Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2007

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND VETERANS AFFAIRS AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2007 -- (Senate - November 14, 2006)

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Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, this amendment, which the Senator from Wisconsin and I have offered, would ensure continuing vigorous, aggressive oversight of American tax dollars in Iraq by repealing the premature termination date for the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. This office will be prematurely terminated by provisions that were recently enacted as part of the conference report on the Defense authorization bill. Our amendment will restore the special IG's termination date to its previous schedule of 10 months after 80 percent of the funds for the Iraqi reconstruction projects have been expended.

The special IG has been very effective, and the important work of this watchdog must continue as long as American funds are being used for Iraq reconstruction. We should not terminate this mandate to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse by some arbitrary and premature date. In fact, it is inconceivable to me that we would terminate this office which has played such a vital role in spotlighting waste, fraud, and abuse and has more than proven its worth.

The Office of the Special Inspector General has saved the American taxpayers literally millions of dollars. In fact, when one looks at the combined impact of the audits, the investigations, the cost avoidances, and other savings, the potential financial impact of this office has been nearly $2 billion. Yet the office has cost the American taxpayers only $73 million since it was created. So $2 billion in savings, in cost avoidances, versus a cost of only $73 million. This means that for every dollar the special inspector general has spent, there has been a financial impact of $25--an impressive ratio.

There is no question that the inspector general's office has been extremely effective. Its work has led to convictions, to indictments, to the recovery of funds, and to improvement in contracting. It was the inspector general who told us about cost overruns on contracts--Halliburton contracts, for example. It was the inspector general who highlighted shoddy construction of health clinics, of a special police station. It was the inspector general who made recommendations that have improved contracting oversight and procedures in Iraq.

We are talking about billions and billions of dollars. It makes absolutely no sense at all for this office, which has been such an effective watchdog, to be brought to a premature end.

Some people say: Why can't you just have the regular IG from the Department of Defense or the Department of State or USAID undertake this work? I think in many ways the question answers itself. There are many departments and agencies that are involved in the Iraqi reconstruction projects. We need to have a special IG who has the authority to follow the money no matter from what agency or department it originated. Also, the special IG has proven its worth time and again. The special IG is in Iraq even as we speak and has had a team on the ground in harm's way. Also, the DOD IG's office has not had a team on the ground in Iraq auditing, inspecting, and investigating on an ongoing basis.

I am very pleased to join with the Senator from Wisconsin who has been such a leader in this area, who originated the idea of having a special inspector general in the first place, and I was very pleased to partner with him in that effort years ago.

Let's correct this mistake right off so that the office doesn't have to start shutting down its operations in anticipation of the termination date next October. We can remedy this mistake right now, and we should do so.

I thank the Chair.

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