Improving America's Security Act of 2007

Improving America's Security Act of 2007 -- (Senate - March 02, 2007)

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Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, this amendment will expand and improve the Proliferation Security Initiative in the national security interest of the United States. The Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, is now 4 years old. It is a program whereby the United States is working with 80 allied countries to jointly interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction-related materials in a timely manner when critical intelligence is received about imminent transfers of weapons of mass destruction.

The PSI is based on voluntary cooperation by participating countries and relies on the ability to react quickly to time-sensitive intelligence on the movement of weapons of mass destruction material. According to the Department of State, the Proliferation Security Initiative was critical in uncovering Libya's weapons of mass destruction program in the AQ Khan proliferation network in 2003. PSI halted more than two dozen weapons of mass destruction-related transfers from 2005 to 2006. PSI has improved the capabilities of our partnering countries to take coordinated action to interdict proliferation-related shipments.

The House-passed version of this legislation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations bill, or H.R. 1, significantly changes the Proliferation Security Initiative in two key ways: First, the House would surrender the Proliferation Security Initiative to the U.N., a multilateral bureaucracy. Second, the House wants to give countries such as Russia and China veto power on U.S. national security by subjecting the Proliferation Security Initiative to U.N. Security Council approval. This is the wrong direction to take for a key U.S. tool in fighting the war on terror.

For the Proliferation Security Initiative to be successful and intervene in time to stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction, there must be a rapid-response capability and flexibility to respond to intelligence information. H.R. 1, the House-passed version of this legislation, would place the Proliferation Security Initiative in a regulatory and inflexible straitjacket overseen by an international bureaucracy.

When we receive intelligence that al-Qaida is shipping material for a nuclear bomb through the waters of one of our allies, that intelligence demands immediate action, not deliberation and redtape. By removing the Proliferation Security Initiative from the safety and discretion of unique and bilateral relationships, the House-passed bill will likely reduce the willingness of other countries to cooperate, especially countries where cooperation could produce domestic political problems.

The Proliferation Security Initiative is an effective means to help our allies use their own legal authorities to implement their commitments under existing multilateral nonproliferation regimes that include the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group. In addition, the State Department believes that PSI cooperation is an effective way to implement countries' commitments to U.N. Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1718 on North Korea and Resolution 1737 on Iran. Turning the PSI into yet another multilateral regime would not only be unnecessary but would also be a hindrance to effective nonproliferation.

H.R. 1, the House-passed bill, by creating a multilateral regime for PSI, would limit our ability to share intelligence on proliferation-related shipments because it would subject sensitive U.S. intelligence sources and methods to broad international disclosure. This disclosure of sensitive and, at times, classified intelligence would expose our sources, covert agents, and methods to our enemies, including the very weapons of mass destruction traffickers we seek to shut down.

H.R. 1 would require annual GAO reports on Proliferation Security Initiative activities even though there are already several other reports currently required on nonproliferation matters that are sent to Congress, including reports that discuss PSI-related activities, such as the ``Periodic Report to Congress on the National Emergency Regarding Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.' Adding another hoop for PSI to jump through would be counterproductive, and annual reports on PSI may even expose PSI's methodologies to proliferators.

The House-passed bill is also flawed because it would require the President to seek authorization from the U.N. Security Council for PSI. H.R. 1 implies that international law written by the U.N. Security Council is required to authorize U.S. measures to protect itself and the world from the proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Security Council members should not be given a veto over what a bilateral national security program can and cannot do. As it is, China has refused to endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative, probably because Chinese traffickers are likely targets for PSI. We have already seen China wielding its veto power to undermine and delay U.S. national security priorities. Because of their objections, it took months of extra deliberations for the Security Council to finally confront the leading state sponsor of terror, probably the world's greatest proliferation challenge--Iran. Granting the U.N. Security Council an intrusive role in our national security activities would compromise highly sensitive intelligence.

PSI activities already are legal. All activities are undertaken in full compliance with international law. PSI already cooperates well in its existing form with the United Nations and other international organizations. In 2005, the U.N. Secretary General applauded the efforts of the Proliferation Security Initiative to fill a gap in our defenses. PSI has also won European Union and G8 endorsement. Why would our Democratic friends in the House want to change a program so highly regarded by our European friends?

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.N. has a failing grade when it comes to effectively fighting the war on terror. The U.N. has failed to establish a comprehensive definition for terrorism. The U.N. has failed to fulfill its September 2005 commitment of the Summit of World Leaders to establish a comprehensive convention against terrorism. The U.N. Counter-Terrorism Committee has failed to identify terrorist groups and states.

Finally, the U.N. has failed to prohibit state sponsors of terror from running for seats on or chairing any U.N. body, such as the Human Rights Council or the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In fact, in April of 2006, the leading weapons proliferator and state sponsor of terror, Iran, served as vice chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

The U.N. has failed to prohibit giving U.N. credentials to nongovernmental organizations that condone or promote terrorism or terrorist groups.

H.R. 1, the House-passed version of the 9/11 Commission recommendations, the legislation we are considering currently in the Senate, returns us to the failed policy of the previous decade where the preference was for unenforced multilateral regimes instead of effective U.S. programs. H.R. 1 would be a step backward toward policies that left the United States vulnerable to terrorist attacks on 9/11. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment to maintain the integrity of the Proliferation Security Initiative and to help keep our Nation secure.

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