RAIL AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT OF 2007
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Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I'd like to congratulate my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for producing bipartisan legislation to address the security weaknesses in our rail and mass transit systems and to ensure that strong whistleblower protections are provided to our front-line rail and mass transit security workers.
One area that has been largely overlooked since September 11th is the security associated with shipments of extremely hazardous materials on the roads and railways of our country.
Every day tank cars pass through our urban centers carrying enough chlorine to kill 100,000 people in half an hour. Some of these shipments must travel the routes they are currently using. But others could easily be safely re-routed to avoid population centers and other sensitive areas.
We already know that these chemicals are attractive terrorist targets. Just a few weeks ago, several deadly attacks in Iraq involved improvised explosive devices that included canisters of deadly chlorine gas, and a planned attack involving a truck full of chlorine was foiled this past weekend.
The risk is not just an overseas risk either. Several years ago, an Ohio-based al Qaeda operative was arrested and pled guilty for plotting to collapse a bridge in New York City or derail a train in DC.
Earlier this year, reporter Carl Prine at the Pittsburgh Tribune wrote a scathing expose on the state of rail insecurity in our country. He was able to walk right into rail yards with tanker cars containing some of the deadliest chemicals on earth. No one stopped him--he had no problem getting his hands on these deadly chemical tanks.
We're lucky that--this time--it was a journalist and not a jihadist who penetrated these rail yards.
Whether it's an accident or an al Qaeda attack, we need to make the shipments of deadly chemicals more secure.
The language in this bill that I authored and that was agreed to on a bipartisan basis builds upon the recent Notices of Proposed Rulemaking issued by the Department of Transportation and the TSA.
It requires rail carriers to analyze the routes and storage facilities for security sensitive materials as part of the security plans that they must submit for approval to the Department of Homeland Security. Then it requires the rail carriers to select the route and storage facilities that best reduce the risk and consequences of a terrorist attack on a shipment of these materials as they travel through or near high threat urban areas and other areas that DHS thinks need special security protections.
The language in this bill doesn't apply to all hazardous materials--just the ones that pose the greatest threat, such as chlorine or propane. Most assessments put this at less than 1 percent of all shipments.
This bill also doesn't require re-routing to occur if there is no practical alternative route. Rail carriers will only be required to re-route when a more secure route is available.
I urge my colleagues to join me in this bi-partisan effort. Now is the time to upgrade the security for these toxic shipments so none of our constituents are ever exposed to a catastrophic chemical release simply because we failed to take these simple steps.
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