational customers and those that are managing the science and technology so that if the science and technology is executed it reaches a certain point in time, there's an agreement by the operator that they will in fact use it, and that basically is a handshake budget agreement, which means they will fund it.
And so he has instituted -- and the department has instituted -- what I consider to be some very rigorous and disciplined processes to ensure that we get a pretty good return on the investment for the S&T, and our plan reflects that.
In the area of --
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. Please go on to the other two --
MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes. In the area of human capital, we do not take exception to that. That is one of the weak areas that we have. I don't remember if we contested any of those off the top of my head, but the fact of the matter is in the management areas -- in fact, I would say in the management areas generally -- and I use this term with the comptroller general when I went and met with him a couple weeks ago -- I almost think we've reached an equilibrium of understanding, and reason is we know what they look for in the management areas, be it acquisition, financial systems, internal controls and the like, and the fact is we either produce it -- objective quality evidence or we don't.
So we have very few -- probably, I would say, for the most part -- disagreements in the management area, so we wouldn't contest that.
In the IT area, that one -- we had a couple of issues. Most specific -- and I think three associated with the enterprise architecture, and so we would -- in my -- (inaudible) -- letter, which addressed some of these, we talk about the fact that we have an enterprise architecture, it's an approved enterprise architecture, it's being executed. We get high marks from OMB on the architecture, and I think that's attributed -- relates to I think several of those performance expectations in the IT area. So we have some disagreement on that.
I want to go back to the preparedness thing, which you covered. That is our biggest exception.
Roughly 25 pages -- 25 percent of the total pages in my letter to the comptroller general takes issue across the board with the preparation of performance expectations, and it's all-encompassing. It talks about the various levels of response teams, and the fact -- this is where we -- this is where the issue is the grade, not so much the words.
In their assessment, they talk about the various tiers of response teams that we have for local, regional, national disaster- type levels. Yet -- and it talks about the progress we've made but yet it gives us a low score. It talks about the -- there are three performance expectations that talk about interoperable communications. We strongly disagree with the rating on those three, and I think the words -- and I think the GAO's only words that describe our progress relative to implementing SAFECOM, implementing interoperability standards at the local and state level -- we think that their words support our rating.
The other issue is the National Response Plan that I talked about in my statement. We really have a problem with that one, and the reason being is we have a plan; it's being executed. One of the criticisms in the report was the fact that we haven't been able to test it out in a large-scale disaster. Well, it's very hard to simulate a large-scale disaster, and thank God we haven't had one.
One of the other ones we disagree with is emergency assistance.
So we strongly disagree with that particular area more than any other area in the report, and -- so I think I've covered all four.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schneider, I want to focus on the four areas where the GAO really gave the department unsatisfactory ratings -- in other words, found only limited progress, the lowest rating. They are emergency preparedness and response, science and technology, human capital management and information technology management on the chart.
Now, I indicated in my opening statement that I think GAO actually graded the department too low on the emergency preparedness and response area, and that that one deserves at least somewhat higher ratings, so let's go to the other three.
Tell me whether or not you agree specifically with the ratings of only limited progress for those three areas: science and technology, human capital management and information technology.
MR. SCHNEIDER: In science and technology, I strongly disagree, and the basis for that is the strategic plan that I referred to in my opening oral statement, and the reason for that is that I have looked at that strategic plan. One of the things that the department was criticized for significantly about two years ago was the lack of a good S&T strategic plan. I would say that we did not have a good plan, we did not have a good structure, we did not have a good process for making science and technology investments as one of the secretary's priorities, which is why he went outside, hired a new undersecretary, they brought in a lot of people, changed the processes around.
I worked very closely with the undersecretary for science and technology -- actually a retired admiral from the Navy who used to work with me, and you might say he actually worked for me. And so what we've done is we actually have instituted a segment of the very basic processes that were used in DOD and the Navy for science and technology investments, which is why we've spent a lot of time making sure that that science and technology plan that we sent to the Hill was in fact what we consider to be an outstanding plan.
If you take a look at the number of the performance expectations that drive from that S&T plan, there are several, so I would say that we strongly disagree with that one.
SEN. COLLINS: If I could just interrupt, that's Admiral Cohen who was brought in, and I too think he's made a real difference in that area. I think it was very weak until he was brought in, but I think he's making a real difference.
MR. SCHNEIDER: We are -- this is not, you know, most plans are living plans, if they're good plans. This is a living plan. We changed the number of mission areas that we invest in, we increased it based on the changing threat. There's handshake agreements between the operational customers and those that are managing the science and technology so that if the science and technology is executed it reaches a certain point in time, there's an agreement by the operator that they will in fact use it, and that basically is a handshake budget agreement, which means they will fund it.
And so he has instituted -- and the department has instituted -- what I consider to be some very rigorous and disciplined processes to ensure that we get a pretty good return on the investment for the S&T, and our plan reflects that.
In the area of --
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. Please go on to the other two --
MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes. In the area of human capital, we do not take exception to that. That is one of the weak areas that we have. I don't remember if we contested any of those off the top of my head, but the fact of the matter is in the management areas -- in fact, I would say in the management areas generally -- and I use this term with the comptroller general when I went and met with him a couple weeks ago -- I almost think we've reached an equilibrium of understanding, and reason is we know what they look for in the management areas, be it acquisition, financial systems, internal controls and the like, and the fact is we either produce it -- objective quality evidence or we don't.
So we have very few -- probably, I would say, for the most part -- disagreements in the management area, so we wouldn't contest that.
In the IT area, that one -- we had a couple of issues. Most specific -- and I think three associated with the enterprise architecture, and so we would -- in my -- (inaudible) -- letter, which addressed some of these, we talk about the fact that we have an enterprise architecture, it's an approved enterprise architecture, it's being executed. We get high marks from OMB on the architecture, and I think that's attributed -- relates to I think several of those performance expectations in the IT area. So we have some disagreement on that.
I want to go back to the preparedness thing, which you covered. That is our biggest exception.
Roughly 25 pages -- 25 percent of the total pages in my letter to the comptroller general takes issue across the board with the preparation of performance expectations, and it's all-encompassing. It talks about the various levels of response teams, and the fact -- this is where we -- this is where the issue is the grade, not so much the words.
In their assessment, they talk about the various tiers of response teams that we have for local, regional, national disaster- type levels. Yet -- and it talks about the progress we've made but yet it gives us a low score. It talks about the -- there are three performance expectations that talk about interoperable communications. We strongly disagree with the rating on those three, and I think the words -- and I think the GAO's only words that describe our progress relative to implementing SAFECOM, implementing interoperability standards at the local and state level -- we think that their words support our rating.
The other issue is the National Response Plan that I talked about in my statement. We really have a problem with that one, and the reason being is we have a plan; it's being executed. One of the criticisms in the report was the fact that we haven't been able to test it out in a large-scale disaster. Well, it's very hard to simulate a large-scale disaster, and thank God we haven't had one.
One of the other ones we disagree with is emergency assistance.
So we strongly disagree with that particular area more than any other area in the report, and -- so I think I've covered all four.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walker, when you look at the four areas where DHS has fallen most short, did you see a common pattern in these areas as far as the cause of the difficulties? What I'm interested in in particular is did you identify that the problems were caused by resource shortages, not enough funding, leadership deficiencies, statutory barriers, institutional or cultural problems from legacy agencies? Were there common themes that prevented progress from being made in those four particular areas?
MR. WALKER: Well, first, I think to the extent that leadership at the department makes something a priority, clearly you have a higher likelihood that you're going to see progress there. To the extent that -- and we saw that.
To the extent that there are adequate resources, you know, allocated or more resources allocated, there is some difference. But I think it's not just a matter of how much in resources, it's a matter of the flexibility that one has with those resources. To what extent are they tied, to what extent are they earmarked, to what extent does the department have the ability to allocate those resources based upon value and risk and -- if you will. And so I think that's an issue where one might have adequate resources, but you may not have enough flexibility to allocate those resources based upon value and risk and therefore you're not going to give it as much of a result.
And as I said before, to the extent that Congress has, you know, has paid attention in a constructive way -- (laughs) -- to try to be helpful and acknowledge progress not just point out what's wrong and to figure out whether or not there's enabling legislation that might be necessary such as maritime security, other things, that's been a positive indicator as well.
SEN. COLLINS: Mr. Schneider, there's one area within the port security area that the GAO is very critical of, and I agree with the criticism, and that is that the GAO graded the department as not achieving implementation of a national facility access control system for port secured areas, in other words, the TWIC card.
We have been talking about the Transportation Workers Identification Credential for years -- for years, and we can -- we're never going to achieve the highest level of security at our ports until we come up with a good system of restricting access to our ports. This has been a source of great frustration to me. I've brought it up to the department time and time again, and I was not surprised to see GAO highlight this as an area of deficiency.
Can you explain to us why this many years later after the TWIC program was first envisioned the department continues to miss deadline after deadline and delay the full implementation?
MR. SCHNEIDER: Senator, I can't tell you what happened before January 2007 and what led to all those problems. I can tell you what's happened since January 2007 and the reason being is I've been personally involved in this ever since I came on board.
This is one of those areas where -- you know, I prioritize my time, what I consider to be -- in terms of the acquisition procurement area, what I consider to be the five major areas that I want to spend time on this is one of them.
We had some deficiencies in the execution of the initial contract with TWIC. It was a failure, and so what we did is we went out and we re-solicited the effort. The contractor that's currently performing that effort is Lockheed Martin. And what we did starting in I believe it was late January is set up, if you will, a schedule that I personally oversight every two weeks with a meeting with the program team, and we track everything. And so what I believe is that we are essentially on track to, at least as of my meeting a week ago Friday, to be able to start enrollment and issuing cards early this fall.
And what we've had to work out is software glitches. We've had to work out just the sheer production of the card. There's an awful lot of information on that card. I won't bore you with the details of bar coding and 1D-type barcodes and how you have to upgrade printers and how you have to get the card printer -- the printer -- the software to actually trigger the printer.
We've had issues relative to be able to -- somebody punch in an applicant, fill out the form on the computer screen, go through what they call a screening gateway to basically get all the checks back, if you will, so you can get a go on issuing him the card.
We believe the end-to-end test is actually completing literally as we speak. We're going to review the results of that in the meeting that I'm chairing tomorrow. And we also are going to be discussing the detailed rollout plans for -- I'm talking about the number of sites that will be used for people -- applicants come on board. We've also drafted the draft rule that would implement that. We worked with the Coast Guard and the rule-making people.
So I can tell you that since January this has been micromanaged between myself and the deputy secretary and the head of the Transportation Security Administration. So we are going to wait, frankly, until after this rather comprehensive review tomorrow afternoon and then if we think the situation is a go for -- then we will publish the dates for initial enrollment at the first two sites.
So I can tell you, having read some of the -- doing the postmortem back in January when I came on board that we -- there were a lot of false starts. There was a lot of poor work done on the initial contract. I think they've marshaled the forces with the team that is -- frankly, we're executing the plan by and large that we put together in January, and we may be off by a week or so. So I hope to be able to tell the secretary next week that we are on track. I had briefed him about a week ago on where this was with the team, so I'm hopeful that we've turned this thing around.
SEN. COLLINS: I certainly hope so too, and I hope you'll keep us informed. Thank you.