Expressing The Sense Of Congress On Iraq--Motion To Proceed

EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IRAQ--MOTION TO PROCEED -- (Senate - February 05, 2007)

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, I commend Senator Warner, Senator Nelson, Senator Levin and others who have worked so hard on this resolution. I do believe, like my colleagues, that this measure and an alternative measure deserve an up-or-down vote by the Senate. That is what the American people want, and that is what they should receive.

We embarked on this effort in Iraq more than 4 years ago. From the very beginning I thought this was not a response to an imminent threat to the United States or even to the region. It was based upon highly speculative and, it turns out in many cases, flat wrong intelligence. It represents, in my view, a flawed strategy because the approach the President has taken in Iraq fails to recognize that the major regional threat was not Iraq but Iran and failed to recognize the huge amounts of resources that will be necessary to successfully occupy and stabilize a country the size of Iraq with the cultural and historical issues that are inherent in that country.

The strategy, as I said, I think was flawed. Strategy, to me, means having a clear objective and putting forth the resources necessary to achieve that objective. The objective in Iraq shifted from the WMD allegations, to terrorist connections allegations, to creating a transformative oasis of democracy and free enterprise in a country that has not seen that in many years. And the resources were never adequate for the task.

One of the most important resources in a strategy is public support. I think one of the major problems with the President's last address a few days ago when he talked about Iraq and his so-called new strategy is that, I believe, he squandered significantly the willingness of the American public to support any proposal made. Without that public support, it will be very difficult to sustain our activities in Iraq.

I think the proof of this failed strategy is evident. Today Iran is in an enhanced strategic position vis-a-vis the United States and is being much more difficult to deal with, with respect to the region and to its aspirations of nuclear technology. We have compromised our efforts in Afghanistan and in Pakistan where real significant threats exist to the world and to the United States. We have diverted our attention from North Korea and from the Iranian aspirations for nuclear technology.

According to many experts such as Hank Crumpton, who is leaving as the Assistant Secretary of State for Counterterrorism:

We have made it more likely this country will be struck by terrorists, not less likely.

Of course, we can talk at length about the incompetent execution of these policies in Iraq, but I want to go right to the heart of what the President is talking about. He suggests that we have a changed strategy. I would suggest that perhaps we are changing our tactics; we are taking American units and putting them in the heart of Baghdad. But it seems that this surge is more of the same, more of the clear hold and build, more of involvement in the existing conflicts of the Iraqi people and not essential to our national security, which would be to protect ourselves from terrorists there, to stabilize the country so it doesn't disintegrate, and also to go ahead and to train, continually train the Iraqi security forces.

Many have criticized this surge on purely military grounds. Too few troops. The doctrine calls for more than 120,000 troops to cover the city of Baghdad. We will be lucky to muster 50,000 to 60,000 to 70,000. Including Iraqi security forces.

There is a lack of unity of command. There is uncertain leadership by the Iraqis. Their commanding general is a virtual unknown who has been plucked by Maliki to lead this effort, probably more for political reliability than for tactical skill. And the rolling start, the gradual buildup has already led many Iraqis in Baghdad to suggest that our efforts have further compromised their security, as evidenced by the bombing just a few days ago of a marketplace in a Shia neighborhood in Baghdad.

The strategy we have to pursue is a complementary and reinforcing strategy involving military, political, and economic steps, together with regional and international diplomacy. It rests fundamentally on the capacity of Iraq and non-DOD, nonuniform military advisers to carry the day. Frankly, the Iraqi Government is in too many cases dysfunctional and incompetent, and elements outside of our uniformed military personnel--our State Department officials, our Agriculture officials, our Justice officials, our AID officials--have not been in Iraq in sufficient numbers and in sufficient quality to deal decisively with these issues. There is nothing in this plan which suggests that situation will change.

I think we are also at a point where we have been informed by the National Intelligence Estimate of the true nature of the struggle in Iraq. It is a sectarian battle between Shia and Sunni, with insurgents who, according to the NIE, accelerate the violence between these two sectarian groups. It is an existential battle where the Shias feel insecure because they have labored for many years under the yoke of the Saddam Hussein regime, and they don't want to go back there. It is existential from the Sunni position because they see themselves entitled to rule.

I think our best course is outlined in the Warner resolution, clearly stating our disapproval and disagreement with the augmentation as the resolution describes, and focusing ourselves on reconciliation, on both military efforts, but scaled back, and also concentrating on diplomacy and economic activities. I would hope that at least we could get a vote on it and, frankly, I think it will pass.

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