Implementing Recommendations Of The 9/11 Commission Act Of 2007

Floor Speech

IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION ACT OF 2007 -- (Senate - July 26, 2007)

Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, after the terrible attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress moved to strengthen America. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security, and Senator Lieberman and I led a bipartisan effort to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission--reforming our intelligence community, creating a Director of National Intelligence, and establishing the National Counterterrorism Center. We have also passed legislation to strengthen security at America's seaports and chemical facilities and to reform FEMA.

These were great advances in protecting our country. But as the recently released National Intelligence Estimate noted, the United States faces a ``persistent and evolving terrorist threat.'' Foremost among those threats is al-Qaida, which continues to plot attacks against us. We also face a growing threat of homegrown terrorism--violent radicals inspired by al-Qaida's perversion of the Islamic faith, but with no operational connection to foreign terrorist networks.

These real and evolving threats mean that we cannot stop improving our existing security arrangements, or ignore needs and opportunities to adopt new measures. Congress has, in fact, already enacted most of the 9/11 Commission recommendations, but our security must continually improve to meet the advances of our enemies.

The conference report that we consider today builds on our prior work, offering important enhancements to our homeland security.

Notably, the conference report will protect concerned citizens from civil liability when they make good-faith reports of suspicious activity that could threaten our transportation system. This provision, based on legislation that I coauthored with Senators Lieberman and Kyl, also wisely protects security officials who take reasonable steps to respond to reports of suspicious activity.

Vigilant citizens should not have to worry about being dragged into court, hiring defense attorneys, and incurring big legal bills, because they did their civic duty by reporting a

possible threat. The bill's protective language reinforces the important message that New York transit passengers see every day: ``If you see something, say something.'' And with TSA recently reporting possible ``dry run'' efforts to pass simulated bomb components through airport security, it is more urgent than ever that we remove any deterrents to citizens making their concerns known to authorities.

Another important aspect of the bill is its creation of a sensible formula for homeland security grant programs. We know two critical things about the prevention of, and response to, terrorist attacks: one, the attacks can be planned and executed anywhere and two, State and local agencies are likely to be the first and most urgently needed responders.

The compromise reached on minimum levels of grant funding will help ensure a strong baseline of capabilities across the Nation, helping to prevent the next terrorist attack before it occurs. Terror plots can emerge from any location. Planning, training, and logistics for these attacks often occur far from the location of the terrorists' final target and, in some cases, are preceded by other local criminal activities. And, as the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on this threat assessed:

The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt plots. It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.

Much of the work to prevent homegrown terror plots--like the thwarted attempt to attack Fort Dix, NJ will occur at the State and local level. This legislation ensures adequate funding for prevention efforts in all our States.

Effective response, of course, requires that emergency workers and officials be able to talk with one another. The Senate Homeland Security Committee's investigation into the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe revealed many instances of tragic failures to deliver timely assistance to victims simply because communications systems were damaged or

not interoperable. State and local governments recognize the problem. That is why DHS receives more requests for funding to upgrade and purchase emergency communications equipment and systems under the State Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security Initiative than for any other purpose.

We should, therefore, take special notice of this bill's provision for a dedicated grant program at the Department of Homeland Security to enhance emergency communications interoperability. With an authorization of $2 billion over 5 years, this critical program will fund development of a robust, national emergency communications network to assist emergency personnel whether they are responding to a terrorist attack, a tornado, a flood, an earthquake, or an ice storm.

The conference report also contains important provisions that will strengthen the intelligence functions at the Department of Homeland Security and will improve the sharing of information related to homeland security threats among Federal, State, local, and tribal officials.

Senator Lieberman and I helped establish the Information Sharing Environment in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. This program is an essential element in promoting homeland security information sharing across the Federal Government and with our State and local partners. The conference report makes important improvements to the Information Sharing Environment--extending the tenure of the program manager, enhancing his authority to further develop and coordinate information-sharing efforts governmentwide, and providing additional guidance concerning the operation of the ISE.

The conference report will improve the operations of the intelligence components of the Department of Homeland Security. Through the creation of an Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis charged with strategic oversight of the intelligence components of the Department, the bill will improve the coordination of the Department's intelligence activities.

Whether homeland security information or national intelligence is collected by Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Transportation Security Administration, or the Coast Guard, this information

must be efficiently and effectively identified, processed, analyzed, and disseminated. The conference report charges the Under Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis with responsibilities for improving the sharing of information, training Department employees to recognize the intelligence value of the information they receive every day, and providing important budget guidance to the intelligence components of the Department.

The legislation will also improve the Department's ability to provide useful information to State and local officials and provide feedback on the value of the information they share with the Department.

It is important to recognize the tremendous effort and good work that has already gone into establishing fusion centers across the country. State governments, in particular, are devoting considerable resources to establishing fusion centers. I believe this demonstrates the value government entities and the private sector place on establishing mechanisms to integrate information and intelligence to protect against all kinds of threats.

The legislation establishes a DHS State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative whereby DHS will make available federal intelligence officers and analysts to assist the work of fusion centers. It also directs the Secretary of DHS to establish guidelines for fusion centers that seek Federal funding.

These guidelines are not meant to step on State toes, but to ensure that a fusion center has a clear mission statement and goals, incorporates performance measures, adheres to a privacy and civil liberties policy, ensures that all personnel receive training on privacy and civil liberties, has in place appropriate security measures, and provides usable intelligence products to its stakeholders.

Most fusion centers are established and operated by States. However, if federal funding is going to support these centers, we should ensure that they are operated in a responsible manner and in a way that ensures efficient information exchange with the Federal Government and with other fusion centers.

The bill also encourages deeper cooperation with State and local officials, by authorizing exchange programs that will send Federal intelligence analysts to state and local fusion centers, and by bringing the expertise of state and local officials to DHS and the National Counterterrorism Center.

Transportation security is another area that will be strengthened under the terms of this bill. Last year's SAFE Port Act made significant improvements to maritime security. This conference report bolsters the security of other transportation modes, including aviation, railroads, and mass transit. For example, the bill requires electronic screening of information on l00 percent of air cargo loaded on passenger planes through a known-shipper program. It also authorizes more than $1 billion annual funding for rail and mass transit grants.

The bill also enhances security in the Visa Waiver Program. It restricts expansion of the program until DHS can effectively track entries and exits from our country. And it encourages foreign governments' cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and information-sharing initiatives, including timely reporting of lost and stolen passports.

I finally note two other important sections of the conference report.

First, the legislation recognizes that security enhancements should not come at the expense of our rights to privacy or our civil liberties. The legislation enhances the authority of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board and mandates important privacy and civil liberties training for officials working at fusion centers.

Second, the conference report will establish an international science and technology R&D program with our allies in the global war on terror, providing money for joint homeland security ventures and facilitating technology transfers.

All of the provisions I have mentioned are worthy additions within the letter or spirit of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. I continue, however, to have considerable concerns about other portions of the conference report.

Above all, I am disappointed that the House amendment mandating scanning of l00 percent of maritime containers was adopted by the conference committee, overturning the risk-based, layered security system enacted just last year as part of the SAFE Port Act. Based on current technology, this proposal is not practical because of the huge volume--11 million containers per year--coming into our seaports. It will divert resources from the focus on high-risk cargo and will likely cause considerable backlogs at our ports, disrupting trade and posing problems for businesses relying on just-in-time inventories.

My reservations on that point prevented me from signing the conference report.

While the proposed report makes important improvements to our national preparedness, I fear that its language on private-sector preparedness could short-circuit the progress that DHS and the private sector have already made in the recent release of all 17 sector-specific plans under the National Infrastructure Protection Program. I also believe that, at this time, Congress has insufficient data to warrant mandating a new private-sector preparedness certification program.

Now that the conference report has reached the floor of the Senate, however, I must weigh my concerns with this legislation against the benefits that it undoubtedly offers. Because I believe the net benefits to our homeland security are substantial, I

intend to support final passage of the conference report.

I close by offering my congratulations and appreciation to Senator LIEBERMAN for his efforts to advance this legislation.

I also thank my staff who worked so hard on this legislation: Brandon Milhorn, Andy Weis, Rob Strayer, Amy Hall, Jane Alonso, Asha Mathew, Kate Alford, Melvin Albritton, John Grant, Amanda Wood, Mark LeDuc, Steve Midas, Leah Nash, Patrick Hughes, Jen Tarr, Clark Irwin, Emily Meeks, Douglas Campbell, and Neil Cutter.

Mr. President, I congratulate Senator Lieberman on his outstanding leadership on this bill. This was truly a bipartisan effort in a Congress that has seen precious few bipartisan bills taken to completion. I join him in thanking our staffs on both sides of the aisle. They worked extremely hard. This was a very difficult bill because it involved many different issues, complex issues, and also jurisdictions that overlapped various committees, and that always is difficult in the Senate to resolve.

I do want to touch again on three points. First, this bill builds upon legislation that Senator Lieberman and I authored in 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act. This bill implemented the vast majority of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. It created, for example, the Director of National Intelligence. It established the National Counterterrorism Center. It set forth standards for information sharing. That legislation has made a real difference. In fact, last summer when the plot which was hatched in Great Britain against our airliners was thwarted, Secretary Chertoff told me he believed the reforms we put into place through the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 helped connect the dots, and information was shared with our allies and helped lead to the detection and the thwarting of that plot. So that made a difference.

Nevertheless, there were some areas where we hadn't finished the job, and this bill will help take us further down the road.

I want to highlight a second point, and this is the provision that is in this bill that I think is absolutely critical and will help to increase the safety of our country.

A recently released National Intelligence Estimate noted that the United States continues to face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat, and foremost among these threats is, of course, al-Qaida which continues to plot attacks against us.

We also face a growing threat of homegrown terrorism, violent radicals inspired by al-Qaida but not necessarily linked directly to al-Qaida. These real and evolving threats mean we cannot stop improving our existing security arrangements or ignore needs and opportunities to adopt new measures.

Most notably, this conference report will protect concerned citizens from civil liability when they in good faith report suspicious activity to the authorities. This provision, which is based on legislation that I coauthored with Senators LIEBERMAN and KYL, also wisely protects security officials who take reasonable steps to respond to reports of suspicious activity.

Vigilant citizens should not have to worry that if in good faith they report suspicious activity that may indicate a terrorist threat, the result is going to be they are dragged into court, have to hire defense attorneys, incur big legal bills, just because they did what we would want them to do. The New York subway has signs saying: ``See something, say something.'' And with TSA recently reporting possible dry run efforts to pass simulated bomb components through airport security, it is more urgent than ever that we remove any deterrence to citizens making their concerns known to authorities. I think these are very important provisions in this bill.

Finally, let me comment on one provision in this bill that is of great disappointment to me. I am very disappointed that the final version of this bill mandates scanning of 100 percent of maritime containers. That overturns the risk-based, layered security system enacted just last year as part of the SAFE Port Act. Based on current technology, this proposal is simply not practical because of the huge volume, some 11 million containers per year, coming into our seaports. It will divert resources from the focus on high-risk cargo, and it will likely cause considerable backlogs at our ports, disrupting trade, and posing problems for businesses that rely on just-in-time inventories.

My reservations about these provisions prevented me from signing the conference report. But on balance, this is a very good bill. It contains a lot of provisions that I think will improve our homeland security and, in the end, I am pleased to vote for it, and I am delighted with the strong vote for its passage tonight.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oklahoma.

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