Iraq

IRAQ -- (House of Representatives - July 12, 2006)

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak out of order.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Speaker, lately it seems that the national debate over the next move in Iraq has become bogged down in a way that really reflects the military struggle itself. The administration has dug in, believing that simply staying the course, we can simply outlast the military insurgency.

Conversely, there are some in my party who, angered understandably by war under false pretenses, are seeking a pell-mell evacuation complete with a publicly announced evacuation date, which I think makes the withdrawal of 136,000 troops more dangerous and more difficult.

But, Mr. Speaker, drawing upon the lessons of history, I would like to propose a third way: creating a mechanism to more effectively empower the new elected Iraqi Government, which will allow for a gradual but permanent U.S. troop reduction.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to take a moment to talk about a process that we went through in my office after five visits to Iraq to try to find a model that would allow us to shift the governmental operations in Iraq away from the U.S. military and to their new government. And the example that we came up with, that has been used by this government in the past, is actually the model that was developed during the Second World War.

In 1944, after driving Japanese forces from the Philippines with the help of the Filipino resistance, the United States military, like today in Iraq, found itself in complete control of the Philippines, over 7,000 islands. It found itself in complete control of the basic services that government would provide in the Philippines. And because of the recent occupation by Japanese forces, there was no incumbent government in the Philippines that could take the responsibilities for these government operations.

So, by default, the U.S. military took over these government operations; and while U.S. policy at the time strongly supported Filipino independence, the military had no choice but to temporarily exercise control under the fragile circumstances.

Clearly, that situation could not endure indefinitely. And what Congress did next, in 1944, under the tutelage of John W. McCormack and the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, and later the Truman administration supported, was instructive and I think worth repeating.

In 1944, this Congress passed and the President signed the Filipino Rehabilitation Act, which created a national commission comprised of three appointees each from the White House, the Senate, and the House, and their mission was to plan and coordinate and oversee the transition of government operations away from the U.S. military and over to the newly forming Filipino government.

Of course, there are certain arguable differences between the situation in the Philippines in 1944 and Iraq in 2006. However, after my five visits to Iraq and dozens of meetings with General George Casey and top generals in his office and in the field, as well as Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, I believe the critical weakness in our current strategy is this persistent inability to empower the new Iraqi Government.

With this in mind, I recently introduced the Iraq Transition Act of 2006, H.R. 5716, drawing from the Philippines model. And I give credit to those in 1944 who devised this. This is not original thought; this is borrowed from their example.

I have proposed the establishment of a national bipartisan commission comprised of appointees, again from the White House, the Senate, and this House, whose specific and targeted purpose would be to help facilitate the orderly, deliberate, and expeditious transition from U.S. military control to Iraqi civilian control of operations of government in Iraq. It is important to remember that the transition to civilian control in Iraq is a political process, and while I have many times witnessed the excellence with which our military has performed in Iraq, I also believe it is a strategic disservice to the military for us to add political reconciliation to the massive burdens of security and reconstruction that they are now shouldering.

Simply put, the newly created Commission on Iraqi Transition would be held directly responsible for working with the military leadership and the Department of State to accomplish the transition to Iraqi civilian control of government operations in Iraq and to regularly report its progress to the Congress, the President, and the American people.

While this approach may not satisfy the ``stay the course'' advocates or those who would prefer to announce a specific date for withdrawal, I believe it offers a responsible and workable plan for two important reasons.

In closing, firstly, this bill introduces a level of direct accountability to the political transition process that does not now exist and has made measuring progress extremely difficult. And secondly and lastly, it has precedent and success to support it and offers the best opportunity for the earliest withdrawal of U.S. forces, while leaving the Iraqi people with the greatest chance for preserving their newly found democracy.

I look forward to working with my colleagues.

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