STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS -- (Senate - November 13, 2006)
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, today Senator Feingold and I are introducing the Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act of 2006. This bipartisan legislation, is co-sponsored by Senators Lieberman, Leahy, Coleman, Cantwell, Salazar, Kerry and Coburn, has a single purpose: to ensure continuing, vigorous oversight of American tax dollars in Iraq by repealing the premature termination date for the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).
This legislation would restore SIGIR's termination date to its previous schedule of 10 months after 80 percent of Iraq reconstruction funds have been expended. It would repeal conference language in the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill that would close SIGIR on October 1, 2007, and transfer oversight to the Inspectors General of the Departments of State, Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Departmental and agency Inspectors General perform an important service with dedication and expertise. However, those offices are configured to provide audits, inspections, and investigations of continuing government operations. The traditional approach of IG oversight--extensive inquiries, lengthy preparation and delivery of reports, recommendations for corrective action--is thorough. But it also is time-consuming and can allow wasteful or fraudulent practices to continue for some time.
Iraq reconstruction is a unique situation, with enormous amounts of money being spent in a relatively short period of time on a specific range of programs and operations. A number of agencies across the federal government are active in Iraq reconstruction, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice and others. Reconstruction managers, and ultimately the taxpayers, do not have the luxury of waiting months to receive recommendations to correct wasteful or fraudulent practices. Oversight of Iraq reconstruction requires that the Inspector General be able to cross departmental boundaries and deliver the results of his work quickly and efficiently.
Effective oversight of Iraq reconstruction requires the unique approach provided by the SIGIR. Special Inspector General Stuart Bowen described this approach in testimony before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in a hearing on August 2. SIGIR's auditors and inspectors provide on-the-spot guidance to managers as soon as problems are discovered, so corrective action can begin
immediately. This ``real time'' method allows most of his reports to document not only how problems were detected, but also how they were corrected.
This method works. It should continue as long as American funds are being used for Iraq reconstruction, not terminate on some arbitrary and premature date. As of October 30, 2006, SIGIR estimates that the financial impact of its audit operations is $441 billion, its investigative operations is $20 million and its inspection operations is $1.44 billion. It has achieved these results while costing the taxpayer $72 million. This means that for every dollar SIGIR has spent there has been a financial impact of $25 dollars, a very impressive ratio. SIGIR has also opened 256 cases thus far, and has either referred for prosecution or cleared 164. SIGIR has an impressive record. The Office has 92 open cases, with 25 of them at the Department of Justice. SIGIR has issued 73 audit reports and 65 project assessments. Its work has led to the arrests of five people, and the convictions of four, with more than $17 million in assets seized. During the current quarter, SIGIR investigators opened 20 new cases and closed 10.
There is no question that SIGIR has proven itself to be a much-needed watchdog, auditing reconstruction contracts in Iraq and spotlighting numerous cases of waste, fraud and abuse. We must keep this watchdog on the job.
In addition, SIGIR has taken on a mission that will benefit our nation long after the Iraq reconstruction efforts conclude. Through its Lessons Learned Initiative, the experience gained in Iraq--and the methods developed to track, evaluate, and correct programs--will provide critical guidance to managers and policymakers in the future. The efficient and speedy SIGIR approach would have helped the initial urgent stages of Katrina recovery immeasurably, and it will be invaluable in the aftermath of new disasters to come.
SIGIR has performed admirably in the most difficult of circumstances. Mr. Bowen and his exemplary staff have put themselves in harm's way numerous times. This incredible dedication is reflected in their work, which provides a high degree of oversight and accountability that is essential for Iraq reconstruction to succeed, and it is creating a template for success in the challenges that lie ahead. I urge my colleagues to support the Iraq Reconstruction Accountability Act. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.
http://thomas.loc.gov/