Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Holds Hearing on FY2004 Defense Authorization: Joint Forces Command

FDCH TRANSCRIPTS
Congressional Hearings
Mar. 14, 2003
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Holds Hearing on FY2004 Defense Authorization: Joint Forces Command

REED:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first say what a privilege it is to serve with you as the ranking member. You and Senator Landrieu have done an extraordinary job over the past several years. You are the first and only chairman of this subcommittee. So when we think of Emerging Threats, we think of Pat Roberts.

(LAUGHTER)

Even before you were on this committee, I thought of emerging threats and Pat Roberts.

(LAUGHTER)

But...

ROBERTS:

I had thought I had reached the place in my personal sun (ph) where I was not an emerging threat, I was just a threat.

(LAUGHTER)

REED:

That's fine. That will be upon us shortly, Mr. Chairman, but it is a pleasure to be with and serve with you. And again, let me commend you, because I think this committee—you did so much to get it going, not only as the first chairperson, but also as the one who saw the need. And I appreciate that and want to thank you for it.

ROBERTS:

Jack, let me just interrupt. Pardon me for interrupting you, and if you would yield, I guess is the proper way to say it.

REED:

Yes, sir, absolutely.

ROBERTS:

But a lot of credit has to go to chairman of the full committee, John Warner, who set up this subcommittee. And this was what, three, four years ago? And a lot of credit has to go to Senator Lieberman and Senator Coates, whose idea it was in the first place. So all we had to do was pick up the plate.

REED:

Well, you deserve a little bit of credit, so you'll get it today. And they rightly deserve it also, and thank you for that point.

Let me also welcome Admiral Giambastiani and Admiral Cebrowski. I had the privilege of getting to know Admiral Giambastiani in his submarine days, and Admiral Cebrowski was distinguished president of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, and in that capacity was a visionary and thoughtful and articulate, not only naval theoretician, but also someone who saw the bigger picture with the whole Defense Department.

I'm glad you're in your present position, Admiral Cebrowski. In fact, I recall last November you were at a conference and you were reported to have said that a lot of discussion in the Pentagon and Congress today about defense is becoming irrelevant, that we should be talking more about sensors (ph) than about the kind of aircraft we're buying and how many. And in that provocative and innovative thinking I hope you'll follow through on in your present position, and maybe even this morning, you might amplify those remarks.

I'm very concerned today as we go forward to look at the evolution of the roles and responsibilities of transformation within the department. I know we have several different organizations that are involved.

REED:

There is a forthcoming transformation planning guidance which I hope will be a road map for a lot of what we do and institutionally in transformations. We have the Office of Force Transformation, the Joint Forces Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the regional combatant commanders, the military services. All of these have to be not just integrated, but really energized to provide real transformation.

And one of the issues that's throughout all of this discussion is just changing cultures, which might be the most difficult thing and difficult challenge that you gentlemen have. We are all, many very much, set in our ways, both here in the Congress and in the Pentagon. And to change the cultures might be the greatest challenge. And you might also discuss some of your thoughts about that this morning.

One of the key issues, obviously, that we're going to be looking at is to ensure that you have adequate resources to do your jobs, and that there are adequate resources within the overall budget so that you can reach out and make the transformation, not just in a rhetorical sense but in a practical sense with new systems and new methods and new approaches to persistent problems.

One of the things that I noted with some dismay was that the technology of the research and development budget in this year's budget has been decreased, I think. And so much of what you are going to be doing is to identify those appropriate projects and hopefully accelerate the deployment with the field forces. But R&D is the key part of what I think you are going to be doing, or at least affecting. And I would be much more enthusiastic if we could get some additional dollars into our R&D budgets across the services.

Well, let me also just say to Admiral Giambastiani, this—you've been in command now for not the longest period of time, so you're sort of present at the creation. And your thoughts would be very much appreciated about the roles you see for JFCOM, and also the resources you think you need at JFCOM.

But I am extremely pleased to be here, and also delighted that we have such competent and dedicated patriots who are doing this important job. And I thank you for that.

I also would—Senator Akaka is here, and I thank you for joining us.

And Senator Clinton very much wanted to be here, but she is at Fort Drum, New York, this morning. The 10th Mountain Division lost a helicopter with several soldiers. And I know General Hagenbeck, the commander. And I know she wanted to be up there with General Hagenbeck and the troops of the 10th Mountain. And she is not here with us because of that reason.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REED:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.

This is a daunting challenge to try to change the operations of the Pentagon, Department of Defense. It seems to me that everyone is looking for the approach, how do you do that? And I don't have an exhaustive list, but typically you recognize or you reallocate budgets or you do a combination of both, so let me take the organizational question first.

The new transformation planning guidance is about to become public. Can you, Admiral Giambastiani, and then Admiral Cebrowski, can you give us a preview of what this new organization will look like under the guidance? Is it just collaborative between these agencies? Is there an agency that's responsible for initiating projects? Is there a hierarchy of approval? Anything along those lines will help us understand what this new organization or at least new arrangement will look like.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REED:

And let me correct that. I should have been more direct at the science and technology programs. And I think you were going to make that corrective. So thank you for that.

But it is an important part of your role, which is the science and technology business, because that's the R&D 15 years from now, when the basic research and science comes up with new developments and then you're in the R&D business. And the concern I have, and I think you would agree with me, is that right now we might be able to afford it, but if we continually deny science and technology funding, it's going to no longer in your world have an impact.

CEBROWSKI:

Right. One of the things that was really debated in the transformation planning guidance was the creation of the Transformation Initiatives Program and the Joint Rapid Acquisition Program, because those are R&D items, but they occur late in the program.

And we had considerable discussions with DDR&E (ph), Dr. Rob Sega (ph), about ensuring we have an appropriate balance between S&T and R&D, and so I know he's quite sensitized to the issue.

REED:

Let me ask you, Admiral, you indicated in—I think your description's a very helpful one about, kind of, what's the underlying premise, and these two agencies get to discuss it before it gets to the secretary. Who decides which two of those entities on a given issue get to play?

CEBROWSKI:

That's in the document, that those issues were resolved before the document went forward to the secretary.

And so it—for example, a program in place on evaluation will support my strategic assessment as it goes forward. The chairman will produce guidance concerning the experimentation program broadly, which Admiral Giambastiani and I will comment on that. So those are the kinds of...

REED:

Going forward, I think—and I suspect you will be sensitive—many times who gets to look at the program determines whether the program survives or fails. And I think if you're sensitive to that going forward, it would be very helpful.

GIAMBASTIANI:

I think one of the things, though, I'd add, Senator Reed, and it's important, is the fact that we can bring up criticism, if you will, critique comments, recommendations, or voices of dissent during this process, which is important.

REED:

Yes, absolutely. Sometimes, the dissent is more important than the concurrence.

Let me just—Mr. Chairman, I'm happy to go for a second round if you'd like to take questions, ask questions now, or whatever you...

ROBERTS:

Oh, I had quite a show planned, why don't you go ahead?

(LAUGHTER)

REED:

Let's turn our attention now. The JROC process: Where does that fit in terms of this new approach towards joint requirements, joint doctrine? I know Admiral Giambastiani, in a slightly different context you responded to Senator Akaka about the requirements, et cetera, et cetera.

My understanding is a lot of that is going to be changed as we move to capability-based approach, et cetera. But just, to stir (ph) the question, how do you see JROC working within now the context of this new transformational guidance.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REED:

Let me change the subject just briefly to Millennium Challenge. There was some criticism at (inaudible) about it being overly scripted and raises a more general issue about the—I think we all would agree, you know, theoretically that you learn more from your mistakes than sometimes you learn from your successes. But in the real world, we're loathed (ph) to make mistakes, at least public mistakes.

But can you comment about the nature of Millennium Challenge, and also to what extent are you going to design experiments that have a significant probability to failure to learn from that?

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REED:

I remember talking at length with General Paul Van Ripper (ph), who is the head of the opposing force, and indicated in rather—how can I describe this—meaningful dialogue...

(LAUGHTER)

... that every time that the opposing force won or was one or two steps ahead of the operation, that they should stop the exercise. That might be a little harsh. I'm just trying to sum that up. I think his name was Sunsu (ph), as I recall, in the exercise.

Would you comment on that, because one of the questions I have is how do you keep the opposing force up to speed with a rapidly changing environment that we are facing? And it doesn't do much good to have an exercise and have the opposing force really figure out what the answer is and quote, "win," if that's the proper term, only to stop the exercise, although I don't know that we're into a credit game where you get a star by your name in regards to, you know, what happens here. Would you care to comment on that?

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REED:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, Admiral Giambastiani. You made reference two a two-page memo. Could you make sure we get a copy of that.

GIAMBASTIANI:

Yes, sir. I'll leave it with you when I leave.

REED:

Thank you very much. Let me follow up on the issue of rapid acquisition funding.

Admiral Giambastiani, you talked about funding within this year's GISCOM (ph) budget.

Admiral Cebrowski, you mentioned both the TIPS (ph) and the JRAP (ph) programs. There are already, as I understand it, other programs to achieve similar program, like ACTDs (ph), a technology transition initiative, and the services rapid acquisition programs. Can you clarify to me how these different funds interacted (ph), who overseas and coordinates these funds?

CEBROWSKI:

I'm (inaudible) to oversee the (inaudible), and the undersecretary of defense for acqusition is meant to oversee the JWRAP (ph).

REED:

And what about these other funds, the ACTDs (ph), the technology transition. Is there a coordination collaboration?

CEBROWSKI:

Those are all under the undersecretary of defense for acquisition. There is of course a profound difference between the JWRAP (ph) and the ACTD (ph). The ACTD (ph) process is multiplied. And even though it is rapid compared to, you know, some of the other...

REED:

A normal acquisition? Right, yes.

CEBROWSKI:

Yes. Is it still quite ponderous. And we need things that can work on the near side of that. And these other programs are going to help with that. Furthermore, they are also meant to focus specifically on joint constituiency as opposed to service.

REED:

Thank you, sir.

Admiral Giambastiani, I'm asuming that JFCOM is one of the potential operational users of the Doppler (ph) Total Information Awareness Suite of data collection and analysis technology. How do you propose making use of this total information awareness program at JFCOM? Or do you?

GIAMBASTIANI:

What we're interested in is, is the technology with regard to how it relates to external sources, if you will, foreign intelligence and the ability to collate, fuse, network and use this in that organization I talked to you before about where we look at knowledge management and also the information piece, how that is fused for astaining joint force headquarters. So this is—we're talking about foreign intelligence external to the United States, but we're very interested in those technologies becuase they have some very powerful capabilities that we would like to leverage off of.

REED:

Could you give me a hypothetical, you know, an example of...

GIAMBASTIANI:

Well, let me give you an example. If, for example, we have a variety of PERMINT (ph) sources, each ELINT (ph) sources, and other words all of these differnt INTs (ph), and how we fuse and put that together is a very key component in allowing our people to have situational awareness this—and so that the customer is the guy who is getting that. That's why when Admiral Cebrowski said before if you, Senator Reed, haven't been down to the Army's Intelligence Command, for example, and visited General Alexander (ph), I commend you to do that. He has done a lot of this very well. And he's interested in it too.

REED:

(OFF-MIKE)

GIAMBASTIANI:

Please.

REED:

I think a good example is one that Senator Roberts pointed out to the (inaudible) scenario. What his explanation or his recounting of that is very dramatic. You have pointed out what the difficulty when you have zero death of battlestations. And what we need is intelligence efforts which will create for us depth of battle space, moving unambiguous warning to the left (inaudible) so I'm not sure it would have saved the Cole.

But now we have a situation in which—basically in the Navy, we insist, no more Coles. And it's that kind of thing where if you'd have had enough advance information, and I think we finally tumbled (ph) to the fact that terrorism is really transnational. Only 6 percent of the information that comes in can be handled now by the analysts.

And so you have to have different platforms like, what is it? TIA, I think I would have named it something else, but maybe we can come up with a new acronym that won't be quite so threatening, I guess, but Total Information Awareness. But I think it's an excellent question, but we have to do this. We have to do this or we will not be able to do the job in the intelligence community that we have to do.